EISA and the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support for this project from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
MANAGING INTRA-PARTY AND INTER-PARTY CONFLICTS IN LESOTHO

TRAINING MANUAL

By

VICTOR SHALE & KHBEBLE MATLOSA

Prepared by EISA for a training programme for political parties in Lesotho organised by the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho with financial support by the Lesotho office of the United Nations Development Programme

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We acknowledge the enormous contribution of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Lesotho in initiating this project and the design of this manual. The partnership between EISA and the IEC through this project is meant to deepen democratic governance by focusing primarily on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts within and between political parties in Lesotho. We extend our gratitude to the IEC and various individuals within the IEC Directorate who facilitated the development of this manual. We also wish to acknowledge the generous financial support for this programme by the United Nations Development Programme.
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FOREWORD

Political parties play a crucial role in the democratisation process, especially in elections. Modern representative democracy is unthinkable without political parties. Elections, themselves, become meaningless without inter-party competition for control of government on behalf of the electorate. For political parties to remain key agents of democratisation, they need to embrace internal democratic ethos, practices and principles that would allow them to manage intra-party disputes and conflicts constructively.

Besides ensuring internal democratic processes and constructive management of intra-party disputes, parties need to build smooth and cooperative inter-party relationships that allow for political tolerance of their divergent opinions and views. A culture of political tolerance should be accompanied by constructive engagement of parties on various national issues, both during and in-between elections, which guarantees inter-party dialogue where misunderstandings prevail. One of the major challenges facing political parties in Lesotho in its efforts to nurture and consolidate its democratic governance has revolved around intra-party and inter-party conflicts.

In any democracy, political parties form a critical pillar for entrenchment of democratic culture and practice. This means, among other things, that for parties to add value to democratisation at the national level, they ought to embrace tolerance and internal democracy, but most importantly they ought to be able to manage both their internal and external conflicts in a democratic manner. For instance, all party structures must be democratically elected in order for the political party to entrench the culture of democracy in the country. Each party must live and practice democracy internally in order to be seen to be democratic. The consequences of lack of tolerance and intra-party democracy are many and varied within each party. A lack of conflict management mechanisms within political parties in Lesotho has produced undesirable consequences.

It is behind this backdrop that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), in partnership with the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), concerned about intra-party and inter-party conflicts, has organised a training workshop on how best to manage these conflicts. The workshop is meant to empower political parties in handling these conflicts with a view to redressing their adverse effects on parties themselves and the country’s burgeoning democracy. It is the IEC’s hope and belief that this workshop on conflict management will equip and empower political parties with methods of addressing their internal conflicts, promote tolerance and consolidate
democracy within parties. It is also the IEC’s firm belief that political parties will take this opportunity to ensure that they seriously deepen these conflict resolution strategies within their structures.

The IEC is not a creature by itself and, therefore, political parties form part and fabric of the IEC. The IEC cannot watch parties fragment without assisting these parties to manage their internal conflicts of which they are part. We, therefore, believe that this training workshop will bear fruit for all Lesotho political parties specifically and Lesotho’s democracy broadly.

Dr Fako Johnson Likoti
Commissioner IEC
INTRODUCTION

This manual is meant to facilitate a tailor-made training workshop for political parties in Lesotho in their efforts to prevent, manage and resolve intra-party and inter-party conflicts. Conflicts within and among political parties, if not well managed, could undermine their effectiveness as key agents of the country’s democratisation process. Cognisant of the central role that political parties play in building and sustaining democratic governance, this training programme is meant to enhance the capacity of political parties to redress the adverse effects of intra-party and inter-party conflicts. To this end, the main components of this training manual are as follows:

- Political parties and their functions
- Conflict and conflict management
- Leadership
- Intra-party conflicts
- Inter-party conflicts

As with all its other manuals, EISA wishes to state that this manual should be treated as a guide for the training workshop for which it is intended. It is not meant to deal exhaustively with all issues related to political parties in Lesotho.

It is expected that at the end of the workshop, participants will have enhanced their understanding of the dynamics of intra-party and inter-party conflicts.

Box 1: Ice Breaking

At the beginning of the workshop, participants need to introduce themselves. Naturally, participants have a tendency to want to sit next to the people they know. These could be their friends or members of their party. The facilitator has to mix the participants so that people of the same party do not sit together deliberately. This can be done by counting from one to four or five so that participants will then be mixed.

Secondly, participants are divided in pairs and are asked to take turns introducing each other. They should first talk to one another about themselves, their families, their parties and any hobbies they have. The idea of the exercise is to make the participants realise the commonalities they have as Basotho in spite of their party political differences. After the allocated time the participants will then take turns to introduce their partners to the larger group.
Box 2: Ground Rules

In order to use the workshop optimally and avoid unnecessary distractions, there have to be ground rules which are proposed by the facilitator and agreed to by workshop participants. These rules may range from cellphone use, time-keeping and language to respect, and how participants should engage with each other during the workshop.

Box 3: Participants’ Expectations

Participants are required to state their expectations of the workshop; these will be written on the flip chart and placed on the wall. The expectations list is important as it helps in the assessment of whether or not the workshop has achieved its objectives. Towards the end of the workshop, the facilitator should refer back to the list of expectations and verify with participants that all the expectations have been met. Any expectation that has not been met should be dealt with before the workshop ends.
MODULE 1: POLITICAL PARTIES

1.1 OBJECTIVE

The objective of this module is to introduce participants to what political parties are all about: what their main roles and functions are, so as to provide a common platform for subsequent deliberation in the workshop.

1.2 DEFINING POLITICAL PARTIES

Box 4: Definition of a Political Party

A political party is defined as ‘an organised group of people with at least roughly similar political aims and opinions, that seek to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected to public office’.

Thus a political party, unlike an interest group, aims to capture state power and control the public policy-making process within the confines of the constitutional and legal framework of the given country. Four characteristics that distinguish parties from other groups (including interest groups and social movements) include the following:

- Parties aim to exercise government power by winning political office (small parties may nevertheless use elections more to gain a platform than to win power);

- Parties are organised bodies with a formal card-carrying membership. This distinguishes them from broader and more diffuse social movements;

- Parties typically adopt a broad issue focus, addressing each of the major areas of government policy (small parties, however, may have a single-issue focus, thus resembling interest groups); and

- To varying degrees, parties are united by shared political preferences and a general ideological identity.

It is worth noting that political parties can be either democratic or authoritarian. Thus, ‘whether they are the great tools of democracy or sources of tyranny and repression, political parties are the vital link between the state and civil society, between the institutions of government and the groups and interests that operate within society’. (EISA Political Parties Handbook 2008)
1.3 FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Although the defining features of political parties are principally the capturing of government power and control of public policy-making, their impact on the political system is broader and more complex. Thus, various functions of political parties can be identified. The six main functions of parties in any democratic system are as follows:

- Aggregate and articulate needs and problems as identified by members and supporters;
- Socialise and educate voters and citizens in the functioning of political parties and electoral system and generating general political values;
- Balance opposing demands and convert them into general policies;
- Activate and mobilise citizens into participating in political decisions and transforming their opinions into viable policy options;
- Channel public opinion from citizens to government; and
- Recruit and train candidates for public office. (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, http://aceproject.org)
MODULE 2: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

2.1 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the module are to assist participants to understand the meaning of leadership, to distinguish between the various types of leadership, to learn about the requisite leadership skills and the communication skills that leaders should possess.

2.2 DEFINING LEADERSHIP

Box 5: Defining Leadership

Leadership is defined as ‘the ability of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success of the organisations of which they are members’ (See EISA Political Parties Handbook, 2008). Organisationally, leadership directly impacts on the effectiveness of the party in terms of inculcating intra-party democracy, public outreach, gender parity, election campaigns and the constructive management of intra-party and inter-party conflicts.

2.3 TYPES OF LEADERSHIP

Adapted from Coleman @ http://www.12manage.com/methods_goleman_leadership_styles.html

2.3.1 VISIONARY LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>How style creates resonance</th>
<th>When style is appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inspires. Believes in own vision.</td>
<td>Moves people towards shared dream</td>
<td>When change requires a new vision/direction = radical change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathetic. Explains why and how people’s efforts contribute to the dream</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
King Moshoeshoe I was a visionary leader:

Source: Government of Lesotho website

‘Morena Moshoeshoe oa pele ebile mothehi oa sehaba sa Basotho. O thehile sehaba sena ka ho kopanya lichaba tse fapaneng; joalo ka Batlokoa, Baphuthi, Bathepu, Matebele, Makhoakhoa le ba bang; a ba kopanya, a bopa sehaba sa Basotho. Lichaba tse ling, tse nemp la le haufi le eena Morena Moshoeshoe, li ne li rata likhoka; ‘Me li phela ka lintoa. Morena Moshoeshoe ebile lehlatsipa la boemo bona. One a iphumana a loantšoa ke lira tsena. Ka lehlohonolo, o ne a atisa ho ba hlola. Le ha a ba hlotse joalo, o ne a sa ikhabe; empa, one a khutlela morao ho kopana le sera, ‘me a ikopele tšoarelo, a be a qetelle ka ho fana ka likhomo, ele mokhoa oa ho bopa khotso.

Malimo aile a bolaea ntatae moholo Peete. Empa ha a ka a a loantša, oile a laela hore a hlabeloe likhomo, aje, ‘me ho otloem limpa tsa ona ka mosoang e le sesupo sa hore ke mabiti a ntatae moholo.

Liketso tsena tsa Morena Moshoeshoe, li ile tsa makatsa sehaba sa hae le lira tsa hae. Lira tsa hae li bile tsa fetoha metsoalle ea hae, ‘me ba phelisana ka’ Khotso.’

### 2.3.2 Coaching Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>How style creates resonance</th>
<th>When style is appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotes harmony. Boosts morale and solves conflicts</td>
<td>Connects people’s dreams with organisational dreams</td>
<td>To help competent, motivated members to improve performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.3.3. AFFILIATIVE LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>How style creates resonance</th>
<th>When style is appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listens, encourages and</td>
<td>Creates harmony and connects people to each other</td>
<td>To heal rifts in a team and motivate during stressful times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delegates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
2.3.4 DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

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<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>How style creates resonance</th>
<th>When style is appropriate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good listener, team worker and collaborator</td>
<td>Appreciates people’s inputs and gets commitment through participation</td>
<td>To build support and consensus</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Nelson Mandela is the world-renowned democratic leader.

Source: ANC http://www.anc.org.za/people/mandela.html

Nelson Mandela affirmed: I detest racialism, because I regard it as a barbaric thing, whether it comes from a black man or a white man.

Mandela was convicted and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. While serving his sentence he was charged, in the Rivonia Trial, with sabotage. Mandela’s statements in court during these trials are classics in the history of the resistance to apartheid, and they have been an inspiration to all who have opposed it. His statement from the dock in the Rivonia Trial ends with these words:

I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment and started his prison years in the notorious Robben Island Prison, a maximum security prison on a small island 7km off the coast near Cape Town. In April 1984 he was transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town and in December 1988 he was moved to Victor Verster Prison near Paarl,
from where he was eventually released. While in prison, Mandela flatly rejected offers made by his jailers for remission of sentence in exchange for accepting the bantustan policy by recognising the independence of the Transkei and agreeing to settle there. Again in the Eighties Mandela rejected an offer of release on condition that he renounce violence. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. Only free men can negotiate, he said.

Released on 11 February 1990, Mandela plunged wholeheartedly into his life’s work, striving to attain the goals he and others had set out almost four decades earlier. In 1991, at the first national conference of the ANC held inside South Africa after its decades-long banning was lifted, Nelson Mandela was elected president of the ANC while his lifelong friend and colleague, Oliver Tambo, became the organisation’s national chairperson.

Nelson Mandela has never wavered in his devotion to democracy, equality and learning. Despite terrible provocation, he has never answered racism with racism. His life has been an inspiration, in South Africa and throughout the world, to all who are oppressed and deprived, to all who are opposed to oppression and deprivation.

In a life that symbolises the triumph of the human spirit over man’s inhumanity to man, Nelson Mandela accepted the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of all South Africans who suffered and sacrificed so much to bring peace to our land (ANC 2008).

### 2.3.5 PACE-SETTING LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>How style creates resonance</th>
<th>When style is appropriate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong edge to achieve. Low on empathy and collaboration, micro-managing</td>
<td>Realises challenges and exciting goals</td>
<td>To get high-quality results from motivated people/employees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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2.3.6 COMMANDING LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>How style creates resonance</th>
<th>When style is appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Do it because I say so.’ Threatening, tight control. Contaminates everyone’s mood and drives away talent</td>
<td>Decreases fear by giving clear direction in an emergency</td>
<td>In a grave crisis. To start urgent organisational turnaround</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 LEADERSHIP SKILLS

The skills that a true leader should possess include the ability to:

- Debate, clarify, and enunciate values and beliefs;
- Fuel, inspire, and guard the shared vision;
- Communicate the strategic plan at all levels;
- Recognise the problems inherent in the planning process;
- Ask the big picture questions and “what if”;
- Encourage dreaming and thinking the unthinkable;
- Engage in goal setting;
- View problems as opportunities;
- Set priorities;
- Be a critical and creative thinker;
- Set the example (walk the talk);
- Celebrate accomplishments.

Personal qualities include passion, humour and empathy, strength of character, general maturity, patience, wisdom, common sense, trustworthiness, reliability, creativity, sensitivity.
### Activity 1: Leadership

**Purpose:** To allow participants to deliberate on their understanding of leadership and how leaders should conduct themselves.

**Time:** 1 hour for group work  
20 minutes for plenary

**Process:**
1) Participants are divided into groups.  
2) Participants are requested to discuss leadership in terms of:  
   a) Leadership types;  
   b) Leadership skills;  
   c) Challenges they face; and  
   d) Suggest how these could be addressed.
MODULE 3: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

3.1 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this module are to assist participants to understand intra- and inter-party conflict in terms of its causes and effects in parties, to help participants analyse conflict situations and to equip them with the necessary skills to respond to the conflict, and to assist parties to establish conflict management structures within them.

3.2 DEFINING CONFLICT
Conflict is defined by Rubin at al. (1994) as a perceived divergence of interests, or beliefs that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. It can manifest itself in many forms, some of which may be violent and inflict pain and suffering on both parties in conflict and to other people who may not be directly involved, due to its spillover effect.

Conflict is a natural and necessary art of life

Whether at home with our families or at work with colleagues, conflict affects our relationships. The paradox with conflict is that it is both the cause and the result of relationships and can tear or bind them together. It is therefore important that we study and understand conflict.
3.3 SOURCES OF INTRA-PARTY AND INTER-PARTY CONFLICT

Box 6: Sources of Intra- and Inter-Party Conflict

Data/information: Involves lack of information and misinformation, as well as differing views on what data are relevant, the interpretation of that data and how one performs the assessment.

Relationships: Results from strong emotions, stereotypes, miscommunication and repetitive negative behaviour.

Values: Arises over ideological differences and differing standards on evaluation of ideas or behaviours.

Structural: Caused by unequal or unfair distribution of power and resources.

Interest: Involves actual or perceived competition over interests such as resources.

3.3.1 INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT

- Favouritism – promoting one’s kith and kin;
- Unequal sharing of resources (leader’s constituency gets a lion’s share);
- Lack of regular meetings;
- Centralised authority – power concentrated at the top.

3.3.2 INTER-PARTY CONFLICT

Inter-party conflicts are often around elections. Elections are a competition and therefore cause conflict. Parties compete for space for their campaign. Lack of clear rules, systems (including conflict management systems) can escalate conflict to a destructive conflict. These rules have to do with:

- Access to media;
- Ruling party’s use of state resources for campaigns;
- Parties’ use of ethnicity or other social factors as divisive force;
- Character assassination;
- Constitutional changes (party’s changing of national constitution without proper consultations and procedures to suit its goals, thus threatening democracy).
The 1998 election results triggered tension between the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the opposition parties, who believed that the LCD had rigged the elections. This led to a protest and a sit-in at the Royal Palace grounds, as shown in the photograph above.

3.4 FACTORS ESCALATING CONFLICT

When efforts to contain conflict fail, the conflict tends to escalate into violence. This is also the case in election-related conflicts. The escalation process follows three main stages:

- Discussion stage (mutual respect and co-operation);
- Polarisation stage (distance and competition);
- Segregation stage (disrespect and defensive competition); and
- Destruction stage (total antagonism and violence).

Source: Conflict Trends 1 2008
Conflict escalation can also be explained by the following models:

**The Aggressor-Defender Model**

In this model, one party is the aggressor while the other is the defender. The aggressor uses mild to heavier tactics against the defender until the aggressor gets what he wants or gives up. The aggressor is the party who realises an opportunity to change things to meet his interests and therefore initiates the offensive. The defender, on the other hand, is the party who resists this change. It should be indicated from the onset that being the defender does not imply that one is automatically the weaker of the two parties. The defender could be the stronger of the two parties and can be weaker as well under certain circumstances. In other words, the two parties in a conflict can shift positions from being the defender to being the aggressor, depending on the situation at hand. The defender’s interest is to maintain the status quo.

**The Conflict Spiral Model**

**The Structural Change Model**

Source: Pruitt and Rubin 1986
During national Party rule in South Africa, for instance, many would argue that the National Party government was the aggressor. While this is undoubtedly true, it has to be pointed out that it does not follow that the aggressor is always the stronger and the defender is perpetually the weaker party.

For instance, there is evidence that shows that the apartheid regime for a long time was the aggressor. There is also evidence that points to the fact that in the early sixties, the African liberation movements, although described as defenders according to the model, became the aggressors, particularly when, through their armed wings, they started underground operations. Negotiations between these groups with the government were fruitless as the government only made platitudinous statements regarding freedom that never translated into action. The last resort was the use of violence by the liberation movements as shown in the photograph above. The National Party government then strengthened its police and the defence forces in order to withstand the challenge of the liberation movements and clamp down its activities in defence of the status quo.
THE CONFLICT SPIRAL MODEL

This is the model that demonstrates escalation as a result of response and retaliation by the defender against the aggressor. This retaliation invites further action by the aggressor so that the whole circle is completed – and it may repeat itself again. As it repeats itself, the conflict does not continue at the same level. In the example of the conflict between the liberation movements and the apartheid government, as the conflict intensified, the government also went out to hunt activists outside South Africa and killed many of them, together with local people, as well as destroying properties in Lesotho, Botswana and other neighbouring countries. In order to survive the ferocious reaction by the government, the liberation movements also intensified their activities, using more attacks as their form of defence. The conflict, therefore, moved to an even higher level.

THE STRUCTURAL CHANGE MODEL

The continuity of the spirals produces changes in the political and socioeconomic spheres of the parties involved in conflict. This makes it difficult for conflict to be managed because both sides become even more determined to continue with the conflict, particularly when they have incurred loss of lives and property. The structural change model explains the effects of the protracted conflict emanating from the conflict spirals and escalations, as explained in the previous models. Under this model, people’s and groups’ perceptions change, and hostile and competitive goals develop within these communities. The aim becomes to punish, discredit, defeat and destroy the other party. The negative perceptions discourage conflict settlement and promote its escalation. Once escalation happens, the process repeats itself, as has been said earlier, and the structural changes also persist. This then has a direct effect on the human relationships.
We have all learned responses to confrontation, threats, anger and unfair treatment. Some of our learned responses are constructive, but others are not and escalate the conflict. How we respond to confrontation depends on our previous experience in dealing with conflict as well as our confidence in dealing with conflict. What can start to change destructive responses to conflict is learning to assess the total impact of negative responses.

Conflict is inevitable and the challenge therefore is how we address it. It can be managed negatively through avoidance at one extreme and the use of threat or force at another. Alternatively, conflict can be managed positively through mediation and negotiation.
3.5.1 MEDIATION

Mediation refers to a process through which a third party provides procedural assistance to help individuals or groups in conflict to resolve their differences. It is a voluntary process and its successes are linked to the vesting of decision-making authority in the parties involved in the conflict. The mediator structures the process in a way that creates a safe environment for the parties to discuss the conflict and find solutions which will meet their interests.

Source: Conflict Trend 1 2008
Box 7: Mediation Process

- Preparation of the stage;
- Convening of parties to the conflict;
- Opening of the mediation which includes welcome, introduction of parties and seating;
- Explanation of the mediator’s role (facilitation of the process and neutrality);
- Description of the process and its confidentiality;
- Agreeing on the ground rules, which provide behavioural guidelines for the participants;
- Checking of understanding of the process;
- Ensuring the belligerents’ comfort (tea breaks, bathrooms, etc);
- Signing of agreement on the mediations (at times not required);
- Parties are then, in turn, given an opportunity to present their understanding of the conflict (no interruptions allowed). Only the mediator may reframe to ensure that the parties’ concerns are properly understood;
- Parties are allowed to talk to each other under the mediator’s facilitation. If necessary, the mediator may request a break so as to consult with individual parties (care should be taken to balance the times and leave no room for suspicion);
- Mediator ensures that issues are properly heard and suggests agenda to address them;
- Brainstorm options for meeting concerns of parties;
- Evaluate options (reality check), get to agreement (sometimes need to have it written);
- Clarify and review agreement (next steps, future mediation in necessary);
- Closing of the mediation (thanks, guarantee confidentiality).
3.5.2 Negotiation

Negotiation is a process between parties that is directed at reaching some form of agreement that will hold and that is based on common interests for the purpose of resolving conflict. This process is achieved through establishing common ground and creating alternatives. It is also an exchange of information through communication. The conflict that precedes negotiation would be a clash of interests that may be mild and not necessarily violent. Negotiation offers the belligerent parties the opportunity to communicate openly and express their feelings. In the negotiation process each negotiator decides what to offer, what to reject and how much concession to make.
Thinking Outside the Box

Activities of political parties cannot be successful unless communication in such organisations is maintained to assure information flow in both horizontal and vertical directions within an organisational structure. The same applies to the success of any attempt to manage intra- or inter-party conflict. The parties need to have certain skills to ensure smooth and effective communication. Similarly, they need to have the skills and ability to think outside the box. Thus, the secret behind the solution of a problem is not to allow our thinking to be contained and limited by imaginary boundaries. Thinking outside the boundaries and limitations is what creative thinking is about.

Thinking outside the box exercise 1:

1. Divide the shape into six exactly equal parts.
Thinking outside the box exercise 2

1. Connect all the nine dots using no more than four straight lines.
2. The dots cannot be repositioned.
3. The connecting line must be drawn in one continuous strike; leave the pencil on the paper until all lines have been drawn.
### 3.5.3 NEGOTIATION PROCESS AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOOL

**Box 9: Prerequisites for Negotiation**

In order for negotiation to take place there first of all has to be conflict. This can be latent or manifest conflict of any scale.

The level of negotiation varies from one conflict situation to another. When a husband and his wife talk about where they are going to spend their next holiday, there is conflict already because there is a clash of interests.

The negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Israeli Government (although not always maintained) are held in an attempt to put an end to the seeming nature of the intractable political conflict between the two of them. Each party in negotiations has direct or indirect needs that they want to satisfy. There is a direct causal link between conflict and negotiation because it is after the former has happened that the latter takes place, probably initiated by one of the parties or because both parties believe that the time is ripe for talks.

Frustration of a party’s needs invites counter-frustration of needs by the receiving party. In order to thwart this vicious circle, negotiation should always be used to counter-balance the effects that the conflict brings and maximise the meeting of their interests. There are alternative approaches that are designed to establish contact between representatives of parties in conflict. It is important to consider a suitable approach for a particular negotiation in the pre-negotiation stage.

One of these approaches is ‘walk in the woods’. This approach allows parties to explore issues without binding them to an agreement. All parties are at liberty to accept or reject options that are made available to them. In everyday life the majority of people perform well when they are not under pressure. In walk in the woods, therefore, people make genuine and meaningful contributions without having to worry about things not working out. They also do not worry about carrying the blame for such a failure. Another dimension that is not far from a walk in the woods approach is pre-negotiation. This is negotiation before negotiation because it involves a lot of informal interaction before negotiations begin. The importance of pre-negotiation is that it reduces disagreements, enables parties to sort out their own motives for negotiation in the given context and prepares parties physically and psychologically for negotiation. Here parties think outside the box and move from their positions to mutual understanding and multilateral solutions. (Azar)
In many conflicts involving groups, a negotiator is someone who has been mandated by the group to represent it in negotiation. In other cases people become negotiators because no one else could represent them. This is mostly the case with small-scale conflicts. For instance, a person who wants to buy furniture, at a reduced price from a furniture shop normally has to negotiate for himself, and not through a third party. Negotiators in any negotiation are human beings who have their own weaknesses and strengths.

Individuals who represent their groups in a negotiation carry the ideals, values and beliefs of their group in dealing with others. They often have to suppress their personal beliefs and conscience and air those of their groups. In this way they are not able to negotiate according to the objective merits of the conflict.

It is an enormous task for each individual negotiator to make these decisions and the process therefore consumes a lot of time. Negotiators avoid moving quickly because it can be extremely dangerous to them as it involves yielding to the other side. Many negotiators therefore drag their feet and use delaying tactics such as the use of threats to pull out of negotiations in order to increase the risk that no agreement is reached.

There could be parties that are not necessarily primary to the conflict but have influence in the process of negotiation. Additional parties may be openly supporting one of the parties in the conflict. They may well support them secretly. In the event of coalitions being formed openly, the membership of a coalition as a whole poses a threat to individual members when they want to take a different position from that of their coalition.
Box 11: Limitations of Negotiation Process

It is important to look at the limitations of negotiation as a tool for resolving conflict. The process is not entirely flawless.

- It often falls short of benefiting both parties as sometimes one loses and the other wins. It can even be worse when both parties lose. As a result of the inherent flaws in this process some negotiations are started and then broken off without clear achievements.

- It is common for negotiations to end without an agreement. Any one of the belligerent parties may decide to unilaterally quit if they feel that they are not happy with the offers made to them.

- Some negotiations have not been able to produce agreements even if there have been negotiations that have gone into history as success stories. The negotiations between the South African Government and the African National Congress prior to 1994 and the negotiations in Sierra Leone after that country’s civil war are among the successful ones.

- The tendency of some parties to pull out of negotiations may not only be the exercise of power. It may also depend on the personalities of the individual negotiators. Some negotiators may be wrong or inappropriate for certain kinds of negotiations. Other negotiators go into negotiation to fulfil their individual needs that are not part of the conflict.

- They fail to pursue the needs of their constituencies. When their needs are frustrated, such negotiators are quick to grab the opportunity to derail the negotiation process. Their lack of loyalty and their self-centeredness compels them to create sensational stories and deceive people.

- In reality, negotiations usually suffer a setback because of the fact that on many occasions people believe in these kind of negotiators. Their mischievous behaviour makes them different from those negotiators who carry the values, ideals and beliefs of their groups along.
MODULE 4: INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS IN LESOTHO

4.1 OBJECTIVE
The objective of the module is to enable participants to assess causes of conflict within political parties and in the process suggest concrete solutions to these conflicts. The module is also meant to provide participants with information pertaining to primary elections, their types, advantages and disadvantages, so that they can be well equipped to deal with challenges surrounding primaries. Lastly, the module will enrich participants’ understanding of the candidate nomination processes and procedures.

4.1.2 INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT TRENDS
One of the major challenges facing political parties in Lesotho is internal conflicts, most of which are caused by fierce contestation over the leadership of these institutions. No single political party in Lesotho seems immune from conflicts related to leadership. But in some parties these conflicts tend to be covert, while in others, they are more overt and in the public domain. While relatively smaller parties have had their fair share of leadership conflicts, the parties that historically dominated Lesotho’s political landscape, namely the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), have experienced these conflicts in a more pronounced fashion, in many instances leading to factionalism and splits. Table 1 illustrates this trend.
### Table 1: Intra-Party Factionalism and Party Splits in Lesotho (1957-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Political Parties in Lesotho</th>
<th>BCP founded in 1952</th>
<th>BNP founded in 1957</th>
<th>LCD founded in 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MTP (1957) Leader: Chief Seepheephe Matete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FP (1961) Leader: BM Khaketla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LCD (1997) Leader: Dr Ntsu Mokhehele</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAC (2002) Leader: Chief Molapo Qhobela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahatammoho a Poelano (2002/3?) Leader: Mr Ntsukunyane Mphanya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basotho-Batho Democratic Party (2006) Leader: Mr D Ramathebane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 LEADERSHIP SELECTION

Increasingly intra-party democracy is being recognised as a necessary aspect of a key pillar of good governance within political parties which, itself, is a healthy environment conducive for democratic development and stability in a country. In new and/or restored democracies, especially in post-conflict societies, political parties tend to operate in an environment in which parties are not insufficiently institutionalised and lack transparent and accountable regulatory mechanisms that deepen intra-party democracy. Parties in post-conflict societies marked by fledgling democracies also tend to experience non-democratic leadership styles.

For any democratisation process to succeed, political parties themselves must develop the culture of intra-party democracy. Two ways of entrenching the culture of intra-party democracy are (a) democratic selection of the leadership on a regular basis and (b) the holding of credible and genuine primary elections within parties. In this section, we will dwell more on leadership selection and we will come back to primary elections in the next section. The most important rules for the regular and democratic selection/election of leaders include the following:

- The party rank and file must be given an opportunity to influence and determine who leads the party all times and conversely, party leadership should be accountable directly to party structures all the way from villages up to the national level;
- The election of the party leadership should have a clear time-frame to avoid a situation where leaders are not replaced, thereby (either by design or by default) promoting a personality cult;
- Succession-planning should be institutionalised, so that parties avoid unnecessary leadership squabbles and faction-fighting;
- Leaders must be accountable to the party rank and file, prioritising party interests above personal interests;
- Parties should deliberately embrace leadership quotas that promote affirmative action aimed at empowering marginalised social groups such as women, the youth, and people with disabilities.

In order to enhance the credibility, transparency and legitimacy of the process of electing leaders within parties, the process ought to be administered by an independent technical agency with expertise in electoral administration. Within the context of South Africa, EISA has administered leadership elections and primary elections of various political parties (including the ruling ANC) for over 10 years. EISA has provided this service through its Department of Balloting and Electoral Services (BES) with the following objectives in mind:
• To promote and/or deepen intra-party democracy within political parties;
• To ensure the credibility, transparency and legitimacy of intra-party elections;
• To minimise intra-party conflicts, thereby enhancing the institutional capacity of parties as key agents of democracy;

In striving towards the three objectives above, EISA has undertaken the following activities in assisting parties to run credible elections:

• Advice on balloting and electoral procedures, election scheduling, and good electoral practices;
• Assistance with the drafting of ballot rules and the wording of ballot questions and statements;
• Design of nomination forms, ballot papers, proxy forms, candidates’ election statements;
• Advice on compliance with constitutional, legal and regulatory requirements of the parties;
• Compilation and certification of voter eligibility lists, both manually and electronically;
• Management of the candidate nomination process, including the calling, screening and verification of nominations;
• Management of proxy registration and verification processes;
• Conduct of voting on site, postal or a combination of both by employing effective measures to prevent electoral fraud;
• Design of electoral communication and voter education material.

In South Africa, the outsourcing of the conduct and the management of elections for office bearers by political parties is an established tradition. Most political parties in South Africa make use of an independent electoral body (including EISA) to conduct their elections at national congresses. This process is also bolstered by an Act of Parliament which states that the election of office bearers or board of trustees to pension and provident funds and medical aid schemes should be conducted by an independent and impartial body. Initially in South Africa, EISA used to fundraise in order to assist political parties with the elections of office bearers but now parties have election budgets and are, therefore, in a position to pay for this invaluable service.
4.3 PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Primary elections are internal party processes aimed at choosing a political party’s candidate(s) for the next general election. These are, therefore, essentially internal elections. Exactly how this is done depends on the legal framework, internal party rules and informal practices. Primary elections are an example of a selection process with a high level of participation, meaning that ordinary members (or in some cases all voters in the electoral district) control the process.
Box 12: Arguments for Primary Elections

‘Those who argue for primary elections tend to say that:

- Primary elections help the political party select the candidate who is most likely to win a general election by consulting a considerable number of those who are likely to vote for the party’s candidates.
- Primary elections start the democratic process even before the general elections.
- Primary elections give the candidate(s) a clear mandate and legitimacy, since the decision has been taken by party members in general and not only by the top leadership.
- Primary elections give a party, its candidate(s), and perhaps even its platform significant public visibility.
- Primary elections empower the ordinary members and engage them in party strategy and key decisions.
- Primary elections help members overrule unpopular but entrenched party elites.’ (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network)
Box 13: Arguments Against Primary Elections

‘Those who argue against primary elections claim that:

- Primary elections do not produce the candidate(s) most likely to win the general election, since only a small fraction of party members (usually hard-liners) tend to vote in the primary elections. Strategically, it might be better to choose candidate(s) who can also appeal to other parties’ members or supporters rather than only to the party’s own core members.

- Primary elections are very expensive and (unless organised and paid for by the public purse, which they are in some cases) take funds away from the general election campaign.

- Primary elections encourage internal party strife instead of fostering an environment of negotiation, consultation, and compromise at a time when efforts need to be focused on defeating external challengers, not internal ones.

- Primary elections take the decision away from the most experienced, the office holders, and party leadership. Instead, ordinary party members with little or no experience of running for or holding public office get to decide.

- Primary elections weaken the party structures by putting the focus on individual candidates rather than on the party manifesto or policies.’

(Ace Electoral Knowledge Network)
Box 14: Legislated and Non-Legislated Primary Elections

‘Legislated primary elections refer to cases where the country’s legal framework stipulates that political parties must choose their candidates by holding internal elections. In some cases, the laws or regulations (or, in other cases, the Constitution) merely state that parties must select their candidates democratically, while other countries have chosen to lay down the details of how primary elections must be held. Where this is the case, the law sometimes gives the electoral management body the responsibility to organise, monitor, and supervise the primary elections. Legislated primary elections are often membership-based; otherwise, they can be open to all voters in the constituency (see Types of Primary Elections below).

Laws also differ on sanctions for non-compliance with the provisions requiring internal party elections. In some countries, the law does not stipulate any sanctions, while in others, having held primary elections is a prerequisite for registering a political party for election or for nominating candidates.

Political parties that hold primary elections even though it is not required by law are often guided by their own party constituencies or internal rules for candidate selection. Party system, electoral system, and party ideology tend to influence this decision, and even in the cases where legislation exists, it is not always possible to say if the law has determined the processes or if they simply reflect practice.’ (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network)

Box 15: Types of Primary Elections

‘There are three main types of primary elections: the congress (or convention/caucus) election, the membership election, and the open voter election.

The congress election is a common internal party mechanism where the election takes place at a party meeting, often called a party congress, convention, or caucus. Some political parties allow all their members to attend and vote at the selection congress, while others restrict attendance to delegates from the sub-units of the party. The advantages of this system are that the congress allows the participants to discuss and reach compromises before a vote is held, the sub-
units of the party can be given a clearer voice than in other systems, and, in general, the congress system strengthens the role of the party organisation vis-à-vis the individual candidates. Disadvantages include the often unrepresentative participation, the risks of manipulation (such as not calling the meeting on time or closing deals behind closed doors), and the lack of division of power within the party. Voting in party congresses is also sometimes done by acclamation or other methods that do not allow for secrecy of the vote, which might inhibit the democratic process.

**Membership elections** are sometimes called “closed” primary elections, given that they are open to all members of the party but closed to other voters. Membership elections are at times operated by the Electoral Management Body (EMB) but can also be organised internally by the party itself. Advantages of this system are that it is more open and transparent than the congress elections, empowers the ordinary members, and involves them more in the business of the party. It limits the dominance of the party elites but may in that process also take the decision away from those who are more experienced and might be in a better position to take a good decision. Another disadvantage might be that the decision is taken only by those who want to be publicly affiliated with a political party, and not by supporters or potential supporters who might help the party get a better indication of which candidates(s) would do well in a general election. In volatile or polarised political environments with high levels of political violence, voters may not want to publicly display their affiliation by turning out to vote in a membership election.

**Open voter elections** are primary elections where all registered voters in a constituency, even those who are members of other parties or of no party, can participate. This is not a very common method. EMBs tend to organise open voter elections since they require enrolling all those who could vote in a general election. The advantage of this system is that political parties do not need a formal and fully updated membership register, and voters do not have to declare their affiliation through membership. Open voter elections take one of the main functions away from the party: that of acting as gate-keepers and recruiters of candidates. Given that primary elections tend to inspire a lower voter turnout than general elections, there is also a significant risk that the result does not reflect the view of the majority of voters who will vote in the general election. Since supporters of other parties can also take an active part in the primary election, they may seek to ensure that the candidate with least possibilities of winning the general election would win the primary – and thereby take competition away from their preferred party’s candidate.’ (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network)
Box 16: Factors Influencing Primary Elections

‘The electoral system and election law influence the conduct of primary elections, not only because requirements to hold primary elections are often included in election laws, but also because the electoral system in itself influences politics. In single-member constituencies, the regional and local branches of political parties would naturally tend to have greater influence, while the central party organisation would be more influential in systems with multiple-member districts. This tendency is, however, not clear-cut, and there are many cases that would contradict this.

Electoral laws may also include legislated quotas that have an impact on the selection of candidates. Quota laws can reserve seats in the national legislature to ensure gender equality or to enhance the participation of under-represented groups such as national minorities. They may also stipulate the number of, for example, women on the parties’ candidate lists and in some cases even dictate the placement on the list.

The party system is heavily influenced by the electoral system but also by legal regulations such as the threshold to win seats in the national legislature, the political geography of the country, and other contextual issues. The number of political parties contesting an election, the number of parties likely to win seats in the legislature, and other issues can determine the need for coalition-building and other party strategies that can influence the selection process.

The political context and culture are major factors in deciding on primary elections. As has been mentioned above, polarisation and political violence can, for example, affect voters’ will to publicly display their affiliation. The level of trust in a society can set different needs for transparency and participation, and cleavages in the society can be reflected in internal party practices.

The political party culture, lastly, is another of the major factors influencing the process of candidate selection. If the party is membership-based or not, if it is built on a strong ideology or on the leadership of an individual, and what its ideological values and traditions are, ultimately decide if the party chooses to voluntarily select its candidates through internal elections.’ (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Purpose:** To allow participants to discuss primary elections in terms of procedures and their usefulness or otherwise. Participants will also discuss challenges they face during primaries and the role of the party leadership in primaries and how best parties can deal with their inherent challenges.

**Time:** 1 hour for group work  
20 minutes for plenary

**Process:**  
Participants are divided into groups and are requested to role-play the positions of a) party leadership, b) rank and file members, c) constituency leaders and d) would-be candidates. The participants have to demonstrate their understanding of the people in each role in terms of the criteria for candidate election and procedures to be followed. They should also suggest how disagreements on the candidature have to be solved.
4.4 NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES

The nomination of candidates (to gain ballot access) is the formal procedure by which political parties and/or individuals put candidates forward for election, and the acceptance by the EMB of that nomination. In list systems, parties put forward a list of candidates selected within the political party. In constituency systems, candidates are nominated individually (not as part of party lists). Depending on the country, they can be nominated either by a political party or by an individual.

Legal frameworks can place requirements on the composition of party lists. In some cases, there are requirements aimed at increasing the representivity of the list by, for example, asking or requiring the party to have a certain number of women (or members of other traditionally under-represented groups) on its list. In some cases, not only the number but the placement on the list is specified (ACE Encyclopaedia 2008).

Gender equality remains a major challenge in the Southern African Development Community region. Political systems of some countries are more inclusive and broadly representative than others, but even the countries that are doing relatively well in this regard still need to increase the number of women in political decision-making. Political parties, too, need to incorporate more women into their decision-making structures.

Source: EISA 2008
4.4.1 CASE STUDY: LESOTHO LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2005

The Parliament of Lesotho amended the Local Government Act of 1997 ahead of the 2005 elections to include one-third representation of women in local government structures. This was in line with a 1997 undertaking by SADC member states to address gender inequality among public representatives and ensure a minimum of 30 per cent representation of women in political leadership and decision-making by 2005.

The amendment included a clause that lays down that no less than one-third of the seats in a council shall be reserved for women. The Local Government Elections Act of 1998, which outlines the procedures, rules and regulations for the local government elections, had also to be amended to accommodate the election of women.

Section 18(1A) of the Local Government Elections Amendment Act 2004 only provides that ‘In accordance with the Local Government Act 1997, one third of the reserved seats in each Council shall be from every third electoral division’.

To legitimise the process, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) adopted a multi-stakeholder strategy to determine the electoral divisions to be reserved for women. Political parties were invited to take part in a random selection of the electoral divisions to be reserved.

Table 2: Electoral Divisions per District per Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Councils</th>
<th>No of Community Councils</th>
<th>No of electoral divisions</th>
<th>No of reserved electoral divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botha-Bothe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leribe</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maseru</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafeteng</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohale’s Hoek</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quthing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qacha’s Nek</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaba-Tseka</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokhotlong</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 272</strong></td>
<td><strong>385</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission 2005
After the nomination exercise a man from the Litjotjela Community Council area sued the government, saying his constitutional right to participate in the elections as per Section 20 of the Constitution had been violated.

His case was also based on Section 18(3) of the Constitution, which states that no person shall be discriminated against because of race, sex, and so on. His legal team argued that women should be empowered but their empowerment should not be at the expense of other people’s constitutional rights, such as the right to stand for election. The decision of the High Court was that the law seeks to empower women and that fact overrides the question of whether the manner in which women are empowered is constitutional or not. The man’s claims were therefore dismissed without costs.

4.4.2 LESOTHO: WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN THE 2007 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

One of the most important positions in Lesotho is that of the National Assembly, which ranks very high in the Lesotho Official Order of Precedence. The Speaker is elected by the National Assembly from among its members or from among other persons who are not members of the National Assembly. Election of the Speaker is the first task of a new Parliament. This is so because the Constitution says no business can be transacted when the office of Speaker is vacant (Parliament of Lesotho 2008). The current Speaker of Parliament is a woman. She has occupied this position since the 6th Parliament and her re-election as Speaker can be interpreted as a vote of confidence by the legislators in her ability, and by extension the ability of women, to perform this very important office.

Source: Transformation Resource Centre
In the February 2007 elections, 30 women were elected to the 120-member National Assembly, forming 25 per cent of the House. This is a considerable improvement on the 14 women, 11.7 per cent, of the 2002 National Assembly (IEC Lesotho 2008). If the figures for the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy/National Independent Party alliance are combined, 28.9 per cent of the alliance’s National Assembly members were women. The opposition All Basotho Convention/Lesotho Workers Party alliance’s combined rate was 18.5 per cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Alliance</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
<th>Women’s seats</th>
<th>% women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independent Party</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Workers Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Congress Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front For Democracy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basutoland Congress Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Batho Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EISA website 2008.

The Senate (the Upper House) is comprised of 22 principal chiefs and 11 appointees by the king on the advice of the prime minister. Out of the 22 principal chiefs, seven are women, having assumed office at the death of their husbands. On the other hand, there are two women out of the 11 appointees. The picture is different when it comes to Cabinet. There are 18 ministers and five assistant ministers. Out of the 18 ministers, six are women, and of the five assistant ministers, three are women.
It is also important that as political parties strive towards gender parity, concern with the numbers of women in positions of leadership and decision-making is balanced with concerns about the requisite power and authority given to women in these positions. In this way, gender parity will be able to address both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the empowerment of women. Put somewhat differently, it is pointless simply to increase the number of women in political leadership and decision-making positions if such women do not have the requisite authority and power to make an impact on governance.

4.5 NOMINATION REGULATIONS
Candidate nominations are based on both external legislation (e.g. the Electoral Act) and internal party regulations. External regulations generally cover aspects such as age and citizenship requirements of candidates, while internal regulations govern nomination procedure and processes, including membership status.

In Lesotho the law provides for two kinds of nominations, namely, constituency and proportional representation (PR) nominations. The constituency nominations happen in the constituencies where in order for one to become a candidate, he/she has to be proposed by a member of the public. Such a proposal has to be seconded by another person. The proposed candidate has to give his/her consent in order for such a proposal to be valid. Again, if the proposed candidate belongs to a political party, then the party president or secretary general has to endorse such a candidature. On the day of nomination court, candidates are presented to the IEC by their supporters, translated into local language as ‘Ho emisoa Bakhethoa’, and it is during this day that the candidates also pay their fees to the commission in accordance with the law. This has become a big event in the electoral process in Lesotho because during this day, party loyalists put on their colourful party colours, sing party songs and accompany their candidates to the constituency office to demonstrate their party strength.

The PR nominations happen within the parties, where individual parties prepare lists for the 40 PR seats. The IEC usually stipulates a time frame for the PR nominations and after receiving the lists, the IEC displays them at the national office for people to inspect.

Nomination of candidates for the general or local elections is a very important process which, if not handled properly, creates conflict within parties. Therefore there is a need to have a clear set of procedures in terms of who administers this process.
4.6 **FLOOR CROSSING**

Floor crossing can be likened to political migration because as in migration, where people move with the hope of getting to greener pastures, a similar mindset drives a politician or politicians moving from one party to another with the hope that prospects for accessing state power are greater with the new rather than with the old party. While floor crossing in and of itself is not necessarily undesirable in a democracy, if not well managed it accentuates the proliferation of parties – a trend that may have adverse effects upon already fragmented party systems and fledgling representative democracies, such as that prevailing in Lesotho. Two interesting common features of these floor-crossing developments in Lesotho are that, first, all of the floor crossings involved leadership squabbles and some degree of intra-party conflict and, second, they all happened in the run-up to a national election (for instance, the 1997 floor crossing preceded the 1998 election; the 2001 floor crossing preceded the 2002 election; and the 2006 floor crossing preceded the 2007 election).

In order to foreground our discussion in this section, we make three distinct, albeit interrelated, assumptions, namely:

a) Floor crossing (political migration) in Lesotho, although permissible constitutionally, undermines the country’s representative parliamentary democracy.

b) Floor crossing (political migration) in Lesotho is also a clear manifestation of the country’s fragmented party system, which is not sufficiently robust for the institutionalisation of democracy. Floor crossing has therefore reinforced the fragility of Lesotho’s democracy since that country’s historic political transition of 1993.

c) Given that floor crossing (political migration) is a feature of the constituency-based electoral system that Lesotho inherited from the British in 1966, it was assumed that this problem would be redressed with the reform of the electoral model towards more proportionality and the adoption of the mixed member proportional (MMP) system; however, recent developments suggest that this is not the case.

Since its historic democratic transition of 1993, Lesotho has experienced a series of floor crossings within the National Assembly, as follows:

- In 1997, the split of the then ruling BCP led to the creation of the LCD with a majority of MPs crossing the floor and thereby turning the BCP into an opposition party;

---

1 Matlosa and Shale 2007
• In 2001 about 27 MPs crossed the floor from the ruling LCD to form the LPC;
• In 2006, about 18 MPs crossed the floor from the LCD to form the ABC.

What is striking about all the three experiences of floor crossing outlined above is that they all happened on the eve of general elections. While floor crossing could be said to enhance the freedom of MPs to change political allegiances from time to time, its impact on Lesotho’s representative democracy can be identified at six levels.

First, floor crossing changes the political complexion of the National Assembly and alters the outcome of general election results. This means that a general election result can easily be altered by elite pacts and the realignment of power in the National Assembly. This explains why the LCD, which received 79 parliamentary seats following the 2002 general elections, but was reduced to 61 seats after the floor crossing of 2006.

Second, while a multiparty system is good for democracy it can result in the proliferation of small parties with strong leaders; and the proliferation of small and weak parties through floor crossing compounds the problem of a fragmented party system in emerging democracies such as Lesotho. Floor crossing could easily lead to weak parties institutionally and strong personality of their leaders. The leaders become too strong while parties are weak, creating a conundrum of institutional sustainability of parties.

Third, when MPs cross the floor of Parliament they are not compelled to consult their constituencies in advance. MPs are also not compelled to seek a new mandate after crossing the floor, thereby undermining the vertical accountability of MPs to the electorate.

Fourth, a weakness of political parties in Lesotho – as in other emerging democracies in the region – is their lack of mutually reinforcing inter-party relations vis-à-vis cooperation and alliances, whereby their ideological and programmatic positions coincide and open avenues for inter-party unity. So, floor crossing accentuates political tension among political parties. The smooth cooperation expected to exist among political parties gets weakened and increasingly parties turn politics (especially elections) into war by other means.

Fifth, it is also possible that some MPs have been prompted to cross the floor in the National Assembly in response to the new MMP electoral model that itself encourages many parties to contest power. There is no doubt that even the new culture of party coalitions and alliances has been prompted by the MMP model. However, a negative effect of the floor crossing and alliance formation may manifest itself in the form of a
distortion of the spirit and letter of the MMP model itself, provided these processes (floor crossing and party alliances) are not well regulated.

Finally, if not well managed, floor crossing may undermine representative democracy: if the electorate elects MPs who after a while undermine that choice by switching political allegiances in Parliament, the electorate may begin to feel that MPs are representing themselves and not the electorate, resulting in a legitimacy crisis for the MPs in the eyes of the electorate. This trend may in turn result in declining public trust in MPs as well as in political parties. In fact, available data from recent Afrobarometer surveys suggest that public trust in political parties is declining in all SADC countries, and that opposition parties are affected more in this regard than ruling parties.

If the floor-crossing problem is not well regulated, it will continue to undermine the institutional viability and sustainability of political parties. It will also continue to undermine efforts towards electoral and parliamentary reforms. Ultimately, it will continue to undermine the country’s representative democracy. Some possible ways of dealing with challenges posed by floor crossing include the following:

- Changing the electoral law, barring all MPs from crossing the floor, but this may not be possible without changing the electoral model towards full PR;
- Putting legislation in place stipulating specifically that any MP who crosses the floor (for whatever reason) loses her/his seat and such a seat will therefore be declared vacant, necessitating a by-election, as is the case in Malawi.

Part of the reason why South Africa ultimately scrapped the practice of floor crossing in Parliament was precisely because it distorted the representation and accountability role of MPs in the National Assembly.

**4.7 PARTY STRUCTURES**

The basic structure of parties in the SADC region is similar. The different levels of organisation in the hierarchy from the bottom up are: sub-branches – branches – districts – provinces – national level. The challenge is maintaining an effective communication channel linking up the various structures of the parties, especially when key policy decisions have to be made.

Political party structures exist at all levels, ranging from the village, area, district and region to national levels. Because parties recruit members for purposes of elections, almost all of these structures are aligned to electoral divisions or boundaries.
For instance, in South Africa there are municipal, provincial and national level structures. To use the ANC as an example, the party consists of the following organs:

a. The national conference, which elects the national executive committee;
b. The provincial conference, which elects the provincial executive committee;
c. The regional conference, which elects the regional executive committee;
d. The branch annual general meeting, which elects the branch executive committee;
e. Branches may be grouped together in zones and may be subdivided into smaller units such as street committees, and zones may be grouped into sub-regions.

The ANC Women’s and Youth Leagues have basic structures at all the levels mentioned above.

In Botswana most parties, although differing slightly from one party to another, have cells as the lowest structure of the party, followed by the ward, constituency, regional and national levels.

The same system applies in Lesotho, where parties have sub-branches, branches, constituencies and national level structures. Because of the migrant labour system, bigger parties (mainly the congress parties) have provincial structures in South Africa, which are very important structures and regarded as a strong voting bloc.

Ideally, political parties should have clearly defined vertical linkages between all structures. The reality, however, is that most parties do not have offices at lower level structures.
MODULE 5: INTER-PARTY CONFLICTS IN LESOTHO

5.1 OBJECTIVE
The objective of this module is to assist parties to understand the causes of conflicts between their political parties. Using concrete examples in the context of Lesotho, the participants will be able to analyse the causes of inter-party conflicts during group discussions so as to be able to suggest solutions to the conflicts.

Source: Conflict Trends. (The picture illustrates results of an inter-party conflict where in 1998 opposition parties and the ruling party were involved in a conflict that had far-reaching consequences for Lesotho).

5.2 COALITIONS

5.2.1 DEFINING POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS
Political party coalitions are organised collective parties which are in pursuit of a common goal. Coalitions may be between two or more opposition parties or between a ruling party and a number of opposition parties. In forming coalitions, parties usually make a formal commitment (a memorandum of understanding, MoU) to pool their resources. In the MoU, the parties also agree on the type, structure and role of leaders. Furthermore, the parties can agree on the distribution of power once they have achieved their goal.
5.2.2 RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS

Parties form coalitions to maximise their chances to achieve a desired goal or to survive certain threats.

- They form coalitions to exploit the electoral economies of scale.
- Some form coalitions in Parliament to strengthen their voice.
- Coalitions are very important to the democracy-strengthening process; opposition coalitions provide an opportunity for an alternative leadership.
- In forming the coalition, the parties’ choice of whom to partner with is usually influenced by ideology shared with the targeted party.
- A party is considered by the initiating party with the hope that collaboration will be beneficial.
- But even if the ideologies are different, a party sometimes just uses a simple criterion that picks parties which have the same interests and hold similar views and therefore the same position on certain policy issues.
- The other major factor is ethnicity, where some parties prefer certain ethnic groups.

Source: Transformation Resource Centre
5.2.3 TYPES OF COALITIONS

Different types of coalitions are determined by many factors, among which the electoral system ranks high. Coalitions form during two main periods, namely the pre-election and the post-election periods. There are three preponderant types of coalitions: pre-election coalitions, majoritarian coalitions and conflict resolution coalitions.

a) The **pre-election coalition** consists of parties which come together to maximise their electoral votes, often under competitive elections. These are often highly effective and sometimes gain majority.

b) The **majoritarian coalitions** are often formed by a group of parties in Parliament. The majoritarian aim is to form a government.

c) **Conflict resolution coalitions** are mostly formed by former belligerents to address a particular conflict or potential conflict. Conflict resolution coalitions are ideal in post-conflict situations. They help to hold the fragile peace settlement in place until adequate political stability is achieved.

Coalition partners use various models to realise their goals. For instance, in the election pact model, political parties join hands for the purposes of winning elections only. Where the first-past-the-post electoral model is used, they could agree not to field candidates in the same constituency. An example is the National Rainbow Coalition, which consisted of the National Alliance of Kenya and the Liberal Democratic Party–LDP (Rainbow).

In boxes 17, 18 and 19 below we show examples of the MoUs entered into by Lesotho political parties ahead of the 2007 elections.
Box 17

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE BASOTHOLAND AFRICAN CONGRESS (BAC),
THE LESOTHO PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (LPC)
AND
THE MAHATAMMOHO LED BY NTSUKUNYANE MPHANYA

JULY 2006

FORM OF ALLIANCE

We, the leaders and representatives of the Basotholand African Congress, Lesotho People’s Congress and Mahatammoho, hereafter referred to as BAC, LPC and Mahatammoho respectively representing members of our respective political parties have agreed to form an Alliance with the ultimate objective of unification/merger.

The name of the Alliance shall be LESOTO CONGRESS PARTIES ALLIANCE (LCPA) OR ALTERNATIVELY SETLAMO/SELEKANE SA MACONGRESS LESOTHO.

ACKNOWLEDGING that we share the same original political philosophy of the original LEKHOTLA LA MAHATAMMOHO which emphasises that real process of political, economic and Social Emancipation, Transformation should not be geared to or served to protect the political interests of either capitalism or socialism or /communism but mainly that of the Basotho. Further acknowledging that we share a common understanding, principle, vision and programmes over the areas of national concerns in all fields of human endeavour and aware that we all emphasise the need to achieve the common objectives of fighting for: freedom, peace and development;

RECOGNISING that a unified front of the congress/opposition parties is the key to winning the next election or forming a strong opposition and therefore saving Lesotho and Basotho from total economic, social, cultural and political collapse;

RESPONDING to a popular demand for a capable, dedicated, principled, dependable transparent and progressive government with a clear development agenda;

MINDFUL of the calls by Basotho for a corruption free government with proven competence, committed to service delivery, demonstrated capability, resolute compassion and unequivocal credibility to restore the lost confidence of Basotho in electoral process and multi-party democracy;

INSPIRED by our commitment to the active promotion of democracy under a regime of balanced power sharing;

RECOGNISING the need for a dynamic partnership required to win elections and form a government with clear mandate to achieve our fundamental objectives;

COMMITTED to good public service, to being accountable to the people, to the rule of law, to social justice and to ensuring that human rights (with particular reference to the effective participation of Basotho in the decision making process) and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed and respected by all, by establishing an enabling environment for all Basotho to push forward programmes which concretely, equitably and sustainably improve their livelihoods;

CONCERNED about the cross mismanagement of public funds with widespread theft and fraud and financial laws and regulations flouted with impunity by those tasked with the responsibility to account for the use and management of public monies effectively,
efficiently and with transparency, fidelity and probity with the resultant culture of chaos and loss of financial consciousness reigning;

CONCERNED about the decline in the standards/quality of education with the resultant high repetition and drop our rates. Further alarmed by the indifference of the present government on the failure of the education system to address the needs of Basotho;

CONCERNED about the alienation of Basotho from the political process as demonstrated by the recently held local government election which neither created a firm foundation for devolution of power to the communities nor a road map towards transformation of our society as well as affirmative action program to promote the integration of marginalised groups particularly women and people with disability;

ALARMED by the general decline in the service delivery by the government departments/ministries a clear sign of lack of merit in the appointment system;

AND while recognising the strategic gains made in many fronts since independence to advance the political, institutional and Socio-economic breakthroughs, the following issues remain unattended or unaddressed.

- The growing inequalities in the distribution of income between the rich and the poor despite the macro-economic growth gains of the economy since the 1980s.
- The appalling levels of the poor, underemployed and unemployed; and inadequate food supplies and delivery of social services, the latter as demonstrately, among others, the decline in the delivery of health services, shortage of medical personnel and drugs, compounded by the rampant and widespread of HIV and AIDS.
- The need for government to act as a catalyst for change in the light of globalisation instead of subjecting Basotho to the whims of foreign investors.
- Collapse of the rule of law as demonstrated by weak judiciary and parliamentary system, rampant stock theft and generally high crime rate.
- Government policies are not adequately subjected to public scrutiny due to the practice of government secretiveness which hinders openness to dialogue and participation of all stakeholders particularly civil society.

RECOGNISING the need for a dynamic partnership to restore democratic governance that is committed to restoration of the faith of the founding fathers of Mahatammoho: the need to achieve the common objective of fighting for freedom, peace and development.

NOTING that fissure that developed and resulted in factions emerging from within the Lekhotla la mahatammoho had nothing to do with the original Mahatammoho (BCP).

FURTHER NOTING that the fissures that developed resulted in the dominant faction substantially diverging from the BCP philosophy and fundamental principles.

ACKNOWLEDGING that, after very careful and systematic analysis, that we share a common understanding over areas of national concerns in all areas of human endeavour.

MOTIVATED by the fervent desire to meaningfully establish democratic governance that is capable, dedicated, principled accountable and transparent.

DETERMINED to establish a road map to an early unification of the parties in concert with the philosophy and principles of the founding fathers of BCP.

We the leaders of the Alliance, having engaged in and completed full and fresh deliberation do hereby resolve as follows:
1. To adopt and improve institutional, organisational and operational capacity to co-ordinate and enforce framework of the alliance, bearing in mind the trust or genuine intent for mutual benefit for the alliance as well as a win-win situation based on comparative advantage or a fair outcome in mutual gain and the eventual unity of the parties.

2. To work on strategic agreements relating to two core principles of democracy: broad participation and accountability, it being clearly understood that the alliance is not just an election front for the upcoming elections (not just a momentary or tactical front) but based on a common understand/perspective on the challenges facing the Basotho nation. Special reference is made to good governance and creation of an enabling environment for development of mechanisms to harness the collective strengths of the concerned parties to bring about truly democratic change and the socio-economic advancement of the Basotho people.

3. To develop a code of principles, standards and indicative criteria for the progressive development of the proposed alliance and ultimate unity.

4. To develop a mechanism for mass-mobilisation, it being understood that agreement by leaders is not enough to achieve the goals and strategic objectives of the alliance. In this regard the institution would have to prepare a coordinated political programme centered around the need to create a new socio-economic path with emphasis on empowering the people in development activities.

5. To develop modalities for accountability to the electorate and the promotion of transparency within the alliance.

6. To prepare/recommend measures to get greater participation in future elections.

7. To design measures for mobilisation of resources for effective operation of the proposed alliance.

8. To prepare guidelines to carry forward the alliance taking into account that these must be simple, measurable, time bound and within the context of transparency, accountability and audibility.

9. To monitor progress towards the achievement of the alliance, which in essence is a benchmark for implication of the parties.

We, the leaders of this Alliance, further agree:

a) To establish a common SECRETARIAT, common SYMBOL, common MANIFESTO, and CODE OF CONDUCT.

b) To field one candidate as a leader of the alliance for the coming general elections who shall be elected by consensus and that two of the leaders of the participating parties who shall not be elected to the leadership be automatically declared DEPUTY LEADERS of the Alliance and shall so assume the role of DEPUTIES in government.

c) To EQUITABLE and MUTUAL allocation of constituencies.

d) To EQUITABLE allocation of CABINET and other SENIOR PORTFOLIOS in GOVERNMENT, PARASTATAL, STATUTORY BOARDS and DIPLOMATIC SERVICE after elections.

e) To promote EQUITY for Gender, Youth and DIFFERENTLY ABLE PERSONS through various measures including AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.
f) That a **TECHNICAL COMMITTEE** shall be constituted to harmonise the various **PARTY MANIFESTOS** of the **PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES**, and formulate a **COMMON PROGRAMME** of **ACTION** and shall also be mandated to formulate **CODE OF CONDUCT** of the alliance.

g) That the members of the Technical Committee shall be provided by the executive committees of the **PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES** who shall have power to co-opt, people to assist in given tasks.

h) That there shall be established a **NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE** of the **PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES**, comprising of the leaders, plus up to five senior members from each political party charged with the responsibility of the management of the Alliance.

i) That there shall be four main Committees namely: Mobilisation and Strategy Committee, Finance and Resource Mobilisation Committee, Administration and Publicity Committee and Research Committee.

j) **TO PROMOTE INCLUSIVENESS AND EQUITABLE NATIONAL INTEGRATION FOR ALL CITIZENS, WORKERS UNION, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS.**

k) To act in the interest of the Basotho people and pay due regard to free choice and free will.

l) To work together with the other citizens and nations to establish and implement a **RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME** for redressing the devastated **ECONOMY**, especially **AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY**, social and physical **INFRASTRUCTURE, HEALTH** and **EDUCATIONAL** services.

m) To encourage **POLITICAL PARTIES, STUDENT BODIES, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS** and other groups to join.

n) To bind **OURSelves and members of our PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES BY THE CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE ALLIANCE.**

o) That the symbol for Alliance shall be made out of a combination of the symbols of the **PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES**.

---

**SIGNED BY:**

**NTSKU NYANE ALPHONSE MPHANYA**
LEADER OF THE MAHATAMMOHO CONGRESS PARTY SIGNED

**DR. KHAUHELO DEBORAH RALITAPOLE**
LEADER OF THE BASOTHOLAND AFRICAN CONGRESS (BAC) SIGNED

**KELEBONE ALBERT MAOPE**
LEADER OF THE LESOTHO PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (LPC) SIGNED

THUS DONE ON THE ………….DAY OF …….. 2006 AT………….MASERU
Box 18

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT OF POLITICAL PARTY’S ALLIANCE
ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN

ALL BASOTHO CONVENTION/ KOBO-TATA
(Hereinafter referred to as ABC/KOBO-TATA)
And
LESOTHO WORKER’S PARTY
(Hereinafter referred to as LWP)

1. WHEREAS:
1.1 The ABC/KOBO-TATA, a duly registered political party in the Kingdom of Lesotho herein represented by its Leader, Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, with full powers of representation;

1.2 And the LWP, a duly registered political party in the Kingdom of Lesotho herein represented by its Leader, Macafea Billy, with full powers of representation;

1.3 The parties wish to establish a political party alliance for purposes of the forthcoming 17th February 2007 National Assembly Elections in The Kingdom of Lesotho to their Mutual advantage.

2. COMMENCEMENT:
2.1 This agreement applies retrospectively to the 30th day of OCTOBER 2006 when both leaders had an oral agreement with the same terms as stated above.

3. DURATION:
3.1 This agreement shall be in force for the duration of the life of the 7th Parliament of Lesotho.

4. IT IS NOW THEREFORE AGREED:
4.1 That the leader of ABC/KOBO-TATA will be the leader of the alliance in all respect.

4.2 That the LWP will not have candidates in the 79 Constituencies of Lesotho and that the ABC/KOBO-TATA shall instead have candidates in the 79 Constituencies.

4.3 That the leader of LWP will stand as a candidate in one Constituency of his choice.

4.4 That the ABC/KOBO-TATA will not have a party list for purposes of the forty (40) National Assembly seats divided in terms of proportional representation.

4.5 That the LWP will have a party list for purposes of the forty (40) National Assembly seats and that it (LWP) will have six (6) names in the said list and the rest of the list will be comprised of the names of members of the ABC/KOBO-TATA as indicated in annexure “1” hereto.
4.6 That both leaders will encourage their respective members to vote ABC/KOBO-TATA in the constituency ballots and LWP in the party ballots during the 17th February 2007 National Assembly Elections.

5.

GENERAL:
5.1 No waiver by a party of any breach, failure or default in the performance by the other party, and no failure, refusal of neglect by a party to exercise any right emanating from this agreement or to insist on strict compliance with or performance of the other party’s obligations under this agreement shall constitute a waiver of the provisions of this agreement and a party may at any time require strict compliance with the provisions of this agreement.

5.2 This agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties who acknowledge that there are no other oral or written understandings or agreements between them relating to the subject matter of this agreement.

5.3 This agreement shall be governed by the laws of the Kingdom of Lesotho.

5.4 All provisions of this agreement shall be severable and no provision shall be affected by the invalidity of any other provision of this agreement.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED AT MASERU ON THIS ...................DAY OF FEBRUARY 2007

AS WITNESSES:-

1.................................

2.................................

............................................................

MOTSOAHE THOMAS THABANE
LEADER ABC/KOBO-TATA

3

THUS DONE AND SIGNED AT MASERU ON THIS ...................DAY OF FEBRUARY 2007

AS WITNESSES:-

1.................................

2.................................

............................................................

MACAEFA BILLY
LEADER OF LWP
Box 19

MEMORANDUM
OF
UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
LESOTHO CONGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY
AND
NATIONAL INDEPENDENT PARTY
ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION
FOR THE 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS

PREAMBLE

The Lesotho Congress for Democracy and National Independent Party (hereinafter abbreviated and referred to as LCD and NIP respectively).

PURSUANT to the dissolution of the Sixth Parliament per Legal Notice No: 198 of 2006 in terms of section 83(1) and (4) of the Constitution of Lesotho; Legal Notice No: 207 of 2006, proclaiming general elections to be on the 17th Day of February 2007; and Legal Notice No: 210 of 2006 detailing the General Elections Timetable;

CONSIDERING that the Mixed Member Proportional Model provides for 80 Constituency-based seats and 40 seats allocated according to Proportional Representation in terms of the Fourth amendment to the Constitution;

TAKING into account various meetings between representatives of LCD and NIP sanctioned by their respective Executive Committees;

DESIROUS of consolidating and developing a special relationship which will be guided by the strategic partnership on co-operation in the general elections 2007;

GUIDED by the aspiration to strengthen and intensify friendly relations existing between LCD and NIP;

CONVINCED that the identity and integrity of LCD and NIP shall continue to subsist;
PROMPTED by their commitment to the universal norms of Democracy, Human-
Rights. Development and the Rule of Law;

LCD and NIP hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

COMPETENT AUTHORITIES AND OBLIGATION TO
COOPERATE

1. The competent authorities responsible for the implementation of this Memorandum
of Understanding shall be:

The Executive Committees of both LCD and NIP.

2. LCD and NIP may establish procedures to facilitate harmonization of operating
procedures and administrative formalities where practicable.

ARTICLE 2

SPECIFIC AREA OF COOPERATION

LCD and NIP shall for the purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding co-operate
in the areas relating to the general elections of 2007

ARTICLE 3

MANNER OF CO-OPERATION

In order to give effect to the provision of Article 2, LCD and NIP shall co-operate as
follows-

(a) LCD shall compete for the 80 constituency-based seats in the National
Assembly whereby followers of both LCD and TW as well as the electorate
in general shall be sensitized to vote for LCD in the constituencies.

(b) NIP shall compete for the 40 Proportional Representation-based seats
whereby the Executive Committees of both LCD and NIP shall compile a
party list according to the formula specified in (c) below, to be submitted
to IEC as stipulated in the 2007 General Elections Time-Table. In the same
breath both LCD and NIP followers as well as the electorate in general
shall be sensitized to vote for NLP under the National Ballot.

(c) LCD and NIP shall compile a party list as follows:
(i) Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NIP</th>
<th>6+4 Names</th>
<th>LCD</th>
<th>LCD</th>
<th>NIP, LCD, NIP, LCD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Names</td>
<td>5 Names</td>
<td>10 Names</td>
<td>1 Name each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Followers of LCD and NIP shall be concientised on the allocation of the Proportional Representation seats according to this formula.

(ii) The 6 + 4 names of LCD means; the six: LCD members who will also be contesting in the Constituencies but are being secured should certain eventualities occur (e.g.: a failed election): Whereas the four names will form part of the entire Proportional Representation list:

(iii) An approved party list will be attached to form part of this memorandum.

**ARTICLE 4**

**AMENDMENT AND TERMINATION**

This Memorandum of Understanding may be amended or terminated by mutual consent of both LCD and NIP.

**ARTICLE 5**

**ENTRY INTO FORCE**

1. This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force on the date of the signing thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Executive Committees, have signed and sealed this Agreement in duplicate, in the English language, both copies being equally authentic.

DONE at .........................on this ....................day of ................200

FOR LESOTHO CONGRESS  
FOR NATIONAL

FOR DEMOCRACY  
INDEPENDENT PARTY
I, The undersigned

MPHO MAL1E

Do hereby make oath and say:

I am an adult Mosotho male and Secretary General of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). I have been duly authorized by the National Executive Committee of the LCD to make this affidavit for and on its behalf of the party (LCD).

2.

Facts deposed to herein are, unless the context indicates otherwise, within my personal knowledge are to the best of my belief and recollection true and correct.

3.

I have read and understood the Replying Affidavit deposed to by ‘Matsotetsi Mpesi and wish to state as follows thereto.

4.

4.1 I confirm that LCD is aware of these proceedings as it was served with the Notice of Motion. I confirm further that the agreement between NIP and LCD was signed at an open public ceremony on the 15th January 2007.

4.2 LCD is not interested to join as a party in these proceedings.
5.2.4 CHALLENGES FOR PARTY COALITIONS

- It is a challenge for coalitions to use ideology as a major factor.
- The majority of coalitions are electoral pacts, thus short term.
- The challenge: members often fail to agree on the kind of outcome they want from the coalition.
- Most coalitions still face the problem of agreeing on matters of policy, given the coalition members’ divergent ideological backgrounds.
- One of the biggest challenges to coalitions is maintaining them.
- Most coalitions are not able to function properly because of internal conflicts.
- They lack mechanisms to manage tensions within the coalition. These could include a code of conduct and a dispute management strategy.
- The weakness is that coalition members concentrate on the goal and assume that there won’t be problems.
- The parties do not usually have well documented lessons in terms of what makes or breaks alliances either locally or regionally to draw from.
- Most coalitions lack clearly defined goals and defined roles of individual member parties.
- Some coalitions do not have organisational structures.
- This problem mainly emanates from the individual parties’ own lack of functioning organisational structures.
- Lack of internal democracy within parties has a rippling effect on the internal democracy of the coalition itself.

5.3 CAMPAIGNS

Election campaigning often leads to conflict between parties. The challenge is to manage such election-related conflicts constructively. Election campaigns are governed by different acts or regulations. In some countries, the electoral act covers campaigns and this may or may not include an electoral code of conduct.

In Lesotho the Electoral Act includes the electoral code of conduct. The code of conduct could be a voluntary agreement among political parties. It draws mainly on the goodwill of the parties to abide by it. However in the case of Lesotho where it is a part of the electoral law it should be enforceable by the election management body. The primary aim of a code of conduct is to regulate how parties conduct themselves ensuring a free and fair democratic election that promotes political stability.

The specific objectives of a code of conduct include the following:
• Contributing to a peaceful election;
• Contributing to a level playing field during elections;
• Developing public confidence in the electoral process;
• Promoting a culture of political tolerance;
• Ensuring that the electoral process is credible and its outcome legitimate and acceptable to all contestants;
• Promoting constructive management of election-related disputes.

The code should specify who is bound by it. At the minimum, political parties and candidates are supposed to be bound by the code. But the code may also bind other players (e.g. the Tanzania Code) including the media, civil society organisations (CSOs), the election management body, etc. If in the law, it should specify the expected ethical code to be adhered to by all those affected by its implementation. Equally important, the code specifies sanctions to be imposed on those who violate its provisions.

Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network
5.3.1 TYPES OF CAMPAIGNS

a) Grassroots campaigns
This type uses recruited voters to become campaign volunteers, thus creating an activist, grassroots base of support. It enables direct voter contact, which brings a voter to a more cognitive level than in other campaign communications. The advantage here is that it allows two-way communication where a voter is more engaged and can share his or her own views, thus becoming more invested in the campaign.

Source: Transformation Resource Centre

A rally is one of the traditional ways of campaigning that parties employ. It is a useful tool for parties to demonstrate electoral strength and it needs to be well planned to ensure good attendance. The time and place of the event is therefore crucial. Whatever event is being planned needs to take into account available financial, human and other resources.

Source: Transformation Resource Centre
The following points need to be taken into account when planning a rally:

- Who is the target audience and how does the rally reach the target audience? This will impact on the programme; for example, if specifically targeted at youth, the music, celebrities, etc should be those with whom the youth identify.
- What is the message that the candidate wants to convey?
- Where are my potential voters and how do I reach them? This will impact on the venue, time and date of the rally.
- What are the challenges and how do I meet them? (e.g. funding, etc)
- What are the security implications? Crowd control with sufficient marshals is crucial to avoid rioting, injury or violence.

b) Technology-based campaigns
This type of campaign uses phones, Internet, newspapers, radio and TV. It is a costly type of campaign compared to the grassroots but it saves time for political parties as it reaches many households at the same time.

c) Consultant-based campaigns
Modern electoral campaigns are run by private consultants. Their role is to assist parties with:

- Strategic planning;
- Preparing initiatives for the ballot;
- Message development;
- Radio and television advertising;
- Targeted mail;
- Graphic and web design;
- Grassroots organising;
- Day-to-day campaign operations;
- Community outreach;
- Polling/surveys/focus groups;
- Opposition research;
- Budget planning.

5.3.2. CAMPAIGN PLANS
Campaigns need proper planning in order to succeed, entailing details and deadlines. Planning is a useful tool which brings order to the campaign. Generally, a plan defines the what, when, who and how of the campaign. It divides tasks, integrates work, and provides a road map of the electoral process. As a result, it minimises uncertainty and saves time and money. It is important to note that a campaign plan may change during the electoral process.
5.3.3 STRATEGIC POSITIONING
Campaigners should know their strongholds (constituencies, districts, etc) and as such need to have a strategy which is mindful of whom it targets, and how it will approach the target. The main goals should be ‘reinforcement’, ‘persuasion’ and ‘conversion’. Reinforcement seeks to retain the base while persuasion seeks to win swing voters. Conversion seeks to win opposition voters.

5.3.4 CAMPAIGN THEMES
Parties should develop campaign themes. A theme should consist of what the voter wants, what the candidate/party offers and what the opponents bring. A good theme has the power to influence the voters’ choice. It acts as a link between voters’ concerns and the candidate’s/party’s approach. It should therefore be inclusive of diverse issues to appeal to more voters.

5.3.5 PARTY MANIFESTOS¹

a) Preparing and /improving your manifesto
Elections involve a competition for power. Candidates need to ensure that published material is of a standard that is at least equal to the material of other parties. Journalists and political analysts will critically examine and compare election manifestos. Their analysis will inform and shape public opinion, and the voting process.

b) Features of a good party manifesto

- Brief introduction (paragraph): this can be a message from the party leader;
- Strong headings (incorporate party slogans) followed by explanation;
- Easy to read;
- Clear and concise;
- Relevant;
- Making party concerns and political platform obvious to reader;
- Illustrated – Use photographs to highlight issues. If your printing budget is limited, use them on your website’s manifesto page.

5.4 PARTY FUNDING
As key role players in multiparty democracy, political parties need to be viable so that there is strong competition for power and the shaping of a country’s development trajectory.

¹ Adapted from the EISA Manual on Capacity Building Programme for Women in Politics in Madagascar 2007
High on the list of the fundamentals that the political parties need in order to deliver on their mandate is sound financing, more than ever before both during elections and beyond the elections. It is only through adequate funding that political parties can participate effectively in governance. Financial resources enable opposition parties to become effective challengers to the ruling parties in their running of the country. Likewise, ruling parties need financing in order to be able to function in the communities so as to consolidate their positions with the electorate.

Also equally important is the need for financial resources for general day-to-day running of the party and for election campaigns, all of which are not cheap. It is for this reason that multinational companies and, in some cases, local companies have to intervene to ameliorate the financial problems that face many parties. However, there is always a risk that the multinational companies could become the real power, controlling the state, and the political party only their proxy, therefore defeating the spirit of democracy.

In Lesotho, there is no public funding for political party development. Only during elections does the government provide some public funds to parties earmarked for political campaigns. This is done through the IEC, and following an election parties are required to account for the use of these campaign funds.²

## 5.5 MEDIA
The image of the candidate is shaped by the media strategy. Voters get to know what the candidate is about through the media (TV, radio and newspapers) as it allows candidates to access many households in a short time. A campaign through the media must have a consistent content so as not to confuse voters. It should also be efficient in terms of resource utilisation across electronic and print media because electronic and print media are paid for and this can be costly (e.g. TV spots made by a producer, photographer and editor). Campaign messages should therefore be time conscious because programmes are time bound. The less time spent on the issues the more the issues will be covered. This allows voters to know the candidate better.

## 5.6 ROLE OF PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT
Political parties play a very central role in the shaping and further development of a political system as a whole and the legislature in particular. A political party mobilises votes premised upon a particular type of political interest and ideology with the ultimate goal of assuming the reins of government and controlling state power. Parties gain control of the government and the state through Parliament after contesting

² Matlosa and Sello 2005
elections. Within Parliament itself, political parties play an important role ‘in shaping the relationship between the executive and the legislature and in prioritising the legislative agenda’ (Policy Dialogue on Legislative Development, Brussels, 20-22 November 2002). Political parties are key in ensuring that the legislature plays effectively its three-pronged mandate:

- Law-making;
- Representation;
- Oversight.

A vibrant democratic governance system gains more strength through the existence and activities of political parties both within and outside of Parliament. Political parties influence the legislature in more ways than one, such as:

- Whether a legislature exists at all or has any meaningful powers;
- The relationship among political parties in the legislature;
- The legislature’s relationship with the executive; and
- The legislature’s internal organisation, stability and dynamics (http://magnet.undp.org).

That Lesotho is indeed a functioning multiparty democracy, in and of itself, presupposes a step forward towards nurturing the country’s democratic governance, surely. This situation does not exist in Swaziland’s executive monarchy, which is a drawback on that country’s transition to democracy. Thus, the very existence and functioning of political parties in and outside of Parliament in Lesotho is a quantum leap forward in terms of efforts to institutionalise democratic governance. After successfully embarking on a political transition from military rule to multiparty democracy, all that Lesotho needs to do, mainly, is to put in place robust institutional mechanisms for deepening and consolidating democratic governance, especially following the electoral reform of 2002.

One of these challenges, therefore, revolves precisely around the key role of political parties in the legislature. This is a pertinent and germane issue to address, given that Lesotho’s legislature has changed so drastically since the transitional elections of 1993, mainly due to the reform of the electoral system. The tables below, showing the results of all general elections in Lesotho since 1993, tell the full story.
Table 4: 1993 General Election for the National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contestant</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>398 355</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>120 686</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>7 650</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6 287</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>532 978</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5: 1998 General Election for the National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contestant</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>355 049</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>143 073</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>61 793</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>7 460</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16 244</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>584 740</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6: Lesotho General Assembly Election Results, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Parties</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>304 316</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>124 234</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>16 095</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>14 584</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>32 046</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>30 346</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWP</td>
<td>7 788</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>MFP</td>
<td>6 890</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFD</td>
<td>6 330</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>3 985</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>554 386</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Matlosa, 2003
Table 7: Lesotho National Assembly Election Results and Seat Allocation
Summary, February 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>FPTP seats</th>
<th>% of FPTP Seats</th>
<th>Total Party (valid Votes)</th>
<th>% of Total Party Votes</th>
<th>Party’s allocation of compensatory (PR) seats</th>
<th>Total no. of seats</th>
<th>% of PR Seats +FPTP Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Congress Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>20 263</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basotho Batho Democratic Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8 474</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Congress Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9 823</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8 783</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>29 965</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho Workers Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>107 463</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9 129</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Independence Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>229 602</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Lesotho Freedom Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3 984</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for Democracy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15 477</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>442 963</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Independent Electoral Commission, Lesotho

* The election was postponed in Makhaleng Constituency due to the death of one of the candidates. A fresh poll was subsequently held and won by the ruling LCD.
Following the historic 1993 election, for instance, Lesotho’s 65-member National Assembly was composed solely of members of the ruling Basutoland Congress Party which managed to grab all the 65 parliamentary seats, resulting in a one-party legislature. This situation continued after the 1998 elections, although one seat went to the opposition BNP. The size of Parliament was increased to 80 seats of which the LCD won 79 and BNP 1. What at a glance seemed to be an evolving political culture of the one-party legislature changed dramatically following another historic election in May 2002. The election itself was preceded by electoral reform which led to the introduction and adoption of the MMP electoral model and the increase of Parliament once again, this time to 120 seats. Following the 2002 election, Lesotho’s 120-member National Assembly assumed a colourful political complexion which reinforced its democratic character. A total of ten (10) political parties garnered enough votes to gain representation in the legislature: the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (77 seats), Basotho National Party (21 seats), Basutoland African Congress (3 seats), Basutoland Congress Party (3 seats), Lesotho Peoples’ Congress (5 seats), National Independence Party (5 seats), Lesotho Workers’ Party (1 seat), Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (1 seat), Popular Front for Democracy (1 seat) and National Progress Party (1 seat). The broad political representation in Parliament was further reinforced by the 2007 elections. Currently, a total of 12 political parties are represented in the National Assembly.

Parties’ representation in Parliament, while important for deepening democracy, on its own is inadequate. Parties need to play a much more forthright and assertive role in driving the legislative agenda and mandate. It is through political parties that Parliament could be strengthened further. What exactly would this process of strengthening Parliament through parties for democratic consolidation mean in the case of the Kingdom of Lesotho?

First and foremost, a major legislative reform is urgently needed more than ever before. The efforts now underway to reform the Lesotho legislature are a good move in the right direction. Now that the portfolio committees have been established, they need to be resourced and operationalised as a matter of urgency and political parties must influence their workings through their own caucuses. These reform efforts have to be driven to their logical conclusion for purposes of institutionalising parliamentary democracy. These ought to include, inter alia, reform not only of the current Standing Rules of Parliament that date back to colonial days, but they also call for establishment of portfolio committees that would assist Parliament to effectively hold the executive arm of government much more accountable. It must be emphasised that legislative committees are as critical to the work of a parliament as are political parties. Besides reforming parliamentary committees, Parliament must also reform its procedures that tend to treat constituency-based MPs and party-based MPs differentially, as this practice introduces a caste system in Parliament.
Second, constructive dialogue has to characterise parliamentary debate and increasingly debate in Parliament should tilt more and more towards inter-party cooperation for the common good of the Basotho nation, rather than confrontation predicated on the personality differences of party leaders. Parliamentary debates should also be more informed by policy issues, rather than by the personality of leaders. The era of the personality cult and personality differences taking centre-stage over and above national development goals has proved a costly political liability to democratic governance in Lesotho. It is worth emphasising that democratic governance has a firmer anchor if predicated upon institutional foundations rather than upon a personality cult of a great leader. While leaders do provide a vision for parties, the vision must be able to outgrow the person and the party should be able to survive the departure of a leader.

Third, parties in Parliament must begin to cultivate the seeds of cooperative engagement and play win-win politics, rather than perceive each other as mutually exclusive protagonists engaged in a zero-sum game of politics. This point addresses the critical challenge for all parties in Parliament to strive deliberately towards constructive and mutually beneficial inter-party relations and cooperation, either through short-term election pacts or long-term party coalitions and alliances. Alliances and coalitions are important rules of the political game, especially in multiparty parliaments predicated upon proportional representation electoral models. Let it be emphasised that, indeed, when the parties contest elections, they are engaged in a zero-sum game of politics, but immediately they get into Parliament the ballgame changes somewhat. Once in Parliament, the political parties must evolve collaborative strategies and ‘adopt ways to work together’ (http://magnet.undp.org).

Fourth, it is also important that Parliament operates on the basis of an official opposition, recognised as such and given its due responsibilities, so that constructive, rather than destructive, oppositional voices and viewpoints are increasingly promoted. An official opposition reinforces representative democracy and enhances Parliament’s oversight role. The notion of an official opposition is meant to ensure that democratic governance is a shared responsibility between the ruling party and the main opposition which, in theory, is the government-in-waiting. In Lesotho’s Parliament today, it is well known that there is a ruling party, but controversy still surrounds the whole issue of the official opposition. The sooner this important issue is resolved, much the better for the country’s evolving representative democracy.

Fifth, another area that needs urgent and concerted effort from both the state and political parties themselves is the issue of the provision of public funding for parties to develop as political institutions. Without requisite resources, parties cannot be as effective and efficient as they are supposed to be in the legislature. In Lesotho, party funding is confined to the electoral contest only, whereby the state, through the IEC, channels public funding to parties only for electoral contest. Thus, while in Parliament,
the parties are then supposed to fend for themselves generally, although some public funding is also earmarked for those MPs elected through the FPTP component of the MMP system. The MPs elected through the PR system are not entitled to constituency allowances. Two ways could be considered as possible options for the funding of parties in Parliament, namely (a) state funding premised upon the number of seats each party has garnered in Parliament; and (b) retention of the election campaign funding for parties to be able to effectively participate in elections.

Sixth, it is worth noting, though, that all said and done, the success of a political party in influencing the legislative process either from within or outside of Parliament is fundamentally dependent upon its internal organisation and in particular mechanisms for ensuring and sustaining inner-party democracy. Intra-party or inner-party democracy is key to effective party organisation and the stability of both the party itself and the legislature. Undoubtedly, if political parties fail to uphold democratic values and culture in their own operations, prospects for sustainable democratic governance at the national level, through Parliament, are bound to remain a chimera or a pie in the sky. Thus, it is imperative that political parties institutionalise internal democracy both for the benefit of their own sustainability as key organisations of democracy and for the benefit of the nurturing and consolidation of democratic governance in Lesotho.

Seventh, and finally, is the whole question of the manner in which engagement of parties in the legislature is articulated with the actual demands and interests of the constituencies, i.e. the electorate individually or as a collective. Put somewhat differently, how does a party make sure that the issues it tables in the legislature clearly represent the demands and interests of the voters, for purposes of effective representation of, and accountability to, the voters? This calls for a close link between the MPs and the electorate in various ways including:

- Regular public meetings with key constituencies;
- Regular consultation of the MP with her/his party;
- Interface between the MP and her/his political party and CSOs;
- Public awareness and engagement with the daily business of Parliament; and
- Regular media coverage of parliamentary proceedings.

5.7 RELATIONS WITH THE ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODY (EMB)
The IEC was established through Act No. 7 of 1997 (Second Amendment to the Constitution Act) as an independent body to manage elections. Prior to the establishment of the IEC, elections were managed by the chief electoral officer who was a civil servant answerable directly to the government. It is evident, therefore, that under those circumstances no elections would qualify as free and fair, given that a ruling party would obviously play a double role of player and umpire at the same
time. Hence it was that public perceptions of this office increasingly became negative and calls for a neutral body to manage elections with impartiality became stronger, especially within civil society formations.

Consequently, the 1993 Constitution was amended to provide for the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission on 7 July 1997 – some nine months before the eventful 1998 election. Its main function is to supervise and administer all elections (parliamentary and local government elections) as well as referenda. Its specific tasks are:

- Boundary delimitation;
- Voter registration;
- Voter information and education;
- Registration of political parties for election purposes;
- Management of polls;
- Conducting referenda;
- Adjudicating election disputes; and
- Declaration of election results.

In order to try and insulate the commission from undue political influence, the law provides that ‘the electoral commission shall not, in the performance of its functions, be subject to the direction and/or control of any person or authority’. Since 1997, Lesotho has had three electoral commissions. The first one (1997-2002) comprised Mr Sekara Mafisa (chairperson and a legal practitioner), Mr Moriee Khaebana and Mr Lejaha Qhobela. This first IEC managed the 1998 general election.

There is no gainsaying that since the introduction of the IEC, there has been a marked qualitative improvement in the management and credibility of elections, even if often the legitimacy of the electoral outcome is challenged by losing parties as happened in 1998.

Following the political crisis of 1998, the IEC was restructured through the IPA process. The second IEC (2002-2006) comprised Mr Leshele Thoahlane as chairperson (formerly executive director of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and Minister of Health); Mr Mokhele Likate and Mr Mafole Sematlane (later replaced by Ms Limakatso Mokhothu). This second IEC managed the 2002 general elections, the 2005 local government elections and the 2007 general elections. The IEC has contributed immensely to the existing public confidence that the electorate has in the electoral processes and administrative procedures now in place. The current third IEC comprises Ms Limakatso Mokhothu (chairperson and former governance advisor at Ireland Aid), Mr Malefetsane Nkhahle (who replaced Mr Mokhele Likate) and Dr Fako Likoti.
The IEC is also the custodian of the implementation of the Electoral Act, which also contains the Electoral Code of Conduct for political parties and candidates in its Schedule 4. Political parties are expected to adhere to this code of conduct during elections. The main objective of the Code of Conduct is to promote conditions that are conducive to free, fair and transparent elections, including a climate of:

- Democratic tolerance in which political activity may take place without fear, coercion, intimidation, violence and reprisals;
- Free political campaigning and open public debate;
- Intolerance of bribery, vote-buying and political patronage; and
- Intolerance of defamation of character and misinformation to the public.

The Code commits political parties and candidates to the following core principles:

- Expression of divergent political opinions;
- Debating and contesting policies and programmes of other parties;
- Canvassing freely for membership and support from voters;
- Holding public meetings, rallies and marches;
- Attending public meetings convened by others;
- Distributing electoral literature, posters and campaign materials;
- Publishing and distributing notices and advertisements; and
- Promoting free electoral campaigns by all lawful means.

In order to realise the above principles, parties and candidates are bound by the Electoral Code of Conduct to undertake the following:

- To publicly and repeatedly condemn violence and intimidation;
- To avoid the use of language or any kind of action which may lead to violence or intimidation;
- To ensure that no arms or weapons of any kind are carried or displayed at meetings, marches, demonstrations, rallies etc;
- To refrain from publishing false or defamatory statements or allegations in connection with an election in respect of a party, its candidates, representative or member;
- To avoid plagiarising the symbols, colours or acronyms of other political parties;
- To refrain from offering any inducement or reward to any person in consideration of such person either joining or not joining any political party, attending or not attending any political event, voting or not voting etc;
- To refrain from abusing a position of power, privilege or influence
for political purpose, in particular employer/employee relationship, parental, patriarchal or traditional authority; and
• To avoid any discrimination based on race, sex, ethnicity, class, gender or religion, in connection with the election and political activity.

Political parties are supposed to have working relationships with the IEC both during and in-between elections. Political parties in Lesotho have working relations with the IEC. This is a positive development which suggests that parties have confidence and trust in the IEC and therefore do not question its integrity and credibility. All the parties participate effectively in the IEC’s liaison committees that are meant to address various aspects of the election management process before, during and after the election itself. The eight IEC liaison committees and their functions are illustrated in Table 8.

### Table 8: The IEC Consultative Committees and their Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Area(s) of Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election Coordination Committee</td>
<td>General electoral matters from other committees or as indicated by the committee for action of other committees, the commission or staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic and Voter Education Committee</td>
<td>Civic and voter education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Committee</td>
<td>Electoral and referenda logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Committee</td>
<td>Legal and statutory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Management Committee</td>
<td>Voter registration and information technology in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Liaison Committee</td>
<td>Electoral and referenda security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management Committee</td>
<td>Control of electoral conflict and monitoring of observance of the code of conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Liaison Committee</td>
<td>All dealings with the media and issuance of media statements by the electoral stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEC, 2002:13

Although the IEC and political parties have good working relations through the above committees, it is worth noting that the relationship becomes stronger during elections. It tends to become less strong in-between elections.
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ABOUT EISA

EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values and practices and to enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes: electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA was formerly the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is currently the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.

VISION

An African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment

MISSION

EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa

STRATEGIC GOALS

- Strengthening governance processes and representative constitutions in order to entrench participatory democracy
- Consolidating EISA’s authority and credibility in order to provide sustained leadership in the democracy and governance sector in Africa
OBJECTIVES

- To enhance electoral processes to ensure their inclusiveness and legitimacy
- To promote effective citizen participation in democratic processes to strengthen institutional accountability and responsiveness
- To strengthen governance institutions to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes
- To promote principles, values and practices that lead to a culture of democracy and human rights
- To create a culture of excellence that leads to consistently high quality products and services
- To position EISA as a leader that consistently influences policy and practice in the sector

CORE MANDATE

- Research
- Policy Dialogue
- Publications and Documentation
- Capacity Building
- Election Observation
- Technical Assistance
- Balloting
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<td>Political Parties Programme Handbook Developed by Dr Khabele Matlosa and Victor Shale</td>
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