



Promoting Credible Elections and
Democratic Governance in Africa

ELECTION UPDATE 2006

SOUTH AFRICA
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION DAY

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KWAZULU-NATAL

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Election Observation and Monitoring

Observation and monitoring during the local government elections in KwaZulu-Natal was officially carried out by the Community Law and Rural Development Centre (CLRDC). The CLRDC worked in collaboration with Justice and Peace in co-ordinating the recruitment, training and deployment of

poll observers. A total of 1100 observers were deployed to various polling stations on election day. Observers indicated that for the most part, voting stations opened on time. Of those that did not, there was a delay of half an hour or so. In some areas voting queues began to form well before voting stations opened. Despite this, however, the general trend was that voting stations received fewer voters than were registered. The official observer mission report claimed that there were a few incidences of

concern in KwaZulu-Natal during the elections but that these “could not have compromised the free expression of voters and the fairness of the March 1st 2006 local government elections.” As a result the elections were deemed free, fair and credible.¹ According to the report the incidences of concern included the delivery of incorrect ballot papers to some voting stations, thus holding up the voting process. Political

¹ Preliminary Observer Mission Report, Langelihle Mtshali, CLRDC, 3 March 2006

party campaigning at some entrances to polling stations was also reported. The usage of computer scan machines and the voters roll to check whether voters were registered was reported at some polling stations to have delayed voting and complaints ensued about standing in long queues in the hot sun. There were also reports that at some polling stations, voters were told they had to be introduced to the local *inkosi* (chief) before they could cast their votes. There were also disputes at a couple of polling stations over ballot papers not tallying with the number of ballot papers issued.

Inter- and Intra-Party Relations

Political violence in KwaZulu-Natal before and after the election is still alarmingly pervasive according to violence monitor, Mary de Haas. Indeed the African National Congress (ANC) has gone so far as to propose an intelligence driven strategy to root out what it has termed 'war lords' in the province – this strategy would stem from the Department of Safety and Security. The ANC claims that 23 of its members and politicians have been assassinated in the province over the last couple of months:

- Nsizwazethu Thusi – Umshati ward 6 candidate killed on 9 February

- Mzo Mavundla- Msinga activist killed on 9 February
- Three members of the Duma family – ANC supporters in Durban killed on 10 February
- Musa Masondo – Nongoma ward candidate killed on 16 February
- Zakhele Cele – Shobashobane councillor killed on 4 March along with three colleagues, Nkosingiphile Mavundla, Moses Gambushe and Mandla Cele
- Masikito Mzila- Ntembisweni candidate killed on 22 March
- Veli Nyawo – Ngwavuma treasurer killed on 23 March
- Ephraim Mkizhe – Emhubeni branch chairman killed on April 2 along with colleague Nathi Dladla
- Nine ANC Mpangeni township supporters killed between December 2005 and March 2006
- Mzo Sokhulu – uMsinga voter killed on 7 February because he said he was going to vote for the ANC.

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) responded to the ANC's intelligence driven proposal with the claim that the ANC was merely trying to score political points by politicising the killings in the province. An IFP spokesman claimed that "The truth is that we have a list (of assassinated members)

longer than theirs."² De Haas argues that there are still areas in KwaZulu-Natal where people are too afraid to support the party of their choice for fear of being victimised or intimidated.

According to political analyst Laurence Piper, "The 2006 local government elections in KZN were memorable for confirming the beginning of a new era of ANC politics at the expense of the IFP. As such, they promise greater peace and prosperity, but also throw up new challenges of accountability and inclusion."³ Indeed the IFP has, in the wake of the elections, incurred a range of setbacks while the ANC has had to face the challenge of consolidating local government's mandate of providing equitable service delivery and fostering public participation at local levels.

Growing debate within IFP ranks regarding leadership style and dwindling electoral support prompted the party to convene a special congress in Umlazi during the first week of April. Some days before the congress, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi was quoted as saying, "I am ready to walk out of this weekend's IFP special conference, never to come back on the public stage of politics. I am not offering my resignation to seek a new statutory

² *Mercury*, 7 April 2006

³ *Witness*, 4 March 2006

mandate. I am offering to resign in order to encourage an open debate about our party's identity purpose and function."⁴ Indeed Buthelezi made good on his claim by resigning during the congress only to be re-elected by the IFP leadership and the deliberating committees some two hours later. According to political analyst Zakhele Ndlovu a change of leadership for the IFP is not possible at this stage because there are no clearly defined successors to Buthelezi and his having led the party for some thirty years makes him somewhat immovable.⁵ Indeed although the party's secretary general, Musa Zondi and national chairman, Zanele Magwaza could be potential candidates for leadership, they are both known as "die hard Buthelezi loyalists".⁶ With regards the IFP's poor showing during the local government elections, blame was laid squarely on the IEC and the lack of state resources. Buthelezi proclaimed that "the entire state apparatus with all its organs and branches were twisted, warped and perverted to become instruments of the ruling party's electoral agenda and machinery."⁷ He went on to argue that a lack of finances impaired IFP campaigning. IFP Youth Brigade leader

Thulasizwe Buthelezi added that the poor election results were due to "widespread electoral fraud and vote rigging". He added that the IFP did not believe their complaints to the IEC were dealt with satisfactorily⁸

The IFP has also faced various external challenges in the form of the splinter group, the National Democratic Convention (NADECO). NADECO was formed by ex IFP members who accused IFP leadership of being dictatorial and failing to observe good democratic practice. NADECO then went to establish itself as an opposition party in the elections. Since then, however, it has accused the IFP of planting "spies" within its ranks. This has lead to NADECO suspension of its eThekweni deputy regional chairman, Mandlakayise Magubane as he is suspected of corresponding with the IFP on NADECO matters.⁹ Fears at NADECO of IFP infiltration were first raised when three of its members defected back to the IFP claiming that, "We have as a matter of principle and with a clear conscience, decided we cannot fool ourselves any longer and we want to return to our political home... To us NADECO is a one man fan club with no independent identity, trying desperately to use the same principles as

those of the IFP to attract support... We now realise that everything that was put to us, that the IFP was not democratic, that it was a leadership cult etc. was in reality what we had joined."¹⁰ An IFP spokesman claimed that many IFP members had been 'taken for a ride' by NADECO and now, that they had realised this, would be returning to the IFP in their majority.¹¹

Challenges for the New Local Authorities

The ANC, freshly victorious at local level in KwaZulu-Natal, faces multiple challenges pertaining to service delivery and participation. Political analyst Laurence Schlemmer claims that more than 50% of South African municipalities are "dysfunctional" or "severely challenged".¹² He adds that these municipalities suffer from poor management of finances and failings in their performance of service delivery and development tasks. Schlemmer asserts that problems around service delivery also exist in the stronger municipalities and that some 6000 demonstrations and protests over poor service delivery have taken place over the past year by residents groups, activists and voluntary organisations.

⁴ *Sunday Tribune*, 9 April 2006

⁵ *Mercury*, 7 April 2006

⁶ *Sunday Times*, 9 April 2006

⁷ *Witness*, 10 April 2006

⁸ *Mercury*, 10 April 2006

⁹ *Mercury*, 4 May 2006

¹⁰ *Sunday Tribune*, 23 April 2006

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² *Sunday Tribune*, 26 February 2006

According to Piper some 15% of these nationwide protests have occurred in KwaZulu-Natal. Piper claims that KwaZulu-Natal has recorded 700 legal protests over service delivery in the last couple of years and 132 illegal ones.

Testimony from Durban squatter residents illustrates the challenges facing local authorities in eThekweni metro alone. A member of a 20 000 strong movement Abahali Base Majondolo representing squatters in 35 areas, expressed his concerns regarding housing and service delivery. S'bu Zikode a resident of the Kennedy Road squatter camp argued that acquiring the attention of the city's political leaders was a challenge on its own. His movement was forced to become assertive after the realisation that community leaders were commanding no respect from municipal officials. Movement leaders arranged for the council offices to be invaded by some twenty homeless families. Recently the movement won its motion to be able to protest after notifying authorities as opposed to officially requesting permission. Zikode claims that his movement is advocating for homes and better services. He says that 6000 people live in his squatter camp and share 170 toilets among them.

The Foreman road squatter camp, not far away houses 8000 squatters who share 5 toilets. The irony in this, he adds, is that the toilets were built by the apartheid government. Zikode points out that Durban ratepayers money is used to build some 16000 homes a year but that this cannot meet the backlog of the 800 000 shack dwellers in Durban. Furthermore, he points out that politicians' claims that shack dwellers should not live in illegal settlements that are not serviced are unhelpful, at best, because these people have no choice. Most of them are from rural areas and have flocked into the metro for employment. Zikode contends that, "This movement was established out of anger. Politicians run around like mad asking for our votes today, and tomorrow when you ask them to keep the promises they made, they set the police on you."¹³ He adds that the council's attitude to his movement has been less than conciliatory. Ever since its establishment Abahali's marches have been banned, and police have tear-gassed, beaten and arrested its members.

Inherent in the above testimony are issues not just of equitable service delivery but also of local authorities failing to make meaningful contact with constituencies in order to foster

participation. Unfortunately this situation seems set to continue in KwaZulu-Natal under the new administration. Ward 80 in Umlazi is a case in point. Shortly after the elections Umlazi residents protested violently against the re-election of ANC councillor, Bhekisisa Xulu in ward 80. They barricaded roads and set tyres alight and police had to intervene with tear gas and rubber bullets. The protesters argued that Xulu had rigged the vote; they added that they did not want Xulu representing them as he had been in office for the past ten years but failed to deliver on basic services. Protesters also claimed that despite the fact that they were members of the ANC, they had never been part of the party's candidate nomination process when wards chose their candidates for elections. They claimed that they were merely informed by the ANC's branch executive committee in the area that the party had selected the candidate. An Umlazi protester stated, "We were never given the chance to choose who we wanted to stand as a candidate for our ward."¹⁴ The main motivation for the local government election system incorporating a constituency representative element in the form of ward councillors is to ensure that local communities are accurately represented in their municipalities. In the Umlazi

¹³ "Speaking Out for the Poor", *Mercury*, 8 March 2006

¹⁴ *Daily News*, 3 March 2006

ward 80 case, it is unlikely that local community members' needs will be represented effectively by a councillor whom they did not legitimise. A further problem highlighted by ward 80 is that local communities do not seem to completely understand the role their ward councillor is supposed to play or the limitations of his/her mandate. Claiming that "he failed to deliver services" suggests that there is an expectation that a ward councillor has the means and authority to single-handedly confer services on the community. A ward councillor's role is, in fact, to communicate his/her community's needs within the municipality thus ensuring that decisions made regarding services take into consideration community concerns and fulfil community needs. Ward councillors are also mandated to encourage community participation in the affairs of local government through ward committees and public meetings.

Aside from issues of representation and fostering participation the ANC at local level, KwaZulu-Natal is also struggling with administrative challenges which can only hinder the smooth roll out of services. Among these is infighting within municipal executive committees such as the Umgungundlovu district municipality. The ANC was forced to dissolve the

committee because of intense fighting over the nomination of mayoral candidates. The dissolution took place two weeks after the elections. An ANC member was quoted as saying that the committee was dissolved because of its "failure to exercise its political authority". He added that this was a serious problem in the ANC.¹⁵

The IFP has also experienced administrative setbacks in its councils after the elections. Just days after its inauguration, the crisis prone Abaqulasi (Vryheid) municipality voted out its municipal manager Bamba Ndwandwe. Local Government MEC Mike Mabuyakhulu warned the council that it would be held responsible should Ndwandwe's exit package be found to be irregular. It is rumoured that the golden handshake on the grounds of 'negative trust' would cost the municipality R750 000. Reports abound, however, that Ndwandwe's dismissal was an act of revenge by councillors after they claimed he was instrumental in the council's dissolution in November 2005.¹⁶ Reports are that Ndwandwe, who was the council's accounting officer, had advised councillors about a number of activities that were taking place which were illegal. The council however continued to operate as

normal. Ndwandwe then notified the office of Local Government MEC resulting in the dissolution of the council.¹⁷ Ndwandwe's position was then temporarily filled by corporate services manager, Bongani Thusi who only occupied the position for a week before calling in sick and being hospitalised. The shifts and vacuum in the municipal management position has severely affected the running of the municipality. Backlogs have accumulated and links between administrative and political components have broken down.¹⁸ The IFP led uPongolo municipality has also been experiencing problems after the elections. Political bickering among council members forced the party's oversight committee to call for the resignation of Mayor Bheki Mncwango and his brother, council speaker Rasta Mncwango. The Mncwango brothers had occupied the same positions before the 2006 elections but failed to win the wards they had contested and were left out of the council because they did not feature on the party's original proportional representation list. The list was however, reviewed by Albert Mncwango (IFP national organiser) enabling them to return to the council in their former positions. This caused uproar among councillors in the municipalities who refused

¹⁵ *Mercury*, 21 March 2006

¹⁶ *Witness*, 24 March 2006

¹⁷ *Witness*, 21 March 2006

¹⁸ *Witness*, 3 May 2006

to acknowledge the Mncwangos as legitimate office holders.¹⁹ Disruptions such as these clearly have a negative bearing on the general functioning of the municipality effectively slowing down delivery of services and de-prioritising issues of participation.

Both the ANC and IFP election manifestos highlighted the need to improve service delivery and community participation at local levels. The ANC pledged to increase skills and capacity of municipal politicians and officials in order to make their roles more effective. It also promised to strengthen popular forums such as ward committees and IDP consultations in order to facilitate public participation.²⁰ Likewise the IFP pledged to provide ward councillor training and to work closely with communities in terms of consultation and communication in order to ensure that community views influence municipal decisions.²¹ These election

¹⁹ *Mercury*, 13 April 2006

²⁰ African National Congress 2006 Election Manifesto and Mamledia Johnson, DDP Political Forum, Local Government Elections, Durban, January 15 2006

²¹ Inkatha Freedom Party 2006 Local Government Election Manifesto and Dr Buthelesi, DDP Political Forum, Local Government Elections, Durban, 15 January 2006 Inkatha Freedom Party 2006 Local Government Election Manifesto and Dr Buthelesi, DDP Political Forum,

promises are in line with the current national campaign to strengthen community participation in local government as well as through ward councillors and ward committees. Special focus is to be placed on municipalities where there have been protests over poor service delivery. KwaZulu-Natal has been identified as a province where ward committees are severely under utilised as a channel through which communities can lodge their complaints to their municipalities.²² The role of ward councillors also needs to be strengthened.

Interface between Local Authorities and the Traditional Leadership Structures

Another pressing issue for local authorities in KwaZulu-Natal is that of traditional authorities. During the early part of 2006, the provincial legislature passed the KwaZulu-Natal Leadership and Governance Act. The legislation recognises the Zulu monarch and accords it the responsibility of appointing *amakhosi* (traditional leaders) in the province. The legislation is also expected to make an impact on service delivery as it sets out conditions for traditional leaders and elected councillors to work together in advancing the cause of development. In

Local Government Elections, Durban, 15 January 2006

²² *Daily News*, 14 March 2006

effect, it has been hailed as a way to align the institution of traditional leadership with elected public representatives. The legislation also paves the way for the establishment of district houses of traditional leadership. These will effectively mean that traditional councils which were once appointed by traditional leaders will now consist of democratically elected members. According to the Department of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs eleven local houses will be established by the end of June and the provincial house will be established by the end of July. The Department is also to focus on training traditional leadership about good democratic governance and partnering with local politicians. The legislation, in keeping with democratic principles, calls for greater participation by women and youth within traditional leadership circles.²³

FREE STATE

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The Counting Process

Procedures for the sorting of the ballot papers and the counting of votes are set out

²³ Budget 2006/2007 KZN Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs

in the Municipal Electoral Regulations No. R. 848 of 22 August 2000, as amended by Notice No. R. 848 of 23 August 2003, 'Municipal Electoral Regulations'. (Hendrickse 2006:2). In terms of Appendixes 20A and 20B of the Municipal Electoral Regulations (as stated in Hendrickse 2006:69), the process is as follows:

- Papers are first sorted according to the type of ballot papers used at the voting station;
- After the papers of each ballot are counted, the totals are then compared with the statement of the presiding officer (Form MEC 11);
- Papers are examined to ascertain whether they should be rejected and if that is the case, the rejected papers are kept to one side;
- The remaining papers are sorted face up according to each party and ward candidate; They are bound in elastic bands in bundles of ten and

thereafter in bundles of ten such packages; and finally,

- The bundles and the remaining ballots are then counted with the totals of each party or candidate recorded on specified forms (Form MEC 17: Result form – Party List count and Form MEC: Result Form18 – Ward count).

Results

The results were announced at the IEC Headquarters on Saturday, 4 April 2006 in Pretoria by IEC Chairperson Dr. Brigalia Bam who declared the elections free and fair. At the same event, President Mbeki congratulated the IEC on overseeing the elections as well as political parties who had accepted defeats and had not taken recourse to the courts. President Mbeki emphasised the importance of local government “as a critical area where all the promise made by people during their campaign had to be delivered on” (IOL,

2006a:1). The ANC took control of all 25 municipalities in the Free State with more than 80% of the vote with 47.23% of the registered voters in the Free State exercising their right to vote (IOL 2006b:1). This was in comparison to the 48,9% obtained in the 2000 Local Government Elections (Coetzee 2006:2). In the 2000 Local Government Elections, the ANC won all 20 municipalities and enjoyed 72, 11% support with the other parties together only enjoying 27, 89% of the vote (IEC Leading Party Report 2000:1) The highest turnout was at the Golden Gate Highlands National Park where 66.46% of the registered voters voted followed. The results were determined by the IEC in terms of section 64(6) of the Local Government Municipal Electoral Act, No. 27 of 2000 and are provided in the following tables.

Table 1: Leading party overall report

Party Name	Valid Votes ¹	% Support	Seats won ²	% Seats won
African National Congress (ANC)	1,392,337	76,66%	516	67,72%
Democratic Alliance (DA)	227,050	12,50%	83	10,89%
Freedom Front-Plus (FF)	40,745	2,24%	19	2,49%
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)	29,902	1,65%	17	2,23%
Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA)	27,305	1,50%	9	1,18%
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	10,412	0,57%	7	0,92%
Independents	7,069	0,39%	3	0,39%
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)	9,855	0,54%	3	0,39%
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	2,972	0,16%	2	0,26%
Azanian People's Organization AZAPO)	2,6192	0,14%	2	0,26%
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1,270	0,07%	1	0,13%
Belastingsbetalersvereniging van Parys (BVP)	1,437	0,08%	1	0,13%
Phumela Ratepayers' Association (PRA)	2,120	0,12%	1	0,13%
United Independent Front (UIF)	1,454	0,08%	1	0,13%
Other	59,800	3,29%		
TOTAL	1,816,347	100,00%	665	

¹ Valid Votes include both Ward and PR votes

² Seats won include both Ward and PR seats

Source: IEC – Leading Party Overall Report as at 2000/03/04.

Table 2: Table outlining the percentage of PR votes only obtained by the top three parties in the specified municipality

Municipality(Previous name in brackets)	% VD's declared	1 st party	%	2 nd party	%	3 rd party	%
FS 161 LETSEMENG (Koffiefontein)	100	ANC	78	DA	13	FF-Plus	4
FS 162 KOPANONG (Trompsburg)	100	ANC	77	DA	15	PAC	4
FS 163 MOHOKARE (Zastron)	100	ANC	80	DA	10	PAC	5
FS 171 NALEDI (Dewetsdorp)	100	ANC	74	DA	14	PAC	8
FS 172 MANGAUNG (Bloemfontein)	100	ANC	72	DA	16	FF-Plus	4
FS173 MANTSOPA (Ladybrand)	100	ANC	82	DA	10	PAC	4
FS181 MASILONYANA (Theunissen)	100	ANC	83	DA	10	FF-Plus	4
FS 182 TOKOLOGO (Dealesville)	100	ANC	78	DA	12	FF-Plus	7
FS 183 TSWELOPELE (Hoopstad)	100	ANC	84	DA	13	FF-Plus	2
FS 184 MATJHABENG (Welkom)	100	ANC	80	DA	15	PAC	1
FS 185 NALA (Bothaville)	100	ANC	85	DA	6	FF-Plus	3
FS 191 SETSOTO (Senekal)	100	ANC	81	DA	12	PAC	2
FS 192 DIHLABENG (Bethlehem)	100	ANC	77	DA	12	PAC	5
FS 193 NKETOANA (Reitz)	100	ANC	79	DA	11	PAC	6
FS 194 MALUTI A PHOFUNG (Qwa-Qwa)	100	ANC	80	DPSA	11	DA	3
FS 195 PHUMELELA (Vrede)	100	ANC	80	PRA	8	DA	6
FS 201 MOQHAKA (Kroonstad)	100	ANC	77	DA	14	FF-Plus	4
FS 201 NGWATHE (Parys)	100	ANC	77	DA	13	PAC	3
FS 204 METSIMAHOLO (Sasolburg)	100	ANC	65	DA	21	UDM	5
FS 205 MAFUBE (Frankfort)	100	ANC	75	DA	7	PAC	7

Source: SABC News, 2006-03-05: 1-2.

Table 3: Summary of seat allocation per district council (DC)

Table 3.1: DC 16 – XHARIEP

DC 40 % Total Seats available to Municipality: 6				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC 40% Total Seats	% Seats won
ANC	22,210	78,02%	5	83,33%
DA	3,727	13,09%	1	16,67%
PAC	1,016	3,57%	0	0,00%
FF-Plus	996	3,50%	0	0,00%
ACDP	518	1,82%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	28,467	100,00	6	100,00

Source: IEC – MEC 33 as at 2000/03/04.

Table 3:2 DC 17 – MOTHEO

DC 40 % Total Seats available to Municipality: 18				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
ANC	123,384	73,54%	13	72,22%
DA	26,225	15,63%	3	16,67%
FF-Plus	5,750	3,43%	1	5,56%
UCDP	3,650	2,18%	1	5,56%
PAC	3,615	2,15%	0	0,00%
ACDP	2,579	1,54%	0	0,00%
ID	1,372	0,82%	0	0,00%
Black Consciousness Forum	638	0,38%	0	0,00%
UDM	571	0,34%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	167,784	100,00	18	100,00

Source: IEC – MEC33 as at 2000/03/04

Table 3.3 DC 18 – LEJWELEPUTSWA

DC 40 % Total Seats available to Municipality: 15				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
ANC	113,034	81,08%	12	80,00%
DA	17,980	12,90%	2	13,33%
FF-Plus	2,503	1,80%	1	6,67%
PAC	2,301	1,65%	0	0,00%
ACDP	1,451	1,04%	0	0,00%
UDM	1,208	0,87%	0	0,00%
ID	928	0,67%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	139,405	100,00%	15	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC33 as at 2000/03/04.

Table 3.3 DC 18 – THABO MOFUTSANYANE

DC 40 % Total Seats available to Municipality: 16				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
ANC	128,054	80,61%	13	81,25%
DA	11,863	7,47%	1	6,25%
DPSA	9,018	5,68%	1	6,25%
PAC	4,087	2,57%	1	6,25%
FF-Plus	3,724	2,34%	0	0,00%
ACDP	2,111	1,53%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	158,857	100,00%	16	100,00%
DMA DC 60 % Total Seats available to Municipality: 1				
ANC	87	87,00%	1	100,00%
DA	13	13,00%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	100	100,00%	1	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC33 as at 2000/03/04.

Table 3.4 DC 20 – FEZILE DABI (Northern Free State)

DC 40 % Total Seats available to Municipality: 13				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
ANC	80,829	74,23%	10	76,92%
DA	16,082	14,77%	2	15,38%
FF-Plus	4,004	3,68%	1	7,69%
PAC	3,288	3,02%	0	0,00%
UDM	2,110	1,94%	0	0,00%
AZAPO	1,390	1,28%	0	0,00%
ACDP	1,188	1,09%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	108,891	100,00%	13	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC 33 as at 2000/03/04.

Table 4: Summary of seat calculation per municipality

In cases where a ward is uncontested, the PR for the party will be doubled for the overall seat calculation.

Seats Calculated = (A)

Ward Seats = (B)

PR List Seats = (A-B)

FS 161 – LETSEMENG (Koffiefontein): Seats 10						
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	Total Seats	Ward Seats	PR List Seats	% Seats Won
ANC	11,400	74,19%	8	5	3	80,00%
DA	1,906	12,40%	1	0	1	10,00%
INDEPENDENT	735	4,78%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	538	3,50%	1	0	1	10,00%
FF-Plus	451	2,94%	0	0	0	0,00%
PAC	336	2,19%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	15,366	100%	10	5	5	100,00%
FS 162 – KOPANONG (Trompsburg): Seats 14						
ANC	20,325	76,68%	11	7	4	78,57%
DA	4,044	15,26%	2	0	2	14,29%
PAC	1,021	3,85%	1	0	1	7,14%
FF-PLUS	928	3,50%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	137	0,52%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	51	0,19%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	26,506	100,00%	14	7	7	100,00%
FS 163 MOHOKARE (Zastron): Seats 10						
ANC	12,537	80,82%	8	5	3	80,00%
DA	1,550	9,99%	1	0	1	10,00%
PAC	772	4,98%	1	0	1	10,00%
FF-Plus	406	2,62%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	132	0,85%	0	0	0	0,00%
UDM	116	0,75%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	43,447	100,00%	10	5	5	100,00%
FS 171 NALEDI (Dewetsdorp): Seats 8						
ANC	8,241	64,03%	5	3	2	62,50%
INDEPENDENT	2,122	16,49%	1	1	0	12,50%
DA	1,565	12,16%	1	0	1	12,50%
PAC	589	4,58%	1	0	1	12,50%
FF-Plus	228	1,77%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	125	0,97%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	13,870	100,00%	8	4	4	100,00%
FS 172 MANGAUNG (Bloemfontein): Seats 89						
ANC	215,284	71,51%	65	37	28	73,03%
DA	48,477	16,09%	15	8	7	16,85%
FF-Plus	10,8918	3,62%	3	0	3	3,37%
UCDM	6,205	2,06%	2	0	2	2,25%
PAC	5,6206	1,87%	2	0	2	2,25%
INDEPENDENT	5,037	1,67%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	3,632	1,21%	1	0	1	1,12%
DPSA	1,771	0,59%	1	0	1	1,12%
ID	1,675	0,56%	0	0	0	0,00%
AZAPO	1,031	0,34%	0	0	0	0,00%
Black Consciousness Forum	855	0,28%	0	0	0	0,00%
UDM	595	0,20%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	301,043	100,00%	89	45	44	100,00%
FS 173 MANTSOPA (Ladybrand): SEATS 16						
ANC	19,437	79,60%	13	8	5	81,25%
DA	1,809	7,41%	1	0	1	6,25%
INDEPENDENT	1,059	4,34%	0	0	0	0,00%
PAC	852	3,49%	1	0	1	6,25%
ACDP	746	3,06%	1	0	1	6,25%
FF-Plus	514	2,11%	0	0	1	0,00%
TOTAL	24,417	100,00%	16	8	8	100,00%

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FS 181 MASILONYANA (Theunissen): Seats 20						
ANC	23,575	82,85%	17	10	7	85,00%
DA	2,830	9,95%	2	0	2	10,00%
FF-Plus	1,023	3,60%	1	0	1	5,00%
PAC	666	2,34%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	331	1,16%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	28	0,10%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL		100,00%	20	10	10	100,00%
FS 182 TOKOLOGO (Dealesville): Seats 8						
ANC	8,058%	76,49%	6	4		75,00%
DA	1,209%	11,48%	1	0		12,50%
FF-Plus	714	6,78%	1	0		12,50%
PAC	322	3,06%	0	0		0,00%
INDEPENDENT	232	2,20%	0	0		0,00%
TOTAL	10,535	100,00%	8	4		100,00%
FS 183 TSWELOPELE (Hoopstad): Seats 14						
ANC	16,695	75,24%	11	6	5	78,57%
DA	2,725	12,28%	2	0	2	14,29%
INDEPENDENT	2,231	10,05%	1	1	0	7,14%
PAC	334	1,51%	0	0	0	0,00%
FF-Plus	205	0,92%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	22,190	100,00%	14	7	7	100,00%
FS 184 – MATJHABENG (Welkom): Seats 72						
ANC	142,550	78,75%	57	31	26	79,17%
DA	27,302	15,08%	11	4	7	15,28%
INDEPENDENT	2,716	1,50%	1	1	0	1,39%
PAC	2,652	1,47%	1	0	1	1,30%
FF-Plus	1,957	1,08%	1	0	1	1,39%
ACDP	1,542	0,85%	1	0	1	1,39%
Independt Civic Assoc. of SA	920	0,51%	0	0	0	0,00%
UDM	760	0,42%	0	0	0	0,00%
ID	619	0,34%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	181,018	100,00%	72	36	36	100,00%
FS 185 NALA (Bothaville): Seats 24						
ANC	33,265	84,68%	20	12	8	83,333%
DA	2,522	6,42%	2	0	2	8,33%
PAC	1,193	3,04%	1	0	1	4,17%
FF-Plus	1,137	2,89%	1	0	1	4,17%
UDM	639	1,63%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	352	0,90%	0	0	0	0,00%
ID	175	0,45%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	39,283	100,00%	24	12	12	100,00%
FS 191 SETSOTO (Senekal): Seats 33						
ANC	40,045	81,09%	27	17	10	81,82%
DA	6,012	12,17%	4	0	4	12,12%
PAC	1,061	2,15%	1	0	1	3,03%
FF-Plus	863	1,75%	1	0	1	3,03%
ID	791	1,60%	0	0	0	0,00%
UDM	496	1,00%	0	0	0	0,00%
NDM	118	0,24%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	49,386	100,00%	33	17	16	100,00%
FS 192 – DIHLABENG(Bethlehem): Seats 37						
ANC	44,872	77,56%	29	16	13	78,38%
DA	7,283	12,59%	5	3	2	13,51%
FF-Plus	2,357	4,07%	1	0	1	2,70%
PAC	2,309	3,99%	1	0	1	2,70%
ACDP	681	1,52%	1	0	1	2,70%
NDC	152	0,26%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	57,854	100,00%	37	19	18	100,00%

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FS 193 – NKETOANA (Reitz): Seats 18						
ANC	22,501	78,56%	14	9	5	77,78%
DA	3,064	10,70%	2	0	2	11,11%
PAC	1,726	6,03%	1	0	1	5,56%
FF-PLUS	1,097	3,83%	1	0	1	5,56%
INDEPENDENT	252	0,88%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	28,640	100,00%	18	9	9	100,00%
FS 194 MALUTIA PHOFUNG (Qwa-Qwa): Seats 68						
ANC	125,539	80,36%	55	33	22	80,88%
DPSA	16,516	10,57%	7	0	7	10,29%
DA	5,620	3,60%	2	1	1	2,94%
ACDP	1,850	1,18%	1	0	1	1,47%
PAC	1,768	1,13%	1	0	1	1,47%
INDEPENDENT	1,607	1,03%	0	0	0	0,00%
IFP	1,270	0,81%	1	0	1	1,47%
AZAPO	1,247	0,80%	1	0	1	1,47%
FF-Plus	809	0,52%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	156,226	100,00%	68	34	34	100,00%
FS 195 PHUMELELA (Vrede): Seats 14						
ANC	20,269	80,08%	11	7	4	78,57%
PRA	2,120	8,38%	1	0	1	7,14%
DA	1,524	6,02%	1	0	1	7,14%
FF-Plus	894	3,53%	1	0	1	7,14%
PAC	504	1,99%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	25,311	100,00%	14	7	7	100,00%
FS 201 MOGHAKA (Kroonstad): Seats 50						
ANC	53,862	75,89%	38	21	17	76,00%
DA	9,568	13,48%	7	4	3	14,00%
FF-Plus	2,526	3,56%	2	0	2	4,00%
PAC	2,127	3,00%	2	0	2	4,00%
ACDP	1,223	1,72%	1	0	1	2,00%
INDEPENDENT	697	0,98%	0	0	0	0,00%
AZAPO	609	0,86%	0	0	0	0,00%
Socialist Party of Azania	363	0,51%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	70,975	100,00%	50	25	25	100,00%
FS 203 NGWATHE (Parys): Seats 38						
ANC	47,146	77,42%	30	17	13	78,95%
DA	7,708	12,66%	5	2	3	13,16%
PAC	2,185	3,59%	1	0	1	2,63%
FF-Plus	2,068	3,40%	1	0	1	2,63%
BVP	1,437	2,36%	1	0	1	2,63%
UDM	311	0,51%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	38	0,06%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	60,893	100,00%	38	19	19	100,00%
FS 204 METSIMAHOLO (Sasolburg): Seats 36						
ANC	38,514	65,41%	24	14	10	66,67%
DA	12,404	21,06%	8	4	4	22,22%
UDM	2,972	5,05%	2	0	2	5,56%
FF-Plus	1,521	2,58%	1	0	1	2,78%
UIF	1,454	2,47%	1	0	1	2,78%
PAC	722	1,23%	0	0	0	0,00%
AZAPO	685	1,16%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	513	0,87%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	100	0,17%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	58,885	100,00%	36	18	18	100,00%
FS 205 MAFUBE (Frankfurt): Seats 17						
ANC	20,624	75,05%	13	9	4	76,47%
DA	2,081	7,57%	1	0	1	5,88%
PAC	1,940	7,06%	1	0	1	5,88%
FF-PLUS	1,440	5,24%	1	0	1	5,88%
AZAPO	1,372	4,99%	1	0	1	5,88%
INDEPENDENT	22	0,00%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	27,479	100,00%	17	9	8	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC 33 as at 2000/03/04.

It appears that despite poor service delivery and corruption among councillors, the ANC still enjoys the majority of support from the population as had been the case during the 2004 National Election. The DA came second, followed closely by the PAC and the FF-Plus in third and fourth places respectively (Coetzee 2006:2). What is worrying, however, is that despite the 'Power of Media' Campaign run by the IEC, less than 48% of the registered 22 million voters cast their vote and an estimated 6 million people did not even bother to register (Ngonyama 2006:1)

Post-Election Disputes

According to the Provincial Electoral Officer for the Free State, Mr Chris Mepha, only 2 disputes had taken place during the election with both of them occurring at Dihlabeng (Interview with Mr Mepha 19 April 2006). After the elections in the Free State the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) ordered a recount in the Free State. The main reason was that there were cases of non-adherence to the provisions of the electoral laws. Mr Chris Mepha, the Provincial Electoral Officer, ordered a recount because the Democratic Alliance in Bethlehem disputed the vote's tally which they felt had left them far behind the ACDP. The complaint had proved valid because it was found that votes had been

missed by the presiding officer who had allocated 7283 votes to the ACDP and 831 votes to the DA. A recount settled the matter. The UDM and the Freedom Front Plus also complained that their parties were not included on the ballot papers in the districts they were contesting. In response, the IEC indicated that these parties had not met the deadline. Problems in the Naledi municipality flared up again after the elections. Municipal councillor's houses were torched in Dewetsdorp. The house of acting manager Lydia Morobela was destroyed in a fire while the house of another councillor was partly destroyed in a fire. A vehicle at this house was also destroyed. Problems were aggravated when residents protested and disrupted the inauguration of the newly elected mayor and councillors. In spite of the disruptions Motlatsi Motlui was elected mayor. Provincial government officials stepped in when problems arose after Thato Khoase the municipal manager was suspended (Internet, 2006; Naledi councillors and Webb, 2006:3).

Election Observers and Monitoring

No international observers witnessed the 2006 Local Government elections in the Free State. Four local organisations observed the elections whilst four people

from Lesotho were also present to train as observers as part of an exchange programme between the two countries. Three of them were placed in Mangaung whilst one was placed at the IEC Head Office in Bloemfontein (Interview with Mr Mepha 19 April 2006).

After the ballot count the results revealed a resounding success for the ruling party, the ANC.

With the dawn of the 1994 elections, the media both nationally and internationally viewed pictures of long rows of voters waiting to exercise their democratic vote. Whereas a large number of voters had turned out to vote for the 1994 election, the current election reveals a remarkable decline in voting which is largely due to voter apathy. This became very evident during the 2006 elections.

The local government election has been conducted freely and fairly and some voters are still very passionate about their right to cast their vote and to have a say in the governance of South Africa. However, underlying this passion and participation there are murmurs in the political environment which speak of dissatisfaction, distrust, corruption and increasing frustration. This is especially evident in the 2006 local government elections (Sauer, 2006:1).

In the Free State especially, the elections were held against a similar background and within a tense political environment. A post-election preview clearly shows that this environment had a definite effect on the electorate. Prior to the 2006 election, especially since 2004, political tensions have been brewing especially in areas such as the Eastern and Central Free State. It is always important to reflect on the results of an election in order to identify important issues, challenges, patterns, and tendencies which could have significant influences on the governance of South Africa and on voter participation and voting behaviour in subsequent elections. Under the current local government system, 50% of municipal seats are allocated to ward councillors, while the remaining 50% are allocated to Proportional Representational (PR) councillors. The number of votes the party gets in the election will determine the number of PR councillors obtained by the party. A meeting is called after fourteen days to select officers. The meeting, which is presided over by the municipal manager, firstly has to appoint the Speaker of the Council, an Executive Mayor as well as electing an Executive Committee (Sauer, 2006:1).

In the light of the discontent experienced with municipalities in the

province, it was difficult to sketch a scenario depicting the outcome of the 2006 local government elections. It is clear that the ANC has managed to maintain the loyal supporters of the party to such a degree that the party had managed to take all 25 of the municipalities in the Free State with a clear majority of 76.7% of the votes. In second place was the Democratic Alliance with 12.47% and the Freedom Front Plus came third with 2.7% of the votes cast. With this in mind, it is interesting to note the comments made by Charlotte Lobe, secretary of the ANC in the Free State in an interview with a reporter, Gert Coetzee (2006:5), from a local newspaper, *Die Vloksblad*. During this interview Lobe responded to the question as to who would win the election. Lobe said that the ANC would win because the majority of voters in the Free State are black people of whose vote and allegiance the party is assured. Besides that, the political environment in South Africa has changed reflecting a non-racial electorate resulting in a potential to draw votes from the white electorate. As a result of talks with these potential voters, the ANC is confident of drawing votes from all population groups. Lobe also felt that votes traditionally cast in favour of the New National Party (NNP), which have dropped from 170 000 in 1994 to 8000 in 2004 has seen a

bigger support for the ANC. Voters such as Jan van der Merwe and Claude Jenkinson are prominent ANC candidates in Bloemfontein and they have inspired others to support the ANC because they are dedicated to delivering a contribution to the country (Coetzee, 2006:5). In Bloemfontein there were also a number of posters featuring white female candidates in a variety of wards (Internet, 2006...ANC takes Free).

Many students in Bloemfontein did not exercise their democratic right to vote in the local municipal elections. Voter apathy among young people is worthy of notice and is a cause for concern. Many said they were not registered and simply lacked interest in voting. Those who were registered were registered in their home towns and found it impossible to go home just to vote. Some students said they were not sure if they were registered and lacked the interest to find out if this was the case. Besides problems experienced with registration, many students lacked the interest to vote.

Two aspects emerged strongly, namely the need for information and political literacy. A cause for concern is the general feeling among the youth and especially among students that it is meaningless to vote. Student apathy extends to political parties. They feel that there

is no interaction with political parties and the only time they emerge is when they want one's vote. Students feel neglected by political parties who seldom, if ever, show an interest in them (Fourie, 2006:6).

It is interesting to note that the electoral system of student representatives on the campus of the University of the Free State is based on political parties and not individuals. There is also a student parliament on the campus where political parties are represented by elected students. However, more can and should be done to address the political illiteracy of the students.

When interviewed political parties were asked to comment on the issue of youth apathy, Mr Abrie Killian, chairperson of the ACDP on the campus of the University of the Free State, made the suggestion that students and the youth in general should be informed through modern communication mediums such as SMS text messages which encourage students firstly to vote and secondly to vote for a particular party. Killian reasons that the use of modern technology will appeal to the youth and especially to students and will have the effect of encouraging them to participate in the democratic process as well as adding an element of fun to the process.

This form of communication as well as the use of e-mails was also used by other parties. Charlotte Lobe from the ANC reasons that the pre-election strategy of their party was sufficient to gain votes and they saw no need to send SMS messages on the day of the election to potential voters. The Freedom Front Plus also saw a need to get more involved with students and launched a student branch of its party on the campus just a month after the local government elections took place. Lydia Young, spokesperson for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) said that it was in order for political parties to canvas for votes on Election Day if it occurred outside the voting stations (Versluis, 2006:9).

The use of more modern and fun communication to reach and appeal to the youth is one solution but what about the numerous students who do not have the means to access this modern communication. A multi-sectoral approach should be followed to reach the youth who after all are the people who will lead South Africa into the future.

It is interesting to note that it is not only the youth in the rural areas that are experiencing the challenges of political literacy. Farm workers in Koffiefontein for instance, who are illiterate, found the voting process confusing. As they can neither read nor write they

were confused as to where they had to cast their votes.

This problem had been addressed during the national election to a degree as pictures were printed on ballot papers but this was not the case during the local government elections. These voters indicated that they had wanted to vote and regarded it as important as it had implications for service delivery, housing, job creation and future security (Van Wyk, 2006:6).

Overall the IEC had received 50 complaints concerning the local government results. This was an increase on the number of complaints received after the national elections in 2004.

Courtney Sampson, who is from the IEC, explained that most of the complaints resulted from misunderstandings concerning the electoral process.

He said that many new participants experienced problems with issues pertaining to the electoral process with the result that they complained. In response he indicated that many problems were related to where parties placed their focus. The strongest focus point was the winning or losing of the party rather than on the nature of multiparty democracy which advocates a spirit of participation (*Cape Times: Internet*, 2006).

The ANC is determined to make local government work in the Free State. In order to achieve this, problematic municipalities have been identified and the ANC will intervene to support them. Pledges of more resources and trained personnel as well as the employment of more competent managers and technicians have been received. The ANC has also promised to address issues where violent protests were encountered. Perpetrators will be dealt with and if necessary disciplined. In some instances, the post-election days were marred by sporadic outbreaks of service delivery protests. Disgruntled residents even damaged property and shops in the town of Frankfort. Violent demonstrations in De Wetsdorp in the Southern Free State escalated to a level of extreme concern when the home of Mr Mopho Morobela of the Naledi municipality (Dewetsdorp) was petrol bombed and there was firing at the home of ANC council member Mr Paulus Mifi. On 22 March 2006 the first sitting of the municipality was disrupted. Violent protests also occurred in Wepner and Van Standensrus. According to Joel Mafareka, the MEC of local government and housing there are now plans on the table for Free State municipalities. Mafareka admitted in his budget speech that there are challenges from every aspect of municipal management

facing Free State municipalities in the fiscal year ahead.

In their agenda to address these problems, local government will launch an intensive programme to improve municipal governance thereby enhancing performance and promoting accountability. Included in the improvements envisaged by Mafareka was the issue that all municipalities were to re-negotiate municipal manager's contracts with a cut-off date of 1 July. A strategic plan includes facilitating state structures and governance arrangements to the degree that municipalities would be better supported and monitored. A further advantage would include measures to strengthen the legislative and fiscal environment for local government. R522 million has also been set aside for the erection of houses. A thousand of the envisaged 12000 housing units will be allocated to women contractors to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1956 women's anti-pass demonstrations (Internet, 2006: New Plans for...).

It is important to take note of the transformation of local government in South Africa and the challenges this third tier of government has to face and manage. On the one side the ANC, after winning all the seats in the province, has ensured the voters that

accountability by councillors will be high on the agenda. Newly elected councillors should act with honesty and integrity with their skills utilised for the upliftment of the community. ANC spokesperson, Smuts Ngonyama said the ANC will work towards making local government a powerful instrument of change (*Citizen*, 2006:6).

President Mbeki is adamant that local government will work. He has expressed the conviction that all mayors and councillors are expected to uphold the ruling party's vision of "fundamental social transformation" with which the party intends to bring a better life for all (Internet, 2006).

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EASTERN CAPE

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Introduction

In this third submission to the *Election Update*, we review post-election processes in the Eastern Cape province. We focus on the counting process and announcement of results, post-election disputes, election observation and monitoring, outlining the patterns of the results as well as their political implications. We also consider the challenges confronting the new municipalities.

The Counting Process and Announcement of Results

The post-election processes of counting ballot papers and the announcement of results went relatively smoothly in the province as in most areas of the country, despite the potential problems that were associated with the complexity of managing local as opposed to national and provincial elections.²⁴ Some of these challenges included the counting of ballots accurately and doing so in time for the results to be announced within the time frame established by

²⁴ Hopewell Dube, 'Super – complex local poll headache for IEC', <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/specialreports.aspx?ID=BD4A145910>

the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

The nature of these problems was both general (applicable to other provinces) and localised (peculiar to the province). The general problems were located in the nature of the processes attendant to the conduct and management of local elections, especially the institutional arrangements that underline this process. Different ballot papers were used for different areas according to the type of institutional structure in which voters were participating. Thus, variously, voters cast their ballots for ward, proportional representation and district council's representative according to their geographical locality. For example, on average, a council voter would receive three different ballots to elect (ward, proportional representation and district council) candidates.

The localised problems were tied to weather conditions that pertained on voting day. Of note were the floods that affected rural areas mainly in areas of the Transkei region and the relative difficulties in accessing rural voting districts to deliver voting materials due to poor infrastructure such as roads, non availability of bridges and so on.

The other factors that had a bearing on this process were the particular issues that

were related to the electoral process in the Eastern Cape. In particular we refer to the increased voter turnout, revamped voting infrastructure and the consequent complexity that was experienced in efficiently managing these issues.

For example, voting stations were increased by about 30 percent compared to the 2000 election and the number of voters had increased from 2.5 million to 2, 9 million.²⁵ This factor would, in and of itself, not be considered to be a challenge, but was an issue in the Eastern Cape as the province registered the highest voter turnout at 56 percent, translating to 4 .5 million voters turning up to vote. This situation led to increased amount of time and resources needed to administer the voting, counting and processing of the results.

However, taking all the above issues into account, the provincial IEC was able to effectively manage the process with very few problems experienced that would have adversely affected the process.²⁶ Thus, the provincial votes were

²⁵ Lauren Cohen, '4000 Eastern Cape voting stations ready for crowds', *Weekend Post*, 25 February 2006, p.2.

²⁶ François Rank and Dineo Matomela, 'Uneventful Bay elections good news for ANC as counting begins', *The Herald*, 2 March 2006, p.2.

counted and processed in time.

Post Election Disputes

One of the most serious problems that can confront any electoral process is the nature and magnitude of election disputes that emerge in the aftermath of elections. One debilitating effect of such disputes, especially if they are found to be credible, would be to cast a cloud over the freeness and fairness of the election. These can be raised both in a formalised manner (lodging an official complaint with the IEC) or generally making statements that question the credibility of the election.

The nature of these disputes are commonly raised between political parties, usually framed around what is considered to have been the conduct that led to the disadvantaging of others or those leveled at the administrative authority responsible for running the election, in this case the IEC. The common problem that was experienced in the Eastern Cape revolved around intra-party disputes that occurred within the ANC. It should be noted however, that these disputes were not widespread and were thinly spread in terms of locality and indeed in occurrence. They therefore did not effectively constitute a fundamental questioning of the process to the extent that it could be regarded to have been tainted.

In past elections in the province, the trend has been that opposition political parties have generally raised complaints against the ruling African National Congress (ANC) alleging misgivings about the conduct of the party asserting that this accounts largely for the party's success in elections. In this regard this election was no exception.

The DA raised objections with the IEC alleging that ANC officials had canvassed for votes at two polling stations in Port Elizabeth and Cathcart contrary to electoral regulations.²⁷ The other was contained in an opinion piece by a national MP of the party Gareth Morgan in the *Business Day* newspaper. He questioned the national governments' policy of using state funds to advertise departmental campaigns contending that this was widespread in the two months leading to the election, which led to the party to have a high profile to the detriment of its competitors.²⁸ It is however instructive to note that this was not an official complaint that was raised by the DA as an organisation, questioning the extent to which this may

²⁷ Chandre Prince, 'EC parties mostly satisfied with peaceful voting', *Daily Dispatch*, 2 March 2006, p.3.

²⁸ Gareth Morgan, 'ANC ads an abuse of public resources', <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/opinion.aspx?ID=BD4A162737>

be a serious concern for the party.

Two parties, the UDM and African Independent Congress (AIC)²⁹ both raised complaints directed at the professionalism of the IEC in managing and conducting the election. Both these complaints were locality specific and were not raised in a generalised way to question the conduct of the election provincially.

In the first case, the UDM raised technical issues with the IEC around the use of MEC7 forms for voter identification – utilised for special votes – as against the regular bar coded identification document, alleging that this practice was un-procedural and cast in doubt the “free and fair” nature of the election.³⁰ The party was especially concerned by its performance in the Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality – its former stronghold – where it lost massively to the ANC. The IEC dismissed the complaint

²⁹ The African Independent Congress (AIC) was formed by disgruntled Matatiele residents who disputed the government's decision to incorporate the area into the Eastern Cape province from KwaZulu Natal. It is led by the past immediate ANC mayor of the area Cedric Canham.

³⁰ Brett Horner and Xolani Xundu, 'Elections dismissed as being fraught with 'host of fraudulent activity'', <http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=1932499>

on the grounds that this was a legal stipulation that had been in force since 1999 and was applied in the 2000 elections, noting moreover that the practice was not widespread as only 2 percent of voters used this method thus making a negligible impact and could not have decisively affected the fortunes of any party.³¹

The AIC raised complaints about the election results in Matatiele, although the nature of the complaint was much more broader and vague in that its leader, Cedric Canham asserted that the election was characterised by what he called a “whole host of fraudulent activity”- a charge that was also refuted by the IEC.³² The party's complaint was also motivated by its poor performance in this area where it had hoped to upstage the ANC.³³

In addition to the inter-party disputes, the Eastern Cape also registered a new phenomenon where incidents whereby experienced within the ANC were violent.³⁴

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Vicki Robinson, 'Cross – municipality dispute splits community', *Mail and Guardian* 17-23 February 2006, p.5.

³⁴ These are distinct from the incidents, which occurred during the process of selecting ANC mayors after the election, an aspect that will be discussed below, under the challenges facing the new local authorities.

Most of these occurred between ANC supporters and breakaway factions of the party, which supported independent candidates.

This was especially so, as the Eastern Cape registered the highest number of candidates that stood as independents, having broken ranks with the ANC (150) just below triple the nearest number of ANC 'independents' that stood for elections in the province with the second highest number of such candidates Gauteng (55).³⁵

Admittedly, although these incidents of violence were not widespread as in other areas of the country, such as Khutsong, they did raise concern. The most serious incident happened in the Port Elizabeth Metropole where an ANC election victory convoy, which significantly was led by Stone Sizani, the party's Regional Chairman, was stoned resulting in 15 people being injured.³⁶ Similar intra-party conflicts within the ANC were noted in the Amathole District Municipality especially in Fort Beaufort that included shootings, assaults, intimidation and malicious

damage to property.³⁷ Another incident of concern was the arrest of an ANC councillor in New Brighton Port Elizabeth together with two other ANC members for allegedly having violated the Election Act of 2000 by enticing opposition supporters to vote for their party on election day. Under this act, This is interpreted to constitute voter interference.³⁸

However, all in all, political parties registered their satisfaction about the way in which the election was conducted, with major parties such as the DA, United Independent Front (UIF) and UDM being the first to accept the election outcome.³⁹

Election Observation and Monitoring

Despite the problems indicated above with respect to the counting and voting process as well as the disputes that resulted after the election between parties and the IEC or accusations against each other, the provincial election was given a clean bill of health by monitors and election observers. That is, despite

³⁷ Lulamile Feni, 'Political feud flares after election', *Daily Dispatch*, 10 April 2006, p.6.

³⁸ Herald Reporter, 'ANC councillor facing charges for alleged voter interference', *The Herald*, 23 March 2006, p.4.

³⁹ Chandre, Prince, 'EC parties mostly satisfied with peaceful voting', *Daily Dispatch*, 02 March 2006, p.3.

these attendant problems, there were no adverse reports that called into question the conduct of the election and its aftermath in the province. This is attested to by reference to a report released by a major monitoring body the South African Civil Society Observation Coalition (SACSOC). They noted that the election "...was conducted in a substantially free and fair manner".⁴⁰ In its report SACSOC variously commended voters, political parties, the IEC and security services for making the election a success.

Results Pattern and Political Implications

The results patterns in the Eastern Cape mirrored the national scene, with the ANC asserting its dominance of South African electoral politics winning by a margin of 81.74 percent, capturing 1 161 seats, controlling 43 of the provinces 44 municipalities. Thus, the party increased its support by 9.44 percent up from 72.30 in 2000. This included retaining control of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Council (NMMC) one of the six around the country (the only exception in this regard was that the ANC lost control of the Cape Town Metro in the Western Cape although there

³⁵ Vicki Robinson, 'Local poll: ANC vs. ANC', *Mail and Guardian*, 13-19 January 2006, p.2.

³⁶ Piet Van Nierkerk, 'Chaos as voters clash after poll', http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2006/03/06new/n02_06032006

⁴⁰ South African Civil Society Observation Coalition "Sacsoc Commends Free and Fair Municipal Elections" March 2006: Johannesburg.

was no winner in that area with the DA becoming the largest party).

Regarding opposition parties, the DA dislodged the UDM by becoming the second largest party with 100 seats and 7.52 percent of voter support. This is a decrease from the 10.2 percent it had won in 2000.⁴¹ The UDM was relegated to the third largest party at 5.14 percent; down from 10.6 percent in 2000. It significantly failed to wrestle control of the Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality (KSD) from the ANC, which it had won in 2000 before subsequently losing it to the ANC during the floor-crossing period in 2005. The party's decline is likely a reflection of the problems that have afflicted the party since the floor crossing period of 2005 when it lost support to the ANC, critically KSD its stronghold, and the simultaneous emergence of a breakaway faction from the party at the same time, the United Independent Front (UIF).

Table 1: Eastern Cape 2006 Local Government results*

Party**	% support	Seats won
ANC	81.74	1,161
DA	7.52	100
UDM	5.14	73
PAC	1.29	24
AIC	0.44	11
ID	0.40	6
UIF	0.19	4
Independents	0.23	4
ACDP	0.19	2
Adelaide Residents Association	0.10	2
Bedford Residents Association	0.03	1
Kouga Civil Alliance	0.05	1
FF+	0.14	1
Congress Movement for the Coloured People of South Africa	0.08	1
Kouga 2000	0.06	1
Jansenville Klipplaat Alliansie	0.01	1
Other	2.36	129
Total	100	1,522

* Table adapted from the IEC web site <http://www.elections.org.za>

** The commonly known parties are abbreviated and the less well known are given their full names

The PAC's fourth position at 1.29 percent would on the surface, indicate stagnation in its overall position since it occupied the same spot in 2000. But in reality this position reflects a slight increase in support from the 1.9 percent that the party gained in 2000.

The surprise package of the election was the AIC which came in fifth (0.44 percent) considering that it was only formed in the lead up to the election as a breakaway faction from the ANC. This remarkable performance is significant considering that it did better than three major national parties, the Independent Democrats

(0.40 percent), ACDP (0.19 percent) and the FF+ (0.14 percent). Its support is concentrated in the Matatiele region where it is mostly based and its positive showing was premised on channeling the groundswell of opposition to its incorporation into the Eastern Cape from KwaZulu Natal.

Independent candidates also collectively did well considering that as a block they have more representation (0.23 percent) than both the FF+ and ACDP. The United Independent Front (UIF), newly established after a breakaway from the UDM failed to make an impression registering only 0.19 percent of the poll, with 4 representatives provincially. It failed to win even a single seat in the KSD municipality where it had been expected to capitalise on the declining support of the UDM in this area.⁴²

The other parties that managed to have representatives of one member each, are smaller civic-based organisations that include the Adelaide Residents Association, Bedford Residents Association, Kouga Civil Alliance, Congress Movement of the Coloured People of South Africa, Kouga 2000 and the

⁴¹ At that time the DA was an alliance of the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) which broke away from the DA soon after the election of 2000.

⁴² Luxolo Tyali, 'UIF rebels fail to get a single KSD seat', *Daily Dispatch*, 6 March 2006, p.4.

Jansenville Klipplaat Alliance, all with less than one percent support.

The glaring absence from the list of opposition parties is the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which did not even manage to have one representative province wide. This is particularly so because the IFP is the third strongest party nationally, and in the 2000 elections had 6 representatives in the Eastern Cape.

The political implications of these results can be grouped into two categories namely (a) what they signify for the ANC as the ruling party and (b) their implications for the progressively weakening opposition.

In terms of the ANC, it is clear that its electoral support is growing and this means that its political messages continue to resonate with the majority of voters. However, taken against the many incidents of political protests against the lack of service delivery experienced in the province, particularly from the middle of 2005, this means that ironically its increase in support will lead to higher expectations from the electorate. Thus the most critical challenge facing the ANC is how it will be able to manage these high expectations, especially in a province such as the Eastern Cape, which is one of the poorest in South Africa.

The critical implication for opposition in the province is that the weakening base of opposition parties means that more voters are being deprived of an avenue to voice views that are not in line with those of the ANC. It is especially relevant that although the voter turnout in the province is the highest in the country at 56 percent, it has increased very marginally from the 55.9 registered in 2000. Thus, voters are continuing to stay away from the polls - a position that affects all parties - but significantly opposition parties given their weakness. What is very critical about the 2006 poll is the emergent trend of a significant increase in the number of opposition parties that however have marginal support, but nevertheless are splitting the opposition vote further.

Challenges for the New Local Government Authorities

The challenges for the new local government authorities in the Eastern Cape are monumental, no less because the province is considered to be one of the poorest in South Africa. The province is faced with numerous socio-economic backlogs that need to be addressed. Additionally, the province has to deal with the attendant political problems that result largely from the divisions within the dominant ANC. Some of these problems are

general while others are specific to the province. The most localised problem specific to Eastern Cape rotates around wide-spread corruption and the severe administrative log jams that are a legacy of its establishment from an amalgamation of three former apartheid administrations – the former Bantustans of Transkei, Ciskei and the Cape Provincial Administration. Thus the province is faced with both socio-economic and political challenges that are interrelated and affect each other.

One of the most serious challenges facing local government authorities in the Eastern Cape - a situation that is generally experienced in other provinces around the country – is the lack of appropriately skilled people to deliver social services to communities. This has been a serious problem as far back as 1999, where it was imperative for the provincial government to make interventions to save municipalities from collapsing.⁴³ However, what compounds the situation in the Eastern Cape is that not only is there a shortage of critical manpower, but it has also been noted that the quality of existing skills in

⁴³ Tom Lodge, 2002, *Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki*, David Phillip: Cape Town. p.96.

the province is an issue.⁴⁴ Moreover, the problem is worsened by the generally rural nature of the province, which makes it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel as there is intense competition between the rural municipalities and larger urban centre within the province and from other better developed provinces.⁴⁵

The ability to deliver quality social services might also be affected at least in the short-term by the ANC's administrative reform, which has led to the replacement of 60 percent of its local councillors in the interest of addressing broader representation of communities especially on a gender basis and getting rid of non-performing councillors.⁴⁶ The unintended consequence of this massive change in personnel is that there are a lot of incoming councillors who are inexperienced and this might impact on continuity in service delivery with the transition period fraught with serious adjustments.

The other peculiar problem that affects the province is the allocation of resources to municipalities, as most of them are too poor to raise

their own revenues and the resource allocation is unfavourably skewed in favour of the larger municipalities. For example, Nelson Mandela Metro and Buffalo City the largest structures in the province, jointly receive 57 percent of the total allocation of the municipal budget leaving each of the 43 municipalities with an average of 1 percent each.⁴⁷

The most serious political problem that faces the local government sphere of government in the Eastern Cape is related to the divisions that exist within the ruling party the ANC and how successfully the party manages them. These divisions have long existed in the province, and have had an impact on service delivery with the ANC national headquarters and central government having in the past, directly intervening to resolve these. They revolve largely around two factions; that of the regional Chairman of the Party Makhenkhesi Stofile (The National Minister of Sport) and Mluleki George (Chairman of the Amathole Region and National Deputy Defence Minister).⁴⁸

The most recent manifestation of these divisions is the tensions that have effectively paralysed service delivery in many municipalities in the aftermath of the elections. These involved contestation over the selection of mayors, where communities differed with the choice of the provincial party. This environment was the result of candidate being nominated by branches and these being overlooked by lower placed candidates on party lists by the provincial party leading to serious disagreements.

These intractable problems occurred primarily in Mquma (Butterworth), Makana (Grahamstown), Nyandeni (Libode), Mbashe (Idutya) Qaukeni (Lusikisiki and Flagstaff), Mhlontlo (Qumbu and Tsolo) and Sundays River.⁴⁹ Similar disputes also occurred in the Buffalo City Municipality where major fissure of misunderstanding was between the preferred ANC candidate Fudukile Mbovane, and the then incumbent mayor Sindisile Maclean, that was resolved by the settling for a compromise candidate-Ntombentle Peter.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Sarah Hetherington, 'Focus on the Eastern ape', *Delivery*, November/ January 2006, p.43.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Vukani Mde and Karima Brown, 'ANC axes 60% of local councillors from lists', *Business Day*, 20 January 2006, p.1.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.22.

⁴⁸ Both these officials were deployed from the province to the national government as ministers after the 2004 election to try and resolve these disputes, but this seems not to have helped to eradicate the factionalism within the party.

⁴⁹ Jimmy Seepe, Mphumzi Zuzile and Dan Dhlamini, 'ANC's local councillors in revolt', *City Press*, 26 March 2006, p.2.

⁵⁰ Myibongwe Maqhina, 'It's her worship the mayor for BC', *Daily Dispatch*, 17 March 2007 2006, p.1.

The seriousness of these disputes is underlined by the negativity that in some areas were laced with both acts and threats of violence. The former for example resulted in Buffalo City, despite the compromise candidate being chosen as a crowd of Mbovane's supporters riotously demonstrated against Peter's inauguration.⁵¹ In Makana (Grahamstown), council meetings were disrupted as supporters of the ANC's preferred candidate Zamuxolo Peter demonstrated against the party's decision to allow the 'rebel' mayor Phumelelo Kate to continue in office, resulting in intervention by the police.⁵² The ANC's mismanagement of the situation dragged for over a month before it was resolved in these areas. Instructively, the party eventually agreed that the 'rebel' mayors should be allowed to continue in office but noted that they still faced disciplinary action raising the question as to whether the situation has been resolved to everybody's satisfaction.⁵³ For example, this problem has shown its tenacity in Makana, where supporters of the ANC

preferred candidate Zamuxolo Peter have continued to show their disapproval despite the ANC directive that the incumbent mayor Phumelelo Kate should continue in his post. This has led to serious disruptions of the council meetings and public demonstrations that have degenerated into violence.⁵⁴

The other political problem that needs to be addressed in the Eastern Cape is how to engage communities in local government delivery in terms of involving the citizenry in participatory structures. This is critically important because it is only when there is a sense of cooperation between local authorities and their public that much more can be done to offset the problems that the province faces. For example, the acuteness of this disjuncture between the feelings of residents and local government structures is indicated by a survey undertaken by the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) based in Cape Town on the levels of trusts between around the country. It was found that 38 percent of the Nelson Mandela Metro had little faith in the ability of the structures to deliver services.⁵⁵

The other political problem that faces the province is the continuing dissatisfaction by sectors of the Matatiele Community over the incorporation of the area into the Eastern Cape from KwaZulu Natal. Although the situation has been legally resolved with the Constitutional Court ruling in favour of the national government, it is important that local authorities in this area continue to engage the community over this issue to avoid it spiraling out of control as it has done in Khutsong in the Gauteng province where violence has occurred.

Thus it is critical that the ANC, given the overwhelming mandate that has been bestowed upon it, speedily attends to the decisive resolution of these matters as they clearly have a negative impact on the imperative to deliver services. In this regard, the other danger to note, is that the province was one of the most seriously affected by the lack of service delivery protest in the run-up to the election, and they might recur, perhaps in a much more virulent form and more being difficult to address.

Conclusion

The procedural aspects of managing and processing the aftermath of the local government elections in the

⁵¹ Mayibongwe Qhina, 'BC's first citizen inaugurated', *Saturday Dispatch*, 18 March 2006, p.3.

⁵² Mzimasi Gcukana, 'Mayoral protest turns ugly', *Grocotts Mail*, 11 April 2006, p.1.

⁵³ Max Matavire, 'ANC backs down, accepts 'rebel' mayors in posts', *The Herald*, 13 April 2006, p.1.

⁵⁴ Mzimasi Gcukumana, 'Freedom Day Shenanigans', *Grocotts Mail*, 28 April 2006, p.1.

⁵⁵ Jan Hofmeyer, 2005, 'Legitimacy: Can Local Government Regain Citizen's Trust', *SA Reconciliation*

Barometer, Vol.3. No. 4
December 2005, p.11.

Eastern Cape has progressed relatively well in comparison with some of the severe problems that have been experienced in other provinces, particularly in Gauteng. The process went smoothly with no major hitches through all the stages. It was generally considered free and fair by monitors and observers. Most importantly, the electoral process and its outcome were given a stamp of approval by political parties despite some of the disputes that have been raised around the process. However, these were insignificant and did not fundamentally put into doubt the conduct of the election and its veracity.

Politically the results reflect the continued dominance of the ANC and the serious decline in the support of opposition parties. This situation is not altogether healthy for a developing democracy, despite the fact that voters in the Eastern Cape show serious interest in participating in electoral processes by registering the highest turnout nationally.

The challenge facing opposition parties in the province is to increase their support. This is especially relevant in the light of evidence that a significant number of voters are dissatisfied with the ANC as exemplified by the protest around service delivery that preceded the election. For the ANC, the party is faced

with a heightened imperative to deliver social service given its continued and incremental increase of support in the province. Critically, for the party to successfully manage these demands it will have to decisively deal with the perennial and deep divisions which run through the provincial party and have the potential to derail service delivery.

WESTERN CAPE

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The Counting Process

The IEC retained overall responsibility for the management of the counting process. Procedures for counting were known to election officials, party agents, observers and any other authorised persons who were permitted to be present during the count. The counting process took place in the polling stations immediately after the close of voting.

The voting stations functioned effectively as counting stations since they had adequate lighting, communication systems and security. Counting staff had effective training. In the case of spoilt ballots, the party agents had to verify that such ballots were indeed spoilt before they could be disregarded from the total number of votes. Once the counting process was completed the results were immediately announced and posted at the counting station.

The Announcement of Results

The voting results were carefully tabulated and announced without any undue delays. Result centres were open to the public.

Results from the result centres were announced publicly. The IEC provided a report on the elections, containing detailed information on the number of eligible voters who registered and the number of registered voters who voted.

The Post-Election Disputes

There were post-election disputes in Khayelitsha and Delft. According to Courtney Sampson, the Provincial Electoral Officer [PEO] the allegations of irregularities were refuted by independent monitors consisting of local NGOs. Independent reports from the monitors *“made it clear that the Electoral Code of Conduct was indeed observed in Khayelitsha and Delft”*. In the view of the PEO *“There were few disputes because we did not allow tensions to build up. Once the election monitors advised us of any tensions at polling stations we would dispatch our security staff (South African Police Services), there to take of such situations. Also, we did not allow people wait in long queues to vote. We divided people into four to five voting streams so that they did not have long to wait to cast their votes”*.

Political Implications of the Election Results

In some areas such as the Koue Bokkeveld, voters were totally dependent on farmers at least for two

reasons. First, farmers had to grant politicians the right to visit their farms to campaign for the votes of farm-workers (and farmers);

Second, being harvesting time, they had to give their workers time to cast their vote. And in the words of the PEO, *“Unfortunately there are instances where farmers do not co-operate in this regard. In these instances, since we have a good working relationship with Agri-Weskaap [the farmer’s union] we often depend on them to resolve such tension”*. The PEO pointed out that throughout the past few years a healthy relationship of trust has developed between Agri-Weskaap, the SAPS and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

Though it would appear that there is generally a co-operative relationship between the IEC and the farmers, it is extremely important that the IEC ensure that the democratic rights of ordinary farmworkers are not subject to the whims and caprices of the farmers. The fear of intimidation and being expelled from farms can very easily prevent farmworkers from registering their concerns with the IEC and its officials. Vigilance in this regard is thus of utmost importance!

The MEO for Theewaterskloof made it

quite clear that the three ballots *“were quite confusing to voters. In his words:”**Voters did not understand them. Most voters were under the impression that once they have voted for one candidate it was sufficient. They simply did not see the need to cast additional two votes. I think this voting process must be simplified”*. In this regard it is suggested that democracy, voter, or ballot education should be continuous and not be limited to a couple of weeks before an election. Perhaps democracy education should be introduced at school level and the assistance of NGOs should be elicited to reach the larger non-literate sections of a specific the community.

In Stellenbosch, the EPC commented; *“It would appear that people can’t actually see the fact that they are moving forward. The youth appear to be totally caught up in their own daily priorities. They simply can’t see the bigger picture and why voting is so important for the country and its future”*. It is rather disquieting that such an apathetic state of affairs exists in Stellenbosch, being a university town *vis-à-vis* local government elections. It is, thus, important to gauge the overall attitude towards the national government elections as well to establish whether the levels of apathy extend to the entire democratic and

democratisation process in South Africa. Should such levels of apathy indeed obtain, it would be incumbent upon local as well as national leaders, within and across different sectors, to address this political problem. Educating the current youth across ethnic divides is important to safeguard and strengthen the democratising project in South Africa.

In George, the EPC was concerned that citizen apathy could perhaps be attributed to a lack of voter education. In her words "*Eden District is simply too big for one NGO to cover. The IEC only contracted one NGO to do voter education within a very limited period!*" As stated earlier, to ensure informed citizen participation in elections it is important that voter education enjoys attention beyond an election period. It is perhaps important that the suggestions from specific communities in this regard be considered.

In Bitou, the EPC commented: "*Here the youth were very excited to vote as a youth stood as a candidate. This excitement caused some tension. We were called to defuse the situation. Even so, what this tells me is: let the youth stand for election, and you get them involved! Here in Bitou the youth were clearly not apathetic!*" This excitement of youth participating in elections should be encouraged and

sustained. This particular experience should perhaps be tested elsewhere by ensuring that a youth should run for a designated political office, such as Director of Youth Affairs. Incorporating the specifics of the youth into an election campaign might very well counter the apparent apathy of youth *vis-à-vis* elections.

The MEO of Oudtshoorn expressed concern over the secrecy of the ballot especially in relation to the blind and illiterate. In his words "*How secret can your ballot be when the names must be read out in public and others can hear your choice? Surely this compromises if not defeats the notion of secrecy! And then there are three ballots! This is quite confusing to the elderly, illiterate and blind!*"

It is important that voter education and voting assistance occur with specific reference to the particular context or circumstances of the citizens.

According to the EPC for Knysna, people were not happy to travel up to 5km to the voting station. This a problem of demarcation of the voting district. Transport to and from polling stations should be addressed by all the stakeholders with the view to minimising the problems in this regard.

In view the prevailing, adverse and difficult

economic circumstances of unemployment and poverty in which many citizens find themselves, very few people volunteered their services for free to the IEC. On the contrary, they wanted to be paid for their services to the IEC. Whilst under circumstances of high levels of unemployment such a scenario seems to make sense, it is nonetheless important to encourage voluntary work where the intrinsic value of collective mobilisation and support for the democratic process be emphasised.

Election Observation and Monitoring

Monitoring and observer missions interacted with all the actors in the electoral process and organised briefing and debriefing meetings with key stakeholders or role-players, including the IEC, media, political parties, civil society organisations and security forces. In the case of Cape Town, for example, Archbishop of Cape Town together with representatives from various embassies and other 'noted people' were taken along in a bus to various polling stations to see the voting process for themselves. More importantly, perhaps, at all polling stations in the Western Cape, each political party had two representatives to monitor the voting process. These representatives are known as party agents. They were

present during the casting of a vote by a voter. During the vote counting they were also present and, in the case where a particular ballot paper was considered to be spoiled, they had to verify/agree that such a ballot paper was indeed spoiled. This ensured that the voting and counting processes were quite transparent.

Challenges for the New Local Authorities

- Levels of **citizen apathy** *vis-à-vis* local government elections suggest that there is a need for continuous voter and democracy education, especially at elementary and high school levels from whence the next generation of leadership will come;
- **Potential for community conflict** *vis-à-vis* service delivery – the bread and butter issues that inform election campaigns – should be carefully considered before specific sectoral delivery programmes such as housing are implemented;
- **Ethnophobia and xenophobia** in this regard should be discouraged and where necessary be prosecutable to the full extent of the law;
- **Skewed settlement patterns**, which are functionally inefficient and costly;
- **Extreme concentrations of taxable economic resources** in formerly white areas, demanding redistribution between and within local areas;
- **Huge backlogs exist in service infrastructure** in historically underdeveloped areas, requiring municipal expenditure far in excess of the revenue currently available within the local government system;
- **Creating viable municipal institutions for dense rural settlements** close to the borders of former homeland areas which have large populations with minimal access to services, and little or no economic base;
- **Great spatial separations and disparities between towns and townships and urban sprawl**, which increase service provision and transport costs enormously. Most urban areas are racially fragmented, with *discontinuous land use* and settlement patterns. Municipalities in urban areas will need to develop strategies for *spatial integration*, while managing the continuing consequences of rapid urbanisation and service backlogs;
- **Creating municipal institutions which recognise the linkages between urban and rural settlements**. There is a wide variety of urban settlements, ranging from those which play the roles of local or regional service centres (supplying services to rural areas and other towns), to functionally specialised towns (such as mining towns) and administrative centres (common in former homeland areas). Importantly, almost all towns are functionally linked to rural areas, relying on their *hinterlands* for productive economic activity and providing critical centres for the delivery of social services;
- **Entrenched modes of decision-making, administration and delivery** inherited from municipalities geared for the implementation of urban and rural apartheid;
- **Inability to leverage private sector resources for development** due to a breakdown in the relationship between capital markets and municipalities, the lack of a municipal bond market and the poor creditworthiness of many municipalities;
- **Substantial variations in capacity**, with some municipalities having little or no pre-existing institutional foundations to build on;

- **The need to rebuild relations between municipalities and the local communities they serve.** Municipalities should be particularly sensitive to the needs of groups within the community who tend to be marginalised, and responsive and accessible to people with a disability.

NORTHERN CAPE

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Background

Following South Africa's third democratic local government elections, final results were certified and subsequently published in the *Government Gazette*. At government level, the cabinet expressed its satisfaction with the electoral process and in the manner in which the electorate performed their civic duty. Mr Joel Netshitenzhe also expressed satisfaction at the manner the IEC conducted the elections. Political parties also viewed the elections as fair and reasonable (Azzakani, 2006:4).

The input of the IEC is important as it is an institution which had been mandated by the

Constitution of South Africa. As such every election is regarded by the IEC as a test which will ensure that the election held is free and fair. The results of the 2006 local government elections have proved that the IEC's contributions were successful and the management of the elections can be held as an example globally. Of equal importance is that the IEC has achieved its constitutional duty in promoting a culture of democracy in South Africa (Azzakani, 2006:4).

Vote Counting and Voter Turnout

In the Northern Cape, the IEC completed the counting of the votes at 5pm on 2 March 2006. Parties who had complaints or objections could still lodge them 48 hours after the counting had been completed. The media had reported that the ANC had "...achieved a resounding 70% victory in the local government elections". The ANC had also won 21 out of the 27 municipal seats (Kwon Hoo, 2006: 1).

Kimberley held one surprise in the local government elections when an independent candidate Jahn Pieterse won the Greenpoint ward. Greenpoint area had recently experienced troubled times when residents staged protests against poor service delivery. Protests had taken

the form of tyre burning and roads being blocked (Kwon Hoo, 2006:1).

The local government elections are the most important elections and yet the polls indicated a turnout of 47% percent. This compares unfavourably with the national elections which reflected a 70% turnout. Rantao (2006:14) has questioned this phenomenon and trend. The question to emerge is why the electorate abstained from an opportunity to deepen our new democracy. The most serious warning issued by this trend points to problems with the opposition parties. Rantao raises the question as to why the electorate abstained from voting rather than channelling their objections into a vote for an opposition party. A possible answer is that the opposition parties do not present a case which portrays a convincing alternative to the ruling party; this does have an effect in terms of political mobilisation of the electorate during elections. If the opposition presents a case it is often an attack on the ruling party. It can also be said that the opposition parties do not represent the politics of the majority of the electorate. The debate is deepened by a variety of viewpoints which place the voting preferences as being motivated by ethnic origins or race. These deductions are derived from a comparison between the electorate figures and the population

divisions (Coetzee, 2006:10). The issue was hotly debated in the media causing many viewpoints and possible remedies to emerge. Most agree on the point that a stronger opposition is needed to safeguard our new democracy.

It is obvious that the dissatisfaction with the overall lack of service delivery did not overly influence the electorate who, nonetheless, provided a resounding success for the ANC. This is strongly illuminated by the fact that all 26 municipalities in the Northern Cape are now under the ANC stronghold. In the Northern Cape, the ANC now enjoys 70% of the voters support which compares favourably with the 62,4% in 2000 and 68,8% in 2004 with 266 council members. The ANC has won 100% of the ward seats in areas such as Hartswater, Barkly West, Warrenton, Colesburg and Port Nolloth. The ANC also managed to win previously held DA strongholds such as Renosterburg (Petrusville), Ubuntu (Victoria West), Kareeburg (Carnavon) and the Karoo Hoogland in Sutherland (Kwon Hoo, 2006:2).

In the Northern Cape, the DA enjoy 13,7% of the voter's support and has 58 council members. These results show a reduction from the 2000 results which showed a 28,5% support and

119 council members. It was a slight improvement over the 2004 elections which manifested a 11,6% support. Coetzee (2006:10) reasons that the Independent Democrats (ID), drawing on support which had belonged to the DA was the main reason for the decline. The decrease in the support for the opposition parties is a cause for concern especially since South Africa is only twelve years into the country's new democratic dispensation.

The conservative Afrikaner community at Orania in the Northern Cape had decided not to contest the local government elections. Orania was amalgamated into the municipality of Hopetown and Strydenburg but the move received much resistance. The community voted only on district proportional representation and votes for ward councillors or for proportional representation (*Cape Times* 2006:2). The spokesperson, Eleanor Lombard, commented on the results achieved by voting on the Internet from voters as far a field as Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Holland. Orania's population totals 700 people and the aims of the leadership of Orania are to govern this population as an independent municipality. Approximately 80% of the communities' registered voters voted with 484 votes cast. Among the eight members who were elected

are Professor Carel Boshoff, founder member of Orania and Dr. Manie Opperman who was elected mayor of Orania. According to Orania's political structure and electoral procedure, a candidate, not physically residing there, also has to be elected to sit on the council of Orania. Candidates who availed themselves for this position include Anton Alberts, Annatjie Joubert, Jakes Moller, and Albert van Zyl. Annatjie Joubert is the only female candidate to have won in the election.

Participation of People with Disabilities

Given that local government elections are of vital importance to the community, it has been noted that no special voting day was set aside for the disabled. It is of great importance that the disabled, the elderly or bedridden should also be enabled to cast their vote because it is with local elections that service delivery plays an important role to ensure a good quality of life for all its citizens. The disabled feel strongly about their right to participate in voicing their views about service delivery especially where it is of special importance to them. Howitson (2006:10) commended the government and the IEC, who provided transport for the disabled to the polling stations in especially marked cars. Not only was transport provided throughout the day but the

IEC officials at the polling stations assisted the disabled to go through to cast their ballots without standing in queues.

This was not always possible and there were reported incidents in Greenpoint, just outside Kimberley, where the disabled did not have chairs to sit on while they waited to vote and some had to sit on the cold cement floors of the polling stations. According to Lisa Maree, the acting-head of the Disability Desk in the Office of the Status of Persons with disabilities, by 13:00 on the day of the election 13 people in the Sol Plaatje municipal area had been provided with transport to and from the voting stations where they were able to cast their ballots. The majority of these persons were from the Colville/Floors area. The same transport was also used for the elderly. According to Dorothy-Ann Howitson, Chairperson of the Association for the Physically Disabled (APD), upon reflection the remaining challenge in accommodating the disabled to carry out their right to vote was the accessibility of the voting stations. The APD was assured that all voting stations would be accessible however there were cases that were problematic (DFA, 2006:2). Howitson explained to a DFA (2006:2) reporter that “...at places like *Laerskool Vooruitsig and Kimberley Junior School, where there were stairs that*

needed to be negotiated. This is totally unacceptable and some sort of provision should have been made to ensure that the area was accessible, even if it was just by means of a sand ramp”. A positive outcome occurred when Justice Bekebeke of the IEC, who played a huge role in solving various problems declared that this entire matter will be taken up with national government (Howitson: 2006:10).

Gender and Youth Representation

In the local government elections of 2006, gender representation and considerations once again surfaced strongly. President Mbeki supported and commended the progress made in promoting the equality and emancipation of women in the recent municipal elections. The goals of gender equality prominently displayed were. The election revealed the increase in the number of women represented in the municipal system, The Northern Cape obtained great success in terms of gender voting with 55,6% of women who now serve as leaders of their communities in local government. The Northern Cape, Gauteng, and the North West are the three leading provinces in South Africa regarding gender representation (African Women and Child Feature Service: 2006). In terms of gender voting successes, 53% of the mayors in the

Northern Cape are female (Kwon Hoo, 2006:2).

Parents, especially in the areas of Roodepan, Phutanong, Transit Camp, Lerato Park and parts of Galeshewe, expressed their concern over the youth not voting. A man with two sons stated that his children would not vote “until they get jobs and live like descent human beings” (Ramoroka, 2006:6).

The national leadership had numerous factors to consider when deciding on the new list of mayors. ANC Deputy Secretary General, Sanki Mthembi-Mahanyele said that a number of issues had to be addressed and it is important to ensure that there is a combination of “...*new people with old councillors to ensure continuity*” (DFA, 2006:5).

An inaugural meeting of the newly elected Sol Plaatje City Council was held on 17 March 2006 at 14:30 that was chaired by the Municipal Manager. The members of nine standing committees, such as Local Economic Development and Housing; Finance; Arts and Culture; Development; Organisational Development; Planning and Infrastructure; Social Development and Health; and Security and Protection Services, as well as the Speaker and Executive Mayor will be inaugurated at this meeting. It is at this meeting that all the newly

elected members will take an oath. The oath constitutes the following pledge: (DFA:2006:3) *"I solemnly affirm that I will be faithful to the Republic of South Africa and will obey, respect and uphold the Constitution and all other laws of the Republic; and I solemnly promise to perform my functions as a member of the Sol Plaatje Municipal Council to the best of my ability"*.

The councillors will also be introduced to and are bound by a Code of Conduct which provides guidelines regarding taking leave, and attending council and committee meetings. According to this Code, should a councillor miss three or more council or committee meetings without the necessary approved leave of absence he/she will be removed from office.

It was at this meeting that Patrick Lenyibi was re-elected as the new mayor. The new council consists of 40 members of the ANC, 10 from the DA, two from the ID, 1 from the ACDP, 1 from the AZAPO and 1 from an independent councillor. The smaller parties all voted for Lebyibi with 44 votes while the DA voted for their parties' mayoral candidate, Patricia Coutts with 10 votes (DFA, 2006:3 and van der Merwe, 2006:1).

The mandate for local government after the municipal elections of 2006

is clear. President Mbeki said at the closing ceremony of the 2006 government elections that "... all parties, irrespective of the support they get, should live by the promises to serve the people who elected them" and urged all the parties to work together to address the concerns of people (Hlalala, 2006:2). With the election now over it is time to deliver.

The Counting Process

Procedures for the sorting of the ballot papers and counting of votes are set out in the Municipal Electoral Regulations No. R. 848 of 22 August 2000 as amended by Notice No. R. 848 of 23 August 2003, the 'Municipal Electoral Regulations'. (Hendrickse 2006:2). In terms of Appendixes 20A and 20B of the Municipal Electoral Regulations (as stated in Hendrickse 2006:69), the process is as follows:

- Papers are first sorted according to the type of ballot papers used at the voting station;
- After the papers of each ballot are counted, the totals are then compared with the statement of the presiding officer (Form MEC 11);
- Papers are examined to ascertain whether they should be rejected and if that is the case, the rejected papers are kept to one side;
- The remaining papers are sorted face up according

to each party and ward candidate; They are bound in elastic bands in bundles of ten and thereafter in bundles of ten such packages; and finally

- The bundles and the remaining ballots are then counted with the totals of each party or candidate recorded on specified forms (Form MEC 17: Result form – Party List count and Form MEC: Result Form 18 – Ward count).

Election Results

The results were announced at the IEC Headquarters on Saturday, 4 April 2006 in Pretoria by IEC Chairperson, Dr. Brigalia Bam, who declared the elections free and fair. At the same event, President Mbeki congratulated the IEC for overseeing the elections as well as political parties who had accepted the election outcome and had not taken recourse to the courts. President Mbeki emphasised the importance of local government *"as a critical area where all the promise made by people during their campaign had to be delivered on"* (IOL, 2006:1). The ANC won all 27 municipalities of the Northern Cape receiving support of 69,95% of the votes as compared to 64,59% in the 2000 Elections. The DA was the only other party to receive any noteworthy support, viz. 13,63% of the votes which is down from

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the 29,32% which they had received in the 2000 Elections (IEC Local Government Elections 2000:1). The results were determined by the IEC in terms of section 64(6) of the Local Government Municipal Electoral Act, No.

27 of 2000 and are provided in the following tables.

Table 1: Leading Party Overall Report

Table 2: Table outlining the percentage of PR votes only obtained by the top three

parties in the specified municipality

Table 3: Summary of Seat Calculation per District Council

Table 4: Summary of Seat Calculation per Municipality

Table 1: Leading party overall report

Party Name	Valid Votes ¹	% Support	Seats won ²	% Seats won
African National Congress (ANC)	574,160	69,95%	266	61,57%
Democratic Alliance (DA)	111,914	13,63%	58	13,43%
Independent Democrats (ID)	69,010	8,41%	40	9,26%
United Christian Democratic Party (UNCP)	16,257	1,98%	8	1,85%
Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)	2,976	0,36%	2	0,46%
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	3,328	0,41%	2	0,46%
Barkley West Task Team (BWTT)	2,647	0,32%	2	0,46%
Independents	1,136	0,14%	1	0,23%
Other	39,366	4,80%		
TOTAL	820,794	100,00%	379	

¹ Valid Votes include both Ward and PR votes

² Seats won include both Ward and PR seats

Source: IEC – Leading Party Overall Report as at 2000/03/04.

Table 2: Table outlining the percentage of PR votes only obtained by the top three parties in the specified municipality

Municipality (Previous name in brackets)	VD's declared %	1 st party	%	2 nd party	%	3 rd party	%
NC452 GASEGONYA (Kuruman)	100	ANC	78	UCDP	9	DA	6
NC453 GAMAGARA (Kathu)	100	ANC	69	DA	15	ID	11
NC451 MOSHAWENG (Kgalagadi)	100	ANC	82	UCDP	18	0	0
NC601 RICHTERSVELD (Port Nolloth)	100	ANC	63	ID	18	DA	18
NC062 NAMA KHOI (Springbok)	100	ANC	52	ID	34	DA	14
NC064 KAMIESBERG (Garies)	100	ANC	56	ID	35	DA	9
NC065 HANTAM Calvinia)	100	ANC	65	DA	31	ACDP	4
NC066 KAROO HOOGLAND Fraserburg)	100	ANC	61	DA	28	ACDP	8
NC067 KHâI-MA (Pofadder)	100	ANC	78	DA	14	ID	7
NC071 UBUNTU (Victoria West)	100	ANC	61	DA	32	ICOSA	4
NC072 UMSOBOMVU (Colesberg)	100	ANC	78	DA	11	ID	10
NC073 EMTHANJENI (De Aar)	100	ANC	65	ID	19	DA	14
NC074 KAREEBERG (Carnarvon)	100	ANC	63	DA	31	ACDP	3
NC075 RENOSTERBERG (Phillipstown)	100	ANC	65	DA	23	ID	8
NC076 THEMBELIHLE (Hopetown)	100	ANC	69	DA	27	ID	4
NC077 SIYATHEMBA (Prieska)	100	ANC	63	DA	34	ACDP	2
NC078 SIYANCUMA (Griekwastad)	100	ANC	66	DA	31	ACDP	3
NC081 MIER	100	ANC	64	ID	35	ACDP	1
NC082 KAI IGARIEB (Keimoes)	100	ANC	66	ID	20	DA	11
NC083 KHARA HAIS (Upington)	100	ANC	64	ID	24	DA	10
NC084 IKHEIS (Groblershoop)	100	ANC	70	ID	18	DA	8
NC085 TSANTSABANE (Postmasburg)	100	ANC	76	ID	12	DA	10
NC086 KGATELOPELE (Daniëlskuil)	100	ANC	73	ID	15	DA	9
NC091 SOL PLAATJE (Kimberley)	100	ANC	74	DA	17	ID	3
NC092 DIKGATLONG (Barkley West)	100	ANC	72	BWTT	12	DA	9
NC093 MAGARENG (Warrenton)	100	ANC	79	DA	10	ID	7
NC094 PHOKWANE (Hartswater)	100	ANC	74	DA	11	AZAPO	5

Source: SABC News, 2006-03-05: 1-2.

Table 3: Summary of Seat Allocation per District Council

Table 3:1 DC 6 – NAMAKWA

DC 40% Total Seats available to Municipality: 6				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
ANC	20,448	59,15%	4	66,67%
ACDP	937	2,71%	0	0,00%
DA	6,276	18,15%	1	16,67%
ID	6,910	19,99%	1	16,67%
TOTAL	34,571	100,00%	6	100,00%
DMA DC 60% Total Seats available to Municipality: 1				
ACDP	49	25,13%	0	0,00%
DA	146	74,87%	1	100,00%
TOTAL	195	100,00%	1	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC as at 2000/03/04.

Table 3:2 DC 8 – SIYANDA (Benede Oranje)

DC 40% Total Seats available to Municipality: 8				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
FF-Plus	1,011	1,83%	0	0,00%
ANC	36,864	66,88%	5	62,50%
ACDP	808	1,47%	0	0,00%
DA	5,285	9,59%	1	12,50%
ID	11,155	20,24%	2	25,00%
TOTAL	55,123	100,00%	8	100,00%
DMA DC 60% Total Seats available to Municipality: 1				
ANC	677	67,10%	1	100,00%
ACDP	58	5,75%	0	0,00%
DA	274	27,16%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	1,009	100,00%	1	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC33 as at 2000/03/04.

Table 3.3 DC9 – FRANCIS BAARD (Diamandveld)

DC40% Total Seats available to Municipality: 10				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
FF-Plus	891	1,02%	0	0,00%
ANC	65,613	74,78%	8	80,00%
ACDP	2,013	2,29%	0	0,00%
DA	12,992	14,81%	2	20,00%
ID	3,375	3,85%	0	0,00%
UDF	599	0,68%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	87,739	100,00%	10	100,00%
DMA DC60% Total Seats available to Municipality: 1				
ANC	646	79,07%	1	100,00%
ACDP	23	2,82%	0	0,00%
DA	148	18,12%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	817	100,00%	1	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC33 as at 2000/03/04.

Table 3.4 DC45 – KGALAGADI (Kalahari District Council)

DC40% Total Seats available to Municipality: 7				
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	DC40% Total Seats	% Seats won
UCDP	5,150	10,73%	1	14,29%
ANC	37,364	77,88%	6	85,71%
ACDP	908	1,89%	0	0,00%
DA	2,615	5,45%	0	0,00%
ID	1,938	4,04%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	47,975	100,00%	7	100,00%
DMA DC60% Total Seats available to Municipality: 1				
ANC	955	79,45%	1	100,00%
ACDP	247	20,55%	0	0,00%
TOTAL	1,202	100,00%	1	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC 33 as at 2000/03/04.

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Table 4: Summary of seat calculation per municipality

In cases where a ward is uncontested, the PR for the party will be doubled for the overall seat calculation.

Seats Calculated = (A)

Ward Seats = (B)

PR List Seats = (A-B)

NC452 – GA-SEGONYA (Kuruman): Seats 18						
Party	Valid Votes	% Votes	Total Seats	Ward Seats	PR List Seats	% Seats Won
ANC	27,878	77,48%	14	8	6	77,78%
UCDP	2,882	8,01%	2	0	2	11,11%
DA	2,212	6,15%	1	1	0	5,56%
ID	1,697	4,72%	1	0	1	5,56%
ACDP	873	2,43%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	440	1,22%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	35,982	100,00%	18	9	9	100,00%
NC453 – GAMAGARA (Kathu): Seats 8						
ANC	9,573	69,22%	6	3	3	75,00%
DA	2,125	15,37%	1	1	0	12,50%
ID	1,540	11,14%	1	0	1	12,50%
FF-PLUS	356	2,57%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	236	1,71%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	13,830	100,00%	8	4	4	100,00%
NC451 – MOSHAWENG (Kgalagadi): Seats 21						
ANC	35,059	80,69%	17	11	6	80,95%
UCDP	7,233	16,65%	4	0	4	19,05%
INDEPENDENT	852	1,96%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	303	0,70%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	43,447	100,00%	21	11	10	100,00%
NC061 – RICHTERSVELD (Port Nolloth): Seats 8						
ANC	4,173	62,84%	5	4	1	62,50%
ID	1,147	17,37%	2	0	2	25,00%
DA	1,051	15,83%	1	0	1	12,50%
ACDP	196	2,95%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	74	1,11%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	6,641	100,00%	8	4	4	100,00%
DC062 – NAMA KHOI (Springbok): Seats 17						
ANC	14,435	51,77%	9	8	1	52,94%
ID	9,394	33,69%	6	1	5	35,29%
DA	3,737	13,40%	2	0	2	11,76%
ACDP	315	1,13%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	27,881	100,00%	17	9	8	100,00%
NC064 – Kamiesberg (Garies): 7						
ANC	4,425	55,56%	4	4	0	57,14%
ID	2,710	35,46%	2	0	2	28,57%
DA	686	8,98%	1	0	1	14,29%
TOTAL	7,642	100,00%	7	4	4	100,00%
NCO63 HANTAM (Calvinia): Seats 9						
ANC	8,159	64,96%	6	5	1	66,67%
DA	3,797	30,23%	3	0	3	33,33%
ACDP	545	4,34%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	60	0,48%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	12,561	100,00%	9	5	4	100,00%
NCO65 – KAROO HOOGLAND (Fraserburg): Seats 7						
ANC	4,388	61,41%	4	3	1	57,14%
DA	1,967	27,53%	2	1	1	28,57%
ACDP	602	8,43%	1	0	1	14,29%
IFP	188	2,63%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	7,145	100,00%	7	4	3	100,00%
NCO67 – KHAI-MA (Pofadder): Seats 7						
ANC	5,459	78,05%	5	3	2	71,43%
DA	1,013	14,48%	1	1	0	14,29%
ID	522	7,46%	1	0	1	14,29%
TOTAL	6,994	100,00%	7	4	3	100,00%
NCO71 – UBUNTU (Victoria West): Seats 8						
ANC	6,2235	60,88%	5	4	1	62,50%
DA	3,337	32,65%	3	0	3	37,50%
ICOSA	394	3,85%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	153	1,50%	0	0	0	0,00%
UIF	114	1,12%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	10,221	100,00%	8	4	4	100,00%

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NCO72 – UMSOBOMVU (Colesberg): Seats 10						
ANC	12,087	77,72%	8	5	3	80,00%
DA	1,651	10,62%	1	0	1	10,00%
ID	1,552	9,98%	1	0	1	10,00%
ACDP	171	1,10%	0	0	0	0,00%
UIF	90	0,58%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	15,551	100,00%	10	5	5	100,00%
NCO73 – EMTHANJENI (De Aar): Seats 14						
ANC	14,685	64,98%	9	6	3	64,29%
ID	4,102	18,15%	3	0	3	21,43%
DA	3,203	14,17%	2	1	1	14,29%
UIF	238	1,05%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	234	1,04%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	139	0,62%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	22,601	100,00%	14	7	7	100,00%
NCO74 – KAREEBERG (Carnarvon): Seats 7						
ANC	4,952	62,49%	5	4	1	71,43%
DA	2,471	31,18%	2	0	2	28,57%
ACDP	271	3,42%	0	0	0	0,00%
IFP	231	2,91%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	7,925	100,00%	7	4	3	100,00%
NCO75 – RENOSTERBERG (Phillipstown): Seats 7						
ANC	4,771	64,22%	4	3	1	57,14%
DA	1,787	24,05%	2	1	1	28,57%
ID	584	7,86%	1	0	1	14,29%
FF-PLUS	151	2,17%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	126	1,70%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	7,429	100,00%	7	4	3	100,00%
NCO76 – THEMBELIHLE (Hopetown): Seats 7						
ANC	5,982	69,31%	5	4	1	71,43%
DA	2,349	27,22%	2	0	2	28,57%
ID	300	3,48%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	8,631	100,00%	7	4	3	100,00%
NCO77 – SIYATHEMBA (Prieska): Seats 8						
ANC	6,335	63,35%	5	4	1	62,50%
DA	3,426	34,26%	3	0	3	37,50%
ACDP	239	2,39%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	10,000	100,00%	8	4	4	100,00%
NCO78 – SIYANDUMA (Griekwastad): Seats 9						
ANC	10,837	65,85%	6	4	2	66,67%
DA	4,917	29,88%	3	1	2	33,33%
ACDP	448	2,72%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	255	1,55%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	16,457	100,00%	9	5	4	100,0
NCO81 – MIER (Mier): Seats 5						
ANC	1,908	63,75%	3	0	3	60,00%
ID	1,041	34,78%	2	0	2	40,00%
ACDP	44	1,47%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	2,993	100,00%	5	0	5	100,00%
NCO82 – KAI IGARIB (Keimoes): Seats 15						
ANC	17,169	66,53%	10	8	2	66,67%
ID	5,180	20,07%	3	0	3	20,00%
DA	2,976	11,53%	2	0	2	13,33%
ACDP	483	1,87%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	25,808	100,00%	15	8	7	100,00%
NCO83 – KHARA HAIS (Upington): Seats 23						
ANC	28,772	63,89%	15	11	4	65,22%
ID	10,600	23,54%	6	0	6	26,09%
DA	4,315	9,58%	2	1	1	8,70%
FF-PLUS	797	1,77%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	550	1,22%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	45,034	100,00%	23	12	11	100,00%
NCO84 – IKEIS (Groblershoop): Seats 7						
ANC	6,170	69,80%	5	4	1	71,43%
ID	1,581	17,89%	1	0	1	14,29%
DA	749	8,47%	1	0	1	14,29%
FF-PLUS	267	3,02%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	72	0,81%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	8,839	100,00%	7	4	3	100,00%

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NC085 – TSANTSABANE (Postmasburg): Seats 11						
ANC	10,679	76,10%	9	6	3	81,82%
ID	1,602	11,42%	1	0	1	9,09%
DA	1,459	10,40%	1	0	1	9,09%
ACDP	293	2,09%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	14,033	100,00%	11	6	5	100,00%
NCO86 – KGATELOPELE (Danielskuil): Seats 8						
ANC	6,349	72,83%	6	4	2	75,00%
ID	1,341	15,38%	1	0	1	12,50%
DA	819	9,39%	1	0	1	12,50%
ACDP	209	2,40%	0	0	1	0,00%
TOTAL	8,716	100,00%	8	4	4	100,00%
NCO91 – SOL PLAATJE (Kimberley): Seats 55						
ANC	80,760	73,04%	40	23	17	72,73%
DA	19,223	17,38%	10	4	6	18,18%
ID	3,596	3,25%	2	0	2	3,64%
ACDP	2,726	2,47%	1	0	1	1,82%
AZAPO	1,298	1,17%	1	0	1	1,82%
INDEPENDENT	1,136	1,03%	1	1	0	1,82%
FF-PLUS	922	0,83%	0	0	0	0,00%
IFP	431	0,39%	0	0	0	0,00%
UIF	276	0,25%	0	0	0	0,00%
FDP	206	0,19%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	110,574	100,00%	55	28	27	100,00%
NCO92 – DIKGATLONG (Barkley West): Seats 13						
ANC	15,336	71,74%	9	7	2	69,23%
BWTT	2,647	12,38%	2	0	2	15,38%
DA	1,992	9,32%	1	0	1	7,69%
ID	640	2,99%	1	0	1	7,69%
ACDP	556	2,60%	0	0	0	0,00%
PAC	206	0,96%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	21,377	100,00%	13	7	6	100,00%
NCO93 MAGARENG (Warrenton): Seats 9						
ANC	9,644	78,60%	7	5	2	77,78%
DA	1,180	9,62%	1	0	1	11,11%
ID	825	6,72%	1	0	1	11,11%
PAC	279	2,27%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	275	2,24%	0	0	0	0,00%
INDEPENDENT	66	0,54%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	12,269	100,00%	9	5	4	100,00%
NCO94 – PHOKWANE (Hartswater): Seats 18						
ANC	22,420	71,43%	13	9	4	72,22%
DA	3,579	11,40%	2	0	2	11,11%
AZAPO	1,678	5,35%	1	0	1	5,56%
ID	1,291	4,11%	1	0	1	5,56%
UCDP	992	3,16%	1	0	1	5,56%
INDEPENDENT	894	2,85%	0	0	0	0,00%
ACDP	535	1,70%	0	0	0	0,00%
TOTAL	31,389	100,00%	18	9	9	100,00%

Source: IEC – MEC 33 as at 2000/03/04.

It appears that despite poor service delivery and corruption among councillors, the ANC still enjoys the majority of the support as had been the case during the 2004 national election. The DA lost support to other parties especially the ID – as was the also the case during the previous elections. As the election draws to a close

with all the results officially announced, the Northern Cape Provincial government congratulated all the newly elected local government councillors together with district and local mayors. The head of communications of the Premier’s Office, Sipiwe Dlamini stated that “...it is our sincere hope that communities and the newly elected leaders will work

together by participating in all processes of local government in an effort to build a better life for all and make it happen where we live” (DFA, 2006:4).

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GAUTENG

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The Counting Process and Announcement of Results

The election counting process is one of the complex aspects of the electoral process as the IEC has to ensure that the announced results are an accurate reflection of the will of the people. In an effort to be as transparent as possible, the IEC launched the National Operations Centre (NOC) in Pretoria. The primary objective of the NOC was to act as the IEC's control centre for all voting results activities. The centre served as a central point from which the media monitored incoming results and a base from which they reported, as well as a meeting place for political parties, politicians, business and government leaders to closely follow the election results pattern⁵⁶. Similar centres were also established in all other provinces. Launched on 22 February 2006, the NOC served as a place where political parties and independent candidates could observe and monitor their electoral performance as the results came in from various municipalities and wards. The centre had a results system technical

help-desk, a results problem resolution authority, an electoral operations nerve centre, an IT division and a geographic information system group that prepared interactive, map-based graphics displays for large projection screens, for the media and for dissemination via the IEC intranet to provincial operations centres.⁵⁷

As opposed to other provinces such as the Western Cape, the electoral contest in Gauteng was destined to be a one-horse race with the African National Congress (ANC) set to dominate the stakes. As has always been the norm, following hot on the heels was the main opposition party in the form of the Democratic Alliance (DA). For more detailed and precise electoral outcome, refer to the *Election Update* No.2.

Article 56 of the Municipal Electoral Act asserts that counting commences as soon as practicable after the voting station has been closed for voting and must continue uninterrupted and may only be suspended with the Commission's approval. The same procedure applied in all of Gauteng's polling stations. To allay fears of electoral fraud, contesting political parties and independent candidates were given the right to observe and monitor the counting

process. In Gauteng, most if not all stakeholders expressed their satisfaction in the manner in which the counting process was handled.

Post-Election Disputes

The local government elections took place under conditions for best electoral practices in Gauteng. In the period leading to the elections, all contesting parties and independent candidates engaged in vicious electioneering that was tempered by political tolerance. It thus came as no surprise when the provincial IEC noted that there were no reported post-election disputes. The only cumbersome issue, not only for the IEC but for the proponents of democracy is that of Khutsong. Immediately after the elections, houses belonging to the newly elected councillors were torched by residents of the area. This is intriguing given the fact that the alleged perpetrators decided to vote with their feet. Other than this incident, the electoral outcome in Gauteng was well received by all stakeholders involved.

Results Patterns and Political Implications

As in most provinces in the country, the African National Congress had a resounding 62, 4% victory in Gauteng only losing one municipality

⁵⁶ <http://www.elections.org.za/news>

⁵⁷ <http://www.itweb.co.za/ananzi>

Midvaal (Meyerton) to the Democratic Alliance. The ANC won all of the metropolitan and district councils in Gauteng, councils that the opposition will need to conquer if they are to seriously hold power. The ANC won 108 seats in the Ekurhuleni Metro, the last of the Gauteng voting districts to finish counting and auditing their ballots. The party won 61.34 percent of the votes. The DA won 45 seats, the IFP five. Three seats went to the Displaced Ratepayers Association. Three also went to the PAC, with the ACDP and FF+ each obtained two seats. The UDM, Independent Ratepayers of SA, Daveyton Community Peace Committee, Azapo and Simunye in Christ Party captured each one seat. In Nokeng tsa Taemane (Cullinan) the ANC won seven of the seats with 61.61 percent of the votes. The DA captured three seats, while the FF+ and ACDP won one seat each. Nineteen seats went to the ANC in the Kungwini Municipality (Bronkhorstspuit) where the party captured 71.91 percent of the votes. Five seats went to the DA and one each to the FF+, ACDP and PAC.

On the whole, the Democratic Alliance was the only party that managed to mount a serious challenge to the ANC. Whilst the other small parties might have won some wards in different municipalities as well as attaining several seats in

council through the proportional representation, their numbers are not significant as far as shifting the balance of power is concerned.

Whilst council decisions are generally made after in-depth discussions, broad consultations and general consensus amongst council members, they are also based on agreement by the majority of council members. Thus for a proposition to be agreed upon, it must enjoy the backing of the majority of council members. Such a process is not an individualised but a collective one based on political identity and conviction and along party lines. In most of the councils in Gauteng, the ANC enjoys more than 60% majority meaning that it has the ability to see its positions through council with limited difficulty. In a situation where 60% of the council members belong to one party, the opposition parties have very limited if any power to have their views turning into a council resolution.

The results as they stand have two main political implications for Gauteng. The first implication is that opposition parties will find it difficult to live up to their election manifestos. For it is only through council resolutions that political ideals can be realised at municipal level. Opposition

parties will have to collaborate with each other more closely if they are to play a meaningful role in shaping the agenda of councils. In certain instances, even coalitions at council level may not assist the opposition parties. Another possibility would be for some of the representatives of smaller parties and individual candidates to be swallowed up by dominant parties in council through floor crossing and other means.

Election Observation and Monitoring

Election observers play a critical role in the electoral process. Their feedback on electoral process has a far reaching effect on the credibility of elections. Election observers do not only take interest on the election day but are concerned with the broader electoral processes including the pre-election, election and post election phases. South Africa has demonstrated its ability to hold elections by conducting three national and provincial and two local government elections. As a result, local and international bodies that normally deploy election observers are not keen to do so for an election in South Africa.

The 2006 local government elections attracted minimal election observer interest. In Gauteng, quite a number of local institutions applied and

acquired accreditation to observe the elections from the IEC but very few of them turned out to polling stations to observe the elections. The main observers visible in polling stations throughout the province were party agents whose primary purpose was to serve and protect their party political interests.

The South African Civil Society Observation Coalition (SACSOC) is an organisation that took the responsibility for deploying non-partisan election observers in almost all polling stations in Gauteng. Since its inception in 1998, SACSOC has observed all the national and local government elections in South Africa. The significance of this election observation is acknowledged by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC-SA).⁵⁸ SACSOC observed both the pre-election and election phase in Gauteng, below are the observations that SACSOC made during the pre-election and subsequent

Although Khutsong was demarcated to fall under the Northwest, Gauteng had two pre-election observers in the field given the dissatisfaction by Khutsong residents on the incorporation into Northwest. Residents held

several protest meetings and also called for the IEC to postpone the election. Residents also lodged a case with the court to postpone the election and to declare the incorporation of Khutsong into Northwest invalid.

The IEC indicated that it was prepared for the election and would continue with its preparations. However on 15 February, the day scheduled for political parties to sign the Code of Conduct, parties did not arrive on the basis that there was no need as it appeared that voters would boycott the elections.

There was no visible campaigning by political parties during the pre-election period by some parties. The ANC convened several meetings which emanated in conflict and residents preventing the Minister of Defence, Mr. Lekota and the Northwest Premier, Ms Molewa from addressing the meetings. It also culminated in local residents declaring Minister Leota “banned from the township”. The rally held on 19 February was attended by residents from the Khutsong informal settlements and not householders of Khutsong. There was wide media coverage of Khutsong in the pre election period.

Residents planned an all-night vigil at one of the

stadiums but were not allowed to hold the vigil.

Vaal: There were no particular incidents in this area and no major events regarding campaigning and canvassing. There was one rally during the period in which the pre-election observation was active. It was held by the ANC at Siyanqoba, attended by the media, security forces and political party leadership. The pre-election observers were also present at an IEC voter education session attended by an estimated 500 people

Election Day Observation

One hundred and seventeen SACSOC observers and five volunteers were deployed on Election Day. The coordinators played the role of Lead Monitor, and were responsible for the observers in their respective regions.

Soweto (28)

The election process was generally smooth except for the following problems:

- Party agents did not have any visible form of identification
- In some stations, there were no security forces present
- The ANC members were disruptive in some stations as they were busy campaigning around the voting stations, thereby causing unnecessary commotion.

⁵⁸ South African Civil Society Observation Coalition (SACSOC), Report on 2006 Municipal Government Elections.

- Observers noted that in many stations it appeared that the IEC staff were not sufficiently trained and were not fully aware of their role and responsibilities frequently calling on observers to assist them.
- In hostels, the Indunas were located at the entrance of the voting perimeter which could be seen by some voters as intimidating. The observers were also required to greet Indunas on arrival and in one instance, were required to provide refreshments before being able to proceed into the station. At the same time, their presence served to create order and no campaigning or tables with party supporters were visible at these stations as was the case at other stations.
- Some stations closed later than 19h00 due the queues that were still there at closing time.

Ekurhuleni (13)

The election process generally went smoothly. The following problems were noted:

- The atmosphere was different at the hostels. The presence of Indunas was again reported to be quite daunting for some voters. Counting went well;
- Observers also noted that at some stations electoral staff were not well

informed on voting procedures.

Vaal (25)

Overall the process went smoothly apart from the following incidents:

- At one station a voter requiring assistance indicated to the Presiding Office that he wanted to vote for Mandela. When advised that Mr. Mandela was not standing as a candidate, the voter asked for Mr. Mbeki. The PO referred the request to the party agents for advice. It would appear that the voter wanted to vote for the ANC, hence the request for Mr. Mandela. The party agents could not agree with an agent from one of the parties suggesting that “the vote be split amongst all parties, namely, the ward candidate going to one party, the district vote going to another party and the pr vote to another”. The PO then ruled that the ballot should be placed in the ballot box incomplete and would be regarded as a spoilt ballot.
- The person issuing the IEC ballot paper at one station gave a voter two sets of ballot papers. The voter had advised that she was also voting for her mother who was ill and could not attend in person. As the voter placed her ballots in the ballot box, the IEC

official at the ballot box asked why she still had ballots in her hand after she had deposited hers. The extra ballots were then taken from the voter before she left the station and put aside by the PO.

JHB North (5)

Overall the process went smoothly. The following incidents were noted:

- ANC members at had a table with the register and as voters entered the voting station parameter, they were called to the table to have their names checked against this register. Observers noted at one station that a voter name appeared on the register outside the station but not on the register inside the station.
- At one station ANC members were campaigning in the queue.
- At some stations the POs relied on observers to assist them. In particular, the counting process where the PO was not sure what constituted a spoilt ballot. The ANC party agent was quite vocal in describing whether a ballot was spoilt or not, resulting in the PO not asserting herself. The observer was called upon by the PO to assist in the process. At the same station, two ballots had the same markings, with one being rejected and the other being included due to the

insistence of the party agent.

- At Nasrec, observers noted that the IEC staff waited in vain for information from the POs who were required to report in at regular intervals.
- At one station, an ANC candidate was allowed inside the voting area without a letter from the party stating that he was a party agent.
- There was no consistency in the voting procedure as in some station ID books were not stamped, at others they were. At some stations, voters whose names were not on the register were allowed to vote whilst at other stations voters were turned away. Some voters were required to complete a form confirming that they had registered.
- A voter was not on the register, despite proof of registration and having voted at the station in the 2004 elections and was not able to vote.

West Rand

Generally voting and counting went smoothly except in Khutsong where the situation was very tense. This was confirmed by the large police presence monitoring the situation. The lead monitor was advised not to go into the area on his own and went with the security forces. Observers were advised that they

should not wear their apparel for their own safety.

- At the station visited by the SACSOC observer, only 4 people voted there and they had to be accompanied by the police to their homes
- The house of an ANC party agent was burnt whilst he was at the voting station. Under the circumstance the SACSOC observers were instructed to withdraw.
- There was confusion regarding closing time with some stations closing later than other (excluding voters who were in the queue at closing time) as in one instance the PO thought that the station only had to close at 9.00pm.

Tshwane (13)

The following incidents were recorded:

- In most stations, observers were asked to produce a letter from SACSOC and the lead monitor had to intervene.
- Some stations turned voters away if they did not appear on the voters' roll even if they were registered in that voting district.
- The scanner proved to be unreliable in most stations and PO's had to resort to using the manual voter's roll.

Challenges for the New Local Authorities

The March 2006 local government elections

ushered in the second term of South Africa's new system of local governance. In the build up to the elections, different stakeholders such as civil society organisations, political parties, independent analysts, ordinary citizens etc. appraised the new system of local governance after its five years of existence.

The appraisal was marked by sharp criticism of the performance of local government institutions. The criticisms ranged from the inability of municipalities to provide credible and democratic governance to delivering basic services such as water and sanitation to the rural and urban poor. During this process challenges faced by municipalities were highlighted. The challenges included the following: municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and budgets that did not adequately address the needs and interests of communities; irresponsible, unaccountable and irresponsible councillors and partisan, undemocratically constituted and non-transparent ward committees amongst other issues.

The immediate challenge that faces the new local authorities is to develop a comprehensive response to the challenges highlighted above. One of the features that characterise Gauteng is

an increased influx of people coming from other parts of the country as well as outside South Africa's borders. This phenomenon leads to an ever increasing or deepening in the socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, the increase in the number of informal settlements, the need for housing, and urban squalor.

The newly elected councils throughout the province will have to contend with these challenges amongst other factors. The need to deal with these challenges as soon as possible is further compounded by the forthcoming soccer World Cup to take place in 2010, during which Gauteng is expected to host the major

activity related to the tournament. Local municipalities are expected to play a leading role in creating environmental and infrastructural conditions that will enable Gauteng to play the role expected of it in ensuring a successful hosting of the tournament.

Table 1: Applications for observer accreditation - Local Government Elections 2006

Ref	Name of the organisation/individual	Province	Status	Numbers
146/06	SADC ECF	Botswana	accredited	15
011/06	Kopano Conferencing and Skills Training	Gauteng	accredited	2
013/06	Mahle Amasiko National Cultural Organisation	Gauteng	accredited	11
028/06	SACSOC/SACC	Gauteng	accredited	1200
046/06	Greater Pretoria Elections Consortium (GPEC)	Gauteng	accredited	42
047/06	African Blue Skies Travelling Agency CC	Gauteng	accredited	8
048/06	Monyetla Business Enterprise	Gauteng	accredited	8
052/06	Mandisa Paper Solutions CC	Gauteng	accredited	15
069/06	Deo-Favente Tenders	Gauteng	accredited	15
070/06	Young Intellectuals	Gauteng	accredited	7
072/06	Link Contracting Enterprise	Gauteng	accredited	5
074/06	Kanana Development Centre	Gauteng	accredited	12
105/06	National Association of Social Institution	Gauteng	accredited	6
126/06	Gender Commission	Gauteng	accredited	24
127/06	YENEPAD	Gauteng	accredited	3
128/06	Ntataise Development Project	Gauteng	accredited	6
133/06	UNISA, Department of Political Sciences	Gauteng	accredited	7
134/06	Thembi Ngema	Gauteng		
135/06	National Bus & Train Ministry	Gauteng		
140/06	Similosihle Projects	Gauteng	accredited	7
143/06	Vusumuzi Tshabalala	Gauteng	accredited	6
144/06	Black Lawyers Association	Gauteng	accredited	17
145/06	South African Jewish Board of Deputies	Gauteng	accredited	5
147/06	South African Human Rights Commission	Gauteng	accredited	11
148/06	Vusumuzi Johannes Masuku	Gauteng	not accredited	15
111/06	Hlengimizwa Counselling Project	Gauteng	accredited	7
				1454

LIMPOPO

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The Counting Process

The counting process following the local government elections went off without a hitch, as far as the IEC was concerned. According to Mrs N C Neswiswi, deputy EDDE and Transformation Manager, all the party agents who were at

the 2178 voting districts in Limpopo at counting time verified all results.

At some of the voting districts, voters queued until late until after the official closing time of 19h00. Those who had not yet cast their votes were locked in until they had performed their civic duty. This resulted in the late termination of business in some of the voting districts. Although a register of voters who had

this experience had not been kept, Neswiswi confirmed that the last voting district to close business for the day did so at 21h00.

People who had gone to work on election day, either because employers had not given them the day off, or because they were performing essential services during the course of the day, as well as the youth who had "paid deference" to adults during the course of the day,

formed the bulk of the late evening vote casters.

Consequently voting districts that terminated business late also counted later into the night and into the early hours of Thursday 2 March. This had an effect on the timing of the eventual release of the results as municipalities had to wait for all the voting districts in their jurisdiction to submit their results before making their announcements. Results, according to electoral procedure, had to be released municipality by municipality and not per voting station, as confirmed by Neswiswi. The counting itself went off without incident in all of the voting districts.

Announcement of Results

The first municipality to announce results in Limpopo did so early on Thursday 2 March, while the last did so on Friday 3 March at 10h00. All results in the country were later declared on Saturday morning, 4 March.

According to an IEC official, the counting process and announcement of results was much quicker than for the municipal elections held in 2000 and the 2004 general elections. "It was a more efficiently run election", she concluded in a matter of fact manner.

Post-Election Disputes

There were no post-election disputes concerning the

results or counting process that were reported to the provincial IEC offices. All disputes that had to do with processes and procedures were dealt with by the presiding officers at the voting districts, and those officers did not indicate that there were any cases that had to be handled by the provincial office. At a debriefing session the IEC held later with the presiding officers from all districts in the province, the latter had not indicated any areas of dispute. Following the announcement of results, none of the political parties, social groupings or independents who participated in the election lodged a dispute.

The only dispute of note following the election was an intra-party one, where some members of the African National Congress in Belabela disputed the appointment of a mayoral candidate. Another flashpoint took place in the Greater Groblesdal area where some communities from Moutse continued to express discontent concerning their relocation into Limpopo by the municipal boundaries demarcation boards. Sometimes these expressions threatened to take a violent turn.

Results Patterns and Political Implications

The results in the province reveal an overwhelming

majority for the ANC. The following table illustrates the gap between the leading party and the other parties that took part in the elections:

Party	Votes	% poll	Seats	%
NC	2 369 900	83.99	933	75.24
DA	154 461	5.47	64	5.16
Unspecified other	92 010	3.26	-	-
Other parties combined	105 131	7.26	243	19.6

The results indicate an expression of confidence in the leading party and a massive mandate to implement its programmes and policies. It would also suggest that the ANC expressed itself most clearly to the electorate. Given that other parties combined polled less than 20% tells something of their outreach to the electorate. It is a pattern that may not have very good consequences for democracy in the country. The ANC obtained a 100% sweep of all seats in 14 of the 25 contested municipalities and are the leading party in the other eleven.

The following results demonstrate the performance of the different parties in the five districts of Limpopo and

further indicate the overwhelming support for the ANC in the elections.

Vhembe

Party	Total Votes in District	%
ACDP	5 809	2.39
ANC	208 763	86.22
ADP	508	0.20
AZAPO	1 844	0.76
DA	10 315	4.26
DBF	1 226	0.50
ID	3 788	1.56
PAC	3 927	1.62
UDM	2 154	0.88
VF	711	-
XP	3 061	1.26
TOTAL	242 106	

Mopani District

Party	Total Votes in District	%
ACDP	5 133	2.49
ANC	173 830	84.49
ADP	3 865	1.87
DA	9 457	4.59
ID	970	0.47
PAC	4 738	2.30
UDM	3 002	1.45
XP	4 722	2.29
Total	205 717	

Waterberg

Party	Total Votes in District	%
ACDP	1 668	1.48
ANC	92 289	81.89
AZAPO	593	0.53
DA	10 079	8.94
PAC	2 290	2.03
UDM	1 205	1.06
VF	4 565	4.05
Total	112 689	

Capricorn

Party	Total Votes in District	%
ACDP	3 635	1.84
ANC	166 014	83.88
ADP	871	0.44
AZAPO	2 669	1.35
DA	13 164	6.65
PAC	2 292	1.16
UDM	4 696	2.37
VF	1 398	0.98
TOTAL	197 928	

Sekhukhune

Party	Total Votes in District	%
ANC	154 170	85.94
AZAPO	6 216	3.46
DA	7 419	4.14
PAC	5 212	2.96
UIF	5 073	2.83
VF	1 311	0.73
TOTAL	179 401	

The most serious implications of these results rest on the leading African National Congress. It puts a serious responsibility on the party to deliver on its election promises, especially the commitment to “making local government work better”.

The most consistent refrain from the opposition parties during campaigning was the absence of service delivery – something to which the ruling party grudgingly admitted. Members of the public have also voiced dissatisfaction about the lack of delivery on radio talk shows and in snap surveys. While these work with samples that are not representative, they sometimes serve as a barometer of public feeling. It is up to the ANC to realise the gravity of the mandate that it has been given and to put in place systems and programmes that will ensure delivery in local government. It is also up to the party to invest in the best skills available by either looking for expertise outside party structures or to invest in skills development.

Failure to deliver on the part of the ANC will have catastrophic consequences for democracy in the country, and could lead either to high levels of apathy, a reversion to reactionary forms of political conservatism amongst the electorate, or even to a rise

in religious fundamentalism in society.

For the parties such as the PAC, AZAPO and the UDM, it means not only carving out political programmes that the electorate will easily distinguish from those of the ANC, but also increasing their imprint and impact at on all local levels of all kinds. Failure to do so could see them suffer from a SWANU effect. The South West African National Union, which carried the mantle of alternative to SWAPO during the liberation struggle in Namibia, and was left of SWAPO, has progressively faded out of existence on the Namibian political landscape.

For the Democratic Alliance as the official opposition, the challenge is to keep the ruling party on its toes by finding a balance between being critical and being fully engaged with issues of governance at the local level. The temptation to become highly critical could detract from the good work it is able to do on behalf of the electorate. With a national footprint that matches that of the ANC, it is difficult to say whether the DA can continue to grow in numbers or whether it has reached its zenith.

Election Observation and Monitoring

For this round of elections, the concept of monitoring has been done away with,

perhaps indicating the confidence with which democracy has grown in South Africa. Only observers were used in the municipal elections during this round. Mr Itumeleng Masenya, IEC manager for electoral matters in Limpopo, explained that the concept of monitoring has the implication that when a monitor notices what could be interpreted to be an infringement of the rules, such a monitor may intervene to set matters straight. On the other hand, an observer may only take note and is not able to intervene.

The IEC had gone out of its way to encourage observers to participate in the local government elections. Civil society organisations were encouraged to field observers. They, in turn, sourced their own funding and trained observers. These were accredited by the IEC, and observed all aspects of the election for its duration. Masenya, however could not provide the number of deployed observers in the province, or which civil society organisations had fielded them.

Challenges for the New Local Authorities

The main challenge for the new municipalities is to find efficient and effective ways of running themselves. Administrative structures have to be brought to desirable levels of operation.

Since the 2000 local government elections, there have been cases of municipal managers, especially in the Greater Sekhukhune District, who have been in the spotlight for failing to provide the right type of service. Local councils should see to it that they appoint to office people who have the right skills and levels of commitment, or else procedures that will ensure the right type of service.

Another challenge will be dealing with (perceptions of) corruption, especially when the awarding of tenders takes place. Equally important will be finding the political will to use all the budgets that are allocated to municipalities by central government. In the past financial year there have been reports of millions of unspent rands in the budgets that were not spent. This happens when roads, provision of reliable water supplies, sewerage and dependable electricity supply, especially in the newly electrified areas, need to be addressed.

In a province where the traditional authorities still play an influential role as part of civil society, the biggest challenge for local government will be not to undermine traditional authorities.

NORTH-WEST

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The Counting Process

After the voting was completed, the boxes had to be sealed in the presence of party agents and other observers. According to the Electoral Act, the counting process should take place in the polling station immediately after the close of voting, except in the case of mobile stations, or, if in the interest of ensuring free and fair elections, the IEC, decides that those votes be counted at another venue. The counting of votes ("result capturing process") was decentralised to the polling stations. The Presiding Officer of a voting station also served as the Counting Officer at the start of the counting process. Once the voting was declared over, the ballot boxes were sealed ahead of counting and the venue rearranged. All ballots were verified: the numbers of ballots issued were compared with the number of ballots counted. Thereafter, all the ballot papers were scrutinised to ascertain whether any of them had to be rejected as spoilt ballot papers. The spoilt ballots were filed separately. The remaining papers were sorted according to the candidate/ party voted

for. After the final counting, the votes were tallied and entered onto a results form and the results determined. The party agents added their signatures to the results form. After the counting the results were announced and posted at each polling station. Thereafter, the ballot boxes and other voting materials were packed and sealed for transportation to the municipal electoral officer (MEO) who double-captured the results on the electronic system. If the results matched, the auditor entered the auditor's code and submitted the results. The auditor's report was signed and faxed to the provincial IEC operations centre at the SABC Exhibition Hall in Mmabatho. The counting process was witnessed by party agents, observers and other authorised individuals. The counting process proceeded smoothly in an orderly calm and transparent manner, in the presence of auditors. The presence of auditors to verify the results during the counting process enhanced the credibility, transparency and fairness of the results.

Although the electoral staff was well trained, a number of mistakes and problems occurred during voting, which indicated a pressing need to improve the training process. For example, at some polling stations there was a mix-up of ballot papers; some electoral

officers prevented voters from casting their votes because they wore party colours; slow processing of documentation; and late starting times. This indicates that more training is required for Presiding Officers and voting officers on how to manage voting stations and handle voting material. Needless to point out, this incident did not impact on the legitimacy of the elections in the province. At all the polling stations, the voters displayed a high level of tolerance, patience and peace. To sum up, the election process went smoothly and the general atmosphere at polling stations was excellent.

Announcement of Results

The results were announced publicly at the Results Centre in the presence of party representatives and other observers. The electoral results were not disputed by any of the party representatives. A culture of acceptance of results seems to be taking root. The North-West Province was the second in the country to finish capturing the results.

Post-election Disputes

Since most of the parties accepted the legitimacy of the results, no post-election disputes emerged in the province. In fact, it was reported that in terms of the overall operation of the electoral process, political

parties had expressed satisfaction with way the process was handled in the province

Results Pattern and Political Implications

The ANC's dominance in electoral politics has been reinforced in the 2006 local government election. The 2006 municipal elections saw voters not only returning the ANC to power in the majority of local authorities in the province, but it also increased its popular vote.

The ANC popular mandate increased from 71.35 percent in the 2000 polls to 76.57 percent in 2006 elections. Thus the ANC received the highest number of votes in the province, followed by the DA with 8.60 percent, the United Christian Democratic Party with 6.77 percent and the Vryheidsfront Plus with 1.22 percent. The independent candidates - most of whom were actually disaffected ANC members - only managed to score only 0.79 percent of the votes. All the other remaining parties scored less than 1 percent of the total votes cast.

With respect to the 604 seats captured by the ANC (from a total of 788) representing 68.33 percent of all municipality seats in the province. In the 2000 elections, the ANC captured 514 seats (from a total of 799) representing 69.34 percent of all municipality seats.

Table 1: Party seat allocation, 2000-2006

Parties	2000	2000	2006	2006
African National Congress	514	69.34%	604	68.33%
Democratic Alliance/Demokratiese Alliansie	82	9.84%	75	8.48%
United Christian Democratic Party	96	12.29%	56	6.33%
Vryheidsfront Plus	NA	NA	14	1.58%
African Christian Democratic Party	40	0.46%	10	1.13%
Independent Democrats	NA	NA	9	1.02%
Independents	NA	NA	7	0.79%
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	8	0.87%	4	0.45%
United Democratic Movement	7	1.08%	2	0.23%
Inkatha Freedom Party	NA		2	0.23%
United Independent Front	NA	NA	2	0.23%
African Christian Alliance-Afrikaner Christen Alliansie	NA	NA	1	0.11 %
Die Maquassi Hills/Rante Gemeenskapsvereniging	NA	NA	1	0.11%
People's Progressive Party	NA	NA	1	0.11%
Other	NA		NA	

As the above table shows, all the significant opposition parties have witnessed a decline in the total number of seats held in municipality councils. The opposition parties thus seem to have entered a phase of decline. Despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the rate of service delivery, and disaffection over cross-border boundaries, the ANC increased its number of councillors in the province. Consequently, the ANC not only won the popular vote but also the majority of municipalities in the province. The emerging trend is one of a definite move towards a “dominant party model” in the province.

Election Observation and Monitoring

Although two civil society organisations had indicated that they were to monitor the elections in the province, no monitoring reports were submitted to the IEC office at the time of writing this report. However, the IEC provincial office undertook an internal post-election

review at the Carousel Hotel on 22-24 March 2006, and made recommendations for future elections in a “*De-Briefing Report*”. The report highlighted a number of issues which need attention:

- That the counting process took too long There is thus a need for additional counting staff, as well as an increase in polling stations where there are more voters;
- That in order to improve the audit of the results, auditors should also attend the result capturing training and should not leave the MEO office until the final confirmation of the results from the PEO office;
- That mobile stations should be dispensed with and some voting stations are inaccessible and not centrally situated. There was thus a need for the creation of more and better situated voting stations.

The review was undertaken in order to improve the management of future elections.

Challenges for New Local Authorities.

As a result of the widespread violent protest about poor service delivery that preceded the local elections, almost all the parties sought to exploit the anger at the slow pace of delivery, corruption and the general mismanagement of local authorities, and the need to turn around the performance of municipalities. Focus on the critical issues of poor service delivery, the corruption of councillors and administrators and lack of capacity, were thus thrust to the top of the political agenda. The challenge facing the new municipalities is how to overcome the legacy of poor service delivery and mismanagement. If the municipalities are to improve their services and appease the residents, the following have to be undertaken:

- Local authorities will need to be accountable, responsive and transparent;
- Develop effective community participation

strategies in order to deepen local democracy;

- Develop effective and efficient service delivery strategies;
- Local authorities need to give greater recognition to their capacity problem (administrative and technical). This has profound implications for service delivery;
- Implement capacity building and skills development programmes.

If the above are effectively implemented, the 2006 local government elections will cement a decade of transition from a racially based undemocratic, unrepresentative and unaccountable systems of governance to a developmental democratic local governance system. The 2006 elections, the third since the political transition of 1994 were thus of critical significance to the institutionalisation of democratic local governance in South Africa.

MPUMALANGA

Priscilla Shongwe

South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)

The Counting Process

The counting process started immediately after the closing of the voting stations at 7pm pm, not all voting stations closed at 7pm pm due to voters who were still in the queue to cast their votes.

Voters who were within the boundaries of the voting station should by law be given the opportunity to cast their votes as they were there before 7pm. After counting at the voting stations, the presiding officer enters results on to the results slip: one result for each ballot paper, 3 results slips. Each results slip was to be signed by party agents present during the counting process and further verified by the deputy presiding officer. It is either the presiding officer who delivers the result slips to the MEO offices or the ward manager who collects the result slip from the presiding officer and personally delivers it to the MEO for the results to be captured into the system. After capturing, correctness of the results is verified by independent auditors using the result slips and the data in the system.

After verification by Auditors, the IEC provincial office will then be able to view all the captured results per voting district in all municipalities. The IEC had computer systems which were connected from the office of the MOU results centres to IEC provincial and national offices that enabled national and provincial offices to identify exceptional problems that needed to be verified.

Announcement of Results

Mpumalanga News reported on Tuesday 7 March 2006

that the final results of the local government elections in Mpumalanga yielded no surprises, with the ANC achieving a landslide victory in all the province's municipalities.

Although the DA managed to get representation in the majority of the wards, the ruling party once again made a clean sweep - claiming less than 80% of the ward seats in only one municipality. His party obtained 100% of the ward seats in five municipalities and more than 90% in at least five others. The ANC also retained its dominance in the Lowveld municipalities, retaining 80 of the 85 available ward seats. The DA won the remaining 5 seats in the area. In Mbombela municipality the ANC did not loosen its grip, claiming an overwhelming 91,67% of the seats, leaving the DA with just three of the 33 ward seats. The ruling party also dominated Thaba Chewu, winning 11 seats to the DA's one, and Umjindi municipality with six to one. The ANC obtained an easy victory in Nkomazi municipality winning all the 30 available ward seats. DA provincial leader Mr. Clive Hatch however said a proper analysis of the results showed that the party performed best of all the significant parties. "The DA increased its provincial percentage from 6,9% in 2004 to 10,4% in 2006, representing the biggest percentage growth of all the

parties that contested in Mpumalanga.” According to Hatch the party is satisfied that it retained most of its core supporters and made progress in ANC strongholds. Premier Thabang Makwetla expressed his gratitude towards the voters at the victory celebrations over the weekend. *“The people of Mpumalanga have spoken and by putting their cross next to the ANC they confirmed that it was the only political movement that would, together with the people, expand the benefits of freedom and democracy to all the citizens of South Africa.”*

Post-Election Disputes

- There were some complaints by the ANC that independent candidates in Bushbuckridge were campaigning and marching outside the voting station with their supporters; that some supporters were throwing stones in the direction of the voting hall.
- The PAC and DA complained that voters were allowed to cast one yellow and two white ballot papers in Ward 7 of the Greater Marble Hall Municipality.
- The DA objected that a total number of 307 MEC7 forms were counted and where the voting district had only 788 registered voters, 1095 voters voted

in ward 4 at Lekwa Municipality MP 305.

- Highveld residents’ Concerned Party complained that in ward 2, Leandra, only the ward ballot paper was only available until 13H30. Similar complaints were received in respect of ward 11.
- The DA candidate for ward 7, Greater Marble Hall complained that two yellow ballot papers were clipped together and for that reason the yellow and white ballot papers issued did not tally.
- PAC candidate for ward 7, Marble Hall also complained that the different ballot papers issued exceeded the turnout of the voters.

Described Problems and Resolutions taken

- In Greater Grobblersdal there were allegations that the deputy presiding officer was interfering with voters by telling them to vote for independents. The matter was investigated and the allegation was not true.
- At Steve Tshwete Municipality, most voters from Cosmos Hall VS, arrived at the Rietkuil Laerskool Primary expecting to vote. Cosmos Hall VS was damaged and moved to Hendrina Fire Station. Therefore all voters from Cosmos Hall VS were expected to vote at Hendrina Fire Station

where the voter’s roll was situated.

Election Observation and Monitoring

People who are accredited to observe elections were expected to be remunerated for their work. The IEC had no budget to pay accredited elections observers. They were surprised when they were briefed by the IEC officials that they were not going to be paid for observing the elections. To date, there has been no known no accredited election observers in Mpumalanga province.

Results Pattern and Political Implications

The results for Mpumalanga are reproduced in the tables below. There is a table depicting an overall report and a provincial summary arranged by ward.

Challenges for the New Local Authorities

Principally the major challenges faced by the current municipalities revolve around capacity building with a view to enhance their effectiveness and efficiency. It is important that the new local authorities deliver better services for a better life for local communities. It is worth noting that councillors who are now vacating their positions are experienced and better equipped for

service delivery. There will therefore be a dire need for sufficient training and orientation of new councillors aimed at improving service delivery. We are now in a service delivery era, where people are not going to be patient with councillor's mistakes, procrastination and corruption. The learning period has passed and hence now the newly appointed councillors will have to learn how municipalities are governed.

Table 1: Leading party overall report

Party name	Valid votes	Support %	Seats won	Seats %
ANC	1,682,161	80.64%	634	71.48
DA	216,585	10.38%	90	10.15
PAC	41,198	1.97%	19	2.14
VF PLUS	16,504	0.79%	11	1.24
ACDA	13,778	0.66%	8	0.90
IFP	14,971	0.72%	7	0.79
Independents	24,574	1.18%	5	0.56
GMRA	6,865	0.33%	4	0.45
UDM	4,601	0.22%	3	0.34
SPP	3,428	0.16%	2	0.23
ID	4,194	0.20%	2	0.23
HRCP	1,634	0.08%	1	0.11
MRO	1,410	0.07%	1	0.11
APO	1,266	0.06%	1	0.11
Other	52,817	2.53%		
TOTAL	2,085,986	100.00	788	

Table 2: Leading party by ward – provincial summary

Municipality	Party	Valid ward votes/party	Available seats	Ward Seats
MP 301 Albert Luthuli	ANC	38,044	22	22
MP 302 Msukaligwa	ANC DA	21,691 2,934	16 16	14 2
MP 303 Mkhondo	ANC DA	22,503 2,898	15 15	14 1
MP 304 Pixley Ka Seme	ANC	13,147	11	11
MP 305 Lekwa	ANC DA	16,825 2,969	14 14	11 3
MP 306 Dipaleseng	ANC DA	7,282 1,497	6 6	5 1
MP 307 Govan Mbeki	ANC DA	33,371 9,598	31 31	25 6
MP 311 Delmas	ANC DA	7,667 1,719	8 8	7 1
MP312 Emalahleni	ANC DA	44,509 12,111	32 32	27 5
MP 313 Steve Tshwete	ANC DA	22,850 8,319	24 24	21 3
MP 314 Highlands	ANC	8,462	7	7
MP 315 Thembisile	ANC	37,899	30	28
MP 316 Dr J S Moroka	ANC	38,286	30	29
MP 321 Thaba Chewu	ANC DA	13,797 2,655	12 12	11 1
MP 322 Mbombela	ANC DA	88,229 11,076	36 36	33 3
MP 323 Umjindi	ANC DA	9,434 1,336	7 7	6 1
MP 324 Nkomazi	ANC	60,292	30	30
MP 325 Bushbuckridge	ANC	65,320	34	32
TOTAL		606,720	566	360



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