Governance Quality and Government Commitment to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism

Grant Edward Thomas Masterson

Published with the kind assistance of SIDA

ISBN 1-919814-08-6

Order from: publications@eisa.org.za
GOVERNANCE QUALITY AND GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO THE NEPAD AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM
GOVERNANCE QUALITY AND GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO THE NEPAD AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

BY

GRANT EDWARD THOMAS MASTERSON

2004
 CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations vii
Abstract ix

PART I

Chapter 1 – Introduction 1
  1.1 Introduction 1
  1.2 The APRM 2
  1.3 Methodology 4

Chapter 2 – Analytical framework 6
  2.1 Governance: A definition 6
  2.2 Evolution of governance on the African development agenda 7
  2.3 The APRM standards 8
  2.4 The APRM process 10
  2.5 African governments’ dilemma 11
  2.6 Governance quality and the APRM 13

PART II

Chapter 3 – Statistical analysis 17
  3.1 Measuring governance in states 17
  3.2 Statistical analysis of governance indicators 17
  3.3 Case Studies: Selection 21

Chapter 4 – Case Study: Angola 28
  4.1 Country overview 28
  4.2 Historical overview 29
  4.3 The state of governance in Angola 31
  4.4 The rise and fall of the MPLA’s ideology of centralisation 33
  4.5 Angola and the APRM 34
  4.6 Conclusion 38

Chapter 5 – Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Congo 40
  5.1 Country overview 40
  5.2 Historical overview 41
    5.2.1 Zaire under Mobutu 42
    5.2.2 The end of Mobutu 44
    5.2.3 The DRC’s fragile peace 45
  5.3 The DRC and the APRM 46
  5.4 Conclusion 49
Chapter 6 – Case Study: Ghana 50
6.1 Country overview 50
6.2 Historical overview 51
   6.2.1 The First Republic 51
   6.2.2 The Second Republic 53
   6.2.3 The Rawlings era 54
   6.2.4 Kufour and new reforms 56
6.3 Ghana and the APRM 56
6.4 Conclusion 60

Chapter 7 – Case Study: Botswana 61
7.1 Country overview 61
7.2 Historical background 62
7.3 The APRM and Vision 2016 67
7.4 Conclusion 71

Chapter 8 – Summary and conclusions 72
8.1 Case Study summaries 72
   8.1.1 Angola 72
   8.1.2 Democratic Republic of Congo 73
   8.1.3 Ghana 74
   8.1.4 Botswana 74
8.2 Emerging trends 75
8.3 Conclusion 75

Appendix A 77

Bibliography 78

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – The four positions 20
Figure 2 – Political governance quality 22
Figure 3 – Economic governance quality 24
Figure 4 – Comparison between economic and political governance quality 25
Figure 5 – Case study selection 26
Figure 6 – Case study governance scores 27
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADPCI</td>
<td>National Action for Development and International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Botswana National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>Botswana People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Catholic Church of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td><em>Fédération National de Libération Angola</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td><em>Movement de la Libération du Congo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td><em>Movement Populare Libération de Angola</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>National Congolese Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLM</td>
<td>National Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Redemptive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Patriotic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSHG</td>
<td>Participating Heads of State and Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>People’s National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Goma</td>
<td><em>Rassemblement pour la Democratic Congo-Goma</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGCC</td>
<td>United Gold Coast Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td><em>União para a Independência Total de Angola</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the relationship between the existing quality of a country’s political and economic governance and its government’s decision whether or not to participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This relationship is tested using quantitative analysis of governance estimates from the World Bank for 2002, combined with four case studies, which illustrate different profiles of governance quality and APRM status. It concludes that although governance quality appears to be weakly related to APRM status, that position is also informed by at least three other variables, namely: the vulnerability of the state to external influences; the duration of the present government’s term of office; and the costs/benefits of joining.
CHAPTER 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War appeared to signal, among other things, the triumph of liberal capitalism over the socialist and communist ideologies. However, more than a decade on from the collapse of the Soviet Union, many countries which have pursued the liberal reforms espoused by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have yet to see the benefits of this system. In fact many developing nations, particularly in Africa, have witnessed escalating debt and spiralling inflation instead of the economic growth promised by liberal economists, and find that they are in a worse position economically today than at the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the success of South-East Asian economies as well as some of the more progressive Eastern European states confounds those theorists who claim that liberal economic policies do not work in developing nations.

In attempting to understand this contradiction, much of the debate has centred on the importance of good governance in the development paradigm. In the 1980s when the World Bank first began to use the term in a development sense, governance referred primarily to the administrative and technical capacities of the state, with the assumption that the state would be the instrument of reforms in these areas. By the early 1990s it had become evident that many governments were in fact interfering with these technical/administrative reforms, which increased awareness regarding the importance of a state’s political and economic governance in stimulating economic growth, and identified the insufficiency of purely technical/administrative reforms in promoting development.1 As a result, development frameworks now recognise the need to reform the political and economic institutions of a state as well as its technical/administrative capacities in order to promote development.2 In this regard, development agencies are beginning to stress higher standards of accountability and transparency in both the political and economic affairs of the state as a means to promote development; introducing a new dynamic into the African development discourse.

The emergence of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) comes at a time when some African governments are seeking to improve their reputations regarding accountability and transparency, signing on to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), not only to improve their
prospects for development, but also to receive international recognition for their efforts. This paper tests the hypothesis that states with higher existing governance quality are more likely to support regional accountability initiatives such as the APRM than states whose institutions are weak and inefficient. It also examines what might motivate a government’s decision to surrender some of its sovereignty to a regional body.

Historically, the promotion of good governance in African states has been confounded by numerous impediments, including autocratic governments, military conflicts and crucially the willingness of Africa leaders to contravene their own laws in pursuit of personal gain.³ The failure of many African nations to develop has, on numerous occasions, been directly attributed to these impediments.⁴ In response to historically weak development in Africa since independence, NEPAD seeks, among other things, to encourage development through the promotion of better governance quality, in addition to the technical/administrative capacities of the state.⁵ The APRM is believed to be the means though which this aim will be achieved.⁶

1.2 THE APRM
The APRM is one of the most unique concepts to emerge from the NEPAD document, and has captured the attention of the G-7 and other aid donors at a time when the international community’s focus is shifting elsewhere,⁷ signifying its uniqueness in African development discourse. The APRM is conceived as a voluntary body. This is significant as it provides African governments with the opportunity to assess the costs and benefits of joining the APRM prior to making a decision on whether or not to sign on as participants. A potential cost of joining the APRM could be subjecting a state’s domestic political and economic governance to somewhat intrusive peer review, while a potential benefit of joining the APRM would likely be the developmental advantages of a reputation for good governance. With both costs and benefits of joining the APRM related to governance quality, an investigation of the extent to which governance quality informs a government’s assessment of costs/benefits of joining the APRM is potentially valuable. Assessing the existing governance quality of states and whether or not they have signed on to the APRM reveals one of two possible relationships: it is possible that a government’s position on the APRM closely relates to its existing governance quality; or, alternatively, it is possible that
there is little relationship between these two variables. In the first instance, a strong positive relationship between a state’s position on the APRM and its existing governance quality most likely reflects prevailing sentiment that the costs involved in ensuring compliance with the APRM’s standards will be high for states with poor governance quality. If this is the case, its membership would be made up mainly of states with existing good quality governance that are less likely to have cause for concern regarding the costs of joining the APRM. Regionally, the pattern of APRM membership would comprise states with higher existing governance quality, while states with poor governance quality would stay out of the APRM process.

If a strong positive relationship between existing governance quality and APRM membership exists, several advantages and disadvantages are evident. One of the primary advantages of this scenario would be that the APRM’s credibility would be enhanced through the generally higher quality of governance of its members, and favourable governance reviews are less likely to be greeted with widespread international scepticism. Additionally, this type of pattern also avoids the more problematic political and procedural implications of producing negative peer reviews, since the majority of its members already exhibit good governance quality.

The major disadvantage of this scenario is that the potential exists for the APRM to polarise the various African regions, with well governed countries opting in to the APRM, and poorly governed states –arguably those states most in need of governance reform – opting out of the process. Advocates of this type of scenario argue that the benefits of a ‘coalition of the willing’ will in time attract other members as the benefits of governance reform are made apparent.

If no relationship between the two variables exists, this suggests that there are two groups of governments adopting contrary positions on the APRM. One group – countries with poor governance quality reputations – are nevertheless joining the APRM in spite of the perceived costs of doing so, while the other group of countries – whose governance quality is recognisably higher – are deliberately rejecting the notion of peer review as beneficial to their prospects for development. Regionally, there would be no definable governance pattern evident among the states that have signed on to the peer
review process and those that have rejected it. If a large number of governments with poor governance quality nevertheless join the APRM, this suggests three possibilities: a government perceives the costs for non-compliance to be negligible for countries with poor governance quality; it perceives great benefits in the peer review process; and/or the government is seeking to improve its governance quality and is signalling its intention to do so. Although on some levels problematic, this scenario allows the APRM to effect a more dynamic change in continental governance quality, particularly for those governments that are signalling their intention to reform. It does, however, place a greater strain on the process of peer review, given that negative reviews become more likely.

If a large number of governments with good quality governance decide not to join the APRM, three explanations exist: a government with existing good governance sees the APRM as too intrusive; the government doubts the credibility of the APRM process (and sees the mechanism as potentially damaging to its existing reputation); and/or the government sees little benefit in the event of a favourable review.9 This scenario presents alternative complications, particularly in undermining or diluting the credibility of the APRM as a body which upholds good governance. In this instance, the APRM risks failing to satisfy the conditions for ‘a coalition of the willing’ – of like-minded states committed to a common goal.10

In order to test for a relationship or a significant pattern between the existing governance quality of a state and its position vis-à-vis the APRM, this paper adopts a two-step process. The first step is a statistical analysis of observable trends in the governance quality of states that have joined the APRM compared to the governance quality of states that have rejected the mechanism. This is followed by a more in-depth analysis of selected case studies, in order to elaborate on and test the trends observed in the statistical analysis. The case studies also demonstrate the primary motivations of the various governments and offer some explanation for their positions, with particular attention to the relevance of existing governance quality.

1.3 METHODOLOGY
In order to compare the institutional quality of those states that have signed on to the APRM with the institutional quality of those that have not, statistical
data collected by the World Bank – measuring several dimensions of governance quality – allows a quantitative analysis of the two groups. The World Bank’s indicators were collected for every state worldwide for which data was available, and reflect each state’s political and economic institutional quality. Significantly, these governance indicators also reflect the fact that governance quality in different African states varies considerably; from the extremely poor governance quality of states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Eritrea to the excellent governance quality of Botswana and Mauritius. Using this data allows a comparison of the quality of governance in states that have joined the APRM and states that have rejected it. This comparison reveals whether a state’s quality of governance has motivated a particular response to the APRM.

In addition to a broad statistical comparison of governance standards in both groups, a selection of case studies reveals some of the alternative motivations a state has for its position on the APRM. By selecting four states that correspond to the four potential positions on the APRM (see Figure 3.1), it is possible to examine in greater detail whether common trends exist which inform a state’s position on the APRM. The case study examination is also able to confirm statistically observed trends and indicate the specific motivations of individual states that have/have not joined the APRM, which are not reflected in the statistical analysis.

In Chapter 2, NEPAD’s analytical framework is examined in greater detail. Chapter 3 quantitatively tests the relationship between institutional quality and a state’s position on the APRM, while chapters 4 through 7 examine individual states and their motivations for adopting a position vis-à-vis the APRM. The four states examined in these case studies are: Angola, a state with poor governance that has opted not to join the APRM; the DRC, a state with poor governance that has signed on to the APRM; Ghana, a state with good governance that has signed on to the APRM; and Botswana, a state with good governance that has not joined the APRM. Finally, Chapter 8 examines and summarises some of the patterns that emerge from the case studies.
CHAPTER 2
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 GOVERNANCE: A DEFINITION

There is one theme. It is the primary importance of good governance. But if that is to be fulfilled, Africa needs to be more specific in its mention of governance. It needs to move towards Klaus Schwab’s challenge of the virtue of impatience, and it has to accept its own international responsibility for ensuring the establishment of sound governance.

During the 1970s and 80s, the IMF emphasised ‘policy-based lending’ and macroeconomic adjustment for countries with balance of payment deficits, while the World Bank focused on ‘project-based lending’ until the late 1970s. The term ‘governance’ only emerged in its development discourse during the 1980s, and was strictly applied to economic (mainly technical/administrative) policy adjustment until the early 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, new emphasis and research into the significance of political governance began to highlight the importance of political institutions (beyond the technical and administrative) in promoting development. With a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape as the Soviet Union collapsed, political ‘conditionalities’ began to play a more prominent role in the bilateral relations between donor states and aid recipients.

The World Bank defines governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to manage its resources effectively and to implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Stephen Gelb states that good political governance reflects durable stability within the society, low levels of internal social conflict which are best achieved through a political system reflecting democratic values, respect for human rights and consistent application of the legal framework. Economic governance therefore reflects the quality of the state’s supervision of its economic development, management and procedures.
2.2 EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE ON THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

Since the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank at the end of World War II, development theorists have focused more of their attention on the importance of economic governance in facilitating development than on the importance of political governance. During the 1970s and 1980s, both the IMF and the World Bank therefore placed heavy emphasis on encouraging developing nations to implement liberal economic policies that would presumably lead to increased economic growth and development, while placing little emphasis on reforming potentially obstructive political systems and institutions at the same time. This was at a period in Africa’s history when African states were attempting to cope with the combined effects of a commodity price crash and escalating oil prices, leading to the oil shocks of the 1970s. It is now widely acknowledged that the IMF/World Bank policies of the 1970s/80s failed to deliver the benefits that African leaders had hoped for.

Two dominant explanations have been suggested for Africa’s economic failure during this period. Some analysts have argued that the IMF structural adjustment policies during this era failed because they were never fully and correctly implemented. M A Thomas asserts that the failure of the structural adjustment programmes in African states can be attributed to a lack of debtor state ownership in the process. Thomas argues that IMF policies that were fundamentally sound were largely ignored and sometimes even resisted by governments which saw them as a form of neo-colonial control disguised as aid packages and debt relief. In other words, the failure of these structural reforms was largely due to poor governance quality in African states. Birdsall and Williamson come to the conclusion that it was in fact donor nations’ unwillingness to act as ‘agencies of restraint’, or external safeguards against economic and political mismanagement of state resources, that doomed structural adjustment to failure. Birdsall and Williamson highlight the frequent defaulting on conditionalities by African governments, and therefore lack of implementation, as key factors in explaining the failure of economic governance reforms.

Alternatively, other commentators suggest that structural adjustment programmes failed not because they were never fully implemented, but
rather because they were implemented, and yet emphasised the wrong policies needed to stimulate economic growth. Chazan et al\textsuperscript{21} argue that independence afforded African states the opportunity to restructure their external relations, but that Africa’s dependence on aid opened new avenues for external penetration. Aid, in their view, was used as a politically coercive measure during the Cold War, when strategic imperatives superseded developmental imperatives as the primary purpose of Western donor aid to African states. Gordon\textsuperscript{22} also notes the alternative political motivations of donor states in providing aid to African states during the Cold War, and argues that this diluted the development focus of the aid provided.

While the two viewpoints differ on the specifics of exactly why structural adjustment failed, both schools of thought agree that poor governance hinders the successful pursuit of economic strategy. At a basic level, NEPAD can be understood as a convergence of these two perspectives on Africa’s economic failure, with a firm and explicit emphasis on improving the quality of both political and economic governance in Africa as an additional requirement to technical/administrative reforms in stimulating development. African leaders who support the NEPAD initiative continuously reaffirm their shared commitment to:

\begin{quote}
eradicate poverty and to place our countries, individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on [an] equal footing.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

NEPAD is an initiative designed by African leaders with African development in mind, in some ways similar to past initiatives in Africa, yet with marked distinctions from previous frameworks – one of the most significant of these being the APRM.\textsuperscript{24}

\section*{2.3 THE APRM STANDARDS}

The prerequisites for a state’s compliance with APRM standards are provided in the NEPAD document ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’.\textsuperscript{25} The declaration defines the standards to which APRM members can expect to be held accountable, in both political and economic governance.
In the declaration, good political governance includes:

- the rule of law
- the equality of all citizens under the law and the liberty of the individual
- adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments
- equality of opportunity for all
- the inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office.26

In the declaration, economic governance is divided into eight codes, which NEPAD asserts:

have the potential to promote market efficiency, to control wasteful spending, to consolidate democracy, and to encourage private financial flows – all of which are critical aspects of the quest to reduce poverty and enhance sustainable development.27

The eight economic governance codes described in the declaration are:

- Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies
- Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency
- Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- Guidelines for Public Debt Management
- Principles of Corporate Governance
- International Accounting Standards
- International Standards on Auditing; and the
- Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.28

Additionally, the document mentions the need for transparency, accountability, participation in government, peace and stability of a state in fostering development on the African continent.29

The comprehensive nature of the assessment criteria outlined in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance
has been criticised by some analysts, including Ravi Kanbur who believes that APRM is most likely to succeed if its scope of reference is limited to manageable proportions. Kanbur compares the APRM criteria with those of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and believes that the success of the OECD reviews lies in the narrow and specific scope of the review teams, as well as in their technical competence. Kanbur concludes that the APRM is a step in the right direction in Africa’s development, but that there are three elements which will determine the mechanism’s success or failure: technical competence in the review teams; review team independence from political tampering; and the presence of other review mechanisms that lessen the significance of any one report. If these three elements – technical competence, independence and competition – are present, Kanbur concludes that the APRM will prove beneficial to those countries which sign on. For African governments, however, the choice is not always so clear cut.

### 2.4 THE APRM PROCESS

The APRM acknowledges the importance of political institutions in promoting development. It is conceived as a voluntary body, which through the process of periodic peer review seeks to establish and monitor political, economic and corporate governance standards in African states. These standards are assessed by a review team headed by several eminent persons, who are in turn selected by and accountable to the Participating Heads of State and Government (PHSG) – the supreme authority of the APRM.

The APRM process comprises five stages:

1. An initial background study and advance review of existing conditions in a state.
2. A visit by the appointed review team, consulting with as wide a variety of government, civil society and non-governmental sources as possible, with the aim of assessing the country’s compliance with APRM standards.
3. A draft preparation of the review team’s report is prepared in consultation with the government of the country under review.
4. The review teams report is submitted to the PSHG committee, which may decide to amend or make alterations to the report as necessary.
5. The report is lodged with regional and sub-regional institutions.
Several aspects of the APRM concept are worth noting. First and foremost, the APRM is based on fundamentally democratic practices, and espouses democracy as one of the core principles of the initiative. Additionally, Stage 4 of the APRM process is noteworthy in that the PSHG committee is theoretically empowered to intervene in an appropriate manner in the event that an APRM signatory demonstrates non-compliance with the principles of the APRM. As the APRM document puts it:

If the Government of the country in question shows a demonstrable will to rectify the shortcomings, then it will be incumbent upon participating Governments to provide what assistance they can, as well as to urge donor governments and agencies also to come to the assistance of the country reviewed. However, if the political will is not forthcoming from the Government, the participating states should first do everything practicable to engage it in constructive dialogue, offering in the process technical and other appropriate assistance. If dialogue proves unavailing, the participating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the Government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date. The interval should concentrate the mind of the Government and provide a further opportunity for addressing the identified shortcomings under a process of constructive dialogue. All considered, such measures should always be utilised as a last resort.33

This intervention could in theory occur without the consent of the government in question; one of the most fascinating aspects of the APRM.

2.5 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS’ DILEMMA
With the first review team inspections scheduled to begin in February and March 2004, African governments are faced with a dilemma whether or not to join the APRM process. In making this choice, governments are forced to weigh up the benefits and costs of their decision. In signing on to the APRM, a state might potentially be looking for improved economic growth, stimulated by intrinsic factors such as improved governance quality and investor confidence, and extrinsic factors such as donor aid and debt relief.
Alternatively, a state’s decision not to join the APRM might reflect concerns about the intrusiveness of the review process or the redundancy of the exercise. In making a decision *vis-à-vis* the APRM, a government has to decide whether the costs of joining outweigh the benefits, or vice versa. Either way, it appears as though some political and economic costs will be unavoidable.

In attempting to encourage states to sign on to the APRM, the mechanism’s architects have attempted to tie future aid concessions to African states to compliance with the mechanism. But in the face of the intrusive nature of the peer review and the potentially damaging political costs of non-compliance, it must be asked whether economic enticements are sufficient justification for states to sign on to the APRM. In the majority of instances, this does not appear to be the case (at present only 16 out of the 51 African states have committed to the APRM). This begs another question: If economic incentives are not the only factors enticing states to join the APRM, what are some of the other potential reasons for joining? Intuitively, there are several possible motivations. The role of diplomacy and bilateral relations in encouraging a government to sign on to the APRM is potentially one significant factor for joining. Additionally, a government might see benefits in joining the APRM if the majority of states in its sub-region have signed on (peer pressure). In this instance, a government might fear exclusion from lucrative future agreements, etc. because it has not joined the APRM. Governments of weaker African states might opt to join the APRM in order to dilute the direct bilateral influence of larger, stronger neighbouring states through multilateral means, particularly in regions such as West Africa, where state borders are notoriously porous.

According to Collier, another reason would be the introduction of ‘agencies of restraint’; institutions that establish and maintain the accountability of a government. Introducing ‘agencies of restraint’ would release the government from some type of constraining influence, which the government is unable to otherwise remove. Post-colonial independence removed the majority of the institutions that guaranteed accountability and safeguarded against government mismanagement and abuse of power. Collier illustrates how introducing agencies of restraint is often a rational action for the government introducing them, as this often leads to the release of some other, more onerous, binding constraint. In most cases, the government’s binding
constraint is in some way economic, whereas agencies of restraint are usually politically motivated in order to release some economic constraint. Ultimately, Collier concludes that African governments are often unable to remove a binding constraint because they are unwilling to introduce agencies of restraint, and that an alternative solution is to enhance the role of multinational institutions in acting as agencies of restraint. In Collier’s argument, these multinational agencies, which are beyond the control of any one government, represent a viable alternative for governments under some binding constraint. It is therefore possible that those African governments presently unable to restrain themselves may see the APRM as a viable agency of restraint and thus sign on in the hope of being released from a binding constraint.

The APRM also potentially represents an independent institution that can assist governments in forcing through politically unpopular reforms which the government recognises are necessary in order to foster economic growth. Vreeland suggests that sometimes a government realises that structural reforms are necessary in order to encourage economic development, but that the reforms are likely to be politically unpopular. In such a case, the government can willingly submit to an external institution, such as the IMF, in order to force through the necessary reforms under the auspices of compliance with that institution’s criteria for reform. A case in point would be the Uruguayan government, which applied for IMF loans in the 1980s even though it did not appear to need the money. Rather, the underlying motivation was to provide a legitimate reason for the structural reforms which the Uruguayan government wanted to implement. The IMF conditionalities attached to an application for financial assistance, more than the assistance itself, was the primary motivation for the Uruguayan government in applying for the loans. This provided the government with a legitimate reason to reform its structures, and lessened the political impact of the decision considerably. Lessening the political costs of reforms through accession to a multinational institution is another potential motivation for African states in signing on to the APRM.

2.6 GOVERNANCE QUALITY AND THE APRM
The question this paper seeks to address is: To what extent does the quality of political governance in a country influence its decision to join the APRM?
Put another way: Is there a statistically significant relationship between those states that have joined the APRM and their existing governance quality? In testing this question, two possible relationships exist: a positive relationship between the two variables; or no relationship (not positive) between the two variables.

If states with poor governance are too concerned about the intrusiveness of the APRM to consider joining the mechanism, then we would expect to observe a positive relationship between the states that have joined the APRM and political governance quality. If states with good governance are not joining the APRM – possibly because they see the mechanism as redundant – then we would not expect to see any relationship between the two variables. Alternatively, this might suggest that a number of governments with weak political institutions see the APRM as a viable agency of restraint (Collier), or wish to use the mechanism to push through unpopular reforms (Vreeland), and have thus signed on despite the likely costs of compliance. If no statistically significant relationship exists between the governance quality of a state and the government’s position on the APRM, then clearly a number of other factors are as important (or possibly more important) than a state’s political governance quality in motivating its position on the mechanism.

Chapter 3 uses statistical techniques to examines the empirical relationship between these two variables in greater detail, and suggests that although there appear to be observable trends in the type of political governance quality of the states that have signed on to the APRM, there is no statistically significant relationship between the governance quality of the state and its position on the APRM. Chapter 3 also compares the quality of a state’s political governance quality with its economic governance quality, and selects states that are eligible for further examination in the form of case studies.
CHAPTER 3
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

3.1 MEASURING GOVERNANCE IN STATES

Many of the world’s poorest countries are found in Africa, and many African economies are heavily dependent on a single product or export for the majority of their external revenues, making them extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices. A common misconception, therefore, is to assume that African economies are largely homogenous, equally impoverished and ineffective. On the contrary, the diverse nature of the economic, political and corporate development between various African states begs the following questions: Is the APRM generating interest from a particular type of state? Is the APRM excluding a certain type of state? Do patterns exist which suggest that certain states see greater gains to be had from the APRM process than their peers? If patterns do exist, what are the implications? And most importantly, what do those patterns tell us about the importance of governance quality in the membership of the APRM? This chapter examines these questions in greater detail.

One of the major difficulties in testing for possible trends in the governance quality of APRM member states is that political institutions do not easily lend themselves to reduction into quantitative terms, given an unavoidable element of subjective interference in any such attempts to do so. Additionally, to justify using a particular dataset, a relationship between the hypothesis and the data becomes necessary. As discussed previously, economic indicators may reflect a degree of political governance, yet the degree to which economic data can be used to reflect political institutions is tenuous at best. It is therefore essential to identify an appropriate concept of ‘good governance’ with which to compare the quality of political and economic governance between different states. In this case, the APRM document itself provides a possible solution.

Stage 2 of the review process described in the APRM document requires an APRM-appointed review team to:

- carry out the widest possible range of consultations with Government, officials, political parties, parliamentarians and
representatives of civil society organisations (including the media, academia, trade unions, business, professional bodies).\textsuperscript{37}

Significantly, the process described in Stage 2 of the APRM document is similar to the procedures which Kaufmann et al used to generate statistical findings regarding various aspects of political, economic and corporate governance in a paper published through the World Bank.\textsuperscript{38} Kaufmann et al consulted with similarly varied civil society organisations and government agencies in order to generate their findings, and given the similarities between the process described in the APRM document and the Kaufmann procedures, the Kaufmann findings provide a useful insight into governance standards in African states, which are fairly consistent with the APRM standards. The Kaufmann report also provides an opportunity to test for patterns in the quality of good governance countries, both those committed to the APRM and those who remain non-committal.

Additionally, Kaufmann et al measure distinct areas of governance in their survey, which can be loosely classified as political, economic and corporate governance; virtually identical to the aspects of governance identified in the APRM document as important to the NEPAD development framework.\textsuperscript{39} The indicators generated by Kaufmann et al are divided into general categories of governance\textsuperscript{40} described in their paper as:

- the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced (political); and
- the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (economic).\textsuperscript{41}

It would therefore appear that the Kaufmann estimates test several relevant forms of governance quality across African states, and that the process by which these scores were generated is similar to the proposed APRM method in both process and subject matter.

In order to represent a statistical reflection of political governance quality, this paper uses the estimate called ‘voice and accountability’. This estimate measures the political process, civil liberties and political rights of the citizens of a state.\textsuperscript{42} It places an emphasis on democratic practices and institutions,
and consequently democratic states score higher in this estimate than other forms of government, for example, authoritarian. Because a strong emphasis has been placed on the development of democratic practice in NEPAD, it is likely that an APRM review team would value democratic practices in a similar way. The NEPAD initiative in its Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance document states clearly that it seeks: “the fostering of socio-economic development, in particular, through democracy and good governance.” For the remainder of this paper, the voice and accountability estimate will be referred to as a measure of political governance quality.

Generating an estimate of economic governance quality from the Kaufmann data proved to be slightly more challenging. The Kaufmann study split the concept of economic governance into two estimates, which the authors refer to as ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘regulatory quality’. The government effectiveness estimate reflected in the Kaufmann paper was compiled using data measuring the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy and the competence of civil servants. The regulatory quality estimate was conceived to measure economic policy content and coherence.

Neither indicator adequately reflects on its own the type of economic governance criteria espoused in the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. It was therefore necessary to combine the two estimates to generate a combined ‘economic governance quality’ estimate. This is only statistically viable if two conditions exist, namely:

- the two indicators are highly correlated; and
- the variance of both indicators is similar.

In both instances, this proved to be the case, allowing the two Kaufman indicators – government effectiveness and regulatory quality – to be collapsed into a single economic governance quality score. This score provides a useful measurement of economic governance quality; an area where African governments have historically been particularly lax. This is reflected in the core principles of the APRM itself, namely, to: “be technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation.”
In the Kaufmann survey, the data range of the governance indicators is –2.5 to 2.5. The range is constructed artificially using a governance aggregator that is constructed from a world mean. This world mean is assigned the arbitrary value of 0, meaning that in simplistic terms negative scores represent governance standards below the world mean, and positive scores represent good governance comparative to world standards.47

By splitting African states into two distinct groups – those states committed to the APRM ('in’) and those states that are opposed to joining ('out’) – a four-cell graph is created (Figure 3.1). Within the two vertical columns, which separate the ‘in’ states from the ‘out’ states, each country is ranked according to its point estimate score for one measurement.48 Due to the generally poor governance scores in African states compared to the world mean, a comparison using the world mean is less meaningful than a comparison against an African mean; which is lower than the world mean, but distinguishes African states with better quality institutions from those with poorer quality institutions. Combined with statistical analysis of the political and economic governance scores, these graphs indicate whether any statistically significant empirical relationship exists between quality of political institutions and commitment to the APRM.

*Figure 1 – The four positions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to APRM</th>
<th>In</th>
<th>Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong> Governance quality</td>
<td>Cell 1</td>
<td>Cell 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong> Governance quality</td>
<td>Cell 4</td>
<td>Cell 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Countries in Cell 1 therefore have comparatively good governance scores and are already committed to the APRM, and those in Cell 4 have comparatively poor governance scores and are not committed to the APRM. Countries in Cell 2 are states with good governance scores that are not committed to the APRM, and countries in Cell 3 have committed to the APRM process, despite their poor governance reputations.

If a positive relationship exists between states with good governance scores / good quality institutions and the likelihood that they volunteer for peer review, then a larger number of states should fall within cells 1 and 4. If this is the case, then the expectation would be to see fewer countries located in the ‘off’ cells (cells 2 and 3). If, on the other hand, the states are more evenly spread between the four cells, with fairly equal representation in the ‘off’ cells as well, then the relationship is less likely to be statistically significant, indicating that little or no relationship exists between governance and a state’s position regarding the APRM.

### 3.2 Statistical Analysis of Governance Indicators

In order to test the statistical significance of the political and economic governance scores of governments that have joined the APRM, it is necessary to be able to test the difference between two samples – those countries ‘in’ and those ‘out’.49

In order to prove/disprove the assumption that there is no statistically significant difference between the two samples – which in this case is a comparison between a commitment or lack thereof to the APRM, and governance quality – it is possible to use a t-test.50 The t-test calculation answers two questions simultaneously:

- What is the mean difference of countries ‘in’ the APRM compared with the mean difference of countries ‘out’ of the APRM?

- What is the statistical likelihood that this difference occurred at random and does not represent a significant difference in mean governance scores between the two groups of states?
Table: Figure 2 – Political governance quality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOOD QUALITY GOVERNANCE</th>
<th>‘IN’ APRM</th>
<th>‘OUT’ APRM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAURITIUS (0.80)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BOTSWANA (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA (0.73)</td>
<td></td>
<td>NAMIBIA (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI (0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td>BENIN (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL (0.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MADAGASCAR (-0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LESOTHO (-0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE (-0.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>NIGER (-0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKINA FASO (-0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MOROCCO (-0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABON (-0.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ZAMBIA (-0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA (-0.58)</td>
<td></td>
<td>TANZANIA (-0.41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| POOR QUALITY GOVERNANCE |          | MAURITANIA (-0.67) |
| NIGERIA (-0.70)         |          | GUINEA-BISSAU (-0.74) |
| UGANDA (-0.77)          |          | CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (-0.79) |
| ALGERIA (-0.96)         |          | TUNISIA (-0.83) |
| CAMEROON (-1.10)        |          | EGYPT (-0.87) |
| ETHIOPIA (-1.13)        |          | CHAD (-0.95) |
| RWANDA (-1.41)          |          | GAMBIA (-1.03) |
| DRC (-1.89)             |          | CONGO (-1.10) |
|                       |          | BURUNDI (-1.16) |
|                       |          | SWAZILAND (-1.18) |
|                       |          | GUINEA (-1.19) |
|                       |          | IVORY COAST (-1.25) |
|                       |          | ANGOLA (-1.39) |
|                       |          | ZIMBABWE (-1.50) |
|                       |          | SOMALIA (-1.51) |
|                       |          | LIBERIA (-1.54) |
|                       |          | LIBYA (-1.70) |
|                       |          | SUDAN (-1.71) |
|                       |          | ERIITREA (-2.05) |

* Countries are arranged from those with the highest political governance scores at the top to those with the lowest scores at the bottom. Government scores in parenthesis.
In Figure 3.2, two patterns emerge. It is evident that more countries which are ‘in’ the APRM have above average political governance quality, and it is equally evident that the majority of the countries which are ‘out’ of the APRM have below average governance quality. There is nevertheless some numerical representation in the ‘off’ cells. The t-test regression suggested that African states ‘in’ the APRM had on average a 0.35 higher governance score than those ‘out’ of the APRM, and that there exists a 10% chance that this occurred at random, that is, only 90% significant at 14 degrees of freedom.

This analysis suggests that there is a positive relationship between the political governance quality of a state and its position regarding the APRM, but that this relationship is not strong enough to be considered conclusive. Although it is clear from both Figure 3.2 and the empirical analysis that the membership of the APRM is such that the average political governance scores of APRM members are likely to be higher, this evidence is ultimately not sufficient on its own to justify an assertion of this kind.

In Figure 3.3, the same patterns emerge. Again, more governments that are ‘in’ the APRM are located in Cell 1, indicating above average economic governance quality, and governments that are ‘out’ are concentrated more in Cell 4. Again, a fair number of countries are located in the ‘off’ cells of the table. The t-test regression suggested that African states ‘in’ the APRM had on average a 0.21 higher governance score than those ‘out’ of the APRM, and that there exists a 26% chance that this occurred at random, that is, only 74% significant at 14 degrees of freedom. Although the statistical significance of the relationship between APRM membership and economic governance quality is slightly weaker, neither form of governance appears to be definitively related to a state’s position on the APRM.

Further statistical testing demonstrates a very strong positive relationship between the political governance quality and the economic governance quality of a state. The statistical significance of this relationship is extremely high, supporting the theory that improved political institutions are directly related to the economic institutions of a state. Additionally, Figure 3.4 identifies which states do not exhibit the presumed connection between political and economic governance quality. Although the reasons why these
**Figure 3 – Economic governance quality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘IN’ APRM</th>
<th>‘OUT’ APRM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOOD QUALITY GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA (0.56)</td>
<td>BOTSWANA (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITIUS (0.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA (-0.14)</td>
<td>TUNISIA (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL (-0.20)</td>
<td>NAMIBIA (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGANDA (-0.21)</td>
<td>MOROCCO (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABON (-0.32)</td>
<td>MAURITANIA (-0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKINA FASO (-0.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE (-0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA (-0.57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICAN MEAN SCORE</strong></td>
<td>(-0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POOR QUALITY GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA (-0.68)</td>
<td>MALI (-0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMEROON (-0.75)</td>
<td>GAMBIA (-0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWANDA (-0.88)</td>
<td>NIGER (-0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA (-0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA (-1.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC. (-1.69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
states demonstrate high scores on one estimate and low scores on the other would undoubtedly be an interesting discussion, they also introduce additional peculiarities which are better avoided when comparing states ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the APRM. The fact that this statistical comparison has not attempted to control for extraneous factors in its analysis means that it is necessary to compensate for this in the selection of case studies.

*Figure 4 – Comparison between economic and political governance quality*

### 3.3 CASE STUDIES: SELECTION

Although a statistical comparison for 45 African states measured by Kaufmann et al is informative with regard to trends, the statistical significance of the calculations suggests that in order to fully understand possible motivating factors in a state’s position *vis-à-vis* the APRM, it is necessary to examine individual cases. Case studies of states with good governance reputations that are reluctant to join the APRM, and states with bad governance reputations that have eagerly signed on, are likely to prove particularly informative as to what the possible motivations are for these seemingly counter-intuitive positions.
The four states selected (see figures 3.5 and 3.6) as case studies were selected on the basis of their combined governance quality scores to examine states at the extremes of the spectrum (that is, high political and economic governance quality–low political and economic governance quality). Angola and the DRC were selected because they both exhibit poor governance quality, both politically and economically. Non-African countries with comparable governance scores to those of Angola and the DRC include Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea. While the DRC has committed itself to the APRM despite a very poor governance record, Angola – with an equally weak governance record – has remained uncommitted to the APRM. Both states are in the process of rebuilding after decades of protracted and costly war, and as such appear to have much in common. Their contrasting positions regarding the ARPM despite many commonalities present an opportunity to examine the underlying reasons for the two countries’ differing approaches.54

Botswana and Ghana, on the other hand, were selected because their governance scores reflect a far better quality of governance and institutional strength than most other African states. Botswana is recognised internationally to adhere to some of the highest governance standards on the continent, and yet at present has demonstrated little interest in signing on to the ARPM, begging the question: Why? In addition to its high estimate scores, Ghana is scheduled to be the first country to be assessed by the APRM.
review team, and has made its commitment to the process clear for some
time. Both Ghana and Botswana have been relatively stable for some time,
and although both states are currently facing significant social challenges,
in particular the challenge of HIV/AIDS, their positions on the APRM have
differed markedly. Non-African countries with governance reputations
comparable to Botswana include the Czech Republic and Japan, while Ghana
scores similarly to Hong Kong in governance.

\textit{Figure 6 – Case study governance scores}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political governance</th>
<th>Economic governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTSWANA</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGO, DEM. REP.</td>
<td>-1.89</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In selecting candidates for case study purposes, those states responsible for
promoting NEPAD on the continent (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria
and Egypt) as well as internationally, seemed unlikely to prove as informative
as states without an obvious stake in the success of NEPAD, and so were
disqualified as case studies.

Additionally, as mentioned, states with contradictory estimate scores (high
in one, low in the other) were excluded in order to allow for the greatest
degree of similarity to exist between states ‘in’ the APRM and states ‘out’ of
the APRM.

In the following chapters, these four states will be examined individually in
order to assess the contrasting motivations that have informed their positions
\textit{vis-à-vis} the APRM. Additionally, individual case studies may also highlight
unique factors in the motivations of particular states that are unlikely to
exist in other states. Finally, these case studies may prove informative to the
stakeholders in NEPAD in assessing the current state of the APRM
membership and possible challenges to the success of the initiative.
Initially, Angola opted not to join the APRM, given the aftermath of the 27 year long war which ravaged the Angolan nation leaving the country with extremely weak political, economic and social institutions. Kaufmann et al ranked Angolan governance quality alongside that of Zimbabwe and Burundi for 2002. The war, which has only recently been concluded, has left the country with minimal infrastructure and acute economic and social problems. However, it is possibly the political challenges that the country faces which will most significantly affect its future. By examining the historical background of the costly war in Angola, as well as its effect on political institutions, this chapter attempts to make sense of Angola’s initial decision not to join the APRM. It should be noted that despite this initial decision, Angola has subsequently reversed its decision and has now committed itself to the APRM process. Some discussion is also given to the reasons for this reversal.

4.1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Angola is potentially one of Africa’s richest states, with mineral and strategic resources in abundance. It possesses enormous oil and diamond field deposits, as well as various agricultural resources such as coffee, soya and other agricultural commodities. Additionally, Angola has excellent access to ocean routes through Luanda, and its fishing industries are another important export for the government. However, despite the abundance of its wealth, Angola remains one of Africa’s poorest states.

This poverty is largely due to the debilitating effects of the war between the state-armed forces of the Movement Populare Liberation de Angola (MPLA) and the rural-based Uniao para a Indepencia Total de Angola (UNITA), which ravaged Angola for 27 years. During the war, more than 750,000 people lost their lives, and more than five million people were forcibly displaced from their homes. According to the permanent United Nations (UN) mission to Angola, there are more amputees per capita in Angola than anywhere else in the world, and an estimated five million landmines have yet to be disarmed within Angolan borders.
As a result of the protracted conflict, Angola’s political and economic institutions have suffered, to the extent that Angola now has one of the worst records of governance globally. Since achieving political independence from the Portuguese in 1975, and throughout the war, the integrity of Angola’s political and economic institutions has been steadily degraded to the extent that at present these institutions are both highly centralised and heavily influenced by government interests. As a consequence, Angola is widely recognised as one of the most corrupt and least transparent governments in the world today.57

4.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
During the colonial period Angola was an important source of raw materials as well as some processed products to the Portuguese government which controlled it. Although the Portuguese introduced governance institutions that were satisfactory to their colonial needs, these institutions tended to be highly centralised and focused predominantly on facilitating mineral extraction and transport, with little emphasis on the wider administrative and economic institutions and skills needed to encourage a healthy delivery of public services to the Angolan people. Portugal concerned itself largely with developing the infrastructure of the country, via the Benguela railway, and the maintenance of a cheap supply of manual labour, without a visible emphasis on skills development or institutional permanency.58

After Angola gained independence in 1975, many of the Portuguese colonials immigrated back to Portugal. This created a situation whereby the new government was faced with a chronic skills shortage in many critical areas of governance. The institutions that the Angolan government inherited from the Portuguese were ill-suited to the needs of the new state, and the lack of a skilled workforce capable of filling many of the more technical government positions severely constrained the new government.59 This difficulty was, however, soon overshadowed by the civil conflict which erupted in the country and lasted for nearly three decades.60

The roots of the war lie in the socio-economic history of Angola as a Portuguese colony, with the urban elite forming an elitist government whose legitimacy was challenged by the rural-based UNITA. Initially a third actor, the Federation National de Liberation Angola (FNLA) was involved in the
conflict, but with the MPLA victorious in the struggle for Luanda and the symbolic capital of the country, the FNLA was quickly dispersed. UNITA retreated to the Eastern Escarpment, claiming the diamond fields in the north and south in order to fund its war effort, leaving the MPLA in charge of the coastline and most of the major urban areas.

During the Cold War the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to the conflict remained slim due to the involvement of the superpowers, with the United States (US) backing the UNITA rebels, and the USSR providing the MPLA with military support. The end of the Cold War heralded new opportunities to resolve the conflict, but these were initially unsuccessful.

Under the Bicesse Accords of 1994, the UN was able to get both parties to agree to a ceasefire in order to hold democratic elections in the war-torn country. The 1992 elections showed a majority of 49.6% to Dos Santos and the MPLA, with Savimbi and UNITA taking just slightly less of the vote. The elections were marred by political violence, intimidation, allegations of ballot rigging and administrative irregularities. The MPLA successfully weighted the number of polling stations towards the urban areas where its support was stronger, aggravating Savimbi and delaying accreditation to thousands of rural voters.

While the MPLA claimed victory, UNITA rejected the elections and the UN was powerless to prevent both sides from renewing their military campaigns, UNITA advancing from its positions in the eastern and northern parts of the country. The renewed violence was the bloodiest yet, and between the elections of 1992 and 1994, more people were killed and displaced in the country than in the entire history of the war up to that point. New efforts at peace were successful in bringing all parties to the table again in 1998 for fresh elections, but Savimbi walked out on talks regarding a government of national unity when Dos Santos rejected a proposal making Savimbi a special advisor to the president.

Despite international pressure, a new wave of tough sanctions against UNITA globally and serious military reversals, Savimbi remained defiant and the conflict dragged on with no end in sight. However, on 22 February 2002, MPLA forces, allegedly backed by Savimbi’s erstwhile Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) allies, killed Savimbi in a skirmish in Eastern Angola. This news was greeted internationally with cautious optimism, and resulted in scores of war-weary UNITA troops surrendering unconditionally in great numbers soon after Savimbi’s death. Accounts from UNITA soldiers revealed the debilitating extent to which sanctions and the MPLA’s major offensive eastwards had undermined UNITA’s capacity to continue the conflict, and the war-weary soldiers proved eager to see an end to the conflict that had dragged on for 27 years.

### 4.3 THE STATE OF GOVERNANCE IN ANGOLA

Today, Angola’s economic and political institutions are centralised to such a degree that to talk about the national economy is to talk about the government. During the war, the MPLA government repeatedly proved its willingness to circumvent its own constitution and laws in order to nationalise and centralise the Angolan economy. The Angolan government is currently the only exporter (and consequently, the only agent generating foreign exchange), one of the biggest importers into the economy, the largest employer in the economy, the largest consumer of resources, the largest debtor and the largest investor (particularly through its concessionaires in petroleum and diamonds) in Angola. The state is in fact so prominent in the economy that very little remains for private enterprise.66

During the war, the government’s nationalisation schemes saw the number of private enterprises reduced from 5,000 in 1975 to less than 1,500 private enterprises in 1994.67 It is estimated that of the more than 1,500 enterprises legally operating in the country today, less than 30% of these are functionally operational, that is, economically viable and capable of meeting output targets. Of this 30%, nearly half are controlled or owned by foreign businessmen. This high degree of centralisation has in turn generated other difficulties, such as an over-sized civil service, poor skills levels in the civil service, poor emphasis on social spending and regulatory quality.

The success of the nationalisation programme has come at the cost of liberal economic activity; something which many feel is desperately needed if Angola is to address the many socio-economic and political problems that it faces in its post-war reconstruction. The National Action for Development and International Cooperation (ADPCI) is encouraging the government to address these issues by liberalising and privatising the economy, and
decentralising the civil service. According to ADCPI Secretary Carlos Gomes Sucami: “Excessive bureaucracy and delay in the legalisation and start of functioning of an enterprise are being overcome as a result of free access to the African economies and the NEPAD action.” Some argue that decentralising the civil service, in particular, would have a positive effect on political governance in Angola as this would facilitate greater participation in the political process from civil society. Additionally, it would also assist in the development of institutional transparency, accountability and self-regulation.

The government, however, has yet to take this sort of sentiment seriously and remains a part-owner of every mineral extraction concession presently operating in Angola, and continues to hold stakes in many other industrial and manufacturing consortiums. Additionally, the government is particularly sensitive to allegations of corruption and uses its stake in these concessions to firmly discourage references to this issue. This is despite estimates that more than 20% of the Angolan budget is unaccounted for each year. Although the Angolan government has recently reversed it position on the APRM, there is little concrete evidence that Dos Santos is eager to institute widespread governance reforms. This is despite claims to the contrary, in which prominent actors in Angola claim that the government is in fact encouraging liberal economic and political reforms. According to President Dos Santos himself:

In order to attract (and retain) foreign investment we have been improving on the applicable legislation, minimising bureaucratic impediments while addressing measures that will guarantee the protection of investments and ensure the transfer of dividends abroad.

Taking into account the relatively recent cessation of war hostilities in Angola and the cumbersome operation of its civil service, to expect immediate results is being unrealistic. However, as Sucami puts it, the MPLA government takes one step forward and two steps back. Angola has made some progress towards more liberal institutional reforms, but in regard to improving it track record on accountability and transparency, it appears as though the conviction and political determination to press forward is presently lacking.
Angola’s belated decision to join the APRM (Dos Santos only joined at the Heads of State Implementation Committee meeting officially launching the APRM on 15 February 2004) is therefore unexpected. In fact, Dos Santos’s decision to change his country’s position on the APRM is so sudden that it has yet to be ratified by the Angolan Parliament. The sudden nature of Dos Santos’s reversal suggests that diplomatic efforts by possibly South African President Mbeki or Nigerian President Obasanjo may have persuaded the Angolan president to join the mechanism at this late stage. However, at present, there is little indication as to why the Angolan position has changed.

4.4 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MPLA’S IDEOLOGY OF CENTRALISM

The response of the government regarding its position on the APRM was, and to some extent still is, informed by the MPLA’s ideology of governance. This ideology was founded on the socialist principles espoused by Marx and Lenin, in addition to the concept of ‘democratic centralism’; a concept taken from the MPLA’s own political structure, in which the head of the party is also the chief executive of party policy and procedure. In the Angolan constitution, the line became particularly blurred between the ruling party and the state. The MPLA is mentioned by name on ten separate occasions in the constitution, entrenching this ‘centralism’ firmly in Angolan law. Significantly, constitutional revision remains the preserve of the ruling party – a detail which was largely insignificant during the war due to the one-party system in place during that time. However, this had the further effect of facilitating ‘the invasion of the state’; a process whereby the state appropriated all public institutions in order to centralise the system. In part, this centralisation was also strategically motivated in that it kept the reins of power firmly in Luanda and the urban areas where the MPLA was strong, and away from the UNITA-controlled areas of the escarpment.

In 1990, the MPLA government found itself facing new pressures in a world without the aid of its erstwhile Soviet ally. Globalisation and the pressure to liberalise the political institutions of the state forced the government’s ideology towards a far more liberal outlook. The most significant amendment to the Angolan constitution was to end the monopoly of the MPLA over the political institutions of the state, and guaranteeing the freedoms and rights of Angolan citizens. With the failure of the political route to peace in 1994, and again in 1998, these freedoms remained theoretical for the Angolan people.
In the interim, the MPLA forged ahead in seeking ‘the Angolan way’, aiming to reconcile the party’s largely socialist background with the realities of the liberalised global economy, on the premise that the government in a liberal economy needs to do more than regulate the market forces and facilitate infrastructure, and attempted to model its approach to liberal governance on German social democracy. This system espoused the need for government regulation on social spending in order to improve the plight of the poor and disenfranchised, while maintaining the individual’s right to profit.

This ideology captures the essence of Dos Santos’s present approach to governance, incorporating the realist acceptance of the globalised liberal economy and the need to reform the state institutions accordingly, and the more idealistic social welfare state which is more familiar to the MPLA given its evolution as a socialist party. Despite its outward, more liberal, appearance the MPLA remains at its core an essentially centralist and socialist party, and recent signs suggest that Dos Santos is not averse to forging a lone path for the Angolan state. To the centralist way of thinking, the collective regional cooperation advocated by the APRM is an anathema, complicating Angola’s position on the mechanism.

4.5 ANGOLA AND THE APRM

On the face of it, the APRM would appear to offer a solution to some of the major economic challenges facing the Dos Santos government in reconstructing the war-torn Angolan nation. In particular, the APRM is expected to offer a legitimate incentive to foreign investors, and ensure that governance structures are being reformed and are being held accountable by other states. In particular, the management of its petroleum resources is an area in which Angola has a very poor track record, and accession to this mechanism would be a positive indicator of the government’s commitment to accountability. However, at present, the Angolan government has yet to affirm a commitment to this mechanism. As has been suggested, the MPLA’s ideological roots may partly explain the reason for this, but other factors are also involved. This section discusses these factors in greater detail.

The government’s first task in the post-war ceasefire is to reconstruct a country torn apart by one of Africa’s longest and costliest wars. The peace
achieved with the death of Savimbi is still in its infancy, and many of Angola’s most difficult challenges still lie ahead. It is clear to all, including the Angolan government, that if Angola is to succeed in its reconstruction efforts, foreign investment is a key component. Angola’s mineral and petroleum wealth has immediately attracted interest and investors from various multinational corporations, but Dos Santos has publicly stated that Angola’s mineral deposits do not hold the key to Angola’s economic recovery. This statement would appear valid given the technologically intensive nature of the mineral extraction sector, and that this sector employs only one per cent of the population.

As such, the government is looking to encourage investment in other industries and enterprises, and it is here where investors become far more cautious. Combined with an overused infrastructure, logistical logjams at choke points such as customs and ports, poor skills delivery, bureaucratic inefficiencies and state interference, Angola is recognised as one of the least transparent states in the world. If the Angolan government is to succeed in attracting foreign investment into the wider Angolan economy, it will need to convince investors of its commitment to institutional reforms. The degree to which the government is willing to empower its institutions to act independently of government interests will be of key importance in convincing investors that it is genuine in its efforts to reform investment conditions in Angola. Given the state’s dominant position in virtually all major institutions (political, economic and corporate), an obvious gesture on the government’s part would be to sign on to the APRM, signalling a commitment to accountable standards. However, Dos Santos has until recently displayed an unwillingness to do so.

One of the key motivations for this decision may lie in Angola’s long history of government corruption and lack of transparency. If Dos Santos were to sign on to the APRM, it seems inevitable that some of the government’s economic, political and corporate mismanagement would be uncovered by an independent review team. Although it is no secret that the Angolan government is extremely corrupt, the exact details of that corruption may in fact be extremely costly for the political elite of the MPLA. At present, the composition of the MPLA cabinet and ruling elite is one of long-standing officials, similar in many ways to the Mobutu regime in Zaire during the
1980s. In Mobutu’s government, many of the high-ranking officials actively obstructed attempts to improve the transparency of the government out of fear for their own positions and privilege. It would be truly incredible if greater transparency in Angola would not reveal widespread government corruption, yet it is presently impossible to gauge the extent to which this factor is contributing to Angola’s reluctance to join the APRM, given the poor levels of transparency in the Angolan government.

Civil society in Angola, however, is beginning to see the NEPAD-affiliated mechanism as a genuine solution to Angola’s institutional weaknesses. Although NEPAD is not well known in Angola at present outside of a few political and academic groups, those few non-governmental organisations that are currently aware of the APRM, such as the ADPCI and the Catholic Church of Angola (CCA), are campaigning strongly for Angola’s accession to the mechanism. These organisations point to “the economic, political and social benefits of liberalising and reforming the institutions of the state, and the elimination of rules, codes and norms that discourage foreign investment”.

In response, Dos Santos has stated:

our government intends to prioritise the implementation of special incentives on fiscal and customs duties, and define other legal means capable of guaranteeing greater transparency and instil further confidence in the foreign investor.

When one compares the president’s statement with the aims of the APRM, similarities are evident. Clause 3 states that the purpose of the mechanism is to foster policies conducive to sustainable economic development: “through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building.” In fact, the overwhelmingly positive feedback coming from Angolan civil society regarding the APRM is significant in demonstrating the present lack of voice given to the Angolan people, as well as the government’s lack of accountability to them.

The president’s reversal on the APRM illustrates most clearly the lack of civil involvement in the policies of the government. Although Angola’s
decision to join the APRM is a significant development – and may lead to improved governance quality which many Angolans long for – Dos Santos’s decision has been virtually ignored in the Angolan press, while the government website is currently conspicuous in its lack of coverage of the president’s decision.

The direct influence which the president is afforded in Angola empowers him to make numerous decisions without the need for consultation. One explanation for Angola’s tardiness in joining the APRM is therefore the influence of Dos Santos himself. Since the end of the Cold War, many of the African autocrats have fallen from power, either through violent coup d’êtats or, more alarmingly, because of international and regional pressures to step down. Recent events in Liberia – where Charles Taylor was exiled with the support of regional and international actors – will not have gone unnoticed in Luanda. For a man who has ruled in Angola for 27 years, albeit during a war, the invasion of sovereignty inherent in the APRM process may be politically and personally uncomfortable to contemplate. It is possible that Dos Santos committed to the APRM only after he was able to satisfy himself that concerns about the intrusiveness of a review team into his personal role in the governance of Angola were unfounded.

Dos Santos is clearly a man with strongly held ideals and beliefs, and although his recent statements reflect a softening attitude to reform, one of the dominant traits that the Angolan president has repeatedly demonstrated is a stubborn independence. Although Angola is presently in no position to challenge the likes of South Africa and Botswana for regional leadership of the Southern African region, this does not mean that Dos Santos lacks ambition in this area. Often accused of being politically and personally sensitive, Dos Santos’s track record includes bullying, intimidation and even the invasion of other states in order to achieve his objectives; and his record on human rights is also extremely poor.

Politically and personally, exposure to peer assessment will undoubtedly be an uncomfortable process for the president, and may in his estimation be too uncomfortable to contemplate. Given the heavy concentration of power in the position of president, it is not inconceivable that Dos Santos is blocking accession to the APRM for this very reason.
Another important factor in the Angolan response to the APRM is the widespread levels of ignorance at government level regarding NEPAD and the APRM. One informal survey conducted among government civil servants revealed that more staff believed NEPAD to be a new model of motor vehicle out of the US than an African economic recovery initiative. In fact, of those polled, only one per cent of Angolan civil servants correctly identified NEPAD, and most of these candidates admitted that they knew little else about the initiative. Clearly, high levels of ignorance prevail, hindering advocates of the APRM in their efforts to promote the mechanism.

Dos Santos’s decision to join the APRM came at a time when an Angolan delegation, lead by the Premier’s Assistant Minister Aguinaldo Jaime was in Washington meeting with the World Bank and IMF. The delegation was reportedly discussing the possibility of securing low-interest loans for reconstruction and development. A key concern of the IMF and World Bank is Angola’s poor track record on accountability and transparency, and Angola’s decision to join the APRM may represent a gesture of good faith or may be a cynical and calculated public relations exercise. The timing of the two events is too convenient to be unrelated.

4.6 CONCLUSION
Angola appears to have adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach. Prior to the HSIC meeting in Kigali, Angola remained uncommitted to the APRM. However, once Dos Santos was able to gauge firsthand the procedures and aims of the APRM, he appears to have deemed the mechanism as beneficial to the country. Angola’s stance on the APRM in many ways reflects the stark contradictions of its past: at some levels eager to strengthen Angola’s ties to NEPAD, and at other times seemingly ambiguous to the whole debate. In some quarters, Angolan sentiment for the APRM is overwhelmingly positive, yet the president’s concerns regarding both personal and political costs of joining appear to have held Angola back. Dos Santos must now prepare to face the scrutiny of his peers, and if the APRM lives up to its mandate and objectively assesses candidate nations then it is likely that there will be costs involved for the MPLA government. If the mechanism turns out to be little more than a rubber stamp on aid disbursement, then Dos Santos will have achieved his objective of acquiring greater aid disbursement at a relatively cheap cost. Dos Santos may or may not be signalling a greater commitment
on behalf of his government to improved political and economic governance standards but it appears as though the president sees greater benefits to be had from evaluating the progress of the APRM from the inside, than to be outside looking in.
CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The DRC has opted to sign on to the APRM despite the country’s very weak record of political, economic and corporate governance. Combined with the extravagantly corrupt rule of Mobutu Sese Seko, numerous wars have left the DRC impoverished, fragmented and unable to control effectively the political, economic and corporate affairs of the nation. Kaufmann rated the DRC among the worst countries in the world in terms of both political and economic governance. Other countries with comparable governance quality to the DRC include Iran, Iraq and North Korea. In order to understand the fundamental weaknesses inhibiting effective governance in the DRC today, it is necessary to examine the history of the Congo from the time of Belgian occupation through the Mobutu years to the present day challenges facing President Joseph Kabila in order to understand his motivations for signing on to the APRM.

5.1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW

The DRC is potentially one of the richest countries on the continent, with the potential to become a major African economic power in the future. It is endowed with vast mineral deposits, numerous navigable waterways, the second largest rainforest in the world, and a large population (55 million in 2002). Additionally, the abundance of water in the DRC and its hydroelectric potential will increasingly make it a strategic ally of many Southern African states whose power and water requirements look set to escalate beyond present capacities in the next 15 years. Despite the vast potential of this central African state, 80% of its population continues to survive on less than US$80 a year. Since independence from Belgian colonial rule in the early 1960s, the history of the Congo has been marked by constant wars, secessions and political assassinations, aided by a combination of international neglect and incompetence. The DRC faces the enormous challenge of post-conflict reconstruction with hardly any infrastructure to speak of, corrupt and patrimonial government officials and corrupt and weakened armed forces. In his efforts to reconstruct the war-torn nation and to establish a lasting peace, Kabila has grasped the NEPAD initiative as a means of achieving this objective.
5.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The failure of democratic, accountable and transparent governance in the DRC can be attributed to several major factors, including the Belgian system of governance imposed on the Congo, the failure of the First Republic, Congolese nationalism, the patrimonial state of Mobutu and the proliferation of rebel groups and foreign insurgencies post-Mobutu. These factors are examined in more detail in this section.

The Western world knows little about the history of the Congo prior to the adventures of David Livingstone in the late 19th century, and it was only with Belgian colonisation in the early 20th century that the Congo emerged as a single entity. Subsequent to Belgian occupation, the Congolese peoples were forced to define their ethnicity according to rigid and arbitrary distinctions defined by the Belgian colonists, as well as to accept artificially and arbitrarily created borders which did not always reflect historical tribal lands and migration patterns. As a result, the Belgian occupation entrenched and refined the ethnic divisions that continue to plague the war-torn nation to this day. This in turn gave rise to a new form of Congolese nationalism in the 1920s and 30s which, although only manifesting after World War II, would prove significant in the evolution of the Congolese state. This nationalism manifested in two separate ways: some groups favoured secession from the colonial state, while others sought to oust the Belgian government, military officers and officials and assume control of the state apparatus.

In 1960, Belgium granted the Congolese people their independence, in doing so establishing a constitution based almost entirely on the Belgian constitution. This constitution divided the powers of the government between the executive branch, the legislature and cabinet in relatively equal measure. The newly formed constitution envisaged the president as the figurehead of the state, in the mould of the Belgian king, while the prime minister was intended to be the executive head of state. The president was, however, granted the power to appoint certain legislative officials, as well as to nominate candidates to the cabinet. A major weakness in the new constitution was the ambiguous relationship between the prime minister and the president – and this would prove to be a fatal flaw for democratic governance in the newly independent state.
The DRC’s first elections installed Patrice Lumumba, the charismatic leader of the ‘unified Congo’ MNC (National Congolese Movement), as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the radical secessionist Abako party, as president. The two men did not relate easily, and within two years the country’s First Republic was in crisis, with Kasavubu dismissing the prime minister, while Lumumba blocked the dismissal in parliament. The deadlock essentially froze the government, precipitating the first intervention by Mobutu Sese Seko, who was at that time Chief of Staff for the Republic’s armed forces. Mobutu established an interim government, preferring to remain behind the scenes, which ran the country for a period of six months. During the constitutional crisis, the UN was called in for the first time to help maintain law and order, as opportunistic secessionists in the mineral-rich Katanga Province and the eastern Kivu Province sought to profit from the chaos. This pattern of chaotic and fragmented secessions, rebellions and violent government takeovers would become the norm for the next 30 years. Ultimately, the constitutional crisis was resolved in 1964; Lumumba was assassinated by Katangan secessionists with the assistance of the CIA.96 During the next five years, the Congolese government would prove repeatedly that it was unable to resolve the political infighting between the two nationalist movements and, ultimately, Mobutu intervened a second time to restore order, this time assuming complete control of the apparatus of the state.

5.2.1 ZAIRE UNDER MOBUTU
Initially Mobutu was received extremely well by the people of the DRC, which he renamed Zaire. A well known figure in the army, popular, well educated and respected by the people for his close friendship with Lumumba – who had become a symbolic martyr of the nationalist struggle against colonial powers – Mobutu was also the preferred candidate of the US. Mobutu immediately set about reforming the political institutions of Zaire, gradually entrenching more and more powers in the office of the executive to the exclusion of other state apparatus. Mobutu merged the office of president and prime minister into one, and immediately vested vast authority in the new position. The president was also empowered to appoint and dismiss anyone in public office, including Supreme Court judges and cabinet ministers, and over time Zaire’s political system degenerated into a patrimonial state; a state in which the government became defined in the
person of the president, and in order to prosper as a civil servant it became necessary to earn his favour.

Having established himself as the figurehead of the Zairian nation, Mobutu began to whimsically replace civil servants at will and entrench numerous personal privileges in the constitution, such as tax immunity. This system did not encourage transparent and accountable governance. Instead, given the unpredictable and often brief tenure of many civil servants, it became common for them to use their time in office to enrich themselves personally as fast as possible, and curry favour with the political elite who had sycophantically attached themselves to Mobutu like nobles around a king. At the height of his excess, Mobutu travelled the country and often the world with more than 600 staff, aides and other ‘hangers-on’.

During the 1970s, Mobutu introduced a national programme to centralise and nationalise the economy, referred to as ‘Zairinisation’. From 1971 to 1975, the government assumed control of all mineral extraction enterprises, both foreign and domestic, as well as large parts of the transport, agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy. Mobutu used these parastatal companies to amass a personal fortune of staggering proportions, and many of his cronies followed suit. Corruption and economic mismanagement became endemic, and the economy began to collapse as inflation soared and production came to a standstill.

Facing a spiralling balance of payments deficit, which was putting increasing pressure on the Zairian currency, Mobutu encountered mounting pressure from the IMF, the World Bank and other aid donors to reform the economic institutions of the state. However, to liberalise the economy would have meant the loss of all fiscal and political privileges that Mobutu had become accustomed to, and also threatened to undermine his powerbase among the political elite, whose privileged status was also threatened. Instead, Mobutu began skilfully to play the various donor nations off against one another, using the fear of total state collapse to stall reforms while obtaining partial debt relief and new assistance. From 1976 to 1983, the Zairian government committed to numerous reforms which in reality were never implemented, but continued to receive substantial debt relief regardless. Much of this aid was siphoned off into Mobutu’s private coffers.
During the 1980s, Mobutu finally began to implement economic reforms. Notable efforts at restructuring begun in 1983 before being discontinued, again in 1987, and again in 1989. Despite some modest gains during these periods of reform, Mobutu’s unwillingness to reform the political institutions of the state consistently undermined the economic gains achieved through these reforms. This failure to adjust to the political realities of corruption and mismanagement began to isolate Mobutu for the first time in his rule. Increasingly erratic behaviour, unbridled excess and an economy in complete recession finally began to undermine his theretofore exceedingly popular support, both among the political elite and the Zairian people.

5.2.2 THE END OF MOBUTU

In 1995, the little known rebel Laurent Kabila, leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire, launched an extremely successful rebellion against Mobutu’s government. Within seven months, rebel forces had captured the capital of Kinshasa, and an aged and frightened Mobutu fled the country, to die later in exile in Morocco, ending nearly 30 years of rule by one of Africa’s most corrupt leaders ever. Kabila – who was assisted by Mobutu’s old ally, the US – assumed control of the war-torn nation through force of arms, renaming it the Democratic Republic of Congo, doing so with additional backing from Rwandan, Angolan and Ugandan forces.

Hopes that peace and economic reform were at last a possibility were soon dashed when Kabila’s former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, as well as Burundi launched a military campaign against the Hutu insurgents living in the eastern part of the country. This prompted an intervention by Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops, as well as various mercenary groups, in order to keep Kabila in power. Kabila’s former allies against Mobutu accused him of failing to honour an agreement to rid the eastern provinces of Kivu and Orientale of Hutu insurgents, as well as appointing Hutu sympathisers to his cabinet, and took matters into their own hands. This plunged the divided nation once more into a costly and damaging war – this time made worse by the intractability of the conflict.

Kabila’s approach to economic and political reforms was at times both paradoxical and contradictory. On coming to power in 1996, Kabila
immediately privatised large sections of the mining sector, selling the former parastatals to wealthy American and international consortiums. At the same time, however, the DRC president confounded international donors by nationalising the Sizarail, a large transport consortium controlled by South African, Belgian and Zairian stakeholders. Inheriting an enormous debt burden from the previous government (more than half the annual budget during Mobutu’s last years in power was spent servicing debts), Kabila sought immediate debt relief in order to rebuild the economy, but a combination of donor fatigue and the DRC’s poor track record confounded these efforts. As a result, Kabila was responsible for only partial liberalisation of the DRC’s economic and political institutions, but any ambitions of widening the scope of these reforms beyond the superficial were thwarted by the military struggle for control of the country.

On 16 January 2001, Laurent Kabila was confirmed dead at a Zimbabwean hospital, murdered by his own bodyguards; the country’s second leader to die at the hands of assassins. As an emergency measure, the government offered the presidency to Joseph Kabila, the son of the late president. Initially reluctant, Kabila was nevertheless an excellent candidate, whose career in the armed forces had earned him the respect of the military, and his name was recognisable to the Congolese people.

5.2.3 THE DRC’S FRAGILE PEACE

Kabila assumed power in February 2001, and immediately the peace process gained significant momentum. Accords in Pretoria and Lusaka have since seen the conditional withdrawal of Rwandan and Burundian troops from the north, and Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops in the south. However, the present peace remains fragile, and renewed concerns about Hutu activity in the eastern provinces has prompted new threats of intervention from Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Kabila is presently engaged in a precarious balancing act, in which he needs to impose his authority on a government which has been completely corrupted and stripped of any meaningful institutional capacities, while at the same time maintaining good relations with his father’s allies (Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola) and placating his former adversaries. In this regard, Kabila sees the APRM as a lifeline which he intends to grasp in order to achieve this triple balancing act.
5.3 THE DRC AND THE APRM

This section discusses Kabila’s present motivations for joining the APRM. It concludes that the key factors behind his decision are: the current make-up of the DRC government; Kabila’s desire to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships with other countries in the region; the difficulty of promoting governance reforms independent of the APRM; and Kabila’s dependence on international and regional assistance in rebuilding the war-torn republic.

The eminence of the position of president in the DRC tends to overshadow the role of the wider government in policy making and governance. Under the present power-sharing agreement, however, the country has four vice-presidents, each of whom needs to be consulted before most decisions are made. The four vice-presidents represent different rebel groups in the DRC that have little in common apart from their desire to overthrow an existing African regime. Under the present circumstances, it appears unlikely that Kabila is able to create a coherent and unanimous reform strategy, which may offer one explanation for the DRC’s accession to the APRM.

Complicating matters further, it is still unclear just how much influence Kabila exerts over the political elite that comprised the government under Mobutu and his father. The DRC has not been a single functioning entity in some years, and Kabila’s influence does not extend across the length and breadth of the country. Ultimately, Kabila’s term in office has thus far focused almost exclusively on the restoration of peace to the shattered republic, as well as holding the multiparty government together with virtually no opportunity to reform and develop the institutional frameworks of the government.

Kabila has thus far impressed international observers in his term as president, with a practical and flexible attitude towards some of the previously intractable issues that faced the war-torn nation. His role in making possible the various peace accords that have been signed since his father’s death has received international acclaim. It must be stressed, however, that the peace accords which were signed by all parties in Pretoria in 2002 (which represent the most comprehensive agreement on disarming and troop withdrawals to date) are tenuous at best, and have already come under pressure of collapse. In contrast to Angola – whose peace process was driven largely by domestic
forces and actors – the DRC’s own process involves numerous international and regional actors, including Russia, the US and Belgium, as well as Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa and Uganda. In addition to these state actors, several rebel groups have also had a stake in the peace process, which has further complicated an already complex conflict, most noticeable among them the Movement de la Liberation du Congo (MLC) and the Rassemblement pour la Democratic Congo-Goma (RCD Goma).

Given the complex and precarious nature of the peace process, as well as the government’s ineffective control over large parts of the country, Kabila is in desperate need of international assistance in order to maintain peace and to begin to restore a semblance of normality to the economic and social structures of the DRC. The NEPAD initiative provides one avenue through which the president can garner international and regional support for his government, and has the added advantages of being both a source of economic aid and a legitimate reason to begin the necessary government reforms that have thus far been resisted by the political elite. The APRM offers the beleaguered president numerous advantages, chief among these being a long-term commitment on the part of the African Union (AU) and international donors to the establishment and maintenance of institutional reforms. The nature of the APRM as such commits the AU and APRM signatories to a long-term view of reform in the DRC, buying Kabila both time to implement reforms and partner states with whom to accomplish this.

Another advantage of joining the APRM is the signal this move sends to foreign investors anxious about the long-term prospects of doing business in the central African state. Kabila is going to need to exploit the mineral wealth of the DRC in order to fund the reforms that are needed to halt the economic decay facing its people, and with international aid being diverted elsewhere to places like Iraq and Afghanistan, private investment is going to be critical in funding these efforts. Kabila is using the APRM to send a positive signal to private investors that the government is committed to improving its accountability. Given the potential wealth of the DRC, it is likely that the mere appearance of improved governance will be sufficient to attract at least some new private investment, particularly in the mining and hydroelectric industries.
In addition to the apparent benefits of joining the APRM, the political costs of compliance with the APRM are unlikely to concern Kabila much, given the clear need to reform a system that has barely functioned for many years.\textsuperscript{113} It is clear to all observers that the DRC is many years from a fully functioning, liberal democratic economy, and it is highly likely that significant latitude will be afforded to the DRC in assessing its compliance with APRM standards. As long as Kabila is able to demonstrate that policies are being implemented to some degree, this is likely to satisfy a review team, and it would be surprising for criticism of the DRC’s failure to comply with APRM standards to target Kabila personally, given the fragmented nature of political governance in the DRC.

Kabila has also recognised that signing on to the APRM has largely taken the task of restructuring out of the hands of the political elite and the other parties in the multiparty government, committing the DRC to reforms that are largely in line with regional standards of good governance.\textsuperscript{114} In doing so, Kabila has cleverly circumvented the need to motivate restructuring and reforms with the other stakeholders in government, and has created an opportunity to address the issue of reforms within the elite political ruling class itself.\textsuperscript{115} In contrast to Angola and Angolan President Dos Santos, who has a heavily invested stake in the present state of the economy, considering the length of his tenure, Joseph Kabila has little stake in the present state of the DRC’s economy. In fact, because his presidency has been so brief and the majority of his efforts have focused on securing peace, Kabila has had neither the occasion nor the incentive to clearly formulate an independent national strategic agenda. This is not to say that he has not identified a direction in which he believes the DRC must move in order to develop, but because he has held office for only two years, it is less problematic for Kabila to bring his strategic agenda in line with regionally accepted standards than has proved to be the case for Dos Santos, and other long standing African leaders. For Kabila, NEPAD and the APRM have emerged in parallel to his own leadership, facilitating an easier entrance into the mechanism than some of his long-standing contemporaries.

Another aspect which appeals to the DRC president is the collective regional cooperation promoted in the APRM.\textsuperscript{116} Rwanda, one of the DRC’s troublesome neighbours, is also signed on to the APRM, and this potentially
provides an alternative framework through which to resolve long-standing disputes between the Rwandans and Congolese – at the executive level at least. Kabila’s decision to join the APRM may also reflect a desire to establish bilateral relationships with other states and to foster new alliances with states such as South Africa. A recent state visit by South African President Thabo Mbeki reflects the mutual interest the two states have in fostering better relations; and with the South African electricity company Eskom eager to take advantage of the DRC’s hydroelectric potential, this relationship appears likely to strengthen.

5.4 CONCLUSION
As the DRC tentatively emerges from decades of strife and war, it faces a multitude of challenges which threaten to undermine the fragile peace that has been achieved. Kabila – for reasons including his recent assumption of the presidency, the need for international and regional involvement in reconstruction, and the APRM’s usefulness as a vehicle through which to drive institutional change – has opted to join the APRM. Despite the inevitable resistance to institutional reforms, Kabila has identified NEPAD and the APRM as an important mechanism for the economic, political and social renewal of the DRC; and although it would be simplistic to assert that the success or failure of the review mechanism will reflect the success or failure of the DRC, for better or for worse, Kabila has thrown his lot in with the other leaders who are seeking through the APRM to make African governance a more transparent and accountable process.
Chapter 6
Ghana: Case Study

Ghana will be among the first countries to be reviewed when APRM inspections begin in 2004. Its progress towards a democratically stable, accountable and transparent state is reflected in Kaufmann’s assessment of Ghana’s governance quality, with government scores comparable to Hong Kong, both politically and economically, and well above average when compared to African governance quality. Ghana’s commitment to accountability is also evident in its decision to submit to peer review. Although Ghana has historically flirted with both the concepts of democratic rule and collective cooperation, its history is also littered with military coups and authoritarian rule, and it is only in the past decade that democracy has established itself as the preferred form of governance in the West African state.

6.1 Country Overview
Ghana has emerged as a beacon of hope in a region of Africa which has been plagued with forced migrations, cross-border insurgencies and inter-state conflicts. In fact, the transformation that has occurred in the past ten years in Ghana is quite remarkable when one considers that in the 2000 elections, power was transferred voluntarily from one democratically elected leader to another for the first time since the country’s independence.

The man stepping down, President Jerry Rawlings, had held power in Ghana for 22 years, but decided to accept the two-term constitutional limitation prescribed by the Ghanaian constitution. Since 2000, new President John Kufour has affirmed his commitment to develop and entrench democratic and liberal institutions at all levels of Ghanaian society, including the government, legal system, tax regime, tribal system and the media. Ghana’s inclusion in the APRM signals a continued commitment to the entrenchment of these values.

However, the prospects of a bright future in Ghana obscure a shrouded past, and Ghana’s emergence as a beacon of democracy in West Africa looks set to face additional challenges in the future; challenges that will test the mettle of both the Kufour administration and the APRM.
6.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Ghana, the first African state to be granted full independence from colonial rule, has been of interest to colonial powers for some 500 years, due to the presence of precious metals and the slave trade. In the 15th century, Portuguese explorers named the region ‘Mina’, meaning mine, because of the abundance of gold that they discovered in the region. When the British explorers assumed control over the territories that today comprise Ghana, they renamed the region the Gold Coast, also recognising the unusually abundant veins of the precious metal. During British rule, the Gold Coast was used to re-supply British navy vessels, and numerous trading posts were established. After World War II, with its own economy weakened, Britain focused less of its attention on its colonial states, and more on its own economic rebuilding.

As a result, Ghanaian political activity began to flourish. The first political party to emerge in this political vacuum was the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). However, the first Ghanaian Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, emerged out of the UGCC to form the more populist Convention People’s Party (CPP); a far more radical and outspoken party demanding immediate independence for the Ghanaian people. His popularity soared and in 1954, Nkrumah was elected by the Ghanaian people as the first Ghanaian prime minister. Despite Nkrumah’s strident demands for Ghanaian independence, he was at first forced to endure continued British involvement in the affairs of the Ghanaian government, as the British governor continued to hold the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Defence. However, increasingly popular support for the overriding concept of Ghanaian independence ultimately prevailed on the British to allow full legislative elections to take place, and Nkrumah became head of an independent Ghana on the back of the popular vote.

6.2.1 THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The British withdrawal from Ghana and the pace at which it achieved its independence occurred far more gradually than would become the norm in many other African states, and this facilitated a far more orderly and democratic transfer of power from British rule to popular democratic vote. Britain remained involved in the affairs of its former colony, being the first nation to establish an embassy in Accra and maintaining strong export trading
links in the newly formed state. This gradual transfer of power, while frustrating for the CPP and its supporters, enabled the First Republic to maintain the existing institutional capacities which had been created during British rule. Ultimately, the First Republic was able to inherit largely intact the institutional systems that had been in place in the colony prior to independence.

This is not to suggest that British rule did not create complications for the Nkrumah government. In fact, the very institutions which the government established during colonial rule in many areas served to entrench and define previously fluid ethnic divisions in Ghanaian societal structure, which would create serious difficulties later. The First Republic inherited another problem with far reaching consequences: the presence of foreign nationals within the newly independent state. Nkrumah opted to tackle this issue by embarking on a strong centralisation policy, which generated fierce opposition from the National Liberation Movement (NLM), whose preference for a more liberal, federal governance framework won them strong support in the north of the country. The British governor, however, supported Nkrumah’s position, and on 1 July 1960 the Ghanaian Republic came into existence under Nkrumah’s leadership.

Fundamental flaws in Nkrumah’s centralist policies were soon exposed as a drop in the price of Ghana’s chief commodity, cocoa, and a weakening currency began to tell on the country’s foreign currency reserves as well as on its export competitiveness. The additional costs of centralisation saw the Nkrumah regime deliver little to the millions of Ghanaians who had hoped for a more equitable share of the economic benefits than they had experienced under the British. As a result, in 1966, the first coup by Ghana’s armed forces took place, ending Nkrumah’s inefficient rule, and with it the First Republic.

The armed forces which seized control from Nkrumah in 1966 did so on the back of assurances that the country would be returned to a democratically elected government as soon as the economic difficulties experienced under the CPP were rectified. A National Liberation Council (NLC) was established to administer this transfer of power and to rectify the economic difficulties that faced the Ghanaian state. During the NLC’s tenure from 1966
to 1969, it pursued economic policies with predominantly short-term aspirations, such as revaluing the currency higher against the US dollar and attempting to curb inflation which had eroded the spending power of the Ghanaian people, but more specifically, the armed forces. These reforms, extremely popular at the time, ultimately established the destabilising trend of military intervention in government during times of economic recession.

6.2.2 THE SECOND REPUBLIC
In 1969, a newly elected government under the leadership of Dr Kofi Busia of the Progress Party (PP) assumed control of the government. In contrast to Nkrumah’s nationalist right-wing policies, Busia embarked on more progressive liberal economic reforms, in large part due to the encouragement of international investors and the IMF. Busia also promised to regularise debt repayments, implement tighter fiscal policies and became widely known (and disliked) for his ‘austerity policies’; policies which aimed at keeping government spending tight in order to control the country’s rising debt repayments. Busia’s policies isolated him from the constituency that had elected his PP in 1969, but it was a combination of other factors that would prove fatal to his regime. Shortly after his election, Busia ordered the expulsion of more than one million foreign nationals living and working in Ghana, including Nigerians, Ivorians and migrants from Sierra Leone. Some elements of the armed forces, particularly among the officers, resented this order. It was when Busia became aware of this sentiment that he made his second error of judgment, by attempting to purge the army of some of the older officers.

This was the last straw for the military and in 1972, after only three years in charge of the country, Busia was ousted in Ghana’s second military coup since independence. The coup, lead by Colonel (later General) Ignatius Kutu Acheampong established an administrative bureau through which to administer the government, called the National Redemptive Council (NRC). Unlike the previous military government, however, Acheampong made no commitment to return power to the people. Some Ghanaians were in fact less concerned about this than one might expect; by now disillusioned by the failure of both the Nkrumah nationalists and the Busia liberalists to deliver a healthier economy. Other elements, however, began to organise political resistance to the NRC government, which began to entrench military
procedures and administration on the political institutions of the state, highlighting its reluctance to surrender power to the people once more. The Acheampong regime was plagued by mounting corruption, administrative inefficiencies and a strong centralist tendency which undermined the Ghanaian desire for federal government.

In 1979, Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings implemented a junior officer military coup which successfully overthrew the NRC, ending its seven-year military rule. Rawlings and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) restored democratic procedures and attempted to revive decaying political activity in Ghana. The AFRC had grown disillusioned with the militaristic and bureaucratic state which the NRC had established, as well as the centralised chain of command. In accordance with a pre-prepared initiative, the AFRC handed power back to the Ghanaian people, who elected the People’s National Party (PNP) to form a new government.

Dr Hilla Limann, leader of the PNP, became the prime minister of the Third Republic, but his administration would hold power only briefly before yet another military coup would overthrow him. Limann inherited a Ghanaian state already in complete disarray, with clear disparities now evident between the rural and urban populations as well as increasing competition between the various chiefdoms and ethnic groups for scarce resources, in particular land. His government also fatally coincided with the commodities crash of the 1980s. During his tenure, Limann was unable to establish the most basic tenets of a working government, marking the final collapse of any vestiges of the political and economic institutions inherited in 1957.

6.2.3 THE RAWLINGS ERA
The second coup carried out by Rawlings was ostensibly for similar reasons to the first coup he had carried out three years earlier – to establish a workable, grassroots democracy which would curb both the excesses of poor and inefficient leadership and rebuild the economic and political institutions in a way that would prove beneficial to Ghana. It is unclear just how committed Rawlings was to democracy as a form of government. During his 22 years in charge he was responsible for horrific human rights abuses, political manipulation and corruption. However, Rawlings was at the same time able to stabilise the Ghanaian economy after more than
20 years of turbulent fluctuations; a feat which endeared him to many of the Ghanaian people.

The failure of the Nkrumah, Busia and Limann regimes highlighted that the democratic approach was insufficient to address Ghana’s diverse challenges. The military had also demonstrated that it was no less immune to the corruption, inefficiencies and shortcomings that had plagued the democratically elected governments, further compounding the perplexity of the Ghanaian electorate which desperately wanted a more effective form of governance. It is likely the frustrations felt by Ghanaian society worked to the advantage of Rawlings and his officers.

Rawlings set about implementing widespread political institutional reforms, collapsing the offices of prime minister and president into one post. Although his government was highly centralised and the greater degree of power was concentrated in the president himself, Rawlings enjoyed much popular support, particularly within the army and the rural population. He also set up a Committee of Experts to draw up a new constitution and establish the grounds for a new system of governance incorporating the most important elements of the 1957, 1969 and 1979 constitutions. The primary motivation for these reforms appears to be Rawlings’s concern that he would lose Western aid unless he took appropriate measures to reassure donors of his commitment to reforms. In 1992, 11 years after Rawlings assumed control of Ghana a second time, a new constitution was ratified by its citizens.

Among other notable provisions contained in the new constitution, the limitation of the office of president to a maximum of two terms would later test Rawlings’s commitment to democratic ideals. The new constitution was ratified in 1992 and in the country’s subsequent elections, Rawlings, standing as the leader of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), was somewhat surprisingly elected. His election was no fluke, however, as he was re-elected in 1996. During his second term, Rawlings sparked new concerns about the state of democracy in Ghana by putting a motion before parliament to approve an amendment to the two-term limit enshrined in the 1992 constitution. While many particularly within the NDC approved of this course of action, international and regional sentiment was against such a
move. After much speculation, Rawlings decided not to stand for re-election, passing the NDC’s challenge in the 2000 elections to his successor, John Mills.

Although Rawlings’s support for Mills proved a useful boost, and the NDC’s support remained strong in many areas, Ghana had begun to experience an economic decline beginning in 1999, which harmed the NDC’s reputation. A keenly contested election and subsequent alliance saw the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP’s) leader John Kufour emerge victorious, marking the first time in Ghana’s history that one democratically elected president was replaced by another. Election observers pronounced the elections both free and fair.

6.2.4 KUFOUR AND NEW REFORMS
Since his election victory, Kufour has undertaken to reform Ghana’s security forces; namely the police, intelligence service and military. Additionally, Kufour has implemented reforms aimed at strengthening the role of democratic and independent institutions, which it is hoped will prevent further military coups in the future. These institutions are safeguarded and monitored by a free press which jealously guards its new-found freedom, and numerous civil society groups which have served to mobilise Ghanaian social awareness and maintain an accountable government. As such, Ghana has begun to entrench democratic practice in many facets of its social and political structures. The improvement in Ghana’s political governance in the past decade is reflected in the estimates calculated by Kaufmann when one compares the 1998, 2000 and 2002 institutional governance scores for Ghana. In 1998, Ghana scored –0.53 for political governance. However, in 2000, this estimate rose to 0 exactly, indicating a moderate improvement in its governance scores. A miniscule improvement since 2000 has seen Ghana’s point estimate revised upwards by 0.01. Although Kaufmann et al caution against using these direct comparisons to draw conclusions about changes in governance over time, when one examines the Kaufmann data in the light of the political transition since Rawlings has stepped down, Ghana appears to be firmly on the path towards a consolidated democratic state.

6.3 GHANA AND THE APRM
President Kufour has impressed international, regional and local leaders with his statesmanlike demeanour, flexible attitude and commitment to democratic ideals. Kufour also has an excellent track record in democratic
practice; he served as the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs under the Busia regime in the 1970s. While the Rawlings government was often accused of corruption and economic mismanagement, Kufour has committed his government to greater accountability and to diversifying Ghana’s economic base in order to support a more stable and sustainable pattern of economic growth. According to Kufour, the NPP’s policy revolves around three issues: security; foreign policy; and economy. In a statement made in 2000, Kufour stated that his party seeks to:

liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property owning people in this land as the principles to which the government and laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen.

The APRM and NEPAD have become an important means for achieving Kufour’s policies.

One of the major problems facing the Kufour administration is the rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s natural resources, such as land and water. Despite sound policies the population continues to grow rapidly and this looks likely to challenge the practices of democracy in the future. Additionally, Ghana’s economic recovery has yet to be felt at grassroots level, and large disparities in potential income between the urban and rural population exist, despite government’s cognisance of this problem. Another constraint which faces the president is the country’s national debt, which is high enough to qualify Ghana for Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) relief status. Kufour has committed to a structured set of economic and fiscal policy reforms, which, though sensible, are being felt by the consumer, with petrol and amenities costs rising by as much as 60% since 2000.

However, the country’s HIPC status allows Kufour precious little room to manoeuvre, with the IMF and World Bank insisting on strict adherence to established structural adjustment programmes in order to qualify for debt relief and forgiveness. The government is also aware that with the decline in aid to African states, private investment is becoming increasingly important
to Ghana’s economic recovery, creating a dual tension between appeasement policies that satisfy the IMF and the need to invest in the country’s infrastructure in order to attract foreign investors. It is in this context that the importance of the APRM to the Kufour administration becomes evident, as future aid to Africa looks increasingly likely to be tied to the findings of the APRM teams.

Ghana’s debt burden has made the country extremely dependent on foreign aid, and an economic recovery in Ghana appears unlikely without international assistance. It is additionally hoped that the APRM will encourage greater investor confidence in African states, and Kufour is clearly anticipating that the APRM will in fact foster a more positive image of Ghanaian institutions and attract this much needed private investment. The history of Ghana has demonstrated that democratically elected governments that do not deliver tangible economic benefits to the Ghanaian people are in a precarious position, and Kufour is clearly aware that he needs to deliver economically. The APRM appears to be part of that strategy.

The APRM is clearly important to Kufour as an economic stimulus, but the mechanism also offers recourse in dealing with the NPP’s other major issues: security and foreign policy. Kufour has also recognised the need to address the issues of security and foreign policy. The West African region is rife with failed and failing states, and Ghana’s hard-won democracy faces various security threats from both rebel groups and other states.

Although Ghana has emerged as a potential success story in Africa, West Africa remains one of the most unstable regions in the world, with extremely porous borders, border disputes, refugee and displaced persons migrations and political instability in many neighbouring states, strengthening Ghana’s desire to develop partnerships both within the region and continentally. Through the NEPAD framework, Kufour would be able to pursue this multilateral policy with greater facility and, crucially, the APRM affords the Ghanaian president the opportunity to foster greater cooperation with strategically important states such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Senegal. Instability in these countries has tended to have a spillover effect in Ghana, and greater cooperation with other West African states is seen as a means of reducing the political fallout of refugee movements and rebel groups.
For Ghana, the regional support of more powerful states such as South Africa and Algeria is one way of improving its security framework. Behind Nigeria, Ghana is South Africa’s biggest trading partner in West Africa, and in 2000 South Africa was the single biggest source of private investment in Ghana, further highlighting the importance that Kufour has placed on encouraging bilateral relations outside of West Africa. Additionally, Ghana’s foreign policy has focused on liberating itself from the shadow of Nigeria in West Africa. Ghana’s relationship with Nigeria will be of crucial importance in the future, not just in terms of economic cooperation, but in human security terms as well. At present, there are nearly a quarter of a million Ghanaian migrant workers in Nigeria, and the instability which occurred during the 2003 elections in Nigeria had significant knock-on effects for the Ghanaian economy. Kufour is also unhappy about the hegemonic tendencies of Nigeria in West Africa, and sees the APRM as a means through which to dilute Nigerian influence in Ghana through multilateral alliances. This regional dimension to Ghana’s foreign policy is likely another motivating factor in Kufour’s commitment to the APRM.

Unlike those states which have avoided the APRM – fearing that the costs of surrendering sovereignty to a regional body will outweigh the gains of economic aid and structural reform – Ghana has a long history of collective governance, cooperation and partnership. Ghana’s first president, Nkrumah, was in fact responsible for much of the work that led to the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). Additionally, Ghana has been an active member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and is strongly in favour of promoting regional economic cooperation and integration. Ghana’s decision to join the APRM therefore reinforces the country’s tradition of cooperation at a regional, multilateral level.

Kufour’s decision to sign on to the APRM has also undoubtedly been influenced by the relatively short tenure of his administration in Ghana. Unlike Dos Santos of Angola and similar to Kabila of the DRC, Kufour is far less constrained by the political baggage that comes with protracted and lengthy rule, and as such probably sees far less risk and political cost in peer assessment than longstanding leaders. In the event that a review team was to submit a highly critical report on Ghana’s compliance with APRM
standards, Kufour would be able to blame the failure to comply on historical abuses by previous administrations, most obviously the Rawlings government; or to blame the limited duration of his time in office. In either case, the political costs to the president and the NPP are likely to be negligible compared to the opportunities for gain that the APRM presents at both the political and economic level, suggesting that Ghana has much to gain and little to lose by joining the mechanism.

6.4 CONCLUSION
Ghana has emerged as a stable and democratic state in the turbulent West African region, and its commitment to the APRM is unlikely to surprise many, given the country’s historical involvement in regional collective initiatives, and the challenges that its geographical location within the West African region present. Kufour has clearly placed the importance of economic aid and debt relief high on his list of priorities, and the collective nature of the APRM is also a motivating factor in his position vis-à-vis the APRM. The progress that has been made in Ghana towards the liberal and democratic practices which both the Kufour administration and the APRM espouse will likely hinge on the extent to which both are able to deliver tangible benefits to the Ghanaian people, whose patience is already wearing thin. Ghana can ill afford providing the army yet another opportunity to intervene in the governance of its people.
Botswana has arguably the best governance record in Africa over the past 40 years, having established a multiparty democracy, and an economy based largely on sound economic principles and liberal ideology.\textsuperscript{154} It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that the continent’s longest and most stable democratic state has opted not to join the APRM process. Despite governance estimates well above the global average, and far beyond the African average governance scores, Botswana does not believe that its national interests will be better served through the APRM in the future. Kaufmann estimated that Botswana’s political and economic governance scores were comparable with Japanese governance quality, and well above the global average. These scores rank Botswana as one of the top 20 states in the world in both governance rankings, and it is only upon closer examination of Botswana’s current institutions that its decision not to join the APRM makes sense.

7.1 COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Although it was one of the poorest countries in the world at independence in 1966, the discovery of diamonds in 1967 boosted Botswana’s economy\textsuperscript{155} and, combined with accountable and consistent governance, Botswana has witnessed impressive and sustained economic growth rates over the past 40 years. This is in spite of Botswana’s close proximity to South Africa, which during the apartheid years saw fit to interfere in Botswana’s internal affairs whenever it suited Pretoria to do so. The Botswana government was nevertheless able to implement economic policies and fiscal controls which have led to sustained and steady economic growth since the country’s independence. Botswana’s history has been characterised by a lack of violent conflict, with incidences of ethnic and social conflict rare and sporadic, and the country has emerged as a shining example of how democracy can be made to work in an African context.

Botswana’s exports are heavily dependent on diamonds, beef and copper-nickel,\textsuperscript{156} and President Festus Mogae is aware of the need to diversify the country’s export base;\textsuperscript{157} however, as tourism remains another valuable source of revenue for the Southern African state, the need to diversify is not an all-consuming priority for Mogae. Since 1996, Botswana’s economy has
maintained inflation rates of below seven per cent a year, with real growth rates of between five and eight per cent annually for the same period. This economic performance is largely attributed to the excellent governance standards and rule of law that exist in Botswana, as well as the tight fiscal controls and policies that have been consistently maintained throughout the various residencies.\footnote{158}

The strength of Botswana’s governance in comparison to other African nations is clearly evident in the Kaufmann governance estimates. In every one of the six indicators, Botswana is ranked within the top five African states, and in government effectiveness, political stability and rule of law, Kaufmann et al rank Botswana highest out of all the African states surveyed.\footnote{159} Other institutions have also rated the Botswana government favourably; for example, the World Economic Forum ranked Botswana’s political transparency as the highest in Africa, and 15th highest in the world.\footnote{160}

It is precisely because of the prominence of Botswana’s governance standards that its decision not to sign on to the APRM has proved to be so controversial regionally. Advocates of the peer review mechanism claim that Botswana’s involvement in the process would lend the APRM greater weight and legitimacy internationally, as well as facilitate knowledge sharing with other signatories in order to promote good governance continentally.\footnote{161} Botswana’s reluctance to sign the treaty has sparked fierce debate about the mechanism’s likelihood for success, the makeup of the APRM’s membership, and how it should be reconciled with existing governance standards of individual member states.\footnote{162} Botswana’s deliberate absence from the APRM creates legitimacy issues for the mechanism’s advocates, and will undoubtedly generate closer scrutiny than otherwise might have been the case had Botswana signed on. Mogae’s decision, justified in the sake of national interest, raises some fundamental questions about the APRM.

\section*{7.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND}
Botswana’s political and constitutional evolution reflects the stability and continuity that has enhanced its reputation globally. Since achieving independence, Botswana has maintained tight fiscal policies, sound management of mineral resources, promoted democratic governance and respected the rule of law. As a result, Botswana’s economy has grown steadily,
and its political institutions are now well established. Apart from political struggles within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the occasional government scandal, Botswana’s reputation is already extremely good, causing some government officials to challenge the relevance of the APRM in Botswana. It appears likely that Botswana has little to gain and much to lose by joining.

Until Botswana was occupied reluctantly by the British in the late 1820s, more out of fear of German occupation out of South West Africa than any other reason, the Tswana people, displaced by constant migrations of Boer settlers from the south, and the San hunter gatherers were the only people to live in this largely arid region. The majority of the Tswana settled in and around the major rivers and the Okavango Delta. During British occupation, Botswana was intended to merge with South Africa as an additional province in the Union, but only on condition that the citizenry of Botswana were in favour of such a move.

This consensus never materialised, and in 1966 the British handed over control of Botswana to the newly elected President Seretse Khama (later Sir Seretse Khama), head of the BDP. Botswana’s population at the time of independence was roughly 800,000 people, and the newly independent state covered an area the size of Texas. Initially, Botswana showed little potential in terms of natural resources, relying predominantly on beef and lumber as its main exports. However, the discovery of diamonds in the Okavango Delta provided a welcome boost to Botswana’s exports.

Botswana’s constitution was established with a balanced division of power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; with the executive, comprising the president and the cabinet initiating and directing policy. Botswana also maintains a House of Chiefs, incorporating the eight major tribes that exist in Botswana, who sit whenever the house of parliament refers legislation pertaining to tribal issues to the council. This system effectively resolved the role of the tribal chiefs in the government system immediately after independence. The constitution is constantly and vigilantly monitored by the judiciary, which by law must between every five and ten years appoint a delimitation committee to clarify whether any constituencies require alteration for any reason. Botswana’s constitution has remained largely
unchanged since independence – an early indicator of the country’s political stability.

Even prior to independence, the BDP faced a major challenge from the radical nationalist Botswana People’s Party (BPP), whose leader, K T.Motsetse, advocated the nationalisation of private industry, the centralisation of resources and improved worker conditions. The BPP found a strong following from the urban workforce, the intelligentsia of the line-of-rail towns and the youth. However, despite its strong pull in urban areas, the BPP consistently underperformed in elections, largely due to the limiting influence of the other less radical nationalist parties. At its peak, the BPP won about 40% of the votes cast, but would be plagued by constant infighting which would ultimately weaken the party and lead to several splits in its history. The strength of the BPP as an opposition party has, however, in many ways facilitated a greater degree of accountability in the BDP government, maintaining approximately a 25–30% share of parliamentary seats.¹⁶⁸

Under President Khama, the Botswana government pursued a course of open market, liberal economic policies, with a strong emphasis on encouraging foreign investment and creating favourable investment conditions. In 1975, a workers’ strike at the Selebi-Phikwe mines was firmly contained by the government, which ruled in favour of the company and upheld its decision to sack hundreds of strikers, as well as sending in the Police Mobile Unit to maintain law and order.¹⁶⁹ While this move was greeted with enthusiasm by big business in Botswana, the trade unions became concerned about their future role in labour relations. The BDP was increasingly becoming seen as a ‘big business’ party, and it was during this time that the BPP made considerable gains in popular support. The government, however, aware of the BPP’s growing popularity launched several initiatives aimed at restoring its status among the people, including the creation of a youth league and new channels of communication with the trade unions. These measures proved successful in preventing the BPP from gaining a clear majority in the elections in 1979.

It was during this period, however, that foreign affairs took precedence over domestic issues, with South African interference in Botswana’s affairs escalating as it stepped up its efforts to track down and eliminate African National Congress (ANC) guerrilla camps operating within the frontline states.
Although Khama’s diplomatic efforts ensured that Botswana remained a respected member of the frontline states coalition, he also refused to sanction the presence of ANC training camps inside Botswana’s borders. This failed to deter Pretoria, whose armed forces launched a number of night-time raids across the border into Gaborone, often leaving numerous suspected sympathisers dead in their wake. Another major difficulty that the BDP faced was the rising number of South African refugees, mainly students, who began to stream across the Botswana border after the 1976 Soweto uprisings. The presence of these refugees, as well as accusations from the apartheid government that the ANC was using the opportunity to recruit for its military camps, posed serious challenges to Seretse Khama’s government. At the same time, refugee numbers from Rhodesia were increasing as well: by 1979, 20,000 Rhodesian refugees were in camps along the Botswana–Rhodesia border.

Sir Seretse Khama died of cancer on 13 July 1980 and was succeeded by his vice-president, Dr Quett Masire. The entire country mourned, and numerous international governments offered condolences out of respect for Botswana’s leader. Masire, who had been Khama’s right-hand man since independence, maintained the policies which had been the cornerstone of his predecessor’s government, ensuring both continuity and stability in doing so. A former finance minister, Masire maintained tight and controlled fiscal policy, able to slightly reduce the country’s national deficit during his regime; a notable achievement given the looming commodity price crash and oil hikes. Masire’s first cabinet demonstrated a more balanced ethnic make-up, which was received positively by the eastern ethnic groups that had voiced concerns over the tribal balance in government. This move was seen by all as an olive branch, and effectively ended the discontent among the various ethnic groups in question.

Domestic issues continued to be overshadowed by trouble with its neighbours, as relations with South Africa and Zimbabwe became strained. The South African government continued to launch illegal raids into Gaborone and relations with the Mugabe regime became strained over the presence of ZAPU guerrillas in the east of Botswana.

In 1992, however, a major political scandal erupted surrounding the then vice-president Peter Mmusi, who became embroiled in accusations of using
his office to secure profitable land deals and concessions. He promptly resigned and was replaced as vice-president by Festus Mogae. However, in what was believed to be a victory for the old guard within the BDP, Mmusi and co-accused Daniel Kwelagobe, then Minister of Agriculture, were reinstated to Botswana’s cabinet, despite being found guilty of improper conduct and illegal use of their positions in their land deals. Mmusi’s re-appointment dealt a serious blow to the BDP’s ‘modernisers’, whose leader, Mompathi Merafhe stood against Mmusi for party secretary in 1993, but was heavily defeated. The Botswana National Front (BNF), another radical nationalist political party, threatened to boycott the 1994 elections, ostensibly because of Mmusi’s re-inclusion in the cabinet, but more likely in fact seeking a redress of the voting age from 21 to 18, which favoured its own support. Additionally, factions within the BDP continued to widen, despite another convincing victory for the BDP in 1994. The judiciary began to examine the constitutionality of a limitation of two-terms for the president, as well as other constitutional reforms including reducing the voting age. In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled on both of these issues, imposing a two-term limit on the office of president and reducing the voting age from 21 to 18. In 1998, Masire stepped down voluntarily, acceding of his own accord to the Supreme Court ruling, stating that that the old order had to give way before it corrupted the new. In doing so, Masire joined a small group of African leaders who did not try to prolong their terms beyond the legal limit. Masire was succeeded by Festus Mogae.

Mogae, who had previously served as Minister of Finance, maintained largely the same economic and fiscal policies that had proven so successful in promoting economic growth in Botswana since independence. Private enterprise, the rule of law, freedom of speech and access to education have remained important aspects of the BDP’s policies under Mogae. Within the BDP itself, Mogae has also proven his appeal with both the modernisers and the old guard – for the moment at least healing the rift that has developed between the two factions. Mogae’s major focus domestically, however, has been the implementation and enunciation of the country’s Vision 2016 – a national mission statement seeking to create more equitable social conditions for all Botswana. Vision 2016, it would appear, is at least partly responsible for Botswana’s reluctance to join the APRM.
7.3 THE APRM AND VISION 2016
It appears as though two interrelated factors are the primary motivation for Mogae not to sign on to the APRM. Botswana’s reputation is already internationally acknowledged, and it is unlikely that the APRM could enhance that reputation to any significant degree, making the question of joining the APRM largely redundant. Additionally, with little to be gained, the APRM may require alterations to the established long-term development plans that Botswana has implemented through the country’s Vision 2016. Unless the APRM offers tangibly better outcomes than Vision 2016, there is even less reason for Mogae to join the initiative.

In 1996, when he was then vice-president, Mogae instigated a commission into the economic and social well-being of Botswana’s citizens, with the mandate to develop “a framework for a long-term vision for Botswana”.¹⁷² This framework, now known as Vision 2016, was based on four principles, namely: democracy, development, self-reliance and unity.¹⁷³ Vision 2016 outlines a collective set of goals which it aims to achieve by this date, stating that Botswana will be:

- an educated and informed nation;
- at the forefront of technology;
- prosperous and productive;
- developing in a sustainable way;
- safe and secure;
- democratic, open and accountable; and
- united and proud, sharing common symbols, values and goals.¹⁷⁴

This 20-year time-frame was established in order to allow the government time to achieve these objectives. Although the framework provides the goals which Vision 2016 aspires to, the exact manner in which these goals are to be achieved has been less clearly enunciated.

Masire, in 1997, announced that the government planned to privatise the telecommunications and manufacturing sector completely, to restock the depleted cattle lands of Ngamiland, which had historically provided much of Botswana’s beef exports, and to introduce new incentives to attract foreign investment. In 1998, these incentives proved successful: Korean motor
manufacturer Hyundai announced that it would increase its light car construction to 60,000 cars a year, making motor vehicle exports the second largest export behind diamonds from 1998. The BDP has clearly adopted a laissez-faire approach to the economy, placing strong emphasis on the importance of education in particular, which has been a cornerstone of Mogae’s policies. Yet if it is to achieve the goals contained in Vision 2016, Botswana is in need of further and greater flows of foreign investment in order to create a more broadly diversified economy.

Botswana’s economy has recently been hard hit by the triple effects of a regional drought which has hurt its agricultural sector, declining aid flows to African states due to the US-led war on Iraq and the general downturn in the global economy, which has seen tourism fall considerably in the past two years. As a result, Botswana’s economy has underperformed recently, aggravating some of its social problems. The IMF has endorsed Botswana’s sound economic management, but has urged the Mogae administration to do more to cut poverty and unemployment. It is estimated that 54% of Botswana’s 1.5 million people live below the poverty line, and unemployment remains high at 35%. Additionally, the disparity in income between the rural and urban workforce is beginning to widen appreciably for the first time in the country’s history, which, combined with the population explosion in urban areas, is putting pressure on the government to deliver more jobs to the people.

In this context, it is reasonable to expect that a country with an outstanding governance record, which needs to inject new investment and capital into its economy, would see the NEPAD initiative and the APRM as an easy option in acquiring new capital inflows. However, despite the fact that it appears increasingly likely that future aid packages to Africa will be tied to the APRM, and the seemingly negligible costs of signing on to the mechanism, Botswana continues to see its national interests as separate from the APRM.

As a result of this seemingly counter-intuitive position on the APRM, and Botswana’s high profile in African governance, Mogae’s government has been criticised both regionally and domestically for its lack of interest in the mechanism, and has been forced to justify its position repeatedly. According to one government official: “The country feels it has already opened its
economy to enough international scrutiny, while the political review process will be too difficult to implement because the issues are not quantitative.”  

This statement succinctly points to the heart of the Botswana government’s dilemma: while NEPAD and the APRM are both laudable initiatives, and the concept of regional accountability holds merit for many states, Botswana has already demonstrated both the political will and necessary institutional capacities to maintain the type of accountability that other states require regional initiatives to establish.

In contrast to the presently idealistic and theoretical goals of the APRM, with little evidence of whether they will work in application, Botswana’s own institutional capacities are well established, tried and tested, and joining the mechanism potentially places those institutional frameworks in jeopardy. If Botswana were to join the APRM and the organisation were to ultimately degenerate into a club for African leaders to pat each other on the back, Botswana’s credibility might in fact be harmed by association with the mechanism. If in this scenario Botswana remained apart from the APRM, then its reputation would be unharmed by the failure of the mechanism.

Furthermore, the legitimacy of the APRM will be dependent on the regional commitment to accountable and good governance practices, and with huge question marks hanging over issues such as the AU’s handling of Zimbabwe and the legitimacy of the Nigerian elections in 2003, a decision to involve itself in the APRM process might in fact damage international perceptions of governance in Botswana. Axelrod and Keohane capture the essence of Botswana’s dilemma succinctly, arguing that most states trade on their reputations, and where these reputations are poor, it is necessary for the state to introduce credible institutions which improve its reputation.

Clearly, Mogae sees little that the APRM can do to improve Botswana’s already excellent reputation.

Another factor complicating Botswana’s response to the initiative is the role that South Africa has played in developing the NEPAD and APRM frameworks. South African President Thabo Mbeki is recognised as the architect of NEPAD, and South Africa has been prominently involved in the promotion of the initiative continentally. Although relations between the two countries have improved dramatically in the post-apartheid era,
Botswana is wary of its southern neighbour’s political influence within the region, in particular South Africa’s regional and continental ambitions.\(^{180}\) Although the NEPAD framework is premised on “a global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual trust”,\(^{181}\) it would appear that Botswana’s preference would be to develop a mutually beneficial bilateral relationship through the avenue of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) rather than through wider regional initiatives like the AU.\(^{182}\) Fundamentally, South Africa’s ideology differs markedly from Botswana’s on the future of cooperation in Africa, with South Africa favouring the multilateral approach to African relations, whereas Botswana prefers bilateral links in its foreign policy.\(^{183}\)

Botswana’s government has to assess whether or not these two initiatives – one an ambitious, continental development framework and the other a national development scheme tailored specifically for Botswana – can be compatible as an essential part of its decision on signing on to the APRM. Already eight years into a 20-year vision which aims to redress the social and economic imbalances presently existent in the country, Vision 2016 has been an important point on Festus Mogae’s agenda since assuming the presidency.\(^{184}\) Although the two initiatives were conceived separately, and with different purposes, on the face of it the two initiatives seek to establish largely similar social and economic conditions, such as poverty reduction, the containment of HIV/AIDS and improving basic education. Even the time frames are compatible; NEPAD aims to achieve its objectives by 2015, while Botswana’s vision seeks completion in 2016.

However, the major sticking point between the two initiatives is in their respective underpinning ideologies. One of the four main principles of Vision 2016 is self-reliance,\(^{185}\) while NEPAD’s development is based on the premise of “shared responsibility and mutual interest”.\(^{186}\) While Mogae believes that it is in his country’s national interests to choose partnerships with discretion, Mbeki sees South Africa’s future to be inextricably linked with the continent, and more specifically the region. Here is where the South African vision of collective cooperation contrasts sharply with Botswana’s view of self-reliance. Although it is possible for Botswana’s government to improve the compatibility of Vision 2016 with the NEPAD vision, there is at present little incentive for Mogae to make any such attempt.
Mogae has also assessed the risks involved in not signing up for the APRM, and found that these are negligible compared to the risks of joining the review process. Concerns about the future of international aid to Africa are unlikely to materialise in the short term, and if aid does become inextricably linked to the APRM and NEPAD, then Botswana can always review its position in light of this information. Civil society in Botswana perceives the NEPAD process to have been conceived from the top-down, and as a result is largely in favour of the government’s position. Although some non-governmental groups are campaigning for the government to change its position vis-à-vis the APRM, at present the issue is of negligible political importance domestically to the BDP. Although Botswana’s decision to remain apart from the APRM is likely to continue to draw criticism regionally and continentally, this criticism is also unlikely to faze Mogae’s government. As such, for the time being, Botswana appears to be satisfied to ‘wait-and-see’ whether the outcomes of joining the APRM are likely to be beneficial; if they are, then Mogae can always review his position on the issue.

7.4 CONCLUSION

It would appear that Mogae is convinced that his country’s national interests will be best served in the context of selective bilateral links, mutually beneficial partnerships and trade ties. Mogae is clearly intent on exploiting his country’s excellent governance record in order to attract greater foreign investment flows into the country, and believes that this record would be placed in jeopardy if Botswana signs on to the APRM. At best, the APRM appears to be a redundant and expensive addition to Botswana’s excellent political and economic institutions, and at worst, the mechanism could conceivably undermine Botswana’s hard earned reputation. Ultimately, Botswana stands to gain little and risks much if it signs up for the peer review process, providing strong motivation for the BDP and Mogae to refrain from involvement in the mechanism at all.
CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper examines the role a state’s political and economic governance plays in motivating its position on the APRM, and attempts to unravel some of the competing motivations a state has for adopting that position. Statistical analysis of the data suggests that there appears to be a weak positive relationship between good quality governance scores and APRM membership. In general, the states that have joined the APRM tend to have slightly better quality institutions and governance standards than those states that have rejected the APRM. An examination of four individual case studies in greater detail suggests that states which have adopted a particular position tend to have similar characteristics, some of which are unrelated to the quality of their governance and institutions. This chapter summarises these characteristics and points to some general trends and similarities between different types of states.

8.1 CASE STUDY SUMMARIES
8.1.1 ANGOLA
Initially, Angola opted not to join in the APRM initiative, and one of the motivations for this decision appears to have been the country’s poor political and economic governance track record. Kaufmann rated the political governance of Angola as –1.39 below the global governance standard, and for economic governance, Kaufmann ranked Angola –1.16 below the global standard. The devastation wrought by the protracted war in Angola has had severe implications for the government, and the potential to comply with APRM standards appears unlikely to materialise in Angola for some years. There are, however, equally compelling reasons for Angola not to join the APRM, which have less to do with governance quality than they do with other factors.

A key issue for Dos Santos is that the APRM is unlikely to improve significantly Angola’s governance reputation in the short term, making the mechanism less attractive as a means of improving private investor confidence in Angola. There are also likely to be personal costs involved in compliance with the APRM, and the process of review has the potential to expose the details of years of corrupt and patrimonial rule in Angola, with
possible implications at the highest level. The manner in which the war in Angola was resolved, with the defeat of UNITA, as well as the oil reserves that ensure a steady flow of investment into Angola regardless of its governance standards, affords the Dos Santos government with a greater degree of independence than is immediately apparent. Dos Santos’s late decision to join the APRM has not invalidated these considerations, but clearly changing circumstances since Angola’s initial decision to reject the APRM have necessitated a reappraisal of the costs and benefits of Angola joining the mechanism.

8.1.2 THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The DRC has also recently concluded a peace agreement after years of protracted warfare, and similarly possesses vast mineral resources and other forms of potential wealth. Its governance standards – even worse than Angola’s with a voice and accountability estimate of −1.889 and a government effectiveness estimate of −1.6 – have failed to deter President Joseph Kabila from joining the APRM. For the DRC, poor political and economic governance quality does not pose the problem that it does to a state like Angola, for several reasons. One reason for Kabila’s accession to the APRM is the country’s vulnerability to outside influences. Kabila is at present unable to ensure the geographical, political and military sovereignty of his country without regional assistance. Unlike Angola, peace in the DRC came about through negotiated settlement, including a number of neighbouring states poised to resume the conflict if Kabila missteps diplomatically. Additionally, numerous armed rebel groups remain active in the DRC and Kabila is presently unable to remove these groups from the country militarily. This means that Kabila is dependent on regional actors and international assistance in order to maintain control over the government. Kabila is also severely constrained in motivating economic, political or diplomatic reforms given the make-up of the DRC’s government of national unity. The additional motivation of forging strong links with South Africa, which has a strategic and economic interest in the DRC, has also motivated Kabila’s response to the APRM. Kabila’s tenuous position also minimises the personal costs of failure to comply with APRM standards, and the regional community is likely to have modest expectations in this regard for a number of years to come. As a result, the APRM is a viable option for Kabila, despite the DRC’s poor governance quality at present.
8.1.3 GHANA

Ghana has seen a dramatic improvement in the quality of its governance in recent years, and Kaufmann rated the West African nation’s voice and accountability as 0.011 and its government effectiveness as 0.01 (roughly average for global standards) in 2002. Ghana’s commitment to the APRM appears to reflect a strong desire on the part of President John Kufour to improve his country’s reputation internationally, as well as to improve the accountability and transparency of the government. Ghana’s democratic triumph in 2000, for the first time transferring power from one democratically elected president to another, has clearly motivated its response to the APRM. However, additional motivations have also encouraged Kufour to sign on to the mechanism. Despite the success of the elections in 2000, Kufour’s government remains vulnerable to both domestic and foreign influences. Domestically, Kufour is in the precarious process of reforming the military, as well as addressing pressing social issues such as unemployment and foreign immigrants. Regionally, Ghana remains vulnerable to the instabilities of neighbouring states, such as Sierra Leone, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire. Additionally, Kufour is anxious to see Ghana emerge from the hegemonic shadow of Nigeria in West Africa, and sees the APRM as a means of doing so. As a result of these domestic and foreign vulnerabilities, and the country’s HIPC status, Kufour sees the APRM as a useful mechanism through which to improve Ghana’s relations with other states, and in doing so the security of his administration.

8.1.4 BOTSWANA

At first glance, Botswana appears to be a certain candidate to join the APRM, with one of the best governance reputations on the continent. This is reflected in Kaufmann’s governance scores, with a voice and accountability score of 0.733 and a government effectiveness score of 0.87. However, President Mogae has defended his country’s decision not to join the APRM despite the consternation and criticism of the APRM’s leading advocates. A closer examination of Mogae’s motivations for rejecting the mechanism reveals the redundancy of the APRM for government’s that already boast excellent governance reputations.

Botswana’s position on the APRM appears to be strongly motivated by the view that it has little to gain and much to lose. While the majority of African
states have earned reputations for poor quality governance, Botswana has managed independently to earn the respect and recognition of the international community for its high quality of democratic, accountable and transparent political and economic governance. This recognition has resulted in sustained economic growth and generally positive economic performance over the past 40 years. Additionally, Botswana has historically preferred to pursue bilateral relations with those states in the region that serve mutually beneficial purposes, affording Botswana a high degree of independence in its foreign policies.

The existence of already established domestic development frameworks, such as Vision 2016, compound the Mogae government’s motivations for rejecting the APRM on the premise that if Botswana’s domestic policies are already doing the job that the APRM purports to achieve, then the mechanism is of little relevance for Botswana. Ironically, Botswana’s reputation might in fact be harmed if it were to join the APRM, providing sufficient justification for Mogae to reject the APRM.

8.2 EMERGING TRENDS
Although the statistics suggest that political and economic governance standards are relevant to a state’s position on the APRM, a number of other trends emerge in motivating that position. From the case studies, it appears as though the states that rejected the APRM (Angola and Botswana) are less vulnerable to foreign influences; that is, the national interests of these countries tend to be located more in domestic objectives than the states that have signed on to the mechanism (the DRC and Ghana). States that rejected the APRM also exhibited a stronger emphasis on bilateral relationships in their foreign policy than states that have joined the mechanism. Finally, the evolution of governance standards in the countries that rejected the APRM is such that they appear less likely to see a visible short-term improvement in their governance reputations than those states that have signed on.

8.3 CONCLUSION
Statistical analysis of the importance of governance in a state’s position on NEPAD is suggestive, but ultimately inconclusive. States that have joined the APRM tend to have slightly higher governance scores than those that have not; however, this has not prevented states with poor governance quality
from signing on to the APRM, nor has it prevented other states with excellent governance records from rejecting the mechanism. As a result, this paper concludes that although the quality of a state’s governance is often an important motivation in its position on the APRM, it is only one of several important factors in that equation.
APPENDIX A – 16 MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

(AS OF 4 FEBRUARY 2004) 189

Republic of Algeria
Republic of Burkina Faso
Republic of Cameroon
Republic of Congo
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Republic of Mozambique
Federal Republic of Nigeria
Republic of Ghana
Republic of Kenya
Republic of Rwanda
Republic of Senegal
Republic of Uganda
Republic of Gabon
Republic of Mauritius
Republic of Mali
Republic of South Africa
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


NOTES

14. ‘Political conditionalities’ violated the legal mandate of the IMF and World Bank, which deliberately avoided the appearance of tying...
political conditions to aid disbursement. However, both institutions have become vocal advocates of improving the political governance of a state in order to facilitate its development.


16 S Gelb, op cit, 2002.

17 Structural adjustment policies were historically the preserve of the IMF, while the World Bank tended to focus on project-based lending schemes. However, as the development discourse evolved, World Bank lending began to more closely mirror IMF structural adjustment, emphasising tight fiscal controls, accountable fiscal standards and reducing debt as necessary for development.

18 M Thomas, Getting debt relief right, Foreign Affairs 80(5), September/October 2001, pp. 36-45.


20 See this chapter – The African dilemma.


24 Inevitable comparisons have been made between the LPoA and NEPAD. Despite their similar aims, however, the two initiatives are based on completely different ideological bases; the LPoA favours dependency theory, while NEPAD focuses on promoting democracy and accountability as a basis for Africa’s renewal.


31 The seven-member panel is comprised of Ms Marie Angelique Savane, Prof. Adebayo Adeleji, Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat, Mr Mourad Medelci, Dr Dorothy Njeuma, Dr Chris Stals and Mrs Graça Machel. <http://www.touchtech.biz/nepad>.
33 Ibid, p. 4, paragraph 20.
40 For the purposes of this paper, the Kaufmann data on corporate governance was deliberately excluded.
42 D Kaufmann et al, op cit, 2002.
44 D Kaufmann et al, op cit, 2002.

47 D Kaufmann et al, op cit, 2002. Statistically, a score of 0 is actually slightly above average, because of the difficulty in acquiring accurate data for countries with weak institutions. This has the result of weighting the average governance standards at a higher average than an actual objective standard would likely be. In other words, a score of 0 statistically indicates an average governance rating, but given the standard deviation weighting calculations, it probably represents a score of slightly above average in terms of global standards.

48 For statistical purposes, six countries with populations of less than one million people were excluded, as none of these states have joined the APRM, and some have not even joined the African Union. These countries were Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles.


50 An assumed variance which is equal for both samples was used in order to simplify the calculations.

51 See Figure 3.1 – The four positions.

52 For a statistical representation of the data, see Appendix A.

53 In the majority of t-tests, anything less than a 95% chance that the data is statistically significant demonstrates that no relationship exists between two means. In this case, the data is between 70% and 90% significant, indicating a weak positive relationship which is not strong enough by itself to be definitive.

54 J Vreeland, op cit, 2000. Vreeland uses a similar approach to tackle the question of why some states applied for IMF debt assistance without apparent need and others refused assistance despite a pressing need for debt relief.


59 Ibid, p. 775.

60 Ibid, p. 772.


62 After the Cuban missile crisis, both the US and the USSR realised that any direct confrontation between them could result in global annihilation, and as a result both sides limited themselves in regional conflicts, essentially contesting with one another through proxy allies. This had the result of complicating conflicts and establishing conflicting ideologies in the contesting factions.


64 Figure quoted in K Booth & P Vale, Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism, *International Affairs* 71(2), 1995, p. 286.

65 350,000 people were killed, many civilians, and more than two million displaced in the just under two years from 1992 to 1994. See S Stedman, op cit.


69 Ibid.

70 V P Andrade, op cit, pp. 113-115.


72 Ibid.
77 V P Andrade, op cit, pp. 128-130.
83 J E Dos Santos, op cit, 2002.


93 Ibid.


96 The CIA was concerned about Lumumba’s communist ties, and the prime minister had also tried to play the two superpowers off against one another with threats of accepting Soviet aid if the UN did not assist him in squashing secessionist risings. *The History of Zaire*, op cit.


98 Ibid.

99 K Smith & F Nothling, op cit.

100 Ibid.


104 Ibid.

105 G Castillo, op cit, 2003, p. 11.


107 Ibid.


110 Ibid, p. 139.

111 J Vreeland, op cit, pp.16-19.


113 H Solomon, op cit, p. 142.

114 This is a classic case of the Vreeland argument mentioned in Chapter 2 – Analytical framework.


123 Ibid.


125 Ibid, p 167.


127 Ghana officially became independent in 1957, but was only declared a republic in 1960.


Ibid.


During the 1980s, commodity prices fell by 90% while at the same time, oil prices would triple in costs, sparking the developing world’s debt crisis. K Smith & F J Nothling, op cit, 2001, p. 433.

Ibid.


D Mbachu, op cit, pp. 249-257.


T Hughes, op cit, p. 143.


T Hughes, op cit, p. 145.


T Hughes, op cit, p. 146.


All of these states have joined the APRM. See Appendix A.


South Africa is one of the key supporters of the APRM, and Ghana’s decision to join will undoubtedly improve ties between the two countries.

South African Department of Trade and Industry Economic Database, data collected from South African Customs Union and Excise, 2000.


162 Ibid.


173 Ibid.
Ibid.


179 Ibid.


183 Ibid.


EISA PROFILE

The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values, practices and enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA is currently the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is also the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.

VISION

Realisation of effective and sustainable democratic governance in Southern Africa and beyond.

MISSION

To strengthen electoral processes, democratic governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other strategically targeted interventions.
VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

Key values and principles of governance that EISA believes in include:

- Regular free and fair elections
- Promoting democratic values
- Respect for fundamental human rights
- Due process of law/rule of law
- Constructive management of conflict
- Political tolerance
- Inclusive multiparty democracy
- Popular participation
- Transparency
- Gender equality
- Accountability
- Promoting electoral norms and standards

OBJECTIVES

- To nurture and consolidate democratic governance
- To build institutional capacity of regional and local actors through research, education, training, information and technical advice
- To ensure representation and participation of minorities in the governance process
- To strive for gender equality in the governance process
- To strengthen civil society organisations in the interest of sustainable democratic practice, and
- To build collaborative partnerships with relevant stakeholders in the governance process.

CORE ACTIVITIES

- Research
- Conferences, Seminars and workshops
• Publishing
• Conducting elections and ballots
• Technical advice
• Capacity building
• Election observation
• Election evaluation
• Networking
• Voter/Civic education
• Conflict management
• Educator and Learner Resource Packs

PROGRAMMES

EISA’s Core Business revolves around four (4) main programmes namely (a) Conflict Management, Democracy and Electoral Education; (b) Electoral Political Processes; and (c) Balloting and Electoral Services and (d) Research and Publications.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL EDUCATION

This programme comprises various projects including voter education, democracy and human rights education; electoral observation; electoral staff training; electoral conflict management; capacity building; course design; citizen participation.

ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

This programme addresses areas such as technical assistance for electoral commissions, civil society organisations and political parties; coordination of election observation and monitoring missions; working towards the establishment of electoral norms and standards for the SADC region; providing technical support to both the SADC-ECF and the SADC-ESN.

BALLOTING AND ELECTORAL SERVICES

The programme enhances the credibility and legitimacy of organisational elections by providing independent and impartial electoral administration,
management and consultancy services. The key activities include managing elections for political parties, trade unions, pension funds, medical aid societies, etc.

**RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS PROGRAMME**

The EISA research and Publications programme comprises various projects focusing mainly on research and analysis as well as information dissemination. The current research projects include democracy consolidation, electoral systems design and reforms, gender and elections, use of state resources during elections and intra-party democracy. All the projects cover the entire Southern Africa (SADC) region specifically and Africa as a whole. The publications programme involves regular production of the following: books, journal, occasional papers, election updates, election handbooks, research reports, country profiles, election talk.

**EISA’S SPECIAL PROJECTS INCLUDE:**

- Rule of Law, which examines issues related to justice and human rights;
- Local Government, which aims to promote community participation in governance ; and
- Political Parties, which aims to promote party development at strategic, organisational and structural levels through youth empowerment, leadership development and development of party coalitions.

**EISA’S SUPPORT SERVICES INCLUDE:**

- Library
- Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

**EISA PRODUCTS**

- CD-ROMS
- Conference Proceedings
- Election Observer Reports
- Newsletters
- Voter education manuals
- Election database
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Patrons
EISA’s patrons are His Excellency Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana and the instrumental broker of the peace negotiations that ushered peace and reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002 and Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, a key negotiator during the political transition to democratic governance and majority rule in South Africa in 1994 and a businessman of standing in the new South Africa.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

EISA has an International Board of Directors comprising the following:

Mr. Leshele Thoahlane Former Executive Director of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the current chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission in Lesotho (Chairperson of the Board)
Professor Jorgen Elklit Professor of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark
Mr. Steve Godfrey Commonwealth Advisor in South Africa, London
Mr. Denis Kadima Executive Director of EISA
Professor Peter Katjavivi Former Vice Chancellor of the University of Namibia and the current Ambassador of Namibia to the European Union (EU) in Brussels
Justice L. Makame Judge of the Appeal Court in Tanzania and Chairperson of the Tanzanian National Election Commission
Ms. Dren Nupen Former Executive Director of EISA
Dr. Gloria Somolekae A senior lecturer at the University of Botswana and currently a senior policy analyst of the Kellogg Foundation
Ms. Ilona Tip Senior Advisor, Department of Conflict Management, Democracy and Electoral Education at EISA