EISA elections series:
A weekly review of the South African 2019 national and provincial elections
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Foreword
Election update 2019

National elections are always significant moments in the historical trajectory of any democratic state, and the 2019 South African elections are no exception. This almanac of election briefs was put together by a dedicated team of researchers as part of EISA’s programme to engage in elections, contributing to the body of knowledge on a range of issues pertinent to the 2019 elections.

The volume you are now reading is a compilation of the election briefs that were produced and disseminated by EISA from 3 April to 22 May 2019 covering the pre-election, election day and post-election period of the South African 2019 National and Provincial elections.

It begins by reflecting on the pre-election issues, with an analysis of pertinent issues of governance emanating from the 2014 electoral cycle, and their impact on the electoral outcomes. Moving on to giving an analysis of political parties contesting the elections, which includes functioning and organisation of political parties as well as the internal party dynamics, factionalism and fractions. Lastly, it gives insight into the management of the elections in South Africa with a focus on the Independent Electoral Commission.

The final three issues looked at voting day, and the post-election period, detailing salient issues that transpired during the elections, such as service delivery protests, low voter turnout, political violence, and double voting with controversial use offline ‘zip-zip machines’ and section24A forms.

The overall objective of the updates was to provide an in-depth analysis of the 2019 National and Provincial elections, focusing on the institutional framework of elections, with the following thematic chapters:

- Chapter 1: SA elections: 2014-2019
- Chapter 2: Political parties: The voter’s choice
- Chapter 3: Social issues and party manifestos
- Chapter 4: The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
- Chapter 5: The pre-election environment
- Chapter 6: Election day
- Chapter 7: Who voted and why in the 2019 elections?
EISA is a non-partisan, international non-governmental organisation working to promote credible elections, citizen participation and the strengthening of political institutions for sustainable democratic governance in Africa. The Institute has offices in Johannesburg, South Africa, as well as having past and current field offices in over a dozen other African countries. EISA has been observing elections in Africa for more than 20 years. EISA has been involved in South African elections since 1999, supporting critical dialogues on the electoral processes; researching and imparting crucial information in relation to the elections; supporting civic and voter education; supporting citizen observation and election conflict management panels amongst other areas of support.
WILL THE #MUSTFALL MOVEMENTS INFLUENCE VOTING IN 2019?

WRITTEN BY NANCY HAKIZIMANA AND SIZWE NENE

The origin of the “#MustFall” movements in South Africa, particularly at institutions of higher leaning regarding fees, can be traced to the history of underprivileged black students. Chikane (2018) highlights that these movements work towards “de-linking [...] the current state of nature that imagines South Africa as a country that is equal for all”. What began as apolitical movements for students who protested against a higher education system that they viewed as exclusionary and inherently colonial, the student “#MustFall” movement became politicised with the involvement of certain political parties. This ignited scepticism among students.

This article sets out a brief explanation of the multilayered dynamics between student bodies, the leaders of student organisations and political parties, and how this dynamic might impact the 2019 national and provincial elections. How were students’ perceptions of politics altered by the movement and how has the movement impacted on the election prospects of the three largest political parties (the ANC, the DA and the EFF)?

The #FeesMustFall protests, which began in October 2015, saw students across the country call for a free education system, as promised by the ruling ANC two decades ago. The protests ended after unilateral concessions were made by student leaders during talks with university and government officials, leaving masses of students disillusioned with what they saw as a failure to realise the intention of #FeesMustFall. As such, students questioned what they saw as the premature ending of the protests.
The majority of these questions were directed at ANC-backed student organisations such as the Progressive Youth Alliance at the University of the Witwatersrand, where student leaders were accused of taking bribes from ANC leaders to stop the #FeesMustFall protests (Daily Vox Team, 2015). These allegations of bribery have since diminished the credibility of ANC-backed student organisations and negatively impacted on their prospects during student representative council (SRC) elections. In addition, since the protests in 2015, despite the ANC government introducing bursary schemes for poor and working class families, and the government’s announcements of further plans for free education in various state of the nation addresses and budget speeches, the ANC’s 2019 election manifesto contains no concrete plan for free higher education.

Similarly, while the Democratic Alliance Students Organisation (DASO) rejected fee increases and participated in protests at universities, especially in Western Cape, DASO’s support to reopen certain campuses during the protests raised questions about its position with regards to poor and working class students. This raised further questions about its parent organisation’s stance on inclusive socioeconomic development, especially since the DA demonstrated minimal support for free education during the #FeesMustFall protests. The DA did, however, condemn violent protests while criticising the ANC, which gave the impression that the party only intended to maximise its chances of political advancement.

The lack of any mention of free education in the DA’s 2019 election manifesto also highlights the party’s minimal overall alignment with the #FeesMustFall agenda. Rather, in its manifesto, the DA proposes a bursary package for students from lower-income families who cannot afford university fees. This is seen as a solution that will only benefit a few and leave many students in the same situation they find themselves in at present.

Unlike the student organisations backed by the ANC and the DA, the EFF’s Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command (EFFSC) focused on South Africa’s broader economic frustrations. This approach garnered student support across universities over a relatively short period and enabled the EFFSC to capture the sentiments of students aligned with the #FeesMustFall movement. This became evident after the EFFSC won SRC elections at the University of Limpopo in 2016, the University of the Witwatersrand in 2017 and the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 2018. But this surge in support for the EFFSC should not be overestimated. SRC elections are not a clear indication of allegiance as student voter turnouts are generally low.

Although the student “#MustFall” movements have ignited political debates on campuses across the country, they will not profoundly influence national voting trends in 2019. Nevertheless, the formation and participation in these movements, and the resulting dialogues, are an indication of youth interest in political issues. Youth engagement in protests and debates around critical issues such as corruption, governance, identity and space ultimately informs their voting decisions. The “#MustFall” movements were premised on a lack of youth access to South Africa’s political, social and economic structures. Therefore, the extent to which political parties are able to provide plans for economic growth and social inclusion may influence youth voter trends.

References

POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: WITHER THE ONCE DOMINANT ANC?

Written by Maite Dithebe and Thembelani Mazibuko

In the 2019 National and Provincial elections, South Africa finds itself at a crossroads. While it is true that the ANC is still the dominant party, trends including municipal elections results, opinion polls as well as some by-election results show that the ANC does not have the kind of lock it had on voters in the early to mid-2000s. The emerging trend is that voters are more discerning as well as more critical in terms of how they vote and, as a result, in the 2019 elections, voters are more inclined than they were ten years ago to switch their vote away from the ruling ANC. These trends, coupled with inevitable liberation movement fatigue especially among the youth as well as overall disillusionment sees the ANC base diminishing. The question to be asked then, is what are the factors that have led to this situation?

To understand the emerging trends, one has to go back to the ANC’s 52nd National conference that was held in Polokwane in 2007 that saw the clear division of the party into two opposing factions or slates. In that conference, the Jacob Zuma led slate was victorious over the Thabo Mbeki led slate (Setati, 2012). It was against this backdrop that Mosiua Lekota, who was going to be the chairman of the ANC - had the Thabo Mbeki slate won - broke away from the ANC and founded his own party, the Congress of the People (COPE) (Rossouw & Webb, 2008). This new party was seen largely to be made up entirely of former ANC members who were loyal to Thabo Mbeki (Rossouw & Webb, 2008). This split was arguably the largest split from the ANC in the democratic era. In the 2009 National and Provincial elections, COPE went on to win 7% of the vote nationally. In addition, COPE was the official opposition in five of the nine provinces. Analysis of the results showed that there was a relation between COPE’s percentage gain and the ANC’s percentage loss (IEC, 2019).

Table 1: COPE and ANC election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>COPE percentage</th>
<th>ANC percentage loss/ gain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>13.67</td>
<td>-10.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>-10.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>-4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>+15.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>-4.30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This relationship exists in different provinces, albeit to varying degrees. The only province where this relationship does not exist is KwaZulu-Natal where both COPE and the ANC gained votes, political scientists attribute this to Jacob Zuma’s Zulu ethnicity, which, was a point of mobilization among his supporters during his rape trial. Below is a table showing the ANC’s election results between the 2004 and 2009 elections. What one sees is the emergence of a trend, the trend is that voters are now more willing to switch their votes away from the ANC to other parties. The questions; is this a once of event where voters go back to the tried and tested ANC in the next election or will this trend where voters are willing to not vote for the ANC continue?

Table 2: ANC provincial percentage, 2004 and 2009 election results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2004 percentage</th>
<th>2009 percentage</th>
<th>percentage gain/ loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>79.31</td>
<td>69.70</td>
<td>-9.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>82.05</td>
<td>71.90</td>
<td>-10.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>68.74</td>
<td>64.76</td>
<td>-3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>47.47</td>
<td>63.97</td>
<td>+16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>89.72</td>
<td>85.27</td>
<td>-4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>86.34</td>
<td>85.81</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>81.83</td>
<td>73.84</td>
<td>-7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>61.10</td>
<td>-7.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>46.28</td>
<td>32.86</td>
<td>-13.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEC, 2019

A continuing trend? Enter Julius Malema and the Economic Freedom Fighters

In 2012, following a failed appeal to the National Disciplinary Committee of Appeal, then ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema was expelled from the ANC (Bauer, 2012).

It is upon this backdrop that, in July of 2013, Julius Malema, along with a throng of former ANC Youth League leaders founded the Economic Freedom Fighters party (EFF) (Montsho & Ngoepe, 2013). The premise of the EFF was that black South Africans in particular had not enjoyed the fruits of democracy and that the ANC government had not done nearly enough to redistribute economic power to black South Africans. The following was the EFF’s performance in the 2014 National and Provincial elections.

Table 3: EFF provincial election results, 2014
In those elections, the EFF garnered 6.25 % of the vote whereas the ANC garnered 62.15 % of the vote. COPE, which in the previous elections gained 7.42 % of the vote nationally, only managed to win 0.67% of the vote. Importantly for this research is the following question: Did the trend which began in the 2009 elections where a significant amount of former ANC voters switched their votes to another party (COPE) continue in the 2014 elections. While the emergence of COPE and the EFF was an important factor in the decline of the ANC, the ANC’s then President, Jacob Zuma’s actions also contributed. Even though he was cleared in court, the rape trial arguably put a cloud over his head among some voters, a factor that may very well have affected the 2009 election results. Additionally, his long running corruption charges were only dropped a few weeks before the elections. Another issue which may have affected the ANC were the upgrades to his Nkandla residence where the then public protector found that Jacob Zuma had “unduly benefitted” from security upgrades to his property. The main issue is that President Zuma did not follow the public protector’s recommendations of paying back a portion of the funds.

In conclusion

Hence, what is emerging in many of the provinces is that former ANC voters are now more willing to vote for newer parties. However, in KwaZulu-Natal the trend is reversing with the ANC gaining votes in the intervening period. This raises numerous questions with regards to the reasons voters are switching away from the ANC. If ethnicity and the geopolitics are the reasons then the results, including the results in KwaZulu-Natal, can be coherently explained. Going into the 2019 elections, it is clear that the electorate, especially the former ANC voter, is more fluid than it was ten to fifteen years ago. The emergence of newer, more radical as well as more populist parties such as the African Transformation Movement, the African Content Movement and Black First Land First, which all emerged after the 2014 elections, highlights that there is a growing discontentment with the ruling party and therefore that there is opportunity for newer parties to tap into that disillusionment.

References


2019 ELECTIONS: WHO’S NOT COMING BACK

Written by Thembelani Mazibuko

**IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi**
Buthelezi has been the leader of the IFP since 1975 and a member of parliament since 1994. Opinions on his legacy are divided, some say he colluded with the Apartheid government in a civil war that killed thousands of fellow countrymen in KwaZulu-Natal, others say that his decision to eventually participate in the first democratic election secured the democratic transition. He served as South Africa’s first minister of Home Affairs, and, during a short stint while acting Head of State in May 1998, he authorised on behalf of President Mandela, a SADC peacekeeping mission into Lesotho by South African Defence Force troops. He will be missed, if nothing else, for his humour, wit and institutional memory.

**Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies**
Davies has been an ANC member of Parliament since 1994. In 2005 he was appointed deputy minister of Trade and Industry and was appointed minister in 2009. He was reappointed in 2014. He has been an instrumental figure in marshaling South Africa through multilateral fora including the Tripartite SADC-COMESA-EAC Free Trade Area, the Economic Partnership Agreement with EU, AGOA and the World trade Organisation Bali package.

**Deputy minister Lluwellyn Landers**
Lluwellyn Landers has been an ANC member of Parliament since 1994. Prior to that he served in the Tricameral Parliament. He served as a deputy minister in the cabinet of Apartheid era president PW Botha. More recently, he has served as deputy minister of International Relations and Cooperation in the cabinet of former President Jacob Zuma and President Cyril Ramaphosa thereafter.
WHAT DO THE ELECTORAL LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS MEAN FOR YOU?

Compiled by Qiqa Nkomo

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>• Persons that ordinarily reside outside of the Republic must be entered into the voters roll created for such persons using the South African Identity Document and their passport.</td>
<td>• Only natural persons that are duly authorised by the party may submit a party list nominating ward candidate.</td>
<td>• No person may campaign or use the word ‘Electoral Commission’, ‘Independent Electoral Commission’ or the acronym ‘IEC’ in their campaign or trade under a name containing those words. Only the voting stations within a ward in which the person resides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Eligible voters that are imprison on the day of elections are deemed to reside in the district that the prison is in.</td>
<td>• Voters are permitted to request another ballot paper prior to placing the one they have already made a mark on the ballot box.</td>
<td>• The Electoral Court may hear and determine any dispute relating to membership, leadership, constitution or founding instruments of a registered party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Persons permitted to cast special votes prior to Election Day: pregnant persons, physically impaired, differently abled, absent from own district due to working in election process, being security in connection with elections.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The voter’s roll that will be used in the election must be certified by the chief electoral officer for the election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Two party agents are permitted for each voting station. If voting takes place in different rooms or separately in an enclosed area then the two agents may be present in each room/area.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The stamping of the identity documents of voters is no longer required to prove that one has voted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Voters that do not have a physical address will be prescribed one by the IEC. The IEC will take a conventional address or a descriptive address from the voter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Only legal entities may apply to the IEC for accreditation to conduct voter education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Changes for Voters

- If you’re a South African citizen living in a different country on Election Day you may apply to be entered on the voters roll for such persons using your ID and passport.
- If you in prison on the day of elections you may vote within the district that the prison is in.
- Pregnant persons, disabled persons, people that are physically impaired, persons working in election processes outside of their district on election day are eligible to cast a special vote a day prior to elections. You can apply for a special vote: 4th-18th April 2019. Special voting days: 6th & 7th of May 2019.
- You’re allowed to change your mind but only if you have not placed your ballot paper in the ballot box, you ask for another ballot paper if you have made a mark on your current paper.
- You may bring any matter relating to the membership, leadership, constitution or founding instruments of a registered party before Electoral Court.
- You cannot apply in your capacity as an individual to the IEC for accreditation to conduct voter education. Only in your capacity as part of/working for an organisation may you apply to be accredited by the IEC to conduct voter education training.
- If you do not have a physical address, it is your responsibility to say where they stay. Those that refuse to even describe where they stay only get national assembly ballot paper.

## Changes for Political Parties

- Parties are allowed to have two of their members present at each voting station. If the voting station has more than one area/room, each party member may be present in each voting room/area.
- Only persons that have been given permission by a political party may submit a party list nominating a ward candidate.
- Parties/individuals are not allowed to use the words ‘Electoral Commission’, ‘Independent Electoral Commission’ and ‘IEC’ in their campaign or trade under a name containing those words.
- You may bring any matter relating to the membership, leadership, constitution or founding instruments of a registered party before Electoral Court.
CHAPTER 1

HEADING INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS 2014-2019

2015
Ministry of Finance volatility
Nene fired as Minister of Finance
Des van Rooyen hired and fired
Pravin Gordhan replaces DVR
The ZAR plummets

2016
“State of Capture” 14 October
Public Protector Report - investigation into alleged improper
and unethical conduct by the
President and other state
functionaries

2017
ANC electoral conference
Cyril Ramaphosa faction
marginally victorious, 17
December

2018
Jacob Zuma ‘resigns’ as
President of South Africa on the
14th of February

2018
Cyril Ramaphosa sworn in as
President of South Africa on 15
February

2018
Land reform - The Joint
Constitutional Review Committee
(JCRC) ruled that section 25 of the
SA constitution can be altered

2018
Malusi Gigaba removed as
Minister of Finance. Replaced by
Tito Mboweni, 9 October

2019
Tom Moyane removed as SARS
Commissioner

2014
ANC voter share declines
DA grows support base
First time contenders Economic
Freedom Fighters gain support

2015
#Feesmustfall student-led
protest movement begins, mid-
October 2015

2016
3 August, SA Local government
elections - DA and EFF gain
control of major metros

2017
S&P downgrades SA’s long-term
foreign currency debt to non-
investment grade in April
followed by Fitch in November

2017
Save South Africa
Massive and unprecedented civil society and political party
marches against government
corruption #Zumamustfall

2018
Ramaphoria
Zuma exits at 23% approval
rating and Ramaphosa enters at
64% approval
Post “9 wasted years”

2018
VAT increase
The first VAT rate increase since
1993 (14% - 15%),

2018
Commissions of enquiry
Zondo Commission
Nugent Commission
Mrwebi Commission

2019
8 May South Africa elections
WHY SMALL PARTIES MATTER IN SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMOCRACY

WRITTEN BY NANCY HAKIZIMANA

Despite the sway the ANC holds in South African politics, there is no shortage of healthy democratic competition thanks to the number of smaller political parties that take part in national, provincial and municipal elections. Their significance is often underestimated, and it is often assumed that voting for them is irrelevant to the political context, a “wasted vote”. But, in recent times, it has become common to view a vote for a smaller party as a vote against the ruling party.

A recent poll by the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) found that voter support for the ANC has decreased from 62.1% in 2014 to 54.7% in 2019. This corresponds with the number of seats the party lost in the 2014 national elections and 2016 local government elections, making room for smaller parties to enter the parliamentary fray.

Despite their lack of voter support, smaller parties hold relative negotiating power, not only because their elected members are in the position to act as whistleblowers, propose or challenge new bills, and fight state corruption, but because they are able to use their seats to bargain with larger parties. This was the case in the 2016 municipal elections when the Democratic Alliance (DA) won power in Nelson Mandela Bay through forming a coalition government with the

Political parties: The voter’s choice

WHY SMALL PARTIES MATTER IN SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMOCRACY

A PARTY DIVIDED: THE ANC’S FACTIONS, FRICTIONS AND FUTURE

WHO’S OLD? WHO’S NEW?

DECISION 2019: HAS THE DA REACHED A CEILING?

THE EFF AFTER ZUMA

THE VOTER’S VIEW
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the Congress of the People (Cope) and the Patriotic Alliance.

One of the first significant moments for smaller parties in South Africa’s democratic era came in 1999, when Pan Africanist Congress member Patricia de Lille provided an arms deal dossier to Parliament that led to the prosecution of Tony Yengeni and Schabir Shaik. Similarly, in 2018, United Democratic Movement leader Bantu Holomisa shone a spotlight on possible corruption at the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) due to the mismanagement of government workers’ pensions. This resulted in investigations by Parliament’s committee on government spending, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, and led to the passing of the PIC Amendment Bill in the National Assembly in February 2019.

Also in 2018, the Labour Amendment Bill, which was proposed by ACDP member Cheryllyn Dudley, was passed to allow for parental leave of 10 days; and the Inkatha Freedom Party was instrumental in ensuring the Medical Innovation Bill, also known as the Ambrosini Bill, was passed, which allows for prescription cannabis to be incorporated into other health laws.

Smaller parties such as Black First Land First can also play a pivotal role in generating debate around ideas and representing views that may not be raised by larger, more centrist parties. Given the degree of voter apathy displayed in previous elections, the generation of fresh debates in the South African political landscape in 2019 may well draw out some new voters or at the very least push traditional parties to examine their own policies more closely.

References


A PARTY DIVIDED: THE ANC’S FACTIONS, FRICTIONS AND FUTURE

Written by Maite Dithebe and Sandile Khuboni

Factionalism has been part of the ANC’s DNA since its inception, but internal battles have become more pronounced and more public since the party’s 2007 elective conference in Polokwane, when Jacob Zuma ousted Thabo Mbeki.

After Polokwane, according to Mukweda (2015), the party was divided at the national level into two identifiable factions of nationalists and communists. The infighting also led to the formation of the
CHAPTER 2

Congress of the People, a breakaway party whose members were aligned with the losing faction. Increasingly, according to Lodge (2014), the divisions within the ANC were more about personal loyalty than differences in ideology. This led to what Beresford (2014) terms “political gate-keeping” by those who control opportunities and resources. During this period, factionalism took the form of purging rival members and rewarding patronage.

Provincially, the ANC became divided into two camps: the Premier League, comprising former Free State premier Ace Magashule, former Mpumalanga premier David Mabuza and former North West premier Supra Mahumapelo; and the Forces of Change, who emerged in reaction, seeking to wrest back control of the party to save its “soul”. The Premier League used its collective power to influence decisions in the ANC, including those affecting the party’s upper structures. The president and his premiers became untouchable, eventually undermining governance and the ANC’s own constitution and processes.

There was resonance of Polokwane at Nasrec in 2017, although the factions that year had different faces. The ANC was again divided down the middle, one camp behind Cyril Ramaphosa and the other vying for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The Ramaphosa faction might have narrowly won, but the ANC’s top six remained divided. The Premier League was weakened when Mabuza disassociated himself from his cohorts, casting himself as a champion of ANC “unity”. Magashule was the only member of the league to make it into the top 6, as secretary general.

What followed was a concerted campaign to convince South Africa that the ANC was united, but various contradictory messages from the top 6 indicated that this was not altogether true. Recently, the public and political rejection of certain individuals from the ANC’s national list of candidates caused controversy. The fault lines are emerging again as some party members openly support the removal of members implicated in corruption and state capture, while the individuals implicated are fighting for their survival. The shifting of the balance of power has left the supporters of the Premier League unprotected against corruption charges that have surfaced through the various commissions of inquiry into state corruption.

It is essential for the Ramaphosa faction’s survival that its members demonstrate to voters that they are different from the previous faction. They know that the party is compromised by having a member of the Premier League in such a powerful position, and that they will need to address issues of corruption and patronage strongly despite the divisions in party’s top leadership structures. They also know that if the infighting continues, it will threaten to undermine the organisation’s integrity and its ability to deliver on its electoral mandate.

References

(n.d.).


Since 1994, South Africa has seen fluctuations in the number of political parties that contest national elections. The 2019 elections are no exception.

A number of new parties will contest the 2019 elections, bringing the total to 48.

In the last 2 decades:

**1994**
- Parties that contested the 1994 elections and still exist today:
  - African National Congress (ANC)
  - Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
  - Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)
  - African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)

**2014**
- New parties with seats in Parliament:
  - Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)
  - National Freedom Party (NFP)
  - African Independent Congress (AIC)
  - Agang

**2019**
- Newcomers on the ballot sheet:
  - COOD
  - Socialist Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP)
  - African Content Movement (ACM)
  - Black Land First (BLF)
  - Capitalist Party of South Africa (ZACP)
  - African Transformation Movement (ATM)
  - African Renaissance Unity Party (ARUP)
  - Alliance for Transformation for All (ATA)
  - Land Party
  - Zenzele Progressive Movement (ZPM)

Why now? What's new?

Common threads in new political party manifestos:
- Land reform to favour historically disadvantaged South Africans
- Job creation
- Boost economy by encouraging entrepreneurship
- Rework public transport system
- Develop effective policies to combat corruption and crime in general

Did you know? There are 60% more political parties contesting the 2019 elections compared to the 1994 elections.
DEcision 2019: Has the DA Reached a Ceiling?

Written by Thembelani Mazibuko

Although the DA has managed to increase its voter share in every national election since 1994, recent political developments have prompted questions as to whether the party will continue growing. Under its former leader, Helen Zille, the DA transformed into a modern, effective political party. Zille also introduced a new generation of leaders. In 2015, in a move that was seen as an attempt to attract black African voters, Mmusi Maimane was elected DA leader. The 2016 municipal elections, Maimane’s first election as the party’s leader, was widely considered a success as the DA won a number of new mayoral positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Total votes</th>
<th>Share of vote</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Change in seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>338 426</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>7/400</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1 527 337</td>
<td>9.56%</td>
<td>38/400</td>
<td>+31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1 931 201</td>
<td>12.37%</td>
<td>50/400</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 945 829</td>
<td>16.66%</td>
<td>67/400</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4 091 584</td>
<td>22.20%</td>
<td>89/400</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEC

While the DA’s support has grown, such growth has brought about challenges that are common in bigger political parties. Now, as the party attempts to sustain its growth trajectory by capturing newer voters, it is faced with having to fine-tune its message. While there are some overlaps, the concerns of black South Africans (the DA’s target for future growth) are often divergent from the concerns of white South Africans (the DA’s traditional voter base). As such, a message deemed optimal in attracting the one group may be deemed offensive to the other.

During a speech at a DA rally in the black township of Soshanguve in Gauteng in May 2018, Maimane made reference to “white privilege and black poverty” (Phaliso & Adriaanse, 2018). This comment did not sit well with the party’s senior leadership, who were said to be concerned that such comments could alienate the DA’s traditional support base and lead to a “hemorrhaging” of votes in 2019 (Cele, 2019).

In light of these and similar comments made in recent years, some white and middle-class DA voters have felt disillusioned that the DA is not adequately representing their interests. This leads to the question of how the DA plans to sustainably, and over the long term, balance the interests of its black and white supporters. In light of this, there is evidence that some white voters are seeking alternative political homes.
To this end, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), which expressly seeks to advance minority interests, has used the chasm within the DA as an opportunity to attract voters. By-election results in George (Western Cape), Kroonstad (Gauteng) and more recently Krugersdorp (Gauteng) suggest that some white voters are leaving the DA for the FF+ (Davis, 2018). For its part, the FF+, which received 165 000 votes in the 2014 elections, is targeting 1 million voters in 2019 (Makinana, 2018). The FF+ believes it can achieve this target due to its uncompromising opposition to affirmative action and BEE, and the expropriation of land without compensation (Makinana, 2018).

Of factions and splits

Up until recently, the DA had grown by absorbing smaller parties into its fold, which proved to be an effective strategy. However, this strategy has led to “re-divisions”, the most recent being the emergence of GOOD. The GOOD party split, led by former Cape Town mayor Patricia De Lille, is an illustration of how the DA’s growth, if not handled with political astuteness, can backfire. This is a challenge that the ANC, South Africa’s largest party, constantly faces.

Conclusion

Given South Africa’s history and context, dealing with such challenges will be crucial to how the DA adapts and evolves. As the DA grows, such challenges are most likely to increase.

References


THE EFF AFTER ZUMA

Written by Sizwe Nene and Chido Dzinotyiwezi

Since its formation in 2013, the EFF has grown to become the third-largest political party in South Africa by voter share (Adams, 2018: 114). The party came into being after two of its leaders, Julius Malema and Floyd Shivambu, were expelled from the ANC Youth League. The rise of the EFF in this short period prompts a closer examination of how the party has been able to drive itself through populism, and of
whether the party will remain sustainable since the departure of Jacob Zuma as ANC and South African president.

The EFF has gained much of its popularity through rhetoric pertaining to “economic freedom” for South Africa’s historically disadvantaged majority. As such, the party aligns itself with those who still remain on the fringes of the economy 25 years after apartheid, specifically the unemployed youth. The party’s tactics, which ultimately contributed to it winning a respectable 6% of the vote in the 2014 elections, are often considered controversial. However, they have proven to spark debate and unite constituents. The past five years have also seen the EFF’s support increase on university campuses across South Africa, a factor that increases its viability in the future.

While the EFF’s gains since its formation cannot be downplayed, the party’s excessively hierarchical structure, with Malema at its apex as “commander-in-chief”, is seen as a possible barrier to it gaining credibility as a democratic organisation. It also remains to be seen whether the EFF can sustain itself without the political clout it had gained in the past as being markedly anti-Zuma, as much of the party’s previous messaging centred on its “Zuma Must Go” campaign. Now that Zuma is gone, how will the EFF frame its messages? Will it attempt to build itself based on its own vision and mission rather than by discrediting other political figures?

Questions have constantly emerged around how the EFF defines itself ideologically, as well as its relevance in a democratic dispensation. Although the EFF is considered an essentially left-wing party, having been able to gain support from youth and economically marginalised people who are frustrated with the high unemployment rate, which is currently estimated at 55%, its radical style is perceived as a threat to the country’s constitutional democracy (Mbete, 2014).

According to Moffitt and Tormey (2014), the EFF believes that “the people are exploited both by the white capitalist class that has not relinquished power since 1994 and by the corrupt, black elite that sold out during the negotiated settlement”. While the party has been effective at driving important issues in Parliament, it has often done so using populist, inflammatory and derogatory statements, coupled with disruptive and demagogic behavior. One can also argue that the EFF’s presence in Parliament has dominated key policy discussions on land expropriation and the nationalisation of strategic economic sectors.

In conclusion, the 2019 elections will be a test as to whether the EFF can establish itself as a viable political party by growing its support base and enhancing its political skills without resorting to personal attacks and gaining popularity by discrediting others.

References


Independent Electoral Commission | 2014 |
**THE VOTER’S VIEW**

Are you voting? Why are you voting?

Researchers working on this Weekly Brief did a small poll of their acquaintances to get a sense of whether people would be voting, and why. *These are not the real names of the persons quoted.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lethabo</th>
<th>Rethabile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Yes, I am voting because we never had the opportunity to do so and now that I can it’s almost as if I have the responsibility to do so. Our past really is important to me even if I do not personally experience it. I have a voice so I should speak.”</td>
<td>“No. I am busy. I will be working even though it is a public holiday!”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jane</th>
<th>Siyabonga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I am voting because it’s what I have always been taught to do. As a nationalized citizen it is my responsibility to abide by my civic duties of citizenship of this country.”</td>
<td>“Yes, I want to have a voice on policy issues.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Omphile</th>
<th>Blessing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Yes, I vote for the social rights of unemployed, youth and pensioners.”</td>
<td>Uncertain. “I am not sure whether to vote or not. I have not been convinced yet.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE VOTER’S ISSUES – SOUTH AFRICA, 2019

WRITTEN BY CHIDO DZINOTYIWEI

A citizen’s decision to vote, and who they vote for, is influenced by several factors woven into South Africa’s complex social, economic and political fabric. However, there are common concerns that the majority of voters want their political parties to address in the hope that they will inch South Africa forward towards the ideals envisaged at the dawn of its democracy.

This week’s EISA brief looks at how the common concerns of average South Africans are being addressed in the manifestos of political parties contesting the 2019 national and provincial elections.

**Land** – Qiqa Nkomo examines the tangible and symbolic value of land by analysing the potentially extremist stances on the land expropriation policy.

**Housing** – Sandile Khuboni focuses on the issue of state housing and the lack of progress made to mitigate the spatial imbalances that apartheid left behind.

**Inequality** – Thembelani Mazibuko looks at how the ANC, DA and EFF plan to respond to the challenge of inequality in South Africa.

**Unemployment** – Maite Dithaba tackles the complexities of the competing capitalist and socialist ideologies parties advance to enhance job creation and alleviate unemployment.

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**Social issues and party manifestos**

**THE LAND DEBATE**

**CRIME AND SECURITY**

**STATE CAPTURE AND CORRUPTION**

**UNEMPLOYMENT AND JOB CREATION**

**INEQUALITY**

**HOUSING**
THE LAND DEBATE

WRITTEN BY QIQA NKOMO


When it was instituted in 1994, government’s land policy aimed to redress apartheid’s injustices through land restitution and redistribution, and influence the land tenure system, particularly regarding commercial farms, to favour previously disadvantaged people (Lahiff, 2008).

But after 25 years of democracy, the land reform programme has failed to achieve its objectives. As a result, many political parties contesting the 2019 elections have proposed various policies on land reform. The debate is no longer about whether or not to expropriate land, but whether to expropriate land with or without compensation.

Political parties such as the African Democratic Congress (ADC) have capitalised on the debate by using taglines such as “the land belongs to the people”. The implication of this tagline would authorise the state to take private property for public works without paying the party that owned the land prior to it being expropriated. The ADC is not alone in championing the principle of expropriation without compensation: the ANC seeks to use expropriated land for agricultural purposes as a strategy for economic growth.

Instead of using expropriated land for agriculture, the Azanian People’s Organisation seeks to restore dignity to black people by using the land for housing. The call of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) on government “to return all land expropriated … to its original owners” (UDM, 2018) operates on the assumption that the state would become the custodian of land. The UDM’s stance is echoed by the Black First Land First party and the Economic Freedom Fighters, both of which are proponents of the nationalisation of private property for equal redistribution.

At the other end of the spectrum are parties in favour of expropriation with compensation. The Inkatha Freedom Party advocates for the expropriation only of unused land to be given to poor people, and for the owners of land earmarked for expropriation to be fairly compensated (IFP, 2019). The Democratic Liberal Congress (DLC) and Freedom Front Plus (FF+) have argued that land expropriation without compensation undermines the “cornerstone of free market, which is private property” (SABC, 2019). In affirmation of the DLC and FF+’s sentiments, the manifesto of the Democratic Alliance (DA) states that individuals have a right to own land without restrictions, and that uncertainty over private property rights would destabilise South Africa’s economy (DA, 2019).
The Congress of the People has publicly stated that constitutional provisions do not hinder the objectives of land restitution and redistribution (Petersen, 2018). In line with this assertion, the GOOD party advocates for land expropriation without compensation within the confines of existing constitutional provisions. The party believes a comprehensive land audit should be conducted in urban areas to identify unused and underused land to be expropriated for public use (GOOD, 2019).

The emotive taglines and constitutional manoeuvring we’re seeing suggest that the parties in favour of expropriation without compensation, as well as those that oppose the proposed policy, operate from potentially extremist stances. This does not inspire confidence that any of these proposals are inherently beneficial to the people. Resolving the land debate lies in the formulation of a policy that will benefit previously disadvantaged people all the way from the language used in the policy to the budget allocation and the successful implementation of the policy.

References
SABC, 2019. FF Plus reiterates stance on land expropriation at manifesto launch, Pretoria: SABC.

CRIME AND SECURITY

Written by Nancy Hakizimana

A 2018 report by the Institute of Economics and Peace ranked South Africa 125 out of 163 countries on the global peace index, which measures peace by studying levels of societal safety and security, the extent of domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarisation. This finding is underscored by a study by the Human Sciences Research Council between 2003 and 2015 that revealed that only 21% of South Africans are satisfied with government’s efforts to reduce crime (Bohler-Muller et al, 2016). As the national elections approach, it is no surprise that questions of how political parties intend to tackle crime have come to the fore.
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Three major approaches have emerged: the hardline approach; the optimisation and strengthening of the South African Police Service (SAPS); and community-centred approach, which seeks to address the social and economic root causes of crime.

The hard line

Several parties, such as the African Christian Democratic Party, the African Covenant, the African Transformation Movement and the Inkatha Freedom Party, are advocating for the reintroduction of the death penalty to the justice system. Other parties, such as the African Content Movement (ACM), the Azanian People’s Organisation and the National Freedom Party (NFP) argue that a gun-free society would contribute greatly to eradicating crime.

Investing in the police

Most parties recognise the importance of optimising and strengthening the SAPS. For example, the ANC, Democratic Alliance (DA) and Freedom Front Plus’s manifestos propose increased police visibility by increasing the number of officers, whereas the Economic Freedom Fighters propose maintaining police presence by reopening police stations and satellite police stations. The ACM advocates for incentivising police by increasing the pay of SAPS employees. In an effort to make police more efficient, the Congress of the People proposes upskilling officers through special training and the formation of specialised units. The DA advocates decentralising control over the SAPS to allow local government to have more authority on crime specific to their provinces, such as gang violence in Western Cape.

Tackling crime at local level

In addition to optimising and strengthening the police, some parties encourage community involvement in combatting crime. The Land Party’s manifesto, for instance, suggests that all South Africans should take part in police training for six months. This, the party argues, would equip citizens with the skills to make arrests and defuse dangerous situations, and create awareness on what to be vigilant for. The ANC and the United Democratic Movement are also in favour of strengthening community support groups, and the NFP proposes incentivising community policing forums by paying members for their services. In recognising that crime is often symptomatic, GOOD believes in addressing the root causes of crime by prioritising social services and social development.

References


STATE CAPTURE AND CORRUPTION

WRITTEN BY SIZWE NENE

Corruption in South Africa has become so rampant that it threatens the state’s constitutional democracy. In brief, corruption involves bribery, fraud, embezzlement, extortion, the abuse of power, conflicts of interest, favouritism and nepotism (Corplan et al, 2010: 38). It has cost the country’s GDP at least R27 billion and 76 000 jobs that would have been created (Patel, 2017). Ahead of the 2019 general elections, many political parties’ manifestos have spoken out against corruption.

The mismanagement of state funds during Jacob Zuma’s tenure as president has resulted in gains for smaller parties, who have been able to leverage against a lack of accountability in government. One cannot overlook the significant role played by parties such as the United Democratic Movement, the Congress of the People and the African Christian Democratic Party in revealing maladministration in government.

This contributed to a string of strategic litigation and timely interventions in Parliament that compelled a full bench of the court to confirm the powers of the public protector, and found that Zuma “had failed to uphold, defend and respect the constitution as the supreme law of the land” (Mbete, 2018). In the wake of Zuma’s resignation as president, the ANC has condemned corruption, as have the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).
The DA has always been vocal on corruption as an official opposition party. Its 2019 election manifesto focuses on combatting corruption that leads to cash for jobs and sex for jobs. Nepotism, the DA argues, hinders the attainment of the goals of fairness and opportunity. The party’s manifesto outlines that it plans to address the mismanagement of state-owned enterprises, including irregularities in procurement, inflated contract prices, middleman service fees and kickbacks.

Though the EFF, particularly its deputy president, Floyd Shivambu, is implicated in the VBS scandal, it is essential to acknowledge the oversight role the party played in revealing the relationship between the Gupta family and Zuma. The EFF’s election manifesto states that the party’s stance on corruption is to increase, harness and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of governance institutions to pre-empt all forms of corruption in both the private and public sectors.

The ANC can be judged by how it has dealt with corruption within its structures. Noting the commissions of inquiry that have been established, the ANC doesn’t emerge as bold enough in curbing corruption. The same can be said about the EFF for not taking any action against its deputy president. Similarly, the DA did not institute any legal action against its candidate for Gauteng Premier, Solly Msimanga, on the controversial multibillion-rand contract between Glad Africa and the City of Tshwane under former mayor Solly Msimanga (Riddle, 2019).

The ways in which all three of South Africa’s larger parties have dealt with corruption has left much to be desired. As a result, smaller parties will again be called upon to expose and fight corruption and maladministration. The emergence of the GOOD party is likely to strengthen their role.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND JOB CREATION

WRITTEN BY: MAITE DITHEBE

According to the quarterly labour force survey released by Statistics South Africa for the fourth quarter of 2018, youth unemployment in the country is at 54% – twice the national rate of 27%. Slow economic growth has compounded the issue and no reprieve is in sight, with National Treasury predicting the economy to grow by only 1.8% in 2019 and the International Monetary Fund predicting even more modest growth of 1.2% this year (Reuters, 2019).

Reigniting the economy through creating jobs is a priority of all parties contesting the election, but their approaches differ significantly, falling broadly into two distinct schools of thought: capitalist and socialist.

The capitalist centre

The ANC’s election manifesto has included an unequivocal message on reviving the economy so that South Africans are able to realise their aspirations. President Cyril Ramaphosa has emphasised that attracting investment in sectors such as mining, manufacturing and agriculture, and expanding exports, would create employment (Magubane, 2019), spark economic growth and increase local demand for goods.

The Democratic Alliance’s manifesto focuses on attracting investment, and targeting the manufacturing, agriculture and tourism sectors to boost the economy and reduce unemployment, with the aim of
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achieving an annual GDP growth rate of 3% (Head, 2019). Smaller parties such as the Freedom Front Plus, the Inkhata Freedom Party and the Congress of the People also emphasise the importance of attracting investment and developing small, medium and micro enterprises to create jobs and broaden the skills base.

These parties share a capitalist approach that prizes the privatisation of the means of production and advocates for investment to boost economic growth.

The call for a ‘classless society’

Other parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters, on one of its campaign posters, emphasises, “Our land and jobs now”. The party’s manifesto addresses the expropriation of land without compensation, the nationalisation of strategic sectors of the economy, the abolition of tenders, and the protection of industrial development to create jobs (Daniel, 2019).

The newly formed political party Socialist Revolutionary Workers Party (SRWP), founded by the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, believes in the dignity of the working class (Toli, 2019),, and seeks to overthrow capitalism in South Africa and replace it with democratic socialism in the pursuit of a classless society (Polity, 2019). Both parties’ manifestos speak of how nationalisation will create jobs, arguing that capitalist approaches such as investment in strategic sectors and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises cannot provide a job for every worker and a worker for every job.

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SOCIAL ISSUES AND PARTY MANIFESTOS

SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 2019

UNEMPLOYMENT

South Africa’s official unemployment rate is 27.67%. The country’s youth unemployment is significantly higher at 52.8% (Stats SA, 2018).

CRIME

- An estimated 189,000 incidences of housebreaking occurred in 2017/18, 4.36% of all South African households affected.
- An estimated 16,889 incidences of murder occurred in 2017/18 - an increase of 4% from the previous year.
- Households satisfied with the police services in their area decreased from 67.6% in 2016/17 to 54.3% in 2017/18.
- 40,026 cases of rape were reported in the year (Stats SA, 2018).

INEQUALITY

- South Africa remains the most unequal country in the world.
- The top 1% of South Africans own 76.9% of the country’s wealth while the bottom 60% only control 7% of the country’s assets.
- 66.6% of South Africans live below the national poverty line of R992 per month.
- The worst affected are black South Africans, unemployed, less educated, female-headed households, large families and children. (World Bank, 2019)

CORRUPTION

- South Africa ranked 71 out of 185 countries for corruption (Transparency International, 2018).
- Bribery, procurement irregularities, embezzlement and stolen resources are the most common forms of corruption in South Africa (Corruption Watch, 2018).
- Government’s irregular expenditure totalled R98.2 billion in 2018 (Auditor General, SA).

HOUSING

The housing backlog reportedly stands at 2.3 million houses. (80.3%) of South African households lived in formal dwellings in 2017, followed by 13.6% in informal dwellings, and 5.5% in traditional dwellings. 13.6% of South African households were living in ‘RDP’ or state subsidised dwellings. (Stats SA, 2018)

LAND

- A total of 17,439 million ha have been transferred from white ownership since 1994, which is equal to 21% of the 82,759 million ha of farmland in freehold in South Africa. (Stand Daily Mail, 2018)
- 60% of land is commercial, predominately white-owned land
- 18% black communal areas
- 10% other state-owned land
- 8% remainder - urban area and metropolitan areas (DEA, 2012)
PARTY MANIFESTO FOCUS: INEQUALITY

WRITTEN BY THEMBELANI MAZIBUKO

South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. As such, political parties have to develop clear and coherent policies around the challenge of inequality. Inequality can be defined as “the unequal distribution of income and opportunity between different groups in society” (www.wol.iza.org, 2019). Different political parties have different views on how to deal with this issue. Nevertheless, one can group the policy proposals into three broad areas: reformist, conservative and interventionist.

The reformist ANC

The ANC’s policy on inequality revolves around ensuring that previously disadvantaged people and businesses owned by previously disadvantaged people enjoy carve-outs such as affirmative action, Black-Economic Empowerment and a township economy fund. The ANC also wants to make it easier for small and black-owned businesses gain access to credit and it also wants to ensure that government allocates 30% of procurement to small businesses and cooperatives. On the other hand, the GOOD party’s plans to reduce inequality is centered around creating the conditions needed for job creation. This includes creating the conditions for investment, providing policy certainty and focusing on industrial growth. GOOD also wants to use welfare spending to alleviate extreme poverty.

Not dissimilar from the ANC, the African Transformation Movement, wants to establish community-based mining companies that will enable the poor to benefit equally and fairly from these minerals. The ATM also wants to give priority to disadvantaged people to have ownership in emerging and new sectors of the economy including mining and manufacturing, all this in an effort to lessen the financial gap between communities and mining companies.

The conservative DA

Parties such as the DA are more conservative in their approach to this issue. The DA’s policy proposals are more geared towards growing the growing the economy, and through that, ensuring that more people participate in the economy. The DA is far more focused on education and skills development as well as spurring entrepreneurship. The IFP also highlights the need for foreign investment whereas it also wants more public private partnerships on state-owned enterprises and, interestingly, government services. Job creation is also a big part of the IFP’s manifesto with a call for an unemployment register in every municipality and the establishment of a department of Youth and Job creation. The FF+ manifesto does not mention the word inequality, furthermore, the FF+ manifesto does not provide solutions to alleviate alleviating poverty, save to say that indicators such as poverty, unemployment status and access to education, as opposed to race, should be used when assisting disadvantaged people.

The interventionist EFF

The EFF can be described as a democratic socialist left-wing populist as well as nationalist political party. Parties such as the EFF are considerably more interventionist in their approach to tackling inequality. The EFF supports the expropriation of land without compensation, the nationalisation of mines, banks and other strategic sectors of the economy, free quality education, healthcare and housing and the
introduction of a minimum wage. The EFF would also promote labour absorbing industries through industrialization and the protection of infant industries. Not unlike the EFF, PAC believes that “land is a source of wealth” and “that freedom that is without land redistribution is not genuine”. As such, the PAC intends to build “an African economy to suite African people”. The PAC also intends to use government intervention in order to breach the gap between white capital and impoverished African businesses.

HOUSING AND PARTY MANIFESTOS

WRITTEN BY SANDILE KHUBONI

The forcible displacement of South Africans during apartheid rendered millions of black South Africans homeless. By 2013 the government had delivered over three million houses to poor and low-income households (Financial & Fiscal Commission, 2013). In 2017, 13.6 % South African citizens were living in a state subsidised house or RDP (STATS SA, 2018). However, the government is faced with a high backlog in terms of issuing title deeds across the provinces. 10% of the people living in state subsidised houses raised concerned about the condition of the state houses (STATS SA, 2018).

Moreover, housing backlogs and lack of adequate housing are some of the reasons for local service delivery protests across the urban cities and towns. The government is often blamed for a ‘slow pace’ in rolling out the state supported houses, because about 2.1 million households are lacking adequate housing and access to basic services such as the informal settlements. “Housing delivery is highly politicised and subject to politicking and protests throughout the country, particular in the context of medium-to-large state-subsidised housing projects undertaken by provincial housing departments” (Tissington, et al., 2013 ).

In 2017, there were about 13.6 % South African households living in informal dwellings (STATS SA, 2017 ). The informal settlements constitute a vital electoral constituency for political parties and the delivery of houses to deserving communities during the election period can induce electoral outcomes. Winning these voters over is clearly in the interests of the parties.

The following table highlights some of the key promises made in selected political party manifestos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Issue/issues</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
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| ANC             | Apartheid spatiality | ▪ Release land at the disposal of the state for site and service  
▪ Transform the composition and function of the property industry including establishing a Property Sector Ombudsman  
▪ Address the title deeds backlog and institutional capacity gaps |
| EFF             | Apartheid spatiality | ▪ End all informal settlements by 2021  
▪ Subsidies housing finance for the middle-income earners |
Housing, and more importantly the promise of housing, has been a political promise since the dawn of democracy in South Africa. Voter’s, especially those on housing lists, are forced to choose which of the many promises parties make in 2019 are likely to materialize as they continue to wait for what was promised to them 25 years ago.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **DA** | Housing backlog | - To make it illegal for banks to repossess houses whose bonds are paid 50%  
- To end the apartheid spatial planning and expropriate land without compensation closer to inner city centers for sustainable housing  
- To establish State housing construction company  
- To convert unused state building into affordable housing for the poor |
| **IFP** | Apartheid spatial panning | - To give recipients of RDP and BNG houses ownership of the title deeds  
- Create a national housing database which would be controlled by each province and municipal government  
- Establish a national housing audit to verify ownership of RDP and BNG houses |
| **GOOD** | Housing backlog and delivery far from city center | - Stop expansive, low-income housing on the city outskirts, which is fueling urban sprawl and recreating apartheid-era, dormitory suburbs of poverty  
- Develop inclusive higher density housing to infill within the urban fabric  
- Ensuring that towns and cities provide service to informal settlements  
- Provide title deeds to residents in informal settlements so that they can have security and invest in their own homes |
| **ATM** | Addressing housing and basic service backlog | - Introduce larger stand areas  
- Social housing programme to be properly funded and made more accessible to all those who qualify  
- Drive economic development in rural areas so that people are not compelled to move to cities in search for better opportunities |
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References


In this issue of the EISA Elections Resource Centre’s weekly briefing, we take a closer look at the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), its roles and responsibilities and the general perceptions about the commission going into the 2019 elections.

The IEC is a permanent body charged with managing elections at all levels of government in South Africa. Section 190 of the Constitution outlines the commission’s duties, which include:

- managing elections of national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies
- ensuring that those elections are free and fair
- declaring the results of those elections. (IEC)

It is essential that any institution tasked with managing processes that result in the placement of persons into positions of political power is viewed as trustworthy and independent, particularly by all political parties that contest elections. In his article, Thembelani Mazibuko outlines how the independence of the IEC is secured through legislation, parliamentary funding and the manner in which IEC commissioners are appointed.

While the IEC remains a widely trusted and credible institution in the eyes of South Africans, the past electoral cycle included two issues that may have harmed that reputation for some:
(1) the resignation of Pansy Tlakula as IEC Chairperson after findings of administrative overreach in a building lease; and
(2) the manipulation of by-election results in the Tlokwe municipality and the subsequent findings against the IEC by the Constitutional Court.

Sandile Khuboni examines the impact of Pansy Tlakula’s resignation on the IEC’s reputation, reflecting on its impact and ramifications, while Nancy Hakizimana and Grant Masterson examine the way in which the Tlokwe by-elections have highlighted deficiencies in the voter’s roll and verification of voters by the IEC, and continue to have an impact on the IEC’s preparations for the 2019 elections.

The 2019 elections will be managed by a team of five commissioners under Mashinini’s leadership. As these will be the first elections managed by this team, in this week’s infographic, Qiqa Nkomo outlines who these commissioners are and their roles and responsibilities.

Election observer missions (EOMs) have generally found that South Africa’s previous elections have been managed well and have met criteria to be regarded as “free and fair”. However, elections and the environments in which they take place are constantly evolving. Maite Dithebe and Chido Dzinotyiwei unpack several “red flags” and recommendations identified by previous EOMs upon which South Africa, specifically the IEC, could improve.

References

WHAT MAKES THE IEC INDEPENDENT?
WRITTEN BY THEMBELANI MAZIBUKO

The independence of any democratic country’s electoral commission is crucial for maintaining the overall integrity and credibility of its elections. A lack of independence in commissions that oversee electoral processes often leads to situations where election outcomes are disputed, resulting in violence and unrest, and political instability. The past few elections in Kenya, for example, have been marred by violence, with the result of the country’s latest elections being overturned by the Supreme Court of Kenya. In Zimbabwe’s 2018 election, the conduct of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission came under fierce attack from the opposition MDC (The Citizen, 2018) (Burke, 2017). In Nigeria, the People’s Democratic Party branded the country’s 2019 general elections a “sham”, accusing the country’s electoral commission, the INEC, of collusion with the ruling party (Mail & Guardian, 2019).

Against this trend in the rest of Africa, South Africa’s electoral commission, the IEC, has developed a reputation for being independent. As such, the IEC is recognised as a credible election body and has gained the trust of stakeholders locally and internationally. How has the IEC managed to do this?

Legislative framework
Chapter 9 of the Constitution explicitly calls for the establishment of an electoral commission to “ensure free and fair elections”. The Electoral Commission Act (1996) and the Electoral Act (1998) comprehensively detail all laws and regulations that govern elections in South Africa. Owing to South Africa’s history of apartheid and exclusion, these laws and regulations take special care to ensure the
inclusion and participation of all citizens and political parties in the democratic process; and make provisions to enable a fair and robust electoral system.

Financing and oversight
One of the main reasons for the IEC’s independence is that the executive has no power over its funding. The commission, like all Chapter 9 institutions, is funded directly by Parliament and is accountable only to Parliament. In addition, the IEC’s financial records are audited by the Auditor-General of South Africa, another independent institution that is accountable only to Parliament. Financial independence, coupled with independent oversight, ensures that the IEC can operate effectively and exercise its powers without fear or favour.

Commissioners
As it is important for all commissioners to be seen to be credible by all represented political parties, the appointment of IEC commissioners is often contentious. The Electoral Commission Act (1996) states that commissioners shall “serve impartially and independently, and perform his or her functions as such in good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice”. In South Africa, the appointment of commissioners starts with a recommendation of eight names by a panel comprising representatives from Chapter 9 institutions, chaired by the chief justice, to the relevant parliamentary committee. The parliamentary committee then sends a nominee to the president, who then makes the appointment based on the recommendations.

Conclusion
For the IEC to avoid similar challenges faced by election commissions in other African countries, maintaining its independence is of vital importance. To maintain this independence, it is necessary for the IEC to continue to be removed from the executive, as this will enable it to robustly exercise its duties without fear or favour, and, most importantly, with the full confidence of all stakeholders.

References


HOW PANSY TLAKULA’S RESIGNATION AFFECTED THE IEC’S REPUTATION
WRITTEN BY SANDILE KHUBONI
The way in which the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has managed elections in the past has earned it a broad level of trust among South Africans. However, recent polls suggest a 31% decrease in this level of trust, with several issues appearing to have contributed to the decrease (AfroBarometer,
2018). One such issue was the resignation of the IEC’s chief electoral officer and chairperson, Pansy Tlakula, in 2014 and the processes undertaken in the transitional period after her departure.

Tlakula resigned after a Public Protector finding and subsequent Electoral Court ruling on procurement irregularities in the IEC’s head office lease agreement, which was valued at R320 million. The Public Protector found that Tlakula had an “unmanaged conflict of interest as a result of the separate and undisclosed business relationship with business associate Thaba Mafamadi” (Verashni, 2014). The Electoral Court recommended that she be replaced as chief electoral officer and IEC chairperson. Her resignation, which has been described as “the closing of a challenging and tumultuous period in the history of the IEC”, was met with sympathy from the ANC and the DA, who argued her errors were administrative in nature and had no bearing on her integrity (Verashni, 2014), (Politics Web 2014).

This was the first time in South Africa’s democratic history that a Chapter 9 institution was embroiled in a scandal involving a senior official. Tlakula’s resignation also left the IEC in limbo as it was preparing for the 2016 local government elections.

The commission’s deputy chairperson, Terry Tselane, acted in the role until then president Jacob Zuma appointed Glen Mashinini. Mashinini’s appointment was seen by some opposition parties as an attempt by Zuma to bolster his personal and political interests rather than those of South Africans; Mashinini was at one point President Zuma’s personal adviser. Opposition parties also viewed the appointment as an extension of the ANC’s grip on power, while arguing that the IEC and its officers should enjoy the confidence of all parties (Mail & Guardian, 2015).

In spite of opposition concerns and criticism, the IEC has not exhibited any outright bias or political favouritism under Mashinini’s leadership. The commission retained its independence and impartiality during the 2016 local government elections, with local and international observer groups broadly endorsing its management of the elections, which were Mashinini’s first as head of the IEC. The exact extent to which the circumstances that led to Tlakula’s resignation have harmed the reputation of the IEC is unclear. However, it is apparent that this was an unfortunate chapter in the IEC’s history, which it should draw lessons from.

References


CHAPTER 4

Meet the IEC

Chairperson: Glen Mashinini
An HR practitioner and a sturdy institutional strategy and policy development expert, Mashinini is also a large-scale programme and project management specialist with experience in electoral management.

Vice-Chairperson: Janet Love
Love is committed to achieving and promoting human rights. She has drawn experience from working with organisations such as the Human Rights Commission and serving on a parliamentary committee for constitutional development in the early years of South Africa’s democracy.

Commissioner: Dr Nomsa Masuku
An academic and advocate for educating people about democracy, Masuku has more than 30 years of experience working for the IEC on various programmes related to capacity building through voter education.

Commissioner: Mosotho Moepya
Moepya has been working for the IEC since 1996 and has since moved up the ranks to commissioner. Moepya holds a BCom degree and a diploma in Higher Education from the University of the North and an honours degree in Business Administration and an MBA, both from University of Stellenbosch Business School.

Commissioner: Judge Dhaya Pillay
With a legal career spanning more than 50 years, Pillay has experience serving as a labour court judge and holds the position of extraordinary professor at the University of Pretoria. She currently serves as a high court judge in Pietermaritzburg and Durban.

Functions of the IEC

- Manage elections and ensure that they are free and fair
- Compile and maintain voters’ rolls by means of a system of registering eligible voters
- Declare any government election results within seven days after such elections
- Settle disputes that may arise from the organisation, administration or conducting of elections that are of an administrative nature

How is the commission appointed?

1. Chief Justice convenes a panel
2. Panel screens and interviews nominees
3. Names of recommended candidates are shared with the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs in the National Assembly
4. The portfolio committee recommends candidates for endorsement by the National Assembly
5. Recommendation is sent to the president for appointment

Visit www.elections.co.za for more information on the IEC and commissioners
TLOKWE: A MUNICIPAL BY-ELECTION WITH NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

WRITTEN BY NANCY HAKIZIMANA AND GRANT MASTERSON

Much controversy has surrounded the Independent Electoral Commission’s (IEC’s) management of municipal by-elections in Tlokwe, North West, which would ultimately have implications for future elections, including the 2019 national election. The commission’s handling of the by-election revealed a procedural flaw in its systems that can and has been exploited to the advantage of specific candidates. Legal challenges in the case of the Tlokwe by-elections culminated in a case that went all the way to the Constitutional Court in 2015 in the case of Xolile David Kham and Others v The Electoral Commission and Another. This case would significantly impact future electoral administration in South African elections.

Section 190 of the Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act (1996) make the IEC responsible for strengthening South Africa’s constitutional democracy through the administration of free and fair electoral processes.

After the by-election was held in the Tlokwe municipality in 2013, independent candidates challenged the credibility of the by-election at the Electoral Court, alleging that voters were bused into Tlokwe from other municipalities to vote. In addition, before the by-election, the IEC did not make the voters’ roll available to the candidates. It is likely that the low voter registration in the area is what added to the electoral vulnerability, allowing for addresses of non-voters to be manipulated in favour of a particular party (in this case, the ANC).

Disgruntled candidates argued that these voters from other municipalities were able to vote in the Tlokwe by-election because there was an absence of addresses on the voters’ roll and voters were registered in incorrect wards. However, the Electoral Court rejected the independent candidates’ claims despite an investigation conducted by the IEC that found irregularities on the freeness and fairness of the by-election. The matter was taken to the Constitutional Court, which, on 30 November 2015, ruled in favour of the independent candidates and ordered the IEC to prepare a voters’ roll with the correct addresses of voters who live in the area. The results of the 2013 Tlokwe by-election were set aside and new a new by-election was scheduled for 24 February 2016. However, in early 2016, before the rescheduled by-election, independent candidates argued that several thousand addresses were omitted from the voters’ roll. The candidates then took the IEC to the Constitutional Court again in the case of Kham v The Electoral Commission 2016.

The Constitutional Court ruled that an incomplete voters’ roll would undermine the notion of free and fair democratic elections. Based on Section 190 of the Constitution, the court highlighted four distinctive elements that determine if elections are free and fair, one of which is: “[I]n so far as the elections have a territorial component, as is the case in municipal elections where candidates are in the first place elected to represent particular wards, the registration of voters must be undertaken in such a way as to ensure that only voters in that particular area (ward) are registered and permitted to vote.” (Kham v Electoral Commission 2016 (2) SA 338 (CC)). Inevitably, the court ruled that the Tlokwe case lacked the above component.

Nevertheless, the 2016 Tlokwe by-election was allowed to proceed without a complete voters’ roll, however, the IEC was ordered to record all addresses by June 2018. Failing to meet this deadline, in 2018,
the IEC requested an extension from the Constitutional Court, arguing that they had made progress but could not get all the addresses. The court accepted the IEC’s request and extended the deadline until November 2019.

While the IEC works towards adhering to the Constitutional Court’s order to verify addresses on voters’ rolls, it needs to deal with the perceptions of procedural unfairness that have been created through the Tlokwe case. However, it is unlikely that such an issue will manifest in the 2019 national election, which takes place on May 8. Unlike local government elections, where ward councillors are elected based on voter residency, addresses are less important for national and provincial elections as citizens can vote anywhere as long as they are registered and have a South African ID.

The Constitutional Court’s intervention into an electoral administration process is a situation the IEC and the court itself would like to avoid to maintain the separation of powers between different institutions of the state. With the IEC having to report back to the court on its progress every two months, this situation will persist beyond the 2019 elections and has undeniably changed the nature of South Africa’s elections.

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REFLECTING ON PAST ELECTIONS

WRITTEN BY MAITE DITHEBE AND CHIDO DZINOTIYWEI

Since its inception, the IEC has invited various election observer missions as well as various international non-governmental organisations, to observe and report on the electoral process. Observer missions are important for elections as they help improve the quality of elections, build public confidence in electoral processes, and promote and protect the civil and political rights of participants in elections, which leads to changes and improvements in national law and practice (African Union, 2007). Observer missions usually produce public reports on elections, in which they provide recommendations for future improvements. As South Africa finalises its preparations for the 2019 elections, we take a look at some observer recommendations from previous elections.

The 2014 national and provincial elections

Based on the various reports presented by observers, the 2014 elections were considered free and fair. The various stakeholders adhered to the law and electoral regulations to ensure free campaigning and
tolerance. Observers noted that the political and electoral environment was generally peaceful across the country, with voters being able to exercise their right to vote. There was also a high level of tolerance between opposition parties and their supporters. The IEC’s personnel were adequately trained in all aspects of the electoral process and demonstrated high levels of professionalism, competence and understanding of their roles and responsibilities (Brand South Africa, 2014). The participation of women and youth in the elections demonstrated that South Africans are overcoming the barriers of previous discrimination (Commonwealth, 2014). Preferential treatment for pregnant women and disabled individuals at voting stations illustrated democratic inclusivity.

The 2016 local elections

According to IEC vice-chairperson Terry Tselane, the 2016 local elections were the most difficult as the IEC had experienced problems with voters’ rolls, and there had been politically motivated killings due to intra-party conflicts (Evans, 2016). The IEC took precautionary measures to maintain peace by making police available at voting stations and meeting IEC officials every morning. 12 conflict-management mediation panellists were deployed at different voting stations and an Electoral Code of Conduct was instituted (Evans, 2016). Despite these challenges, the IEC managed to deliver local elections that were considered free and fair by observers (EISA, 2016).

Red flags and recommendations

Ballot boxes: In the 2014 elections ballot boxes were often not clearly marked to indicate whether they related to national or provincial elections. This confused voters in identifying which box was correct for which vote, and this confusion extended to the colours of ballot sheets, which, when folded, became difficult to distinguish (Commonwealth, 2014:17). It was recommended that ballot boxes be clearly marked to designate whether they relate to national or provincial elections, and that the colours of the boxes and the ballot sheets be coordinated.

Voter education and procedure: The Commonwealth EOM (2014) found that voters took time to cast their votes. In their report they recommended that presiding officers and election officers should explain the voting process to voters by showing how to mark and fold ballot sheets. It was also recommended that IEC staff be educated on who is permitted to vote, as well as the procedure for special voting (LSSA, 2016).

Voters’ rolls: The voters’ roll contains all relevant information of voters in the country. In 2016, the Constitutional Court handed down a ruling that the voters’ roll be updated to include missing information and personal particulars of voters such as physical addresses. The ruling came after independent candidates in the Tlokwe municipality’s 2013 by-election alleged that due to inaccuracies in the voters’ roll, the ruling party was able to manipulate the election process to its advantage (EISA, 2016).

Election-related violence: While elections in South Africa have generally been peaceful, there have been several isolated incidents of violence around elections, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, where an ANC agent was shot and killed at the party’s desk outside a polling station (Commonwealth, 2014). It was recommended that regulations permitting political parties to establish party desks outside the immediate boundaries of voting stations be reviewed so as to minimise the risk of voter intimidation and violence. It was also recommended that the Electoral Code of Conduct be reviewed so that the IEC could be made aware of intra-party conflicts as they arise (Evans, 2016).
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References


MUDSLINGING SEASON IS UPON US, AGAIN

WRITTEN BY MELANIE MEIROTTI

Mudslinging and baby-kissing feature prominently during any election period. In this weekly review of South Africa’s 2019 national and provincial election period, we take a look at some of the tactics and strategies used by political parties to woo potential voters and discredit their opponents. Chido Dzinotyiwei highlights the key campaign messaging employed by the three largest parties, and how they attempt to strike a balance between cutting into competing parties’ voter bases while staying relevant to their loyal supporters.

Maite Dithebe explores how citizens use protest action during pre-election periods to draw the attention of politicians to grievances around poor service-delivery. The strategy has proven to be effective, but it has also brought some criticisms to the fore. In her article, Nancy Hakizimana outlines what is perhaps the most prevalent example of a blame game during the 2019 election season – Eskom. The crisis at the state-owned power utility has affected all South Africans and is costing the economy billions. Incidents of corruption and inefficiency that led to this crisis have provided perfect campaign material for opposition parties while the ruling ANC fights to keep the lights on at all costs, until the election.

While holding government accountable for its failure’s suits opposition parties in their campaigning, they are often caught...
HOW THE BIG-THREE CAMPAIGNED

WRITTEN BY CHIDO DZINOTYWEI

Political parties use election campaigns to mobilise public sentiment and woo voters ahead of elections. As such, parties invest significant resources to ensure that their messages are effectively communicated in a manner that highlights their vision and achievements and details the failings of other parties. This article takes a look at the campaigns of South Africa’s three largest political parties – the ANC, the DA and the EFF – with specific attention to how these parties have attempted to address social and economic issues in their campaigns leading up to the 2019 national and provincial elections.

Campaigns in 2019
The ANC has deployed a number of approaches to disseminate its core campaign message, “Let’s Grow South Africa Together”. These range from traditional stadium rallies to home visits and public engagements across the country. As South African president, ANC leader Cyril Ramaphosa has been exposed to the finer details of issues faced by citizens such as crime, unemployment, inadequate service delivery and incompetent leadership (Sicetsha, 2019). This has afforded the ANC the opportunity to offer informed commitments to South Africans through various forms of communication.

The DA, the largest opposition party, has maintained its approach of prioritising the need for change while criticising the ANC’s governance record. The party’s core message, “One South Africa for All”, communicates its vision of delivering services more adequately than the ANC, in alignment with Nelson Mandela’s dream of a “rainbow nation” (DA, 2019). Issues such as crime, corruption and unemployment under the ANC are constantly repeated in DA campaigns as factors that have contributed to inequality and disunity among South Africans. The DA has communicated by means of radio, text messages and voice-prompted phone calls that play pre-recorded messages from the party’s leader, Mmusi Maimane. The DA’s multilingual street posters are indicative of its aim to drive unity.

The EFF has focused its election campaigns in provinces where it secured the most support in the 2014 national elections and the 2016 local government elections: Gauteng, North West and Limpopo (IEC, 2019). The party’s core campaign message, “Our Land and Jobs Now”, is seen to be directed at South
Africans who feel betrayed by the ANC, in that the party did not deliver its post-apartheid promises. The term “Son of the Soil” is attached to the party’s leader, Julius Malema, on election posters to emphasise that he is in touch with ordinary South Africans. The EFF’s messaging is also designed to communicate a commitment to including historically disadvantaged Africans into the economy.

Conclusion

While the ANC and DA have cast their nets widely, with the objective of appealing to the broadest possible voter base, at the risk of diluting their messaging in the process, the EFF has employed a campaign strategy that targets a more specific voter base with a simple and repetitive message. Campaigning has proceeded peacefully in all parts of South Africa, with no major incidents recorded as yet. The ANC’s major campaign drawcard remains Ramaphosa, who enjoys notable coverage in his dual role as South African president and ANC leader. Exactly how this assumed advantage of incumbency will boost the ANC’s performance at the polls is now up to voters.

References


WHY SERVICE-DELIVERY PROTESTS INCREASE DURING ELECTIONS

WRITTEN BY MAITE DITHEBE

South Africa faces massive backlogs in the delivery of basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation, and housing, particularly in poor areas. The number of service-delivery protests recorded in 2018 increased by 94%, with a record 101 protests taking place in the second quarter of the year alone (Quintal, 2018) (Davis, 2018). These protests are mainly directed at government as it is responsible for providing basic services to all South Africans.

More than two decades since South Africa’s first democratic elections, most South Africans have become impatient with government for failing to provide the basic services guaranteed in the Constitution (Seokoma, 2010). Ahead of the 2014 national and provincial elections, researchers from Columbia University in the United States conducted an online survey that tracked and mapped service-delivery protests in South Africa. The report found that citizens felt that the best way to express their grievances was through protests. According to the report, these protests increased during election periods as there is a perception that political parties are more likely to arrange for faster service delivery and the repair of infrastructure when they are in immediate need of votes (Le Chen et al, 2014).
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According to a municipal poll, an increasing number of community service-delivery protests took place ahead of the 2016 local government elections (Merten, 2016). Research also suggests that support for a democratic system has declined since 2011, with many citizens now willing to give up democratic elections in favour of a non-elected government that would provide basic services. The latest Afrobarometer findings not only show that fewer South Africans prefer democracy (64% in 2015 compared to 72% in 2011), but there is greater dissatisfaction with the performance of the current democracy (Merten, 2016).

Municipal IQ, a specialised local government data and intelligence organisation, recorded 237 protests in municipalities across South Africa in 2018. This in the context of the 2019 national and provincial elections. Municipal IQ found that although service-delivery protests decreased in Gauteng, Eastern Cape and Western Cape were hot spots for protests (Savides, 2019). The decrease in Gauteng could be attributed to the relative success of the “ntirhisano” (“war room”) strategy, which has been executed to coordinate intergovernmental service-delivery solutions. Another factor for the decrease in protests in Gauteng could be that coalition governments in the province’s three metros allow for greater debate and representation, thus preventing service-delivery protests.

Figure 1: Major service-delivery protests, by year (2004 –2019)

[Source: Municipal IQ municipal hot spots monitor, January 2019-March 2019]

Figure 2: Service-delivery protests by province, 2019

[Source: Municipal IQ municipal hot spots monitor, January 2019-March 2019]
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Do political parties capitalise on service delivery protests?

In periods leading up to elections, political parties lobby voters and win their votes in various ways, including by listening to their grievances during protests and acting more decisively. According to the 2015 Good Governance Africa Voter Sentiment Survey, most South Africans would resort to violence to communicate with government (Radebe, 2017). Recently, in Gauteng, residents of Alexandra took to the streets to call for better service delivery. These protests revealed a battle between the DA and the ANC, with Herman Mashaba (DA) and Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC) pointing fingers at each other about the decline of services in the township (Mjo, 2019). The case of Alexandra shows that areas where there are protests during election periods are crucial campaigning sites for political parties.

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ESKOM AND THE 2019 ELECTIONS

WRITTEN BY NANCY HAKIZIMANA

As chronic power shortages began emerging across South Africa, in early 2008, state-owned power utility Eskom introduced planned rolling blackouts, commonly known as load-shedding, based on a rotating schedule. A decade later, the crisis is yet to be resolved and is seen to have escalated, with repeated cycles of power outages over the years. According to Chris Yelland, a senior energy expert at EE Publishers, load-shedding has cost South Africa R1 billion per stage, per day. In response to loading-shedding, in 2019, President Cyril Ramaphosa and the National Energy Regulator of South Africa resolved to increase electricity prices by a cumulative total of 13.8%. This price increase is well above the 4.5% rate of inflation,
and is set to impact households that are already struggling with the rising cost of living. Businesses have also been negatively impacted, having incurred losses due to power outages, resulting in increased pressure on the economy. The ongoing Zondo commission of inquiry has already uncovered maladministration and corruption at Eskom, and the crisis has sparked debate around how load-shedding may impact the 2019 elections.

The crisis reached its peak in February 2019, when Eskom introduced stage-4 load-shedding. The power utility attributed this to a high number of breakdowns at its plants. Within a week of these power outages, Finance Minister Tito Mboweni announced in his Budget speech plans to give Eskom a R69-billion lifeline over the next three years. Mboweni also announced plans to split Eskom into three units: distribution, generation and transmission. This announcement was met with apprehension from ANC-aligned trade unions as well as union federation COSATU. This was due to their view that splitting Eskom would result in job losses. It remains to be seen after the 2019 elections whether the splitting of Eskom will result in retrenchments.

All major political parties contesting the 2019 elections are capitalising on the Eskom crisis in their campaigns. The ANC has reassured voters that it will fix the Eskom issue, and blamed the crisis on state capture, as revealed in the Zondo commission, during the previous government administration. The DA has used load-shedding to discredit the ANC, especially as allegations of corruption at Eskom occurred with the ANC leading government and some current ANC members being directly implicated.

Load-shedding has also brought about concerns for the electoral administration processes itself in terms of its potential to jeopardise the overall integrity of the voting system. Should they occur during elections, power cuts could result in problems with zip-zap machines and the counting of ballot papers at night. The IEC, the body tasked with managing the elections, has assured the public that it is in talks with Eskom and have put together a contingency plan to make sure that voting is not compromised.

Ultimately, the social and economic implications of load-shedding, along with allegations of state capture and corruption, have all caught up with Eskom. This, in turn, has put pressure on the ruling ANC to resolve the crisis. The extent to which load-shedding will affect how South Africans vote in the 2019 elections is unclear, however, it is clear that the Eskom crisis will remain high on the agenda for the next government administration.

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HOW POLITICAL PARTIES USE TRAGEDIES TO CAMPAIGN

WRITTEN BY SIZWE NENE AND THEMELANI MAZIBUKO

Political parties often use national tragedies for political gain, especially during election periods. In their campaigns leading up to the 2019 national and provincial elections, the ruling ANC and the EFF have made frequent references to national tragedies such as the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre and the 1976 Soweto uprising (Kimmie, 2019). But more recent tragedies have also been used in political campaigning.

The DA and the Life Healthcare Esidimeni scandal

The Life Healthcare Esidimeni incident in Gauteng involved the deaths of 143 people at psychiatric facilities as a result of starvation and neglect. This led the DA to publicly use the names of those who died, a move that received widespread criticism (Merten, 2019). The party landed itself in hot water because it did not seek permission to do so. Political parties have a right to lawfully erect banners, billboards, placards and posters, but this cannot be done in a manner that infringes the rights of other people (IEC, 2019).

The DA’s attempt to gain political traction through this tragic incident was seen by many as crass and opportunistic. However, it is also argued that the party was not entirely wrong in using the incident as an example of there being a lack of accountability in government. In general, though, the manner in which the DA went about using the incident is considered to be in poor taste and insensitive.

The EFF and Marikana

The EFF portrays itself as the last vanguard of the interests of South Africa’s most vulnerable, which are often affected by national tragedies. The Marikana killings, which happened during an ANC-led government administration, was thus seen as an electoral boon for the EFF. This as EFF leader Julius Malema managed to make his party’s name synonymous with mineworkers’ struggles to the extent where the party itself was launched in 2013 at the site of the killings. The EFF has subsequently evoked the image of slain Marikana miners in much of its campaigning (Montsho & Ngoepe, 2013).
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The EFF has, by and large, used the Marikana killings to double down and strengthen its image. During the early days of the party's formation, the EFF centred its branding around the nationalisation of mines. A mine shaft also features prominently in the party's emblem. In the past, Malema has even called for the jailing of ANC leader, President Cyril Ramaphosa, for the Marikana killings (Du Plessis, 2013).

Conclusion

All opposition political parties use tragic events to highlight the shortcomings of the ruling ANC. However, the question remains as to whether tragedies are relevant in political messages and campaigning, or if the use of such events is merely opportunistic, hence insincere. While the EFF's use of the Marikana killings is congruent with the party's overall message, the DA's use of the Life Healthcare Esidimeni incident might be seen as insincere.

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A DECADE OF COMMISSIONS

WRITTEN BY QIQA NKOMO

The overarching objectives of commissions of inquiry are to rally public engagement, provide information on how certain systems work, highlight these systems' shortfalls and identify the parties responsible for these shortfalls (Qukula, 2019). Over the last decade in South Africa, at least 14 commissions of inquiry have been initiated by the presidency. Due to the abundance of commissions of inquiry, a perception among the public has now developed that these commissions serve more as smokescreens – that is, they function as a means to evade accountability and gain political favour – than the resolution and corrective mechanisms they're intended to be. This perception is justified when considering that the number of commissions have increased between 2018 and 2019. Since President Cyril Ramaphosa's inauguration in 2018, he has initiated four commissions of inquiry. This has raised questions, especially in the build-up to the 2019 national and provincial elections.

Commissions of inquiry are supposed to function independently to establish facts. This is done by partially incorporating legal processes to eventually compile reports with non-binding recommendations (Bishop, 2014). Ideally, based on the findings of commissions, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) should

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1 “In 2014 there were 6 commissions of inquiry that were simultaneously running” (Bishop, 2014).
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take matters to court. Civil society should then hold the NPA accountable or action must be taken for resolution (Qukula, 2019). The Commissions Act (1947) gives presidents carte blanche to appoint commissions of inquiry for the purpose of scrutinising matters that are of public concern.

A major criticism of commissions of inquiry is their failure to enforce accountability due to the political interests that they tend to serve (Bishop, 2014). It is also argued that commissions, such as the Zondo commission into state capture, are triggered by public outrage regarding corruption and negligence in state departments and state-owned enterprises. Hence, a commission investigating state capture just before elections may be regarded as means to pacify voters’ grievances, and be considered an act of ethical leadership.

This argument gained credibility after the president’s recent dismissal of NPA advocates Nomgcobo Jiba and Lawrence Mrwebi, based on recommendations from the Mokgoro commission. (Presidency, 2019). Although this creates a perception that the president is serious about eradicating corruption, it is somewhat negated by inaction from the president on findings from the Zondo commission, which implicate members of the ANC’s national executive committee. In addition, the Zondo commission’s report is only due after the 2019 election, which implies that the governing party may not be willing to hold implicated and powerful ANC officials accountable during elections.

If executed properly, commissions of inquiry can be used to strengthen democracy. However, their key characteristics, transparency and accountability, are not always guaranteed or upheld. South Africa’s history of commissions of inquiry has not translated into holding officials and private entities accountable, irrespective of the action taken by the NPA.

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU-NATAL AND THE 2019 ELECTIONS

WRITTEN BY SANDILE KHUBONI

Violence that erupted in KwaZulu-Natal between the ANC and the IFP in the early 1990s threatened to derail the country’s first democratic elections in 1994. These tensions were largely related to the IFP’s demands for federalism and KwaZulu-Natal as an independent state. While the IFP had threatened to boycott the 1994 elections, it eventually participated. Although elections in South Africa since 1994 have
generally been peaceful, the past two election cycles have seen an increase in political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, though the nature of the violence appears to have shifted predominantly to intra-party conflict.

The ANC has been more prone to internal conflict than other parties, even though other parties may have experienced electoral violence in the form of “rally disruptions, prevention of electioneering in no-go and strong areas, attack on supporters and confrontations between party representatives” (EISA, 2014). Political violence can also occur due to rivalry or factionalism, and contestation for political positions and the control of resources at local levels between the members of the same political organisation. Despite this distinction, the overlap between non-election violence and violence directly related to elections in KwaZulu-Natal has the potential to profoundly affect the democratic processes.

**Local election violence**

Electoral trends in KwaZulu-Natal suggest that political violence is mostly experienced during local government elections. One view is that local political positions are often viewed as a source of income in themselves but more importantly as entry points for lucrative government contracts. In the 2011 local government elections, Zanele Magwaza-Msibi’s defection from the IFP to form the National Freedom Party (NFP) was marked by violent confrontations involving supporters of the IFP and the new party. The ANC also became more factionalised during the same period, with increased “conflict over nominations and allegations of manipulation of party lists” (DeHass, 2016). Despite the occurrence of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal during the 2011 local government elections, the 2014 national and provincial elections saw a reduced number of cases of political violence, as reported by observer missions (EISA, 2014).

Soon after the 2014 elections, factionalism within the ANC deepened. Those who supported former KwaZulu-Natal premier Senzo Mchunu (who is aligned with current ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa) and current KwaZulu-Natal Premier Willies Mchunu (who is aligned with former ANC president Jacob Zuma) become antagonistic towards each other. The opposing factions competed for local support and local government positions were violently contested. During the 2016 local government elections, the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal faced serious intra-party tension, in which about 20 politically linked individuals were killed and various other attempted murders were reported in Msinga, Harry Gwala, Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Ladysmith and Ntshanga (DeHass, 2016).

The killings between 2015 and 2016 compelled the premier to appoint a commission of inquiry, known as the Moerane commission. The commission reported factionalism, intolerance and politicisation of the police as the forces behind the violence in the province. However, the commission was criticised for overlooking key factors that have contributed to the violence such as the proliferation of arms and the involvement of private security companies.

On the eve of the 2019 national and provincial elections, no major cases of political violence have been reported in KwaZulu-Natal. Although three ANC supporters were reported murdered in one incident in Pietermaritzburg in March 2019, it is unclear whether their murders were politically motivated (Hans, 2019). Based on the discussion above, it would seem that less prevalence of political violence in the province does not necessarily mean that the 2019 elections will be free of violent incidents. The
Independent Electoral Commission has declared some parts of the province as a no-go areas (Hans, 2019). These areas include political spaces in which violence is used to restrict political mobilisation of the opposition parties.

Although the outcome of the ANC’s 2017 elective conference may have curbed the development of factions within the ANC, the party’s supposed unity may still be susceptible to factionalism as individuals implicated in state capture and other corrupt activities are still fighting for political survival within its ranks.

References


ELECTION DAY MISHAPS: MERE HICCUPS OR POOR PLANNING?
WRITTEN BY QIQA NKOMO

South Africa’s sixth democratic national and provincial elections, which took place on 8 May 2019, are considered the most significant since the historic 1994 elections (Ipsos, 2019). Rampant unemployment, service-delivery protests, crippling power shortages and load-shedding, heated commissions of inquiry, incidents of xenophobic and gender-based violence, and politically linked violence all served as a backdrop to this crucial election, giving it even more significance (EISA, 2019). A week before the elections took place, the IEC, the body responsible for managing elections in South Africa, announced it was fully equipped and ready to facilitate fair and peaceful elections for the 26 million registered voters (IEC, 2019).

Concerns raised on voting day

Opening times and stations that did not open: All 22 942 voting stations across South Africa were meant to open at 7am on election day. There were reports of voters queueing at stations from 6.30am, yet by mid-morning, more than 17 stations, in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape, had not opened. By the end of the day, five stations did not open at all due to ongoing protest action (SABC, 2019). The IEC’s response to polling stations opening later than the stipulated time was announcing that, if there were still people queueing at these stations, they would remain open after the 9pm closing time for all other stations. The IEC also announced that it was unlikely that the
five stations that did not open would affect the outcome of the elections.

- **Indelible ink**: The IEC received numerous reports regarding the ink used to mark people who had already voted. The ink, which was supposed to be indelible, was easily removed by some, making it possible to vote more than once. The commission noted that instances where the ink rubbed off were “a partial reality” and “not a universal truth”, as it also received reports of the ink not rubbing off (SABC, 2019; IEC briefs the media on voting so far, 2019).

- **Opportunity to vote**: Reports emerged of employers, mostly in the retail sector, not allowing their employees to vote (SABC, 2019). The IEC encouraged people to report these incidents so that it can investigate the matter.

- **Scanners and VEC4 forms**: Various complaints were received of ID scanners being offline, which meant that it was possible for people to use VEC4 forms and vote multiple times at different stations. VEC4 forms are sworn affidavits authorised in terms of Section 24A of the Electoral Act (1998) that permit voting if a voter is not in their registered district on election day (CapeTalk, 2019). Persons who are found to have exploited this issue will be charged with fraud.

- **Ballot sheets**: There were complaints of stations running out of ballot sheets in Gauteng and Western Cape. The IEC noted that the issue of stations running out of ballot sheets was due to people going to stations where they were not registered, resulting in shortages. Ballot sheet shortages were resolved by 5pm (SABC, 2019; IEC, 2019).

- **Voting stations**: Some polling stations in Limpopo and North West closed for short periods during the day due to unrest (SABC, IEC briefs the media on voting so far, 2019). These stations were later opened and voters who were still queueing were allowed to vote.

Election day revealed some shortfalls for the IEC in terms of possible instances of multiple voting. The day also prompted questions as to why the IEC’s data-capturing system was not digitised for efficiency and security. These issues are not entirely new to the IEC and have in the past been considered minor. However, due to the socioeconomic climate in which the 2019 elections took place, these issues were considered major, to the point where 30 out of the 48 political parties that contested requested a rerun. Despite the glitches on election day, the IEC recorded a voter turnout of 65% of registered voters, with more than 90% of polling stations functioning without interruption. The IEC was generally prepared but these elections revealed that there is always room for improvement.

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UNION STRIKES ON THE EVE OF THE 2019 ELECTIONS

WRITTEN BY SIZWE NENE

South Africa is one of few countries where striking is a constitutional right. Section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution provides that “every worker has the right to strike, which thereby gives effect to its duties as members under the conventions” (Constitution, 1996). The right can only be limited in terms of the law of general application to the extent that it is reasonable and justifiable in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution. As the 2019 national and provincial elections drew nearer, the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) pursued strike action against the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for various workplace grievances. Although workers have a constitutional right to strike, the timing of the strike a few days before the elections could have had serious ramifications for the IEC as an employer, and the electoral process, if it was left unresolved.

On 5 May 2019, just three days before the elections, it was reported that efforts to reach an agreement between the union and the IEC had broken down. NEHAWU stated that the IEC failed to implement recommendations related to salary bands and organisational structure, which were adopted over the last three years. This after a service provider appointed by the IEC pronounced that the organisation’s structure should be reconfigured with immediate effect. The IEC, however, did not effect the changes, which led to low staff morale.

Another bone of contention was the IEC’s reluctance to provide staff with the necessary tools of trade, such as transportation to move between voting stations to deliver and collect ballot boxes. There were also allegations of harassment and victimisation by IEC management staff on workers (Gous, 2019). The timing of NEHAWU’s strike action placed the IEC in a difficult position in which it needed to respond swiftly. The parties eventually reached a resolution on 6 May, with the IEC addressing matters pertaining to salaries and implementing the organisational structure. A committee was established to implement the resolutions (Somdyala, 2019).

If these issues were not resolved, the IEC risked losing credibility after years of maintaining a good record of delivering free and fair and elections (Dlulani, 2019). While the union’s grievances may have been valid, the timing of this the and the extent to which it was reasonable and justifiable in terms of Section 36 of the Constitution remains questionable.
CHAPTER 6

SECTION 24A AND THE 2019 ELECTIONS

WRITTEN BY NANCY HAKIZIMANA

The sworn or affirmed statement by a voter whose name is not on the voters’ roll, or VEC4 form, received much public attention during the 2019 national and provincial elections. The VEC4 form serves as part of the provisions of Section 24A of the Electoral Act (1998), which caused various issues on election day. As per Section 24A, VEC4 forms must be filled in by persons who wish to vote in districts outside of where they are registered, and if a person is outside the province where they are registered, they will only be able to cast a ballot for the national election and forego voting in the provincial election.

When a large number of voters across the country use VEC4 forms, it can cause difficulties for the electoral process; and such challenges, whether intentional or unintentional, can have far reaching implications.

On voting day, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced that there was a shortage of ballot papers at some stations due to an increase of voters exercising provisions of Section 24A. These stations where mostly in Cape Town, Western Cape (for example, at Jan van Riebeeck High School, Tamboerskloof Primary School and St Cyprians School). Some voters might have also decided to vote at different voting stations to avoid queuing in the rain at stations where they were registered. The shortage of ballot papers was not only limited to Western Cape – a polling station in Pretoria, Gauteng; and two in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, were also affected.

According to electoral law, to ensure that ballots are not tampered with, ballot papers must be transported with police escorts. However, with the South African Police Service having to deal with protest action and other security protocol, the delivery of more ballot papers was delayed. Thus, the shortage of ballot papers at these stations caused long queues as voters had to wait until extra ballot papers arrived. People then either turned back and didn’t vote or looked for other polling stations to vote in line with Section 24A.

The costs and security risks of having large numbers of additional ballots at each station could be significant. The challenges related to the legitimate use of VEC4 forms in the 2019 elections may need to be addressed in future elections. What was revealed is that the provisions made under Section 24A caused ballot papers to run out, which in turn caused unnecessary queues and in some cases resulted in people not voting.
CHAPTER 6

SERVICE-DELIVERY PROTESTS AND THE 2019 ELECTIONS
WRITTEN BY SANDILE KHUBONI

On 11 May 2019, three days after the 2019 national and provincial elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared that the ANC had retained an elected majority in Parliament by winning 57.5% of all national votes cast. Although numerous factors may have affected the voter turnout in these elections, which was the lowest in South Africa’s democratic history, the high number of service-delivery protests that occurred in the period leading up to the election is reflective of the disillusionment felt by many South Africans towards government.

But to what extent do pre-election protests affect voter turnouts and overall election outcomes?

Service-delivery protests can be an effective means for citizens to communicate with local and central government. The majority of these protests represent genuine community grievances, for example, on the delivery of adequate housing, water and electricity, as well as to highlight various socioeconomic problems faced by poor South Africans. Nevertheless, the relationship between protests and politics is often nebulous, as protests are sometimes part of election campaigning or attempts at demobilisation.

Significantly, the timing and occurrence of service-delivery protests during election periods can have political underpinnings, with the objective of influencing electoral outcomes. In the period leading up to the 2019 elections, political parties in Gauteng, especially the DA and the ANC, accused each other instigating service-delivery protests in the province’s metros. The clearest example of this was seen in Alexandra, north of Johannesburg, where protest action was seen by the DA as a “political stunt” by the ANC to discredit Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba, who is a DA member.

The relationship between service-delivery protests and voting is interesting, since voter preference in South Africa is associated with many factors, such as “race, ethnicity and regionalism; party loyalty; and campaigns and performance” (Sadie, et al., 2016). As such, the manner in which voters perceive government performance can be seen as being directly related to election outcomes. But the degree to which actual performance, in terms of service-delivery, negatively affects national election outcomes is unclear. As was the case in the 2016 local government elections, poor service-delivery can influence local government and municipal elections. This as weak performance at the local government level is equated to the general functioning of local government (Sadie, et al., 2016). The high number of service-delivery
protests leading up to 2016 local government elections correlated with a drastic overall decline in support for the ANC at the local government level (Steyn, 2016).

Although there was a high number of service-delivery protests in the period leading up to the 2019 elections—especially in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and North West—very few occurred on election day and had no significant impact on the outcome of the elections. Nevertheless, the IEC faced logistical delays in some areas affected by service-delivery protests (Dlamini, 2019).

Surprisingly, results in protest hotspots did not provide much insight as to how protests might affect election outcomes. The ANC retained its political stronghold in Alexandra, with 73.61% of the vote. This was followed by the EFF, which increased its share of the vote to 18.44% in 2019, from 15.13% in 2014; while the DA’s votes decreased to 4.8% in 2019, from 6.87% in 2014 (Daily Maverick Team, 2019). The ANC’s victory in Alexandra came in spite of the recent service-delivery protests in the area, which were related to an amount of R16 billion budgeted for housing that went unaccounted for by the ANC leadership.

References


**THE COUNTING PROCESS, FROM BALLOT TO RESULTS BOARD**

**WRITTEN BY THEMBELANI MAZIBUKO**

An important part of maintaining the integrity of elections is not only counting votes accurately, but transmitting results from the various voting stations to the large electronic board at the Results Operations Centre (ROC). To ensure this, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) makes use of robust internal mechanisms and checks and balances.

Vote counting begins immediately after all votes are cast and polling stations are officially closed. Once the sealed ballot boxes are opened and all ballot sheets are appropriately counted, checked and bundled by electoral staff, the results are entered on to results slips that are submitted to counting officers in the presence of party agents. The ballots are then placed back into the ballot boxes, which are resealed and kept in secure storage for six months after the elections.
Results slips are sent to local IEC offices where they are verified, scanned, captured and transmitted to a centralised database. The dual scan-capture system makes digital results as well as a scan of the original slip available. This system ensures that technical errors and potential fraud in the transmission of results are avoided. Results are captured using the “double-blind capturing and validation” method, and are audited by independent external auditors.

Built into the system is a mechanism that is able to flag possible exceptions, such as exceptionally high or low voter turnout. Upon flagging, a team at the ROC checks, investigates and, if necessary, attends to the matter. Once this is done, the result is combined along with results from other parts of the country, then displayed on the electronic board at the ROC.

After attending to all objections, the IEC is mandated to make results, along with parliamentary seat allocations, known within seven days. The elections are formally concluded when the IEC chairperson announces the results. The results are published in the Government Gazette soon thereafter.

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**Step 1**: Ballots are counted by electoral staff voting stations in the presence of party agents

**Step 2**: Results are entered on to results slips by presiding officers and given to counting officers. Results slips are also signed by party agents, a copy of which is posted on voting station doors

**Step 3**: Results slips are sent to local IEC offices where they are verified, scanned and captured by IEC staff

**Step 4**: Once they are captured, results are transmitted to a centralised database where they are audited by independent external auditors

**Step 5**: Any exceptions found by the system are attended to by a team at the ROC. The results are then ready to be displayed on the electronic display board at the ROC

**Step 6**: Political parties may raise objections, and after attending objections, the IEC must announce results and parliamentary seat allocations within seven days

**Step 7**: Detailed results are published in the Government Gazette
Since South Africa’s first democratic elections, the IEC has enjoyed a relatively high level of trust and legitimacy, domestically and internationally. An important reason for this legitimacy lies in the IEC’s own procedures as well as the use of independent external auditors. For the IEC to maintain the trust it has gained, it is imperative that its procedures remain robust and transparent.

References

VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2019 ELECTIONS
WRITTEN BY MAITE DITHEBE

Voter turnout is a key indicator in any election as it represents the will of the people (Morais, 2019). On 11 May 2019, three days after the 2019 national and provincial elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) confirmed that the voter turnout in the 2019 elections was just more than 65.5%, an almost 8% drop from 2014, making these elections the least participated in in South Africa’s democratic history (IEC, 2019). More than 26 million South Africans were registered to vote (55% women and 49% men), with 10 million eligible citizens choosing not to register (IEC, 2019).

Voter turnouts differed between provinces. In these elections, opposition parties in Gauteng and Western Cape had a serious chance to contest for power (Kahla, 2019). However, Gauteng recorded a 68% voter turnout (Nqola, 2019), while Western Cape recorded 66.28% (Eyewitness News and Felix, 2019). Rural provinces had even lower voter turnouts: Limpopo recorded the lowest voter turnout at 56.36%; Mpumalanga recorded 63.2%; North West recorded 57.01%; KwaZulu-Natal recorded 66.15%; Eastern Cape recorded 59.51%; and Northern Cape recorded 64.12% (IEC, 2019).

Voter participation has been in a steady decline since the historic 1994 election. One contributing factor might be citizens’ growing distrust of government and political parties owing to corruption and general underperformance (Afrobarometer, 2016: 10). Increasing voter apathy also contributed to the lower voter turnout. With rampant corruption and many election promises left unfulfilled, government has failed to earn the trust of voters in many provinces, resulting in them not casting their votes (Pillay, 2019).

Other factors for the low voter turnout in the 2019 elections included bad weather conditions (Mortlock, 2019), power cuts (Citizen, 2019), and service-delivery protests.

Low voter turnout is a serious concern for any democracy. The possible factors that have led to low voter turnouts should be examined in order for them to be rectified. Perhaps the most notable aspect of the 2019 elections is that the outcomes have been determined more by who didn’t vote than who did, which is clearly a concern for the health of South Africa’s democracy moving forward.
CHAPTER 6

References
CHAPTER 6

SOUTH AFRICA ELECTIONS 2019

VOTER TURNOUT

Total national voter turnout in 2019

65.99%

UNPACKING THE DOWNTURN

APATHY

More than 18 million eligible voters did not vote. Particularly young voters are not registering to vote.

TRUST

Dissillusionment and low levels of trust in political parties. Corruption scandals, service delivery protests and party infighting all contribute to negative voter perceptions.

SMALLER ISSUES

Poor weather, security and protest concerns, long queues and voter station opening times and voting materials.
WHO DETERMINED SOUTH AFRICA’S 2019 ELECTION RESULTS?

WRITTEN BY MELANIE MEIROTTI

To illustrate South Africa’s diverse population, Justice Albie Sachs once noted that “South Africans come in all shapes and sizes”. (SAHRC, 2016). In the run-up to the 2019 national and provincial elections, which took place on 8 May, 48 political parties devoted their resources to appeal to various segments of this diverse population in the hopes of securing seats in the country’s sixth democratic Parliament.

The Independent Electoral Commission’s statistics on voter registration and turnout reveal some interesting and surprising trends regarding the identity politics of South African voters. This final edition of the EISA weekly election review will consider which constituencies were most influential in terms of determining the outcome of the 2019 elections.

In their review of women voters in South Africa, Maite Dithebe and Qiqa Nkomo examine some of the key social challenges facing the numerically largest segment of voters in the country. The article explores how aspects of women’s diverse identities informed how parties appealed to them and whether this influenced how women voted.
What appears to be the active disengagement of South African youth in electoral politics is a serious concern for the country’s democratic future. Nancy Hakizimana and Grant Masterson unpack some of the concerns facing young people today and how political parties have sought to attract their support.

In contrast to the worryingly low turnout of youth (18-29) at the polls, the generation directly above it (aged 30-39 and 40-49) form the largest segment of the voter population. Melanie Meirotti and Sizwe Nene explore the intersection of age and inclusion in the economy in this group and how it has influenced their culture of participation.

The geographic location of voters has always been a key determinant of party loyalty in South Africa. Sandile Khuboni and Thembelani Mazibuko explore how political parties used their resources during the campaign period to maintain party support in traditional strongholds or gain ground in rural and/or urban areas of the country.

WOMEN VOTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
WRITTEN BY MAITE DITHEBE AND QIQA NKOMO

Since 1994, the adoption of various democratic policies have given rise to institutions that promote women’s rights in South Africa. Data from United Nations Women indicates that the South Africa fares relatively well in enabling women to take an active role in government (Anon, 2016). Data from the Independent Electoral Commission shows that women constitute 51% of potential voters in South Africa. In the 2019 national and provincial elections, women across all adult age groups accounted for 55% of all registered voters (Phakgadi, 2019). Globally, South Africa has the 10th highest representation of women in parliament, where 42.7% of all MPs are women (Thornton, 2019). Although South Africa has made impressive strides regarding gender representation in government, it seems women’s rights and opportunities are only taken seriously by politicians during elections.

Leading up to the 2019 elections, political parties promoted gender equality and committed to eradicating gender-based violence (GBV) and inequality. The DA’s manifesto describes GBV as “incalculable”, while the EFF states that women have suffered under the oppression of “sexism and patriarchy” for the last 20 years. This as the ANC simply labelled GBV a “crisis” and aligned its policy on gender representation with the Constitution. Yet these election commitments are not reflected in parties’ day-to-day operations, as well as in the attitudes of senior party officials (Gouws, 2019).

For example, it was not up until very recently that the 107-year-old ANC developed a policy on sexual harassment (Davis, 2019). In stark contrast with their party manifestos, in the months leading up to the 2019 elections, there were multiple sexual harassment allegations against party officials in the ANC, the DA and the EFF (Africa, 2019). This was also foregrounded by the fact that incidents of GBV in South Africa have consistently increased over the years. In 2016/17, StatsSA reported that “250 out of every 100 000 women were victims of sexual offences compared to 120 out of every 100 000 men” (StatsSA, 2018). But
these statistics did not deter women in the 2014 elections, as they constituted 60% of those who voted (Berkowitz, 2019).

In spite of political parties not actioning their policies and commitments regarding women’s rights and empowerment, according to Berkowitz (2019), women voters should not be analysed as a monolithic bloc; and their choices should not be measured in terms of party manifests. There might be no detailed polling information that segments voters by income or education, but there is research that links the voting choices of some women to their socioeconomic concerns.

“A 2017 study by the Centre for Social Development in Africa found that women were less likely to vote for the ANC than men. A subsequent study in 2018 found that the gender divide had narrowed or disappeared. A possible explanation is that the resignation of [Jacob] Zuma changed women’s feelings towards the ANC.” (Patel, 2019).

The same study revealed a correlation between women who are social welfare grant recipients and their likelihood to vote for the ANC. Survey responses suggested that grant recipients were motivated by a fear of losing their grants under another party.

Considering that more women voted in the 2019 elections than men, if women voters collectively voted for a single party, their votes would have changed the outcome of the elections (Gouws, 2019). Hence, it was surprising that political parties only referred to the advancement and protection of women in their manifests but failed to match their behaviour during elections. The lack of better commitment by political parties to women’s issues versus the number of women who voted in the last two elections would suggest that what motivates women to vote is not necessarily linked to how political parties, especially the ANC, deal with gender-related social ills such as GBV.

It would appear that what drives women to vote is linked more to general concerns such as job opportunities and social grants. This may be due to South Africa’s high unemployment rate, which results in basic needs not being met, thereby placing issues such as sexual assault as secondary. Until the broader issue of unemployment, corruption and crime are dealt with, political parties are likely to continue to go unpunished at the polls for their failure to address gender-related concerns in spite of attracting more women than men at the polls.

References
2019 ELECTIONS: WHERE DID THE YOUTH GO?
WRITTEN BY NANCY HAKIZIMANA AND GRANT MASTERSO

With more than 36% of its citizens aged between 15 and 34, South Africa has one of the youngest populations in the world (StatsSA, 2016). However, when comparing statistics from the 2014 and 2019 national and provincial elections, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) found a 47% decrease in the number of people aged between 18 and 19 on the 2019 voters’ roll. The PMG also found that the number of registered voters between the ages of 20 and 29 decreased by 9% in 2019 (PMG, 2019). On 9 May 2019, the day after South Africa’s national elections, the Southern African Development Community observer mission announced that it had noticed a lower youth turnout at the polls (Kubheka, 2019). This decrease in youth participation in elections becomes even more pronounced when considering that South Africa’s population has grown by approximately 7.5% over the past five years (GroundUp, 2019).

These statistics suggest that the 2019 election results do not accurately reflect the voice and aspirations of the largest age segment of South Africa’s adult population; and that young South Africans are apathetic when it comes to politics and governance. However, the youth have been central in shaping South Africa throughout its history. Examples of this can been seen as far back as the Soweto uprising in 1976 or as recent as the 2015 #FeesMustFall protests. Crucial events such as these also illustrate that South African youth are more inclined to use alternative means to voice their concerns.

Leading up to the 2019 elections, the Independent Electoral Commission ran the “Xsê” campaign, which was intended to encourage young South Africans to vote. The campaign used a play on words from the Afrikaans slang phrase “Ek sê”, literally translated to English as “I say”. The phrase is understood by a multitude of South Africans across cultures as one that is used to draw attention to the speaker so they may be heard, as in, “listen up, I am speaking”. The use of “X” was also a clever play on the mark used by voters on ballot sheets. The “Xsê” campaign featured images of young South Africans across all forms of media, from billboards to social media.
Various political parties also targeted the youth in their respective campaigns. While the ANC used #FeesMustFall leader Fasiha Hassan to campaign and attract young voters, the DA released a TV ad inspired by US musician Childish Gambino’s hit 2018 music video “This is America”. While the EFF also ran a campaign that featured #FeesMustFall leaders, it mainly targeted the youth on social media platforms such as Twitter. On these platforms, the party made use of hashtags such as #MCM (man crush Monday), #WCW (women crush Wednesday) and #EFFRedFridays. This approach was, in essence, drawn from the #FessMustFall protests, where students demonstrated that they could mobilise thousands of young South Africans by using hashtags. While using social media does, indeed, reach certain youth audiences, it is, however, important to note that only 12% of eligible South African voters are on social media (De Villiers, 2019).

The question of youth participation in elections is made even more complex by the variety of youth interests and frustrations. To appeal to the youth, parties must understand and address issues that young people are interested in. Studies conducted by YouthLab and the Institute of Security Studies found that the most pressing issues for the youth, which may inform their decisions on whether to vote, are unemployment, free and quality education, corruption, crime, and drug use (YouthLab 2019). This especially as 55.2% of all unemployed people in South Africa are youth (StatsSA 2019). Most parties prioritised unemployment during their campaigns leading up to the 2019 elections. For example, the ANC vowed to strengthen its efforts to attract investment for job creation, while the DA stated its aim to enhance the manufacturing, agriculture and tourism sectors.

South Africa’s youth appear to have actively disengaged from electoral politics just 25 years since the dawn of democracy. Often, the age gap between political leaders and their constituents is offered as an explanation for this kind of disconnect in electoral politics, however, the DA and EFF both fielded young leaders in these elections. Given the grim prospects for young people in South Africa in 2019, the fact that they do not appear to view politics as relevant to their circumstances represents a growing risk to South Africa’s “young” democracy.

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SOUTH AFRICA’S INFLUENTIAL ‘MIDDLE’ VOTERS
WRITTEN BY MELANIE MEIROTTI AND SIZWE NENE

Much concern has been raised about the limited participation of youth voters in South Africa (those aged between 18-19 and 20-29 years – see IEC registration figures below) in the 2019 national and provincial elections. In contrast, the segment of voters aged between 30 and 39, known for purposes of this article as “middle” voters, outnumber registered voters in the 18-29 age segment by more than 1.3 million. Even though the 30-39 age segment is proportionately smaller than the 18-29 segment in terms of South Africa’s total population, this remains a telling feature in the country’s electoral landscape (IEC, 2019). This article briefly explores possible reasons for the significant differences in voting trends between the two age segments.

**Figure 1**

IEC Registration Statistics as at 22 Nov 2018

![Graph showing IEC registration statistics as at 22 Nov 2018](source: StatsSA, 2018)
Culture of political participation

As past statistics indicate, South Africans who were considered youth during the first decade of South Africa’s democracy (1994-2004) were more inclined to vote owing to the relative freshness of Nelson Mandela’s “rainbow nation” narrative and Thabo Mbeki’s notion of an “African renaissance”. This enthusiasm also came on the back of economic growth and the rise of a black middle class. As such, these voters were likely to have cultivated an optimism in South Africa’s future during the first decade of democracy and, in turn, developed a culture of participation in the following decade and beyond (HSRC, 2005).

Political issues and political homes

Education and employment are the major issues concerning South Africa’s youth (YouthLab, 2019), while older generations are more likely to be educated and included in the economy (formal or informal). According to StatsSA (2019) first quarter statistics, just over 70% of the youth do not have jobs. By contrast the unemployment rate among adults (aged 35–64 years) was 18.0% during this period. This does not necessarily mean that the latter group can be classified as middle or working class in the traditional sense, it does however mean that this group are less likely to form part of the most vulnerable and economically marginalized groups than their younger counterparts. Depending on the method of measuring middle class, between 13.5% and 43.2% fall into this bracket (Korhonen, 2018).

Those in the “middle” group are primarily concerned with issues such as the state of the economy, corruption and accountability, unemployment, and poverty and inequality (Heywood, 2013). During the previous election cycle, various political issues affected the economy and standard of living in South Africa. These included: instability within the finance ministry since 2015, followed by credit-ratings downgrades (Donnelly, 2017); a VAT increase from 14% to 15% in 2018; and multiple government scandals affecting
the finances and functions at crucial state-owned enterprises, most notably power utility Eskom (Meirotti, 2019). In contrast, many so-called born-frees have failed to find political homes as they have grown disillusioned in an environment that has not been conducive to their economic growth.

The rising middle class
While members of older generations participate in elections in greater numbers compared with the youth, there is an increasing number of middle-class voters (particularly black middle-class voters) who do not relate to the narratives and messages of political parties (Everatt, 2019). Members of this segment are critical of the governing party’s performance in power and are sceptical of opposition parties. The failure of political parties to address these concerns could impact heavily on the turnout of the largest voting age segment in the 2024 national and provincial elections.

Conclusion
The largest portion of South Africa’s economically active population – those aged between 35 and 44 (StatsSA, 2019) – are likely to be the most invested in South Africa’s politics as they have the most to lose. If the 2019 election campaign narratives of South Africa’s two largest parties, the ANC and the DA, are to be believed, economic growth and tackling corruption are high on the agenda. Should these parties succeed in addressing these issues, the “middle” voter segment is likely to continue participating in elections. It is, however, clear that there is an increasing number of people, in all age and economic segments, who are finding less traction with political parties. This has already impacted voter turnout in the 2019 elections and, more worryingly, will likely have consequences for South Africa’s culture of voter participation in future.

References
Donnelly, L. 2017. Global credit ratings agency has downgraded South Africa to junk status. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-25-global-credit-ratings-agency-has-downgraded-south-africa-to-junk-status.


Political commentators draw a distinction between urban and rural voters as two discrete constituencies representing different demographics and interests. Urban and rural voters are not homogenous, rather, these constituencies can be influenced by various issues, including service-delivery, party loyalty, ethnicity, corruption, patronage and the charisma of party leaders. According to a survey conducted by Afrobarometer, the split between urban and rural voters in the period leading up to the 2019 national and provincial elections favoured the ANC, as the party had 59% support in rural areas and 43% support in urban areas (Felton 2019). The poll showed the DA had 14% support in urban areas and 4% in rural areas, while the EFF had 11% support in urban and rural areas (Felton 2019).

The term “rural” can be understood to refer to areas where farming is the main economic activity, while “urban” refers to areas that have far greater economic diversity. This distinction can be applied broadly to provinces, which are considered either “rural” or “urban”.

Rural areas tend to be homogeneous, whereas urban areas tend to be heterogeneous or cosmopolitan. Furthermore, rural residents tend to be older, whereas urban areas contain a mix of young and old people. As wealth tends to be concentrated in urban areas, young people in search of opportunities flock to them, with many of these people ending up living in informal settlements. As such, urban areas in South Africa typically have higher Gini coefficients where the poor, the working class and the rich live side by side. Today, 63% of South Africans live in urban areas (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2016).

Given the limited resources some political parties have during elections, they are most likely to campaign in areas where they have a relative advantage. During the 2019 election campaign period, the DA disproportionately focused its campaign in Western Cape (its stronghold), Northern Cape and Gauteng. Worth noting is that Northern Cape is arguably the most rural province in the country, whereas Gauteng is the most urban. This suggests that, for the DA, the decision on which provinces to focus its campaigns is based on high levels of urbanisation (as the party has higher levels of support in urban areas) as well as other factors. The EFF campaigned across the country with a strong focus on the northern provinces (North West, Mpumalanga and Limpopo). However, the EFF did not have a specific rural or urban focus, and campaigned in both.

With its vast network of branches, the ANC campaigned countrywide in rural and urban areas. However, given the results of the 2016 local government elections, as well as the Afrobarometer survey, the ANC clearly needed to increase its support in urban areas, especially in Gauteng.

The graph below details the urban/rural split between political parties.
**2019 election results**

The ANC maintained its overall dominance by winning more than 57% of the national vote, while the DA came second with 20% and the EFF received 10% (Elections.org.za, 2019). The ANC also maintained its dominance in most rural areas. The DA maintained its urban (and rural) appeal in Western Cape as well as its urban appeal in Gauteng, winning 27% while slightly increasing its voter share in Northern Cape to 25% (Elections.org.za, 2019). The EFF gained in all provinces and overtook the DA to become the official opposition in Mpumalanga.

Rounding off the top 5, the IFP made impressive inroads in rural KwaZulu-Natal, most likely due to its historical strength in the Zululand area as well as its appeal to a section of Zulu-speaking people, particularly in northern KwaZulu-Natal. However, these inroads for the IFP came on the back of a drastic decrease in support for the NFP. Freedom Front Plus, another party with an ethnically defined base, also made inroads in northern rural areas where there is a high Afrikaner presence (Feketha, 2019). The party’s gains could be attributed to its mobilisation against land expropriation without compensation.

**Conclusion**

Rural and urban voters have distinct voter profiles. Rural voters still tend to vote ANC, with the exception of Western Cape, where the DA still has the lion’s share of voter support. The ANC continues to face threats from the two major opposition parties in urban areas. The DA lost some of its particularly conservative voters to Freedom Front Plus in rural and urban areas.

**References**

CHAPTER 7


The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) or the Embassy of Germany.

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