

## editorial

The broader significance and meaning of an electoral process to any democracy is not merely confined to the voting day alone. The actual meaning and significance of an election to a democracy is thus far broader than just voting. It is, in essence, linked in a large measure to pre-election processes including registration and political campaign. It is pretty much connected to the actual voting that defines the choice of leadership by the electorate during election day. It is equally linked to the character or the immediate election aftermath i.e. the acceptance of election results and the extent of political stability that prevails.

This eighth issue of our fortnightly bulletin, *Election Update*, therefore grapples with the critical issues that surround the election outcome and its immediate aftermath. By all indications, the South African election of April 2004, was an important defining moment for the country's decade of democratic governance. The election has unequivocally vindicated observations and analyses that portray the country as destined for a stable democratic dispensation following the founding election of 1994 and the stabilising

election of 1999. Thus, the election outcome of 2004 points to the possibility that South Africa's democratic system is being institutionalised and habitualised. The election and its outcome have entrenched a culture of predictability that is required for the legitimacy of rule in the country. Not only that: the election itself has helped the country to decisively put behind it the culture of yesteryear's violent politics as a means of resolving political disputes and divergent ideological world outlooks. It has instead inculcated a political culture of consensus and accommodation necessary for a fragile democracy under conditions of multi-racialism.

There have been other various interpretations of the election and its aftermath that we may not be able to tease out in detail in this bulletin. However, one of these is worth emphasising here. The election has also confirmed some of our earlier arguments in this *Update* that South Africa's political system or to be more precise, its party system is marked principally by the dominant party system. This in simple terms denotes a situation whereby even under a condition of multipartyism, only one party the ANC (the ruling party) is dominant that opposition parties pose little, if any, political challenge at all.

This outcome therefore, has invalidated earlier projections of some political actors for a two-party system emerging as a by-product of the 2004 election itself. It does seem that the dominant party system is poised to endure for the foreseeable future.

Khabele Matlosa

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## NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

### POST-ELECTION PHASE ELECTION RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION REVIEW

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#### Introduction

For a period of four days between 14 and 17 April 2004 the election and its aftermath was in the balance while the final vote counting and time for objections proceeded. On Saturday, 17 April the IEC declared the final results and announced the allocation of seats in the national and provincial legislatures. Three phenomena dominated this period: good management of the result capturing process within three days, the IFP's objection to the number of section 24A votes cast in KZN and its reference to the Electoral Court, and inconclusive negotiation about a KZN provincial coalition government.

The following discussion is a broad overview of some of the aspects of the post-election phase. The first topic of importance is the voter turn-out.

#### Voter Turnout

South Africans have become used to the idea that in the instances of national and provincial elections voter turnout or the percentage voter participation is

relatively high (1994 - 86.86% and 1999 - 89.30%) while in local government elections they are low (1995 - 48.79% and 2000 - 48.07%).

For the 2004 elections, from a potential of 27.4 million eligible voters, about 20.67 million registered, which amounts to 75.4% of the total. Of these registered voters 76.73% voted in the elections, which are 57.5% of all the eligible voters. Compared to international benchmarks, it is not a low percentage, though the decline between 1999 and 2004 of almost thirteen percentage points is worrisome. International IDEA in Stockholm calculated the voter turnout averages of the elections held since 1945. The following are a few selected comparative indicators (number of elections per state in brackets, followed by the average percentage voter participation in those elections):

Country	Average % voter turnout
Italy (14)	92.5
New Zealand (18)	86.2
Netherlands (15)	84.8
Sweden (17)	83.3
Mauritius (6)	82.8
Germany (13)	80.6
Venezuela (9)	72.2
Japan (21)	69.0
Trinidad & Tobago (11)	66.2
USA (26)	48.3
Mali (2)	21.7

South Africa's percentage is lower than a number of

Western European levels of participation, but still higher than most African and Latin American states, as well as Japan's and the United States'. It is noteworthy that the general assumption about voter apathy in Europe is not confirmed by this summary. Nine of the top twenty voter turnout averages are European, three are Asian, two are Oceanian and six are African. The conventional wisdom that a decline in voter participation is associated with political 'normalisation', is not supported by these statistics.

Several explanations for the lower voter turnout in 2004 can be suggested, though we are not really sure of the exact reasons. Some would argue that the Easter weekend immediately before the election meant that many people were not in their registered voting districts on the day of the election and were also not aware of section 24A. Rain in Limpopo province might have been another contributing factor. Others were apathetic because the ANC was sure of its victory, and therefore many voters have had little motivation to cast their vote. For others, there was no viable alternative for the ANC, because the spectrum of minority parties was too fragmented and sectoral.

The lower voter turnout was a surprise for many election

analysts. A Markinor opinion poll conducted in February 2004 concluded that 87-92 percent of registered voters indicated their intention to vote in the election.

This prediction did not come true. Most of those who indicated that they were unlikely to vote, said that 'my vote will make no difference'. A feature of the election has been the relatively small percentage of spoilt votes: a total of 250 887 or 1.61% of all the votes cast. It emerges as a significant number of votes considered that only six of the 21 parties at national level received more votes. The ACDP received 600 votes less and the NNP 7 000 votes more than the spoilt votes. The number of special votes are even more significant - a total of 651 438 or 4.17% of all the votes. They were votes cast at diplomatic missions outside South Africa, votes by election officials, by the elderly, patients in hospitals, immobile pregnant women, security officials on duty on election day and similar categories of voters - but they do not include the section 24A votes. The highest percentage of special votes were cast in the North West province, followed by Mpumalanga. The lowest percentage were cast in the Western Cape, followed by KZN - a trend repeating the low voter turnout in the provinces.

### Floor-crossing and the Election Results

Prior to the election several opinion polls were published, including those by the HSRC (November 2003), Markinor (November 2003 and February 2004) and Mark Data (March/April 2004).

These polls appear to be relatively accurate in respect of the ANC and to a lesser degree with the DA. In respect of the NNP all of them were off the mark, while in the case of the IFP, Markinor is unreliable, but the HSRC and Mark Data more accurate. Given the fact that the ACDP, UDM, FF+ and ID received within a narrow margin (0.9 - 2.3%) their voter support, even small miscalculations in the polls are therefore significant for them. None of the polls could predict them accurately.

If one compares the 2004 election results with the effect of the floor-crossing in March-April 2003, it appears to be the best barometer (except for the NNP) of the 2004 elections. It is presented in the following table:

Party	Floor crossing 2003	Election 2004	+/-
ANC	68.75	69.68	+0.93
DA	12.0	12.37	+0.37
IFP	7.75	6.97	-0.78
UDM	1.0	2.28	+1.28
ID	0.25	1.73	+1.53
NNP	5.0	1.65	-3.35
ACDP	1.75	1.60	-0.15
FF+	0.80	0.89	+0.09
UCDP	0.78	0.75	-0.03
PAC	0.71	0.73	-0.02
MF	0.25	0.35	+0.10
AZAPO	0.25	0.27	+0.02

The most pertinent observation is the NNP's decline: minus 3.35% since the floor-crossing a year ago. The UDM was most hurt by the floor-crossing in 2003, losing 2.4% of its support. With this election it turned the tide around and gained 1.28% again. The Independent Democrats (ID) is still too young for any conclusions to be meaningful.

Another striking feature is that all the other parties moved up or down within a range of one percentage point, which is remarkably consistent. Though floor-crossing is often discarded opportunism of individuals who are primarily concerned about their political careers, the 2004 results suggest that they reflected the public opinion quite well, and that since April 2003 it remained relatively stagnant, except for the NNP and UDM.

### The Results

The ANC's dominance in South African party politics has been extended with this election. While in 1999 it was one parliamentary seat

short of a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, in this election it reached a point well above that symbolic level. On 15 April 2004 - one day after the election and before all the results were declared - the ANC already issued a preliminary analysis of the results. It concluded that working class and poor areas were showing confidence in the ANC; that its support base has become more diversified, including significant sectors of the middle class; and that opposition parties were 'competing for a shrinking pool of support'. Regarding the NNP's decline, the ANC observed that 'whether this reflects a continuing trend of decline since 1994 or lack of clarity in message is a matter of conjecture. Further analysis is needed on the residue of support it retains, reflecting an acceptance of the message of co-operation with the ANC'.

In respect of the UDM and ID, the ANC is of the opinion that the UDM has entered a phase of decline, losing support in rural Eastern Cape and in the white community. For the ANC, the significance of white support for the UDM and ID, is that it might represent their transition toward the ANC.

The DA consolidated its status as official opposition and increased its national support by 2.81%. In

comparison to the floor-crossing, its support increased by 0.37%. Together with the IFP in the 'Coalition for Change', it publicly anticipated thirty percent support (twenty percent for itself and ten percent for the IFP). In the end their combined support amounts to 19.34%. For both partners the election alliance did not broaden their support bases: the DA could not attract substantial black support and the IFP could not extend its support beyond KZN. The DA made most of its gains from the NNP's decline in the Western Cape - about sixteen percent went to the DA and about seven percent to the ID; mainly as a white/Coloured split.

A characteristic of this election was the formation of election alliances: ANC/NNP, IFP/DA, IFP/FF+, IFP/Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (Limpopo), PAC/Dikwankwetla (Free State), and FF+/Cape Coloured Congress (Western and Northern Cape). None of these alliances have made a tangible impact on the eventual results. The NNP sacrificed much of its support partly because of its close association with the ANC; the DA gained - not because of the IFP - but because of the NNP's demise; the FF+ recovered from its losses in the floor-crossing but in the Western Cape and the Free State

where the IFP is almost absent.

Speculation is rife on the significance of the ANC's two-third majority. Firstly, it enables the party to amend the Constitution without support from any other party. Few observers, however, acknowledge the fact that the Constitution's basic values are entrenched in section 1 and can be amended only with a 75% majority. But secondly and more significantly, a two-thirds majority signifies 'overwhelming' support for the ANC, which will have as a result more political and bargaining power in its interactions with the other parties.

### **The Provincial Influence**

The results at provincial level provide a deeper insight into the voting patterns. A useful point of departure is to focus on the voter turnout per province and to compare them with voter support per party.

In the case of the ANC a significant pattern emerged. As seen in the table at the end of this article, the voter turnouts of all three general elections are listed (in brackets is the ranking of each province) and next to each of them is the ANC's percentage majority in each province.

From this table it is possible to conclude that Limpopo is

the province which was most seriously affected by voter apathy. While in 1999, it had the highest level of voter participation, it dropped to the fifth place. Gauteng is another cause of concern, with a gradual but consistent decline: fourth in 1994, fifth in 1999 and seventh in 2004. On the other hand, the Eastern Cape demonstrated a good recovery, moving from the fourth to the highest voter turnout. Similarly, the North West also improved from the second last to the fourth place. The provinces most consistent in their voter participation are the Northern Cape and KZN. Over the last two elections Mpumalanga, the Free State and Western Cape also remained consistent. The most unpredictable province is Limpopo: in 1994 it was sixth, in 1999 first and in 2004 fifth.

For the ANC, a discernible tendency emerged from the voter turnout. In 2004 a direct and positive correlation existed between the level of ANC support in the provinces and the voter turnout per province. The Eastern Cape\* and Limpopo\* were the only two exceptions. The same correlation appeared in 1999, except for the North West\* (and partly also KZN). In 1994 no such correlation existed. This tendency in 1999 and 2004 is exactly the opposite of what Markinor predicted in February 2004.

In addition to the voter turnout per province, it is also possible to make a comparison of the real numbers of votes cast in 1999 and 2004. Though in 2004 more voters were registered than in 1999, the lower voter turnout meant that almost the same number of votes were cast: 15 977 142 in 1999 and 15 863 554 in 2004.

Firstly, in respect of the ANC, it increased its real number of votes at national level by 276 921. By far the most of these gains were made in the Eastern Cape and KZN. In KZN it also increased its percentage support with 7.67% and in the Eastern Cape with 5.47%. Other provinces where it made gains in real number of votes are Northern Cape, Western Cape, North West and Mpumalanga. Though it increased its percentage majority in Limpopo, Gauteng and the Free State (with less than one percentage point in each instance), it lost support in real votes - most notably 153 943 in the provincial election in Gauteng.

Given the above conclusions, Gauteng appears to be a potential problem for the ANC: a decline in voter participation, a loss in real votes for the ANC, and the second lowest percentage growth for the party.

The DA has shown percentage increase in all the provinces, most significantly in the Western Cape (+15.20%). In the Northern Cape it experienced its second strongest growth at +6.31%, followed by the Free State with +3.14%. All of the other provinces showed a growth of less than three percent. Its lowest growth was in KZN (+0.20%). It is also the province in which it lost a real number of votes; in all the other provinces it gained also in real terms, mainly from the NNP's losses. The DA's main concentration points are the Western Cape and Gauteng. It is the official opposition party in all the provinces except for the Eastern Cape (UDM) and the North West (UCDP). In KZN it might play the role of official opposition since the IFP joined the ANC in a coalition government.

Compared to 1999, the ACDP increased its national support by 0.07%, but lost 0.15% compared to the floor-crossing. In terms of real number of votes, its support increased in the Free State, Gauteng, Limpopo, Northern Cape, North West and Western Cape, but declined in the Eastern Cape, KZN and Mpumalanga. Its stronghold is the Western Cape.

The UDM lost percentage support in all the provinces in comparison to its 1999 support levels. However, if

the effects of floor-crossing are taken into account, it appears to be slightly different. As a result of floor-crossing it lost 2.4% national support in Parliament, but partly recovered from the losses with an increase of 1.28% in support since last year. Its main base remains the Eastern Cape, where the ANC recovered 5.5% of its losses in 1999, and the UDM lost 4.3% between 1999 and 2004.

The Western Cape has experienced an ever-changing political landscape since 1994. Both in terms of real number of votes and percentage support, the ANC, DA, ACDP and FF+ consistently increased their support since 1999, while the NNP and UDM experienced a decline. All the parties experienced either a consistent increase or decline in support since 1994: a persistent increase for the ANC, DA and ACDP; a persistent decline for the NNP, IFP, UDM and PAC. The FF+ appears to have entered into a decline but then turned it around in 2004. The province appears to be well supported. It hosted the highest number of parties in the election and voter support is distributed amongst a number of parties, though the province captured the lowest voter turnout. As an illustration of the diversity, the following table is presented of the province as a whole, of Cape Town

city, and of one of the voting stations in Mitchell's Plain:

Party	% Province	% Cape Town	% Mitchell's Plain
ANC	45.25	45.14	24.13
DA	27.11	27.13	27.4
IFP	0.14	0.21	0.2
UDM	1.75	2.2	0
ID	7.84	8.16	20.04
NNP	10.88	9.58	18.61
ACDP	3.44	4.01	5.52
FF+	0.62	0.82	0

At least four parties have significant support in the province, namely the ANC, DA, ID and NNP. The city of Cape Town, where 1.05 million of the province's 1.56 million votes were cast, is an accurate reflection of the whole province. Only the DA maintained the same spread of support in Mitchell's Plain. The ID and NNP are much stronger than in the rest of the province, while the ANC lack in support there.

#### **IFP/ANC Bargaining over the Post-election**

Immediately after the election, the IFP referred its objection regarding the IEC's procedural handling of its complaints to the Electoral Court in Bloemfontein. On the eve of President Mbeki's inauguration they withdrew the case 'in the spirit of nation-building'. Its leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, justified it as follows: 'It is my earnest hope that our announcement will have the positive effect of ensuring that future elections will proceed without similar problems and acts of intimidation. We hope our

actions have served to defend the rule of law and the majesty of democracy'. Therefore only the FF+'s case is still pending in the Court.

A matter of more serious concern has been the question of the IFP's participation in the national and KZN provincial governments. Following the tradition of 1999, President Mbeki invited the IFP to fill to deputy minister posts (offered to Musa Zondi and Vincent Ngema). In view of Buthelezi's exclusion from the cabinet, the IFP's National Council decided to refrain from filling the two posts until the unfinished negotiation for a KZN provincial coalition government had been completed. As a result of the IFP's stance, President Mbeki, on 7 May appointed two other deputies: Ntopile Kganyago (UDM) for Public Works and Gert Oosthuizen (ANC) for Sport and Recreation. It means that the new national government consists of the ANC, Azapo, NNP and UDM.

In KZN, the election results produced the following seat allocation: ANC 38, IFP 30, DA 7, ACDP 2, MF 2 and UDM 1. A government needs 41 seats for a majority. A coalition government was therefore unavoidable. After protracted negotiation during which the ANC contemplated also the option of forming a government with the UDM, MF and the

ACDP, it reached an agreement with the IFP that the latter will have three of the ten MECs and the position of Deputy Speaker in the provincial legislature. Instead of the tradition of nominating their own representatives in the provincial government, the IFP agreed that the new ANC premier, S'bu Ndebele, would make the final announcement himself.

### Meaning of the Mandate

The final question in respect of the election concerns the considerations guiding the voters in their choice of a party or, alternatively, how should the ANC's mandate be understood?

The first possibility is that the voters were influenced by the parties' stance or policy proposals on particular issues. Markinor conducted an opinion poll in 2004 on the most important issues or problems facing the country. Their results concluded that ninety percent of the respondents considered unemployment and job creation to be the most important issue, followed in a distant second place by crime (64%), then HIV/AIDS (48%), health issues other than HIV/AIDS (22%), corruption and public sector dishonesty (21%), education (16%) and landlessness (9%).

Should one compare it with the posters used by the

parties in the election campaign, the following emerges:

The ANC used mainly two posters ('Create jobs' and 'Fight poverty'), which appealed directly to Markinor's number one issue. The DA used several more posters, concentrating on 'South Africa deserves better' and 'Unite the opposition', 'Convict corrupt politicians' and '150 000 policemen'. They highlight a combination of corruption and crime as issues, and the political role of the DA as opposition. The UDM also emphasised a number of social issues, mainly the deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of the poor, and corruption ('Arrest arms deal crooks'). The NNP did not address any social issues. Its main concern was focused on the re-election of its leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk as Western Cape premier and on convincing the electorate (mainly minorities) of its cooperation with the ANC: 'It's your country too', 'You deserve a fair share', 'NNP - Your key to government' and 'Let us be your voice'. Both the ACDP and FF+ emphasised 'hope' in the future. The message from the parties is accordingly mixed. The ANC, UDM and DA concentrated on issues; the DA and NNP highlighted their functional identities as parties.

Issue- and interest-based parties, such as the Employment Movement of South Africa, KISS, Economic Freedom Movement, Pro-Death Penalty Party, Green Party, the African Muslim Party or the Christian parties (ACDP, UCDP and Christian Democratic Party) did not perform well in the election.

Alternatively, voting according to party identities might serve to better explain the results. The demise of the NNP and the slight growth of the DA is not mainly due a particular stance on the issues, but because the majority of white voters do not support close cooperation with the ANC - instead, they prefer the DA's strong stance on opposition. Patricia de Lille's ID presents a party identity of criticism of bad governance but cooperation with Government when it merits - more or less the same applies to the UDM. Voters therefore made a choice between support for Government, for allies of Government, for cooperation and criticism, or for primarily critical opposition parties. Much later in future the primary criterion of choice will change to issue or interest considerations.

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**ANC Support Compared with Provincial Voter Turnout**

PROVINCE	2004		1999		1994	
	% voter turnout	ANC support	voter turnout	ANC support	voter turnout	ANC support
NATIONAL	76.73%		89.30%		86.86%	
Eastern Cape	79.31(1)	5*	90.54(4)	5	90.50(2)	2
Mpumalanga	78.30(2)	2	90.57(3)	2	85.40(5)	4
Free State	77.76(3)	3	90.99(2)	3	84.50(8)	5
North West	75.55(4)	4	87.31(8)	4*	91.20(1)	3
Limpopo	74.80(5)	1*	91.55(1)	1	84.70(6)	1
Northern Cape	74.70(6)	6	88.87(6)	7	84.70(6)	7
Gauteng	74.23(7)	7	90.15(5)	6	87.20(4)	6
KZN	72.84(8)	8	87.45(7)	9	82.40(9)	9
Western Cape	71.27(9)	9	86.70(9)	8	89.40(3)	8

## TEN YEARS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE OF OPPOSITION POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

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The advent of multi-party democracy in South Africa also brought the contradictory experience of opposition parties struggling to assert, build and consolidate themselves. After three elections and a decade of democracy, the opposition party results in the 2004 election revealed trends of modest growth for the DA, significant decline for the IFP, and a band of parties in the cluttered near-death zone of around and below 2 percent support. This group included the new ID, which gained a tenuous foothold.

In many respects, the 2004 results signalled an end to the pre-democratic era. The collapse of the NNP and the conversion of the DP into the DA meant that the white party players of the pre-democratic era had virtually disappeared by 2004. The IFP, on a systematic downward path, is the last of the bantustan parties still on the landscape. However, the Northwest's UCDP with its Mangope association keeps some of the bantustan ghosts alive. The UDM, although definitively a post-1994

party, still draws on some surviving Eastern Cape bantustan networks to keep it alive.

The benefits of multi-partyism were demonstrated in the 2004 election period that was alive with contestation. Existing parties such as the DA conducted well-planned and strategically designed campaigns. New budding contestant, the ID, threatened to upset some of the main players. In its swansong, the NNP found its calling to be the 'voice' of minority voters -- within the ANC. Flash parties, those that appear once-off or periodically in the time of elections, dotted the landscape and again disappeared, without representation and minus deposits.

The ID was the only one amongst the five micro-parties formed in the wake of the parliamentary floor-crossings of 2003 that survived into the second decade of democracy. Both the Peace and Justice Congress and National Action rallied, but missed the one-seat parliamentary target. Western Cape voters eliminated the New Labour Party.

When the dust of campaigning and voting settled, however, some sobering realisations lay in wait for South Africa's opposition political parties - and for opposition politics in

general. The ANC increased its majority and confirmed its legitimacy, and opposition parties were facing challenges of growth, credibility and legitimacy. A part of the sharp decline in voter turnout could be ascribed to abstention prevailing over a vote for the opposition.

In a consistent trend over the three democratic elections, the total percentage space occupied by opposition political parties declined further. In 1994, this total opposition party space was 37 percent, with the biggest opposition party, the then NP, on 20 percent. The opposition space declined to 34 percent in 1999, this time with more fragmentation and the DP, on 10 percent, emerging as the biggest opposition party. The trend continued. In 2004, the opposition space comprised a total of 30 percent. The DA had consolidated its main opposition party status, growing to 12 percent. All of the other opposition parties had either shrunk, or grown by decimal points.

In manifesting its modest levels of growth, the DA (still the DP in 1999) had signalled its *potential* in the period of 2004 to 2014 to forge a two-party position within the dominant party system. One of the DA's main achievements was that, compared with the DP's 1999 base, it had grown by 2.8 percent. This level of

growth was only rivalled by the ANC's 3.3 percent. The DA/DP from 1994 to 2004 had also consistently grown in each of the nine provinces, an achievement that the other parties could not rival.

In continuation and exacerbation of the trends from 1994 to 1999, the NNP and the IFP in varying degrees were the opposition party casualties of the 2004 election. The NNP precipitously declined into a state of virtual extinction. The once apartheid monolith and then disciple of transformation plummeted from its 1994 status of home to one-fifth of the South African voters, to representing a group of 1.7 percent -- predominantly white, urban and under 40. The NNP had thus lost 93.5 percent of its 1994 national level support. In some provinces, such as Gauteng, its decline was even more ominous -- 97.4 percent. Much of the NNP's decline was due to the mass defection or abstention of Western Cape working-class coloured voters. The defectors (in this order) voted for the DA, ID and ANC.

Although far from extinct, the IFP's unrelenting slide in its KwaZulu-Natal heartland signalled the elimination of the IFP as a major opposition party. In 1994, it was credited with 1,8 million votes - 50,5% of votes cast in KwaZulu-Natal. In 1999 it

notched up 1,2 million votes (41,0%), thus down by 8,4%. That time around, it had a mere 74 000 votes more than the ANC in the province. The plunge continued in 2004 as IFP provincial support declined by a further 5%, pushing the IFP into second place after the ANC. By now, it was trailing the ANC by close to 300,000 votes. On the national level, the IFP in 2004 had approximately half the number of votes that it had mustered a decade earlier.

The collapse of the NNP meant that the ranks of the micro-opposition parties were swelled. The NNP became one of the many below-2 percent opposition parties. These parties function in a near-death zone. Most of the time, they are too small to handle the combined burden of constituency work, organisational building, electoral contestation and parliamentary representation effectively.

The NNP's 2004 downfall naturally precipitated a chain reaction of further identity and leadership crises. From the Northern Cape came calls for the replacement of leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk; from the Free State there were calls for the dissolution of the party. In contrast, several of the other micro-opposition parties merely sustained their earlier levels of voter support, and were relatively satisfied with

their performances. These parties included the Freedom Front+ and Azapo. The ID was lauded for its 1.7 percent national level performance. Yet it failed to match the first-time performance of 3.4 percent of the UDM in 1999. By 2004, however, the UDM had slipped back to 2.3 percent, giving rise to suggestions that it might be time for reconciliation with the ANC.

A crucial aspect of opposition party support in 2004 was whether these parties had succeeded in transcending the limits of their traditional racial-class support bases. Some parties lost or gained support in cross-class trends. Both the UDM and the IFP lost significant chunks of their white support, thereby becoming more exclusively black-African. They also lost black support, which went to the ANC. The ID's support came overwhelmingly from working- and some middle-class coloured voters, as well as white voters trading the DA for the ID.

The reason for both the ID and the DA falling short of their pre-election support expectations was precisely that they failed to penetrate the black-African working-class voting bloc. Evidence suggests that the small gains that the DA made amongst black voters were at the cost of the IFP and the UDM. The black-African DA gains were largely concentrated in

the rural areas of provinces of Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, and in all likelihood came from voters who had never been ANC supporters.

The opposition parties had limited and minority-group wide only gains. They extended their racial bases, but only amongst the minority groups. The ANC registered fairly significant gains. It is estimated that the percentage of registered white voters siding with the ANC increased quite substantially. However, it was still largely white and coloured voters, or enclaves and legacies of former bantustan politics, that provided the opposition parties with their 2004 support. (See Table 1 below)

Opposition parties in South Africa build their strength in the three sites of elections (and growth in voter support), alliances with 'like-minded' parties, and floor-crossings (through the latter two potentially leap-frogging into expanded representational strength). In the run-up to Election 2004, the opposition parties hoped through a range of alliances either to gain provincial power, or to hold the balance of power in some of the provinces. These ambitions were largely frustrated. The NNP clung to 11 percent support in the Western Cape (compared with its fractional 1.7 percent national support), thereby ensuring that it could

deliver the province to the ANC and gain yet another stay of execution. KwaZulu-Natal was the only other province where the opposition parties could perform the role of kingmaker -- the Minority Front and the UDM ensured the ANC of its provincial majority.

In KwaZulu-Natal, the IFP-DA Coalition for Change started coming unstuck in the weeks preceding the election when rapprochement between the ANC and IFP suggested that the coalition might not be cast in stone. It became ineffectual when the two parties jointly in KwaZulu-Natal could only muster 45 percent of the vote.

Other opposition party alliances and cooperative agreements, such as the FF+'s agreement with the IFP, the FF+ with the Cape People's Congress, the DA's with the Green Party of South Africa, and the PAC's with the Dikwankwetla Party, had a negligible impact on the outcome of the election.

These experiences of South Africa's opposition parties hold warnings of uphill battles in the continuing struggle to become the definitive and credible opposition party of democratic South Africa. By all 2004 indications, the DA is set to further entrench itself as the opposition party

of the foreseeable future. Although its gains were modest, and off a 1994 base that was fundamentally altered through its alliance with the NNP, the party was the only one amongst the host of opposition hopefuls that could claim consistent and across-the-board gains.

In the aftermath of the 2004 election, however, the debate will resume on who will be the 'opposition of the future'. Given the nature of shortcomings and disappointments in South African politics, the most discontented people in society logically should be the poorest. The DA worked on this logic in its 2004 campaign, targeting poor communities in urban and rural areas both through voter segmentation and message. The campaign illustrated that the voters who had least gained from ANC governance are not the voters who were available for opposition recruitment, or, perhaps in particular, for an opposition party such as the DA. The ANC centre thus held and this sealed the 2004 fate of the opposition parties.

The right-of-centre opposition party space remains a congested ideological territory. The near-extinct status of the opposition parties to the left of the ANC still leaves the ANC free to claim ideological space where it rarely treads. A crucial

question for opposition party politics in the 2004 to 2009 interregnum therefore is whether the DA will consolidate its main opposition party status, or whether there might be the tangible genesis of a left opposition party. The possible trajectory could be:

originating in civil society organisations, social movements, perhaps linking up with a small new left opposition party, and ultimately with segments of organised labour. When, eventually and probably not in the next five years, an opposition party of this

nature spreads its wings, the question will be whether it will have the strength and momentum to catch up with and surpass the DA in whichever manifestation it might have concretised itself at that time.

**Table 1: Trends of Growth and Decline in Ten Years of Opposition Party Politics in South Africa**

PARTY	RESULT 1994		Change 1994 to 1999 in level of voter support		RESULT 1999		Change 1999 to 2004 in level of voter support		RESULT 2004	
	%	TOTAL	Growth / decline in number of voters: 1994-1999		%	TOTAL	Growth / decline in number of voters: 1999-2004		%	TOTAL
<b>ANC</b>	<b>62.6</b>	<b>12.2m</b>	13.1% down	1.6m down	<b>66.4</b>	<b>10.6m</b>	2.8% up	0.3m up	<b>69.7</b>	<b>10.9m</b>
<b>DP/DA</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>0.3m</b>	400% up	1.2m up	<b>9.6</b>	<b>1.5m</b>	27% up	0.4m up	<b>12.4</b>	<b>1.9m</b>
<b>IFP</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>2.1m</b>	33.3% down	0.7m down	<b>8.6</b>	<b>1.4m</b>	21% down	0.3m down	<b>7.0</b>	<b>1.1m</b>
<b>UDM</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>3.4</b>	<b>0.6m</b>	33% down	0.2m down	<b>2.3</b>	<b>0.4m</b>
<b>ID</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>1.7</b>	<b>0.3m</b>
<b>NP/NNP</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>4.0m</b>	73 % down	2.9m down	<b>6.9</b>	<b>1.1m</b>	73 % down	0.8m down	<b>1.7</b>	<b>0.3m</b>
<b>ACDP</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.1m</b>	100% up	0.1m up	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.2m</b>	50% up	0.1m up	<b>1.6</b>	<b>0.3m</b>
<b>FF/ FF+</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>0.4m</b>	75% down	0.3m down	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.1m</b>	Same	Same	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.1m</b>
<b>UCDP</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.1m</b>	Same	Same	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.1m</b>
<b>PAC</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>0.2m</b>	50% down	0.1m down	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.1m</b>	Same	Same	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.1m</b>

## PROVINCIAL ROUNDUP

### GAUTENG

#### The Election and its Aftermath

*Khabele Matlosa*  
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##### The Significance of the Election

The South African election that took place between 12 and 14 April 2004 was a political development of monumental proportion, both for the country and the Southern African region. For South Africa itself, the election was meant to solidify and institutionalise its embryonic democracy. Thus, the election was an important political event linked, as it was, to the country's celebration of a decade of democracy. It was fitting, therefore, that the celebrations reached their apex on 27 April coinciding with the inauguration of President Thabo Mbeki. No wonder, therefore, that when Mbeki was inaugurated on that day, deep down he felt a deep sense of accomplishment for his party, the ANC, that had just won the election so overwhelmingly. Mbeki as a statesman, however, also felt an enormous degree of achievement pertaining to the extent to which up to that point, the South African

democratic governance was increasingly being institutionalised and a living testimony to this process of institutionalisation and habituation of democratic culture and practice.

Yet, the election was also extremely important for the SADC region as a whole. There is no controversy around South Africa's hegemony in the region and therefore, its overbearing influence. For this and other related reasons, almost all of the SADC states look to South Africa to learn from their experience in democracy and development. Thus, all eyes were on South Africans as they cast their ballot and the region held its breath awaiting to see whether or not the region's hegemony could institutionalise its democratic governance. Others were rightly concerned about the spectre of violence in some parts of the country especially Kwazulu-Natal which, if not well-managed, could have torpedoed the country's celebrated political transition of 1994. Of all the SADC countries, the keenest observers of the South African election were Malawi, Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique for the obvious reason that these countries are themselves holding their own elections in 2004. Malawi held its election on 20 May 2004

after an abrupt postponement from the original date set for 18 May. Botswana will follow in October, and the others namely Namibia (November) and Mozambique (December) will follow in that order.

##### The Provincial Election and its Outcome

Having outlined in a fairly sketchy fashion, the political significance of the just ended South African election both for the country and the SADC region, this article aims to review the election process, results and highlight its immediate aftermath in the Gauteng Province.

Gauteng Province is the second biggest province in South Africa in terms of population size. Of the country's population of about 45 million, Gauteng's population stands at 8.8 million (20% of the total) second only to that of Kwazulu Natal at 9.4 million (21% of the total). It is thus no surprise therefore, that political party contest centered mainly on this two provinces combined with fierce contest in the Western Cape. A total of about 4.7 million eligible voters registered to vote in the Province of which 2.4 million were female voters and 2.3 million male. The population of registered voters in the province

amounted to about 22 percent of the total registered voters and the highest in the whole country followed by Kwazulu-Natal at 18 percent. Of this registered population, about 3.5 million voters cast their ballot between 12 and 14 April 2004. This amounted to about 74 percent of registered voters. By all indications, this was a pretty impressive voter turnout amidst earlier scepticism linked to projected levels of voter apathy especially among the young voters. Only a paltry 44 000 votes were spoilt suggesting a successful voter education and information programme by the IEC and other election stakeholders in the Province.

All in all, eighteen (18) political parties contested elections in the Province and of these eight (8) were able to secure parliamentary seats. The table below indicates that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) won a landslide victory that had already been predicted by various opinion surveys prior to the election.

Party	Votes	% Votes	Seats
UDM	33 644	0.99	1
VF-Plus	45 648	1.34	1
ACDP	55 991	1.64	1
ANC	2 331 121	68.40	51
DA	708 081	20.78	15
ID	51 921	1.52	1
IFP	85 500	2.51	2
PAC	29 076	0.85	1

Thus, it came to pass that the ANC would retain political

control of the province, while the DA became the official opposition in the legislature. A trend that is manifest in the election outcome in the province, which in some sense also reflects the national trend, is the political decline of both the NNP and the IFP. While the former did not manage to secure a single seat in the province, the latter secured only one single seat. Another interesting development is the emergence of the ID on the political scene and the new kid on the block managed to secure a single seat in the legislature.

Following the election, Mbhazima Shilowa was reappointed the Premier for Gauteng, and in his inaugural speech, Shilowa echoed the ANC's national strategy and commitment to "meet the challenges of unemployment and poverty, homelessness and provision of water and sanitation, HIV and AIDS and other diseases, nation building community safety, improving public education, and eradication of all forms of discrimination". Shilowa is serving his last term in office and is the only Premier who retained his post, while the other eight (8) Provincial Premiers are all new appointees. As with the national legislature, one other fascinating aspect of the new Gauteng Legislature is the extent to which gender balance has been advanced. Of the total of 73 MPs, 31

(42%) are women. Besides, both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are women.

### Prospects

As in other Provinces, the ANC victory in the Gauteng gives the ruling party a golden opportunity to implement its programme aimed at building a social contract for the creation of jobs and eradication of poverty and related social ills for a better life for South Africans. In light of the election outcome in the province, the ANC will have to tread gingerly and with caution. It will have to bring opposition parties into its implementation strategies even if they remain the main critics of government policy. Thus politics of accommodation rather than politics of confrontation would serve the ruling party and the province well in this regard.

Besides managing political diversity in the legislature, the Provincial government will also have to implement its social contract in close cooperation and partnership with a wide array of non-governmental stakeholders. Obviously the key stakeholders in these processes would include the ANC's allies, namely the Congress for South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The alliance will have to be nurtured and consolidated

further through policies that strike a balance addressing interests and fears of these stakeholders.

## northwest

### **NORTH WEST THINGS STAYING THE SAME, JUST MORE SO**

*Michael O'Donovan  
Independent Political  
Consultant*

Although rational behaviouralists have made a substantial contribution to our collective understanding of political behaviour they have difficulty in coming to terms with a key question regarding voting. Why do people bother to vote at all? The chances of any individual affecting the outcome of an election in a significant way, is so remote that a "rational" person is basically wasting their time by voting. This "futility" of voting is exacerbated in those elections (like those in the North West province) where the outcome of the election can be taken for granted.

Since 1994 all the elections in that province have been so dominated by the ANC that there was no doubt that the incumbent party would win an overwhelming majority of the votes cast. Despite this, voters turned out in numbers equal to that of the 1999 election. In 1994, 1.6 million votes were cast in the North

Further more, the provincial government will have to be responsive to the interests and fears of the civil society organisations in their various

West province but stricter registration requirements after that election reduced the total number of eligible voters. In both 1999 and 2004 about 1.3 million votes were cast in the province.

Compounding the rational behaviouralists' enigma was that turnout among registered voters was higher in those provinces where voting made less difference i.e. where the ruling party was most assured of victory. Conversely, in the areas in which the opposition parties had a greater presence the turnout among registered voters tended to be lower. This trend can only be partly explained by the opposition parties preoccupation with competing with each other rather than against the ANC. The turnout rates do however reflect the ANC's unrivalled ability to mobilise those sympathetic to it.

Parties such as the DA and NNP the ANC, in the run up to the election, tended to eschew the mass media in favour of personal contact between supporters and potential voters. The ANC called on cadres to mobilise support in their neighbourhoods. Its ability to do this so effectively reflects on its immense

formations. This will be imperative in order to translate the social contract into a living and live experience for the people.

organisational capacity throughout the country. On voting day this capacity was strongly manifest by the extent to which the ANC was able to provide public transport for voters - even for the highly dispersed rural population of the North West province. The election day dynamics emphasised that no other political party is able to come anywhere close to the ANC in terms of organisational capacity and the ability to mobilise voters.

In 1994 the ANC captured 1.3 million of the 1.6 million votes cast on the national list (83%) in the North West province. They were followed by the new official opposition, the NP with 160 479 votes and the DP with 5 826 votes. In 1999 the political landscape changed with the party that formerly ruled the Bophuthatswana bantustan, the UCDP, re-entering the competition. In that year the ANC won 1 030 901 of the 1 305 441 votes cast (78.9%). It was followed by the UCDP who, with 124 874 votes (9.6%) displaced the NNP as the official opposition. That election aptly portrayed the decline of the NNP. The DP emerged as the third largest party 42 593 votes (3.3%)

followed by the NNP with only 29 931 votes (2.3%). In the North West province (as in other provinces) one of the more dramatic features of the 2004 election was the implosion of the NNP. Following the dissolution of its alliance with the Democratic Party, the NNP reorientated its objectives in the run up to the 2004 election. It now sought an alliance with the ANC and presented itself to opposition supporters as their key to representation in government. This alliance between the NNP and the ANC was to bring the NNP into government while assuring the ANC it would govern all nine provinces. Unfortunately the realignment of the NNP alienated the bulk of its remaining supporters who, if they voted at all, defected to other parties. NNP voters deserted the party for alternatives from the left (the ANC) to the right (FF+) of the political spectrum. In the North West Province, the 5 687 votes secured by the NNP was less than one fifth of their 1999 total (or one thirtieth of their 1994 total). Despite the very low profiles of the ACDP, UDM and ID in the province they came out of the election with fewer votes (in order) than the ANC, UCDP, DA, FF+, ACDP, UDM, PAC, and the ID. Most humbling was that there were five times as many spoilt votes than there were votes for the NNP. Whatever one's opinion

about the party, the decline of the NNP was unfortunate in that it had been, despite its political heritage, the most racially diverse political party. Its decline indicates that voters are possibly becoming increasingly racially polarised along political party lines and perhaps by the level of participation in elections.

The big losers in the election were in those parties most heavily associated with the apartheid state. The NNP losses were paralleled somewhat by those of the former bantustan rulers - the UCDP. Mangope's party lost 30% of the support it had in 1999 and received only approximately 86 000 votes. Minor gains in the number of votes were made by the UDM, PAC, the ACDP and the Independent Democrats. However none of these parties gathered enough support to win seats on the provincial legislature. The final seating in the provincial Parliament was consequently: ANC 27 of the 33 available seats, UCDP 3, DA 2, FF+ 1.

In the North West province, a total of 1 353 963 people voted i.e. 77 percent of the 1 749 529 registered voters. This represents a one percentage point gain over the total number of votes cast in the 1999 election. However, given that the population of the province had increased by approximately 10 percent in

the interim a declining rate of participation is evident. Extrapolation of the 2001 census to reflect the 2004 voting age population indicates that only 57 percent of voting age citizens voted. When compared to the earlier elections, the drop in voting rate suggests that a degree of disengagement is, as expected, taking place. This indicates that the ANC, despite winning 81 percent of all votes, was elected by a minority of the eligible electorate. Although this does compare favourably with turnout in established democracies, the declining participation rate may yet become a cause for concern. In the established democracies the electorate is called upon to vote for representatives far more frequently than in South Africa. For example, in Ireland, voters elect local, county and national representatives as well as delegates to the European Parliament. Elsewhere voters have to elect candidates for governor, senate, parliament etc. All told there have only been five opportunities in which all adult South Africans have been given the opportunity to vote and voter fatigue should be less of a factor here. Turnout should thus be commensurately higher.

The overall reduction in turnout will inevitably vary between groups. Identifying which groups are disengaging will speak

volumes as to the health of the democracy. Although figures are not yet available from the IEC, observers do indicate that youth participation was, not unexpectedly, very low. It is also not yet clear to what extent the IEC has managed to reverse the under-representation of the rural poor. Earlier studies had indicated that the rural poor voted at significantly lower rates than the rest of the population. The IEC had subsequently sought to address this imbalance through the redistribution of resources to those areas.

The opposition parties have been most prejudiced by the declining participation rates. Between 1999 and 2004 the ANC increased its number of votes by five percent. The total number of votes cast for opposition parties declined by 13 percent in the same period. Among the opposition parties the minor gains made by the DA, UDM, PAC and the ACDP were insufficient to offset the losses experienced by the NNP and UCDP. All-in-all the election was marked by the increasing adeptness of the IEC in running elections, declining conflict and increasing disappointment for those looking for a strong opposition in national and provincial parliaments.

If the results point to declining turnout among opposition supporters rather

than their “defection” to the ANC, their abstention may be explained by their having no chance of making an impact on the political landscape. However this line of thinking does not explain why ANC voters, assured of their party's dominance, turned out in increasing numbers – leaving analysts with the rational behaviour dilemma. Unfortunately, if the established trend still underpins voter behaviour, the next national election in 2009 may herald an even greater ANC majority.

The ANC's clean sweep of the provinces enhanced President Mbeki's latitude in appointing premiers. This he used to, *inter alia*, increase the representation of women in high political office. His choice for premier in the North West was the woman highest on the ANC's provincial list of candidates – Agriculture MEC Edith Molewa. While her appointment seems to have struck a cord with those concerned with the representation of women, it went down less well with her fellow MECs. Reports indicate that at least five of her former colleagues are no longer available for provincial office. While some of the redirection was anticipated that of Darkey Africa was not. Africa had been considered one of the more popular candidates for the position and he headed the ANC's provincial list of candidates. Reports also

indicate that the second person on the list, Pitso Tolo is also no longer available for appointment. Molewa has consequently had difficulty in appointing her cabinet and she will be the last of the nine premiers to announce a cabinet. The extent of the difficulty (and the depth of competition within the ANC) is indicated by agreement on a coalition government in KwaZulu-Natal being reached before the North West province could settle on its appointments.

## Kwazulu-natal

### KZN Election Aftermath

"The Sulkers and the Gloaters"

*Shauna Mottiar*  
*Independent Political Analyst*

The post election period in KwaZulu-Natal has been eventful. With the African National Congress's (ANC's) victory in the province, its first step was to appoint S'bu Ndebele and not Jacob Zuma as provincial Premier. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) began its new term as official opposition in the province by lodging a challenge to the election results with the Electoral Court. The Electoral Court has jurisdiction to hear complaints about any contravention of the Electoral Code of Conduct provided that the objection has been raised with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The IFP's complaints centre on the fact that the IEC had declared the elections free and fair without investigating alleged election irregularities. These included the IFP's claim that some 300 000 voters had cast their ballots in voting districts where they were not registered on the voters roll. The IFP also complained about the levels of political intolerance citing incidents

where ANC members had demonstrated outside the home of Lionel Mtshali burning coffins which represented the IFP and the attacking of an IFP councillor in Wembezi Township.<sup>1</sup> The IFP claim that over 50 complaints had been raised with the IEC but that the IEC had overlooked them. This included 42 provincial and 4 national complaints including intimidation, assault, malicious damage to property and voters being prevented from casting their ballots. The IFP also claimed that the ANC bussed voters in from other provinces to skew the results.<sup>2</sup>

The ANC was unconcerned by the IFP's claims. ANC spokesman Mtholephi Mthinkhulu said that his party was not surprised by the IFP's decision to contest the election as it had indicated before the election that it would dispute the results if it lost to the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal.<sup>3</sup> Analysts have suggested that the IFP's legal challenge is a desperate attempt by the party to retain control of the province or is being used as a bargaining chip to strengthen the IFP's hand and extract concessions from the ANC. The IFP argued that the court challenge was separate from

other options it was considering such as negotiations with minority parties, negotiations with the ANC for a shared government or simply occupying the opposition benches. Two days before the Electoral Court was to hear the IFP's complaints however, the party withdrew its legal challenge claiming that all it had wanted to prove was that the IEC had failed to act on the complaints before it.<sup>4</sup> This fuelled comment that the IFP was not serious about allegations of election irregularities in the province but was merely strengthening its position at the negotiating table.

Indeed the IFP in the light of its loss of KwaZulu-Natal to the ANC as well as its deteriorated relationship with the ANC of late, has much to negotiate at both a national and provincial level if it wants to remain a player on the South African political field. At national level, the announcement of Thabo Mbeki's new cabinet confirmed that Mangosuthu Buthelezi would no longer hold a cabinet position. Furthermore, no IFP members were deployed as ministers but two IFP members were appointed as deputy ministers. Musa Zondi was named Deputy Minister of Public Works

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<sup>1</sup> *Mercury* April 19 2004

<sup>2</sup> *Mercury* April 21 2004

<sup>3</sup> *Daily News* April 20 2004

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<sup>4</sup> *Mercury* April 28 2004

and Vincent Ngema Deputy Minister of Sport and Recreation. This amounts to the scaling down of IFP representation from the 1999 cabinet where there were 3 IFP ministers and 2 IFP deputies. More damaging is the fact that Buthelezi, once Minister of Home Affairs, is now confined to the opposition benches while two of his junior colleagues are deputy ministers. Analysts claim that the ANC is sending a clear message that the age of the coalition government is over and that the ANC is no longer under any obligation to make appointments in response to the threat of conflict or violence. Some analysts argue in favour of the IFP's new place on opposition benches pointing out that coalitions in cabinet dilute opposition voices.<sup>5</sup> This notwithstanding, party policies are often better served when the party in question has some measure of political power.

In this case of coalition between the ANC and IFP, the IFP is clearly unhappy with the measure of power it can expect to enjoy with 2 deputy minister portfolios. For this reason Zondi and Ngema declined the appointments claiming that they wanted to wait for the outcome of the coalition government discussions between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal. Their

withdrawal probably comes as a result of pressure from IFP hardliners such as Lionel Mtshali, Blessed Gwala, Prince Zulu, Albert Mncwango and Velaphi Ndlovu. Zondi and Ngema are known to be moderates within the party. Reports from a senior ANC official are that Mbeki has been angered by the withdrawal of Zondi and Ngema. The official said "nobody is allowed to bargain for cabinet positions. Even ANC officials don't do that. The IFP can serve in the cabinet only at the invitation of the President. The sense we are getting from the President is that the IFP is no longer an issue he is going to move on without them." Mbeki confirmed this by stating at the swearing in ceremony that he would replace Zondi and Ngema with "those who are willing to take the oath and willing to work."<sup>6</sup>

The IFP's consideration of whether to be part of an ANC led government or part of the opposition continues at provincial level. KwaZulu-Natal's new premier Ndebele appointed 2 IFP members to his provincial cabinet. Inkosi Nyanga Mgubane for Social Welfare and Population Development and Rev Celani Mtetwa for Public Works.<sup>7</sup> Both Ngubane and Mtetwa however resigned their positions as the IFP

claimed that they were Ndebele's personal choice and that the IFP had not been consulted as to which candidates it would like to put forward or which portfolios it would like to hold. The IFP complained that once again provincial candidates were announced while the ANC and IFP were still in negotiation. Ndebele reacted to the resignations by saying that "people have voted and they now expect delivery. We cannot be involved in endless negotiations. The IFP must make up its mind- it either wants to be part of the government or like the DA part of the opposition."<sup>8</sup>

With or without IFP support, Ndebele has mapped out his priority areas for the province. Of utmost importance to his cabinet will be social upliftment of the poor and vulnerable which will be combated with job creation, poverty eradication and economic rejuvenation. HIV AIDS, safety and security, eradicating corruption and creating a credible social service system also feature on the ANC-led provincial agenda.

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<sup>5</sup> *Witness* April 29 2004

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<sup>6</sup> *Sunday Times* May 2 2004

<sup>7</sup> *Sunday Tribune* April 25 2004

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<sup>8</sup> *Mercury* April 26 2004

## The end of the KZN as we know it: the rise of the ANC in 2004

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There are two main aspects to the election 2004 results in KZN. The first concerns the rise of the ANC, the demise of the IFP, and the relationship between the two. The second concerns the moderate failure of the DA and the consolidation of the MF and ACDP. I will examine each set of outcomes in turn (see table at end of article).

### The ANC & IFP

The ANC was the only party to significantly improve its standing in KZN in election 2004. Not only did the party win the most votes on the provincial ballot (47%), but it was the only party of any size which won more votes in 2004 (120 000) than in 1999. This is a remarkable feat given that the 2004 poll was 15% lower than in 1999.

Indeed, had the polls been the same then the ANC would have won 600 000 more votes on the provincial ballot than in 1999! In percentage terms in 2004 the ANC improved on 1999 by 7.6%, outstripping its 7.15% improvement from 1994 to 1999. If this was the ANC

best election yet in KZN, it was the IFP's worst. Election 2004 was the only poll which did not return the IFP as the largest party in KZN, confirming a downward trend in party support which sees it at 55% of its 1994 level. This noted, the IFP's losses in 2004, while substantial, are not as dramatic as the ANC's gains. Thus while the party lost 8.42% in provincial support between 1994 and 1999, it lost 5.08% between 2004 and 1999. I suspect the reason for this is that while most of the IFP losses were to the ANC, not all of the ANC gains come from the IFP. Let me explore this in more detail.

A close look at the 2004 election results reveals a correspondence between ANC gains and IFP losses in most places. The notable exception here is Durban where the IFP actually improved its support slightly from 1999 (5 703) but the ANC improved its support by a dramatic 79 974 votes. This latter figure amounts to 65% of the ANC's gains in 2004 over 1999!

The reason for the ANC's improvement in Durban is directly linked to its vigorous registration campaign which saw the city up its registered voters by over 140 000 from the 2000 local government elections. Indeed Durban accounted for over 44% of new voters. In this context, IFP complaints about ANC

related registration irregularities take on a sharper significance.

The ANC registration drives and campaigning in Durban is one half of its success story. The other is its provincial wide winning of support from the IFP. This was particularly notable in the southern areas of the province such as Harding, Umzumbe, Izongolweni, Underberg, Creighton, Port Shepstone, in the north in the cities of Richards Bay and Newcastle, and the northern coastal areas of Mtubatuba and Emanqasi.

In comparison, ANC gains in the major cities were not as significant, and were lowest in the historic IFP strongholds of Nkandla, Nongoma, Unlundi and Msinga. Notably though, there were still gains.

All this points to the significance of firstly access for the ANC to rural areas, and secondly, campaigning. Hence there is a rough correlation between the growth of ANC support and the length of time the party has had access to rural areas of KZN. In 1994, the ANC had some support down south, in 1999 it consolidated this and in 2004 is now the largest party south of the Tukela river. The IFP conversely is strongest in the north, in rough proportion to distance from Unlundi, the party heartland.

### The DA, MF and ACDP

For the smaller parties in KZN, election 2004 brought slightly disappointing results. The DA did much worse than it hoped and expected. Thus, on the provincial ballot the party secured 8.35%, just 0.2% more in 2004 than the DP in 1999, and 3.09% less than the DP & NNP combined in 1999. Indeed, the DA fared worse on the provincial ballot in KZN than on any other provincial ballots.

There are two reasons that immediately suggest themselves. First, was the lower turnout by opposition voters, more especially in historically-Indian areas. When added to low registration levels and the in-group focused politics of Rajbansi, this suggests a community which feels politically marginal to the mainstream. Mostly however, it reflects tactical voting in KZN which cost the DA on the provincial ballot.

Thus on the national ballot the party secured 10% while on the provincial ballot it secured 8.35%, some 47 559 fewer votes, the equivalent of 2 seats in the provincial legislature. Some<sup>9</sup> have suggested this was due to the capital issue, meaning that the DA-IFP Coalition for

Change had lost support from many voters who did not want Ulundi to remain the capital, the likely outcome were the Coalition to win the election. However this claim overlooks two facts. First, the IFP secured 45 556 more votes on the provincial ballot than the national one, revealing that many voters supported it in KZN and another party nationally. (Further the ANC received 23 200 fewer votes in KZN than national!). Second, the DA was an even greater loser on the provincial ballot in 1999 (46 959, and 66 989 when including the NNP) than in 2004, suggesting that fewer people voted tactically in 2004. All this means that the capital issue could not have been significant – at least at a province wide level.

When unpacked at municipal level, these results suggest that roughly 30 000 people voted for the IFP in KZN and the DA nationally, and 10 000 voted for the IFP in KZN and ANC nationally. These figures are almost exactly the same as the 1999 ones, suggesting the Coalition made little or no difference to overall strategic voting. The one exception to this was in Pietermaritzburg and surrounding municipalities where the ANC did better at the expense of the DA. However, the number of vote involved was a few thousand.

Where tactical voting was different in 2004 was with the MF. First, over 70% of MF voters supported the party on both ballots in 2004, whereas in 1999 only 50% did. This reflects a greater allegiance to the party at national level, perhaps reflecting Rajbansi's greater national role. Second, a significant proportion of MF provincial voters, I would guesstimate about 20%, endorsed the ANC on the national ballot, reflecting alliance politics in KZN.

These results reflect a consolidation of Rajbansi's support base, and I think similar conclusions can be drawn about the ACDP in KZN following solid returns. Where the MF maintained its two seats in the KZN legislature the ACDP gained a second. Notably these are both parties with very specific constituencies with both distinct identities and, perhaps more importantly, institutional bases. For the MF we are talking about local social, economic and political networks in Chatsworth, for the ACDP, we are talking about churches.

Indeed, in many ways the IFP fits this same profile, especially since losing power in KZN. It is a party rooted in a constituency with a specific identity and institutional basis. Now that the IFP is out of government, it seems that opposition parties in KZN can survive

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<sup>9</sup> See Xolisa Vapi, 'Ulundi Issue Cost IFP Dearly', *Sunday Times*, 18 April 2004.

as 'bonding' movements rooted in particular constituencies, but not as 'bridging' movements which look to catch all. The ANC has this latter politics covered.

### Acceptance of the Result

The result of election 2004 threw the IFP into significant crisis, a situation from which it is still trying to disentangle itself. At root the problem, which has the party divided in two, is whether to look to the future in some kind of relationship with the ANC, or in opposition politics, perhaps in some kind of relationship with the DA. These uncertainties help explain the parties somewhat inconsistent behaviour after

the election. Under the influence of those disaffected with the ANC, the party looked to launch a legal challenge to the result on the grounds of alleged irregularities, only to withdraw the case under the influence of those looking to rapprochement with the ANC and a role in KZN and national government. However, rapprochement with the ANC was also stymied by objections to leaders taking cabinet positions nationally and provincially.

At the time of going to press the party had both dropped its formal objections to the election and withdrawn from participation in national government as debate over

its future rages. To my mind, either choice is a losing scenario if the party still harbours hopes of winning KZN or ever becoming a force on the national stage. As argued in *Election Update 1* the IFP is losing core supporters to the ANC while failing to attract new voters from other opposition parties. In many ways it is now a classic South African opposition party, able to oppose the powerful and all-inclusive ANC only through a 'binding' politics linked to a community with a distinct social and institutional identity. How long the IFP will be able to maintain a grip on this community is a moot point.

Party	Votes			Percentage			Seats		
	1994	1999	2004	1994	1999	2004	1994	1999	2004
ACDP	24 690	53 745	48892	0.49	0.67	1.78	1	1	2
ANC	1 181 118	1 167 094	1 287 823	32.23	39.38	46.98	26	32	38
DP/DA	78910	241 779	228 857	2.15	8.16	8.35	2	7	7
IFP	1 844 070	1 241 522	1 009 267	50.32	41.9	36.82	41	34	30
MF	48 951	86 770	71 540	1.34	2.93	2.61	1	2	2
NNP	410 710	97 077	14 218	11.21	3.28	0.52	9	3	0
PAC	26 601	7 654	5 118	0.73	0.26	0.19	1	0	0
UDM	-	34 586	20 546	-	1.17	0.75	-	1	1
Total seats							81	80	80
Total valid votes	3 664 324	2 963 358	2 741 265						
Spoilt ballots	39 369	46 141	41 300						
Total ballots	3 703 693	3 009 499	2 782 565						
Registered voters	4 585 091	3 443 978	3 763 406						
Percentage poll				80.78	87.38	72.84			
Quota for a seat	44 687	36 585	34 782						

## free state

### WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT? LOOKING AT THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION IN THE FREE STATE IN TERMS OF ELECTION RESULTS, ACCEPTANCE OF THE ELECTION AND PARTY REPRESENTATION

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#### Introduction

After a long and drawn out run-up to the 2004 general election, it is finally over. IEC officials are getting a full night's sleep again, and politicians can rest their throats from overwork on the campaign trail. New MP's and MPL's have been elected and there have been celebrations in many quarters, with seats gained on national and provincial legislatures. In other quarters, ex-MP's and MPL's are facing the prospect of job-hunting as their parties stumbled at the polls. This picture is playing out all over the country and not least in the Free State, where things are already heating up with by-elections and the unexpected choice of premier for the province.

#### Election Results

In terms of the last available figures from the IEC (IEC,

2004) updated on 23 April 2004 the final tally for votes for the Free State read as follows:

Party	Results (Votes)	%
ACDP	13 119	1.3
ANC	827 338	81.78
AZAPO	3 571	0.35
DA	85 714	8.47
DPSA	9 806	.97
ID	5 289	0.52
IFP	3 563	0.35
NA	1 224	0.12
NNP	8 295	0.82
PAC	11 969	1.18
UCDP	7 825	0.77
UDM	8 947	0.88
VF+	24 946	2.47
Total valid votes brought out	1 011 606	100
Total number of spoilt votes	15 795	
Percentage poll	77.76	
Total votes cast	1 027 401	
Total number of special votes	49 526	

As predicted, the ANC garnered the lion's share of support in the province with more than 80% of the votes cast. According to Pretorius,<sup>10</sup> this was the case in 17 of the 20 Free State municipalities, except for Kopanong (Trompsburg and surroundings), Mangaung (Bloemfontein and surroundings) and Metsimaholo (Sasolburg and surroundings). The results of the election also showed that the ANC's biggest support came from the towns in the Eastern Free State district municipality (Thabo Mafutsanyana) and municipalities in the North Western Free State such as Nala (Bothaville and surroundings) and Tswelopele (Hoopstad and

surroundings). As far as opposition parties were concerned, the results showed that the PAC had its biggest support in the Eastern Free State, with the DA and the ID receiving support from voters in the Metsimaholo and Kopanong areas. The DA also showed considerable support in the municipalities of Mattjabeng (Welkom) and Ngwathe (Parys). The ACDP and the FF+ shared their highest support in the municipal areas of Mangaung, Letsemeng (Koffiefontein and surroundings) and Tokologo (Boshoff and surroundings).

Coetzee<sup>11</sup> reported that the results showed that the ANC had lost approximately 6% of its support in the province (54 000 votes) and that the DA had gained 47% (28 000 votes) on its previous showing, with the FF+ also gaining about 8% support (2000 votes).

Commentators had various opinions regarding the result of the elections. Zingel and Pienaar<sup>12</sup> were of the opinion that the DA will show marginal growth in coming years as the economic middle class grows and smaller parties fall by the wayside – the good record of DA councillors on local government level also

<sup>10</sup> 2004a: 7

<sup>11</sup> 2004, 2

<sup>12</sup> in Pretorius, 2004b: 7

counted in their favour. They further stated that many people still voted for the ANC based on historical identity and that the ANC's support will grow if it can show real delivery in the next five years. Support for the ID was largely based on the personal appeal of its leader, Patricia de Lille, while the demise of the NNP was largely due to its incoherent political movements of the last five years. Its move into the fold of the ANC had not been well communicated to its rank and file members. The ACDP showed however, that it was possible to unite voters across the colour line to build considerable support for itself in the province.<sup>13</sup>

### **The New Political Leadership**

President Thabo Mbeki sent shockwaves through the Free State Province with his announcement of Beatrice Marshoff as premier. There are many speculations surrounding the reasons for the President's decision to appoint Marshoff which include the alleviation of poverty, the neutralising of factions in the Free State ANC, ensuring equity among ANC premiers and/or a message to the coloured community. She was originally placed 37<sup>th</sup> on the ANC candidates list and later moved to 22<sup>nd</sup> place on the list. Whatever the President's

reasons the decision has not been welcomed in all sectors and some of the ANC branches are threatening to boycott the 2005 municipal elections mainly because the ANC's number one candidate Ace Magashule was sidelined. Mr Magashule has urged all sectors to support the President's decision and the Premier. The opposition parties in the Free State have pledged their support to the Premier but have urged her not to let the North-South factions interfere with development and poverty alleviation in the province.<sup>14</sup>

Francis Beatrice Henney was born on the 17 September 1957 in Bloemfontein. As a child Beatrice Marshoff attended the Dr. Blok School in Heidedal, a Bloemfontein suburb inhabited mainly by coloured residents, and later worked as at the Pelenomi hospital in the same suburb. Mr Izak Coetzee, principal of Dr Blok High School in Heidedal, stated that the Heidedal community was proud of the former nurse, the MEC of Social Development and now Premier. She matriculated from this school in 1975 with a first rate exemption. The Henney family is well known in the Free State and her nephew, Clarence Henney, was the first coloured member of the executive committee in the

1980's. This mother of three was sworn in as Premier of the Free State on the 26 April 2004 by Judge President J.P. Malherbe in the Fourth Raadsaal of the Free State Provincial Legislature. At her inaugural ceremony, the former MEC of Social Development, Premier Marshoff, said that she has personally experienced the suffering of the people of the Free State due to poverty. She has dedicated herself to improving the lives of the poor and has identified the Free State districts of Thabo Mofutsanyana (Eastern Free State) and Xhariep (Southern Free State) as developmental stumbling blocks in the fight against poverty. The key issues which will receive attention, as mentioned in her inaugural speech, includes AIDS, poverty and crime<sup>15</sup>

There have been a number of changes made to the leadership of the province after the 2004 elections. There have been shifts in the opposition parties' representation. The New National Party (NNP) has lost both seats in the legislature, the Democratic Alliance (DA) gained a seat, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) retained the seat and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) is the new kid on the block

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*

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<sup>14</sup> Pretorius, 2004: p2 and Coetzee, 2004:p 2.

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<sup>15</sup> Coetzee, 2004: 2; Pretorius, 2004:1; Pretorius, 2004:4; and Mokoale, 2004:1

managing to get one seat in the legislature.

The changes in the seats of the legislature are as follows:

Party	No. of Votes		% of Votes		No. of Seats	
	2004	1999	2004	1999	2004	1999
ANC	827338	881 381	81.78	80.79	25	25
DP	85714	58 163	8.47	5.33	3	2
FF	24946	22 996	2.47	2.11	1	1
NNP	8295	56 740	0.82	5.2	0	2
ACDP	13119	9827	1.3	0.90	1	0

(IEC, 2004)

The legislature consists of the following members:

**DA:**

Andries Botha  
Peter Frewen  
Basil Alexander

Adv. Pieter Geldenhuys, former DA-leader and member of the provincial legislature has retired and Mr Darryl Worth, who has occupied the other seat in the legislature since 1999, will now serve as a member of the National Council of Provinces. The Free State's two DA members to the National Assembly are Sandra Botha and Roy Jankielsohn.

**FF+:**

The FF+ retained its only seat in the legislature and Mr Abrie Oosthuizen was reinstated as FF+-leader and member of the provincial legislature.

**ACDP:**

The ACDP is a newly elected opposition party to the legislature. Mr Casper Nordier is the leader of the party and now also fills the one seat in the legislature.

**ANC members of the Provincial Legislature include the following:**

**ANC new members:**

**ANC old members reinstated:**

Ace Magashule  
Beatrice Marshoff  
Gertrude Mothupi  
Sakhiwe Belot  
Suzan Mnumzana  
Annah Buthelezi  
Charlotte Lobe  
Joel Mafareka  
Peter Khoarai  
Tate Makgoe  
Benny Molakoane  
Casca Mokitlane  
Peter Maloka  
Mxolisi Dukwana  
German Ramathebane  
Tony Marais  
Tjheta Mofokeng  
Benny Kotsoane  
Mrs Thoko Mofokeng  
Seiso Mohai  
Mr Playfair Morul  
Mantoa Thoabala  
Hnas Nketu  
Zanele Dlungwana

It is out of this list that a premier, a speaker, a deputy speaker and ten Members of the Executive Committee must be chosen. Mr Mxolisi Dukwana was unanimously re-elected as speaker of the Free State Legislature and Gertude Mothupi replaces Mr Innus Aukamp (NNP) as Deputy Speaker. The legislature also consists of two disabled members, i.e. Zanele Dlungwana and Thoko Mofokeng. The premier announced her team of MEC's on the 3 May 2004 after much speculation over the delay of this announcement. On Friday, 30 May 2004, the announcement was

postponed because some of the members apparently could not be reached and Judge President Malherbe was not available on Friday to swear in the MEC's which include:

Ace Magashule (Agriculture)  
Joel Mafareka (Sports, Arts, Culture, Science and Technology)  
Tate Makgoe (Safety and Security)  
Sakhiwe Belot (Health)  
Ouma Tsopo (Education)  
Benny Kotsane (Local Government and Housing)  
Seiso Mohai (Public Works, Roads and Transport)  
Playfair Morula (Finances)  
Dr. Benny Malakoane (Tourism, Economic and Environmental Affairs)  
Pat Dlungwana (Social Development)

Two key portfolios were given to women. Ouma Tsopo (Education) has served in the Free State Legislature since 1994. Her previously held portfolios include local government and housing, welfare, arts and culture and health. Pat Dlungwana (Social Development), a librarian from Qwaqwa has been a member of the Free State Legislature since 1999. Tsopo, Kotsane and Belot are the only remaining MEC's of the previous term (Pretorius, 2004: p1).

**ANC members of the National Assembly:**

Neo Masithela  
Butana Khmpela  
John Modisenyana  
Abram Salamuddi  
Godfrey Mosala  
Abram Radebe  
Aaron Mnguni  
Sefora Ntombela  
Pauline Khunai

Maureen Madumise  
Ruth Magau  
Magdeline Soty

**Members of the NCOP:**

Tutu Ralane  
Tsietso Setona  
Neels van Rooyen  
Sisi Mabe

With many asking “who has been selected from the North and who from the South” indicates that the North-South faction differences have not been totally resolved. The people of the Free State, however, do respect the President’s decision and premier Marshoff has the support of the people in the Free State in the fight for development and poverty alleviation in the province.

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## Western cape

### THE 2004 ELECTION RESULTS

#### What changes in the Western Cape?

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On April 14 2004, South Africa held its national and provincial elections. The people spoke loud and clear that they wanted the ANC to rule in all the provinces. Thabo Mbeki was sworn in as President on Freedom Day, the Premiers and National and Provincial Ministers have taken up their portfolios, and the work of the government for the next five years is already in motion. As politicians return to the routine business of their profession, political pundits continue with post-mortem exercises on the elections. During the elections, all eyes were on the Western Cape. There was little doubt that the ANC would get the majority of support, as it did in the previous election. It was the margin of that majority that was the subject of speculation and crucial. For, in 1999, despite receiving the majority of support, the ANC did not gain control of the provincial legislature as the DP and NNP formed an alliance. Would it be able to secure an absolute majority this time? Would the NNP, with whom it formed an alliance for this election,

bring in sufficient votes? Question marks surrounded the Premiership as Rasool, Skwatsha and Van Schalkwyk had their eye on the prize position. All these questions have been answered. The focus of this article is to assess the more micro trends in party support and the implications of the results for future politics in the Western Cape.

**Table 1: Provincial Election Results: Western Cape Registered Population: 2220283**

Party	Results	%
United Christian Dem. Party	3575	0.23
Inkatha Freedom Party	2222	0.14
Freedom Front Plus	9705	0.62
United Democratic Movement	27489	1.75
African National Congress	709052	45.25
Pan African Congress	6524	0.42
Azanian People's Organisation	1455	0.09
African Christian Dem. Party	53934	3.44
New National Party	170469	10.88
African Muslim Party	11019	0.7
Green Party of SA	3317	0.21
Cape Peoples Congress	1960	0.13
Democratic Alliance	424832	27.11
Moderate Independent Party	953	0.06
Nationale Aksie	2248	0.14
Universal Party	735	0.05
Peace and Dev. Party	789	0.05
Independent Democrats	122867	7.84
Peace and Justice Congress	3278	0.21
New Labour Party	10526	0.67
Total Valid Votes	1566949	100
Spoilt Votes	15554	
<b>Percentage Poll</b>		<b>71.27</b>
<b>Total Votes Cast</b>	<b>1582503</b>	
<b>No. of special votes</b>	<b>26967</b>	

Source: Independent Electoral Commission web site [www.elections.org.za](http://www.elections.org.za) date accessed 4/17/2004.

The African National Congress was once again victorious in the Western Cape. Although the increase in support was not that huge, 45%, compared to 42% in 1999, this was sufficient for it to govern in alliance with the NNP. All the pre-election polls had indicated that the NNP was on the decline. This election showed how dramatic the decline has been, from 28% in 1999 to 11% in 2004, and this in the heartland of its support base. Conservative and previously staunch NP areas all shifted their vote to the DA. The DA more than doubled its support from 11% to 27%. The ID, too, for a party formed less than a year ago, surprised everyone, obtaining 8% of the votes.

If one breaks down the votes by municipality and voting districts, some interesting trends emerge. The ANC support in the Cape Metropole remains largely confined to African townships or to districts in which demographics have changed such that there is now a majority of Africans in the voting district. Contrary to popular belief, in Coloured townships like Mannenberg and Mitchells Plain, its support actually decreased. The ANC's strongest support is in the rural/peri-urban areas of the Western Cape, for example, in Robertson, Cederburg, Riversdale and Plettenberg

Bay where it secured more than 50% of the votes. These are predominantly Coloured areas where poverty is rife. The explanation for this, I believe to be twofold: first, the perceived threats in the metropole of having to unfairly compete with Africans are largely not applicable in these areas where the forms of employment are unskilled and seasonal; second, is the distinction, which has yet to receive serious attention, between the material and emotional well-being ushered in by ten years of democracy. New labour laws and an emphasis on human rights have conferred dignity and respect to workers in rural areas – where the severity of apartheid was more acutely felt. This, coupled with the little material gain, in the form of access to RDP housing, water and electricity, has had an effect on the population and we are seeing a corresponding shift in voting patterns. On the whole, increase in ANC support in the Western Cape can be attributed to the lessening of fears that accompanied the transition, changed demographics and to effective “meet the people” and “peoples contract” campaigning.

The DA has made definite inroads into both Coloured and White Afrikaner constituencies that were previously dominated by the NNP. For example, in the

Stellenbosch, George and Worcester municipalities and in areas like Brakenfell, Mitchells Plain, and Athlone it secured more votes than the NNP. It was only in the Paarl municipality that the NNP received more support than the DA, 20% compared to 18%. The NNP’s constituency thought it untrustworthy and contemptuous. It made a u-turn on its long held policy of “keep the ANC out,” and it hardly bothered to seek approval for this change in policy from its constituency. The NNP appears to have reached the end of its political career. It has been thrown a life-line by the ANC, but this will not last long. Many of its candidates will jump ship in the next local elections or floor crossing session.

Two questions become relevant here: has the DA reached its ceiling and how should we read the huge increase in support for the DA? Vincent Maphai asserted (SABC 2, 15/4/2004) that the DA has reached its ceiling. I think it is a statement that needs to be qualified for a lot depends on the future performance of the ID. De Lille and Leon are competing for the same constituencies. If the ID is not wracked by the same kind of fissures as befell the UDM, they will eclipse the DA. Already we can see that in white and middle class Coloured areas the ID has made an impact. De Lille has

far more potential than Leon for she has liberation credentials and can therefore appeal across the racial divide. It is doubtful that the DA will be able to make inroads into African areas and this it would have to do if it hopes to be able to secure the province. However, if the ID fails to consolidate and expand its support base, the DA will attract the vote that was given to the ID in this election and can therefore increase its numbers but not sufficient to rule, at least not in the next decade. Support for the DA was largely acquired on the belief that South Africa needs a strong opposition. The one-party state spectre looms large in the imagination of minority groups and has been played up by the DA. Tony Leon, unlike Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, is seen as having the necessary persona to present a vociferous oppositional challenge to the ANC.

There is a debate in South Africa as to whether voting patterns are interests or identity based. These are not mutually exclusive categories. In the Western Cape Africans predominantly vote for the ANC and it is both an interest and an identity based vote. Africans have a long history of association with this party and it is the only party that speaks to their needs and simultaneously has the potential to deliver

on those promises. Coloureds and Whites voted *en bloc* for the NNP in the past, with the DA maintaining the white liberal vote. These votes are now being spread between the ANC, DA and the ID. In the case of Coloureds, there is a clear class divide and a rural-urban split in voting patterns. What is also clear is that they do not vote for parties representing Coloureds *per se*, for example, the Cape Peoples Congress or the New Labour Party. Nor does religion determine voting patterns for parties focusing on this issue, for example, African Christian Democratic Party or African Muslim Party, did not draw significant support either.

The election results produced the following Cape Provincial Parliament:

Party	1999	Floor crossing	2004
ANC	18	22	19
ACDP	1	2	2
DA	5	7	12
ID			3
NNP	17	10	5
UDM	1	1	1

From this we can note that the ANC's hold on the province is a tenuous one. It therefore has to ensure that its alliance with the NNP remains intact and that it delivers during the next five years. Van Schalkwyk was well rewarded for sacrificing his party when he received a Deputy Ministerial position at National Cabinet and, at the provincial level, two NNP candidates were included in the cabinet. The

rivalry between the Africanist faction headed by Mcebese Skwatsha and the non-racialism faction headed by Rasool, that was highlighted by the media in the run up to the submission of party lists, has largely been silenced. Skwatsha has been given the portfolio of public works and Lynne Browne that of finance. These are key positions for delivery focused on creating employment through the public works programme in the Western Cape. Ebrahim Rasool has indicated that under his premiership, the factionalism in the Western Cape and the identity based issues will be resolved. In his words "Coloureds will be allowed to just be" and should no longer feel like the "sausage in the boerewors roll." Hopefully, we will see an end to the racialisation that has defined this province and its politics.

## Eastern cape

### **Election Results Outcome, Trends and Future Prospects**

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#### **Introduction**

This article discusses the results in the Eastern Cape focusing on the outcome and developments. It does so through an interpretation and analysis of the performance of political parties that contested the provincial election. First, it reviews the results. It then engages the performance of political parties, starting with the majority party the ANC, before changing focus to the official party the UDM and ends by discussing the minor parties.

#### **Review of Results**

Thirteen political parties contested the provincial poll. As predicted by pollsters, analysts and the media, the ANC won the provincial contest, registering 79.27 percent of the vote, ten percent above the national average of 69.68 percent, having 51 seats in the provincial legislature. The UDM maintained its official opposition status, registering 9.23 percent of the vote and 6 seats. The other parties represented in the provincial legislature are the DA, which

polled 7.34 percent of the vote and has 5 seats, followed by the PAC at one percent and one seat.

The rest of the parties performed as follows: ACDP (0.78), ID (0.78), NNP (0.63), FF Plus (0.26), FP (0.2), Azapo (0.17), Sopa (0.15), UCDP (0.12) NA (0.07).

In terms of turnout, the Eastern Cape had the highest turnout at 79.31 percent, three percent over the national average of 76.73 percent. The spoiled ballots in the province were 28 360 translating into 1.25 percent, lower than the national average of 1.6 percent.

As in most areas of the country, the election result was accepted by all parties as having been free and fair. Very few and minor objections were raised by political parties over the process.

#### ***The ANC***

The ANC continued its dominance of electoral politics in the Eastern Cape, although at 79.27 percent, the party has not managed to reach the 84.35 it won in 1994. However, the party did make some strides in terms of recouping some of the support it had lost to the

UDM in 1999, when it lost 10 percent.

Against the background of a lower national turnout (from 89 in 1994 percent to 76 in 2004) and the high figure of seven million eligible voters that did not register, the party falls far short of its 1994 support levels. Taken with its attainment of the two-thirds majority nationally, the significance of the ANC performance in the province is notable for its declined support. This is in direct contrast to the often-overstated fears by opposition parties of the ANC's dominance.

Significantly, analysis of provincial electoral figures indicate that the difference between the number of voters who voted for the party in 1994 and 2004 is 687 603, a 30 percent decline in real terms, just four percent lower than the 34 percent loss in 1999.

However, the party still maintains high levels of support provincially. The implications for the party at the national level where it has achieved a two-thirds majority for the first time, is thus not a new development in the province. The party has had more than a two-thirds majority provincially since 1994.

Therefore, in terms of national implications for the

party that it will come under increased pressure to deliver on its electoral promises in the next five years due to its increased majority, this does not appear to be a glaring imperative in the Eastern Cape.

Its success in the provincial ballot can largely be ascribed to its delivery credentials since 1994 especially between 1999 and 2004. Contrary to popular images of non-delivery by the ANC, in poor provinces such as the Eastern Cape, the expansionary budget of the government, especially in the past three years has clearly benefited voters.

In addition, the national government's decisive intervention to deal with issues that were hampering delivery such as corruption played a large part in convincing the electorate, as well as the planned change in policy towards HIV AIDS in terms of rolling out services with regard to the pandemic.

### ***The UDM***

A notable feature about Eastern Cape politics is that it is the only province where the ANC's dominance since 1994, has come under challenge. The UDM, in its first electoral contest in the 1999 election, managed to cut down the ANC's dominance by around ten percent. However, the UDM's support declined in the interim, largely due to

the floor crossing legislation in 2003 that nearly annihilated the party. In 2004, it won 9.23 percent, although it fell short of the 14 percent it won in 1999. Even then, considering the serious loss of MPs nationally in 2003, the party has indicated some resilience managing to retain its status as the official opposition.

This seriously puts into question the tacit view pervasive in South African opposition politics that the ANC dominance is unchallengeable and thus parties just have to position themselves as strong opposition.

The UDM's decline has been ascribed to the party's inability to develop distinct and clear policies to that of the ANC, especially in terms of economic policy. The two parties differ in terms of detail in implementation of economic policy – not the fundamentals.

The popularity of the party in 1999 was due to its strong challenge to the ANC on emotive issues around governance and corruption. However, the ANC's major focus on these issues in between 1999 and 2004, undercut the UDM's main election platform. Similarly, the UDM's reliance on these issues, especially HIV AIDS were watered down by the ANC's policy changes.

The party's serious decline was registered in the former

Transkei stronghold of Umtata, where it lost power to the ANC. Much of the electoral contest between these two parties was fought largely in that area, with the ANC still being dominant in other parts of the province.

In terms of implications for the future, there does not appear to be much that the UDM can do to increase its influence on provincial policy in the next five years, given that it has declined in strength from 1999.

### ***The Other Parties***

The DA occupies position three in the provincial legislature. However, in longitudinal terms - in direct reflection of national trends - the party has been steadily increasing its support, although marginally: in 1994 it only managed 2 percent of the vote, increasing this to 6.29 in 1999 and 7.34 in 2004. Thus, considering its stature at the national level (12.37), percent the DA's power in the province is negligible and is overshadowed by the contests between the ANC and UDM.

Conversely, the PAC in reflection of its national status has shown a steady decline in the Eastern Cape. In 1994 it gained 2 percent of the poll, decreased to 1.14 in 1999 and managed one percent in 2004.

Thus, the party's difficulty in maintaining its national

status as a major former liberation movement is reflected in the province. This is particularly so given that this is one of its strongholds. Since 1994, the party has only managed to have consistent representation provincially in the Eastern Cape. Much of the blame for its poor showing is internal leadership battles, with the provincial branch noted for its opposition to the current leadership - a factor underlined by the observation that in the election period its leader Dr Pheko, did not make an appearance in the province.

The ACDP has shown its resilience as one of the successful post 1994 parties. In 1994 it managed 0.51, in 1999, 0.96 and in 2004 0.78 percent.

The surprise party in the 2004 election has been hailed as the newly formed ID headed by Patricia De Lille. However, in the Eastern Cape the party has not made any impact with its 0.78 percent showing, failing to have any representation in the provincial legislature.

The NNP's slow death nationally is emphasised in its performance in the Eastern Cape since 1994. In the first election it registered 9.83 percent, becoming the official opposition to the ANC. In 1999, it was displaced by the UDM and defeated by the DP when it

declined to 3.2 and in 2004 it had but all disappeared from provincial politics registering 0.78 percent of the poll and having no representation in the provincial legislature.

There is very little to mention about the remaining parties six parties as they all share less than one percent of the poll.

### **Conclusion**

The results generally reflect what is happening on the national level. The ANC's dominance continues. Although the party was shaken somewhat in 1999, it has managed to regain some of its lost power.

The UDM has maintained its official opposition status at a reduced majority, whilst the DA is steadily increasing its support. The other parties are minor players and are just surviving whilst the NNP has been seriously decimated.

The interesting feature of provincial politics will be to see how the ANC performs considering its increased mandate and whether opposition parties will be able to survive. This is especially so with regard to the latter given that there are significant numbers of voters that did not register for the election but can still be drawn into the process in 2009.

## Northern cape

### The Review of the 2004 National and Provincial Elections The Case of the Northern Cape

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The Northern Cape has recently joined the club of two-thirds majority provinces, when the ANC managed to win 68,83 percent of the provincial vote. The ANC support in the province has been steadily growing since the first democratic election in 1994. Other than the ANC, these are the other political parties that managed to get into the provincial legislature: DA, NNP, ID, UCDP, and the VF+. There are only six political parties that managed to get into the provincial legislature out of 12 political parties that contested the elections in the province. While only four parties managed to get into the legislature in the 1994 and 1999 national and provincial elections.

Party	Votes			Seats		
	1994	1999	2004	1994	1999	2004
ACDP	-	-	5 995			1
ANC	200 839	210 837	219 365	15	20	21
DA	7 567	15 632	35 297	1	1	3
ID	-	-	22 485		-	2
NNP	163 452	79 214	23 970	12	8	2
VF+	24 117	5 446	4 948	2	1	1

Political parties represented in the Northern Cape provincial legislature in the past three national and provincial elections are indicated in the table above.

The opposition in the province is becoming more and more fragmented compared to the first democratic election of 1994, when there was a strong NNP (which was then known as the National Party), which had managed to get 40,48 percent of the provincial vote and 12 seats in the legislature. It seems there was then a hope amongst its supporters that it could get its hands onto power and when they realised that this was not the case, it started to lose support. The biggest beneficiaries of the NNP weaknesses in 1999, was the ANC. But in this years election a number of political parties made inroads into its support base, with the DA and the ID becoming the major beneficiaries.

The DA has also taken over from the NNP as the official opposition in the province. The NNP had appeared resigned to forming a coalition government with the ANC in the province but the good performance by the incumbent meant that the ANC would hardly need the NNP to rule the province. The Northern Cape has since joined the club of those provinces where the ANC

has a two-thirds majority. The NNP's hope that there might be a need of a coalition government in the Northern Cape were not completely misplaced because in the 1994 election the combined support of the opposition was almost equal to the ANC support. In fact, the number of seats the ANC had in the legislature was equal to that of the opposition parties. The NNP had 12, FF+ 2, and the DA had one seat.

This scenario had led to the speculation that should there be a province out of the seven controlled by the ANC where it could be unsettled, it had to be in the Northern Cape. The NNP was the main threat to the ANC's support base, shed votes in the 1999 election and the ANC won 64,32 percent of the votes; gaining almost 15 percent of the votes, while the NNP lost more than 15 percent. The relatively good performance of the ANC in the past decade has seen the opposition parties losing hope of unseating the ANC. Even the steadily growing DA conceded that its main concern in the province was to be the main opposition, a position they were able to obtain.

The provincial legislature also welcomed a new player in the form of the Independent Democrats. This party had come about as

a result of the introduction of the floor-crossing legislation and Patricia de Lille its leader defected from the PAC to form this party. This province was one of the few where this party received significant support. It gained two seats in the legislature surpassing two established parties in the form of the ACDP and the Freedom Front, which each obtained one seat. Her former political party did not get even a single seat in this province, as was the case in the previous elections. One striking thing about these political parties is that improved fortunes in the province appear to have been achieved at the expense of the NNP. The NNP has seen its representation in the provincial legislature reduced from twelve seats in 1994 to two seats in this year's elections.

### **Acceptance of the Results**

None of the political parties that contested the Northern Cape raised any objections to the election results. There were complaints that were lodged with the IEC in the province, but these were not serious. The IEC believes that the Party Liaison Committees played huge role in this respect, as all disputes were dealt with by these structures. Even the NNP, that has seen its fortunes dwindle, has not attributed its misfortune to electoral fraud. There seemed to be a consensus in the province

that the ANC had done its homework and deserved the votes it received.

The polls had predicted that the FF+ would lose its only seat in the province, but it managed to retain almost the same number of votes it received in 1999, revealing that its core supporters have not decided to abandon it. The increase of political parties in the legislature gives the indication that the Northern Cape vote is very fluid. Most political parties appear to have been satisfied with the results and what they had achieved and even the NNP defied the opinion poll predictions that it was likely to get less than two percent of the provincial votes. It is still the third largest party in the province with 7, 52 percent of the votes.

The fact that the electoral process is relatively transparent in South Africa makes it difficult for those parties that do not win to challenge results but it also make it difficult for the ruling party to manipulate it. The other factor that minimises possible dispute is that most of our political parties send party agents in their strongholds and do not normally bother to go to those areas where they are historically weaker. This was also evident during the campaign process, where most parties put lamppost posters in their traditional strongholds. This might be

influenced to some extent by the availability of resources and most political parties might prefer to consolidate their position before they can embark on any ambitious campaign. These factors however, might lead to political parties failing to notice fraud when it takes place outside their traditional support areas.

### **Post Election Review**

President Thabo Mbeki had no problem appointing Dipuo Peters as the new Premier of the Northern Cape. This was after John Block; the former MEC for Transport, Roads and Public Works had resigned from his position and all official positions within the ANC after allegations of corruption, to which he later admitted. There were elements within the ANC that believed that John Block had been unfairly treated but this does not seem to have impacted on the fortunes of the ANC in the election, as it consolidated its position. It should be remembered that Dipuo Peters is from the Kimberly region, which is the strongest, and the largest ANC region in the province, while John Block comes from Upington, the second strongest ANC region. After the demise of John Block it was no surprise when Dipuo Peters was appointed as the provincial premier, as she was widely tipped and has a support from the ANC Youth League and other party structures in the province.

It appears that the opposition parties were overwhelmed by the ANC's performance in the province in terms of service delivery. The opposition appeared resigned to occupying the opposition benches in the provincial legislature. This is despite the fact that the Northern Cape voters appear to be prepared to change their

allegiances. This was also proved in the current elections but most parties seem not prepared to spend a lot of resources in a province where votes are few and this appears to have worked to the ANC's favour. It appears to have consolidated its support.

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**Mpumalanga**

**MPUMALANGA: OVERALL ELECTION RESULTS**

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A total of twelve political parties contested the Mpumalanga provincial elections this year. With a registered population of 1442 472 and a 78.30% voter turn out, this was a fairly good response and an enthusiastic participation in the electoral process by the voters in Mpumalanga. The election results show that the ANC gained 86.3% of the votes cast – a 1.47% increase on the 84.83% that the party obtained in the 1999 elections. Also, the 2004 election results show that the ANC has consolidated its position by increasing its membership of the provincial legislature from 26 to 27. In other words, the party currently holds a 90% share of the provincial legislature membership, which strengthens its grip on

power in the provincial government.

**Parties represented in the legislature**

Party	Results	%	Seats
ANC	959 436	86.3	27
DA	77 119	6.94	2
FF+	13 732	1.24	1
CDP	12 065	1.09	0
UDM	11 161	1.0	0
IFP	10 643	0.96	0
PAC	7 668	0.69	0
NNP	5 122	0.46	0
ID	3 406	0.31	0
AZAPO	2 113	0.19	0
UCDP	1 878	0.17	0
SOPA	1 424	0.13	0

The opposition component of the current provincial legislature has also shrunk and at the same appears to have consolidated around the DA. The party also increased its electoral support by 246%, from 4.48% in 1999 (when it was still called DP) to 6.94% in 2004. This performance gained the party one extra seat and it currently holds two seats in the legislature.

The NNP and the UDM lost each of their sole seats in the legislature. The FF+ retained its sole seat in the legislature.

As the table above shows, only three of the twelve political parties that contested the election performed well enough to gain seats and therefore representation in the 30-member provincial legislature.

All the political parties generally accepted the election results. However, six political parties in the province lodged complaints with the Electoral Court against some IEC officials in the Msukaligwa Municipality, in Ermelo. The DA, IFP, PAC, ACDP and SOPA had claimed that the Electoral Code was violated when several presiding officers allegedly allowed some voters to cast their votes twice as well as by allowing people to vote outside their districts without completing the required forms. It is not clear though whether or not these complaints have been formally dealt with by the Electoral Court. Nonetheless, the complaints do not appear

to amount to full-scale evidence that warrants questioning the legitimacy and fairness of the overall poll in the province.

### **Possible Implications For Politics, Governance And Conduct In The Legislature**

The Mpumalanga election results confirmed most of the predictions that analysts made – that the ANC would be returned to power in the province, that the NNP would collapse and that the DA would become the biggest opposition party in the province. However, the results seem to send mixed messages. On the one hand, the slight increase in the ANC's support could suggest that the issue of administrative corruption and the generally poor quality of governance and political leadership in the province were not major concerns for many voters and therefore did not damage the party's electoral prospects to the extent hoped by opposition parties. Some of the political parties, such as the DA, had attempted to raise corruption and poor political leadership in the province as election issues against the ANC. This may also suggest that uppermost in the voters' list of priorities were bread and butter issues rather than the quality of governance. Many voters in this predominantly rural province with high levels of poverty are concerned to see

the provision of basic services such as water, sanitation and basic health care services extended to them. Many voters in the province see the ANC, as an incumbent, as capable of meeting their expectations.

On the other hand, the increase in the electoral support for the DA could be interpreted in more than one way. Firstly, it could suggest that the DA's confrontational stance in raising the issues of corruption and the poor quality of governance in the province received endorsement from a significant section of the electorate in the province. In other words, by raising these issues, the party may have tapped into a well of concerns about the issue of governance in the province, that the ANC would be well advised to take into account. Secondly, the DA's slight increase in its support base could merely be a consolidation of the racial polarisation that appears to have crystallised in Mpumalanga over the last few years. For instance, the composition of the current Mpumalanga provincial legislature shows that it will have a predominantly white opposition component made up of the DA and the Freedom Front Plus, while the ruling party (ANC) is a predominantly black African political party. It appears that the DA has picked up the collapsing support of the NNP – one of the

predominantly white opposition parties in the province, while the ANC benefited from the loss of support by the UDM – another predominantly black African political party. This is the result of a clear racial alignment and polarisation among voters in the province.

The implications of this apparent racial voting pattern among the voters in the province, and the seeming racial polarisation in the provincial legislature's membership, for politics in general and for opposition versus ruling party tactics inside the legislature are worth exploring briefly. In terms of implications for politics in general, the appearance of racial alignment between political representation and composition of party membership inside the Mpumalanga legislature could inject a racial hue to the politics of governance in the province. This might obstruct healthy political interaction between the ruling party and the opposition in the province, with an added danger that the legislature's overseeing function over the government might be reduced in its significance.

In terms of implications for opposition versus ruling party tactics inside the legislature, significant changes are set to follow. In the previous term of the

legislature, the racial element of political conduct in the legislature was muted to a large extent in that the opposition component was not entirely made up of predominantly white political parties. For instance, one of the opposition parties (UDM) in the legislature was a black political party. In addition, the ANC had given the UDM the chairmanship of the all-important Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). This committee is traditionally chaired by a senior member of the opposition but the move served to ensure that UDM was, to some extent, less confrontational in its interaction with the ruling party than was the DA.

Also, in spite of its image as one of the predominantly white political parties in the province, the NNP was in an alliance with the ANC not only at national level, but also at provincial level. This worked out in favour of the ANC in that three out of the four opposition parties in the provincial legislature ganged up to outvote the DA as the official opposition party based on its largest share of voter support after the 1999 election, and installed the ANC's alliance partner (NNP) as the official opposition in the province. The results of all these tactical moves ensured that the DA, which has traditionally adopted a very aggressive and confrontational stance

against the ANC in the legislature, remained a lone, even if very vocal role player, inside the provincial legislature. This, however, did not necessarily reduce its effectiveness as an opposition party.

This time around, the failure of the NNP and UDM to gain seats in the provincial legislature guarantees that the DA will assume the mantle of official opposition in the legislature. With its representation increased to two members, it is expected that that DA will adopt its traditional vocal and aggressive stance in its tactics against the ANC. Also, it is virtually certain that the DA will not be given the chairmanship of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. There are no strict regulations governing the political affiliations of committee chairs. Therefore, there is a possibility that the ANC-dominated legislature will decide to keep the position to itself rather than give it to a member of one of the two opposition parties in the current legislature. If this turns out to be the case, then this is guaranteed to lead to higher levels of tension and adversarial relations between the ruling party and the opposition component of the legislature. It is not clear what the effects of this would be on the much more pronounced racial element of the membership of the current legislature.

Of course the ANC has another tactical option. It could give the chair of this committee to the sole member of the Freedom Front Plus. The Freedom Front Plus has traditionally not been as aggressive in its stance towards the ANC as the DA has been over the years. Giving this position to it may serve to drive a wedge between the two predominantly white opposition parties, thus buying a certain level of sympathy from the FF+ in the legislature. This move may serve to neutralise the expected increased potency of opposition versus ruling party confrontations and therefore the racial politics of the legislature. However, this may turn the Standing Committee on Public Accounts into a potent tool because in the previous committees, Joe Nkunah of the UDM, was seen as more conciliatory to the ruling party than the member of the Freedom Front Plus.

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