EISA ELECTION OBSERVER MISSION REPORT

TANZANIA

TANZANIA PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

14 DECEMBER 2005

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EISA’s mission is to strengthen electoral processes, good governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other targeted interventions.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In line with its vision of promoting credible elections and democratic governance in Africa, EISA deployed a regional observer mission to the Tanzanian Mainland presidential, National Assembly and local government elections, which were to be held on 31 October 2005. At the same time EISA deployed a separate observer mission to Zanzibar, which has produced a separate report.

The EISA mission was led by Mr Leshele Thoahlane, Chairperson of the Lesotho Electoral Commission and of the EISA Board of Directors. EISA Executive Director, Mr Denis Kadima, assisted him as the deputy mission leader. The delegation comprised 24 members, who were nationals of various countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), namely Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The delegates came from electoral commissions and a variety of civil society organisations (CSOs). Eight EISA observer teams were deployed from 25 to 30 October 2005 throughout the country.

However, the Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) vice-presidential candidate, Mr Jumbe Rajab Jumbe, died on 26 October 2005. In accordance with the electoral laws of Tanzania, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was obliged to postpone the presidential election. With regard to the possible confusion voters might experience and the logistical difficulties and costs involved in holding two separate elections, the NEC decided to postpone all the Union-governed elections, presidential, National Assembly and local government, until 14 December 2005.

EISA had to withdraw its observation mission in the Mainland and redeploy a technical team of EISA staff on 10 December. This report outlines the EISA mission’s assessment, findings and analysis of the electoral process in all its phases, specifically the pre-election phase, the polling, counting and post-election phases, which include the proclamation of the results. This report also takes into account observations made by the EISA observer mission before the postponement of the elections in October 2005.
The EISA technical team was led by Zefanias Matsimbe (programme officer) and consisted of Themba Nkwinika (programme officer) and Grant Masterson and Deane Stuart (researchers).

From 5 to 30 October 2005, the observer mission and, from 10 to 13 December 2005, the technical team met with a variety of civil society and political stakeholders to familiarise themselves with the conditions prevailing prior to the election. On election day, 14 December 2005, two teams were deployed to observe the voting in Dar es Salaam. The teams were able to visit a total of 33 polling stations.

The teams used the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation endorsed at the United Nations on 27 October 2005 as the basis for its assessment of the Tanzanian presidential, National Assembly and local government elections. PEMMO is a document developed under the auspices of EISA and the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of SADC countries. It outlines standards and best practices for the conduct and assessment of elections in the SADC region.

The report summarises the main findings of the EISA mission and makes appropriate recommendations to the relevant election stakeholders in Tanzania, with a view to improving the electoral process and triggering subsequent reforms. The report will be shared with the NEC, political parties, CSOs and other electoral stakeholders in Tanzania. In addition, EISA will disseminate the findings of this mission to government authorities, political parties, election management bodies and CSOs across the SADC region and the African continent so that lessons can be drawn.

On the basis of guidelines enshrined in PEMMO and the findings of its observations, the technical team concluded that the 2005 Tanzanian presidential, National Assembly and local government elections were free from any technical deficiencies that could have substantially impacted on the credibility and legitimacy of the final results.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The EISA election observer mission’s work in Tanzania would not have been successful without the assistance and co-operation of many people and institutions. The team would like to express its sincere gratitude to all those who directly or indirectly contributed to the success of the mission’s work.

We would like to express our special thanks to the NEC, not only for inviting EISA to observe the 2005 presidential elections in Tanzania but also for providing critical information to the team as well as agreeing to meet us on various occasions to share with us information as the electoral process evolved. The information provided, as well as the meetings held, proved to be of great importance to the team’s understanding of the complex issues that the electoral process entails.

Our special thanks also go to political parties and CSOs that met the team to exchange information on the electoral process.

Ultimately, the mission is indebted to the people of Tanzania for their willingness to share their experiences, thoughts, opinions and views on the electoral process and the broad democratisation process in the country. The hospitality and support extended to the mission are deeply appreciated.

The observer mission and the technical team are grateful to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Department for International Development, DRC and Angola offices, for the generous funding that enabled the deployment of the mission and technical team.

Thanks go to the Elections and Political Processes Department of EISA as organisers and coordinators of the mission, and to Zefanias Matsimbe, Deane Stuart, Grant Masterson, and Themba Nkwinika for drafting this report.
THE EISA TECHNICAL TEAM’S TERMS OF REFERENCE

The terms of reference of the EISA election observer mission describe the role and responsibilities of the mission during its deployment for the 2005 presidential, National Assembly and local government elections in Tanzania. Essentially, they provide a summary of the mission’s objectives and outline the activities to be carried out by all EISA observers.

EISA and all other international observers were invited guests in Tanzania and the election and related processes were for the Tanzanian people to conduct. As observers, EISA mission members were expected to support and assess these processes, but not to interfere. EISA believes that international observers can play a critically important supportive role by helping to enhance the credibility of the elections, reinforcing the work of domestic observer groups and eventually increasing popular confidence in the entire electoral process.

The overall objective of this mission was in line with EISA’s vision of promoting credible elections and democratic governance in Africa. Specific objectives for this particular team included the following:

- To assess whether conditions existed for the conduct of elections that reflect the will of the people of Tanzania;
- To assess whether the elections were conducted in accordance with the electoral legislative framework of Tanzania; and
- To assess whether the elections met the benchmarks set out in PEMMO.

In order to achieve the above, the team sought to undertake the following activities:

- Obtain information on the electoral process from the NEC;
- Meet with political parties, CSOs and other relevant stakeholders to acquaint itself with the electoral environment;
- Report accurately on its observations and refer any irregularities to the relevant authorities;
- Observe all aspects of the election in the areas visited;
• Assess if all registered voters had easy access to voting stations and whether or not they were able to exercise their vote in freedom and secrecy;
• Assess the logistical arrangements to confirm if all necessary materials were available for voting and counting to take place efficiently;
• Find out if all the competing parties and candidates were given an equal opportunity to participate in the elections.
THE EISA APPROACH TO ELECTION OBSERVATION

EISA seeks to realise effective and sustainable democratic governance in Africa through strengthening electoral processes, good governance, human rights and democratic values. In this regard, EISA undertakes applied research, capacity building, advocacy and other targeted interventions. It is within this broad context that EISA fields election technical teams to assess the context and the conduct of elections in the SADC region.

In order to assess the presidential, National Assembly and local government elections of 14 December 2005 in Tanzania, EISA established a regional team whose members were drawn from electoral management bodies, various CSOs, political parties, and academic institutions in the SADC region. The team conducted a range of activities covering the pre-election, election and post-election phases. In the main, these activities included:

**Election Update**
Due to limited financial resources available, EISA was not able to field a long-term team in Tanzania. As a palliative measure, EISA used its innovative method of gathering and sharing information that ensured that members of the team and other interested parties were fully informed on major events which occurred during the electoral process. In this regard, EISA contracted Tanzania-based researchers to gather information and analyse significant election-related issues. This information was published fortnightly in the *Election Update* series, which was extensively disseminated electronically and in print. Much of the pre-election information contained in this report is drawn from *Election Update*.

**Stakeholder Meetings and Political Party Rallies**
Because of the postponement of the Union-governed elections, EISA was able to spend two periods in the country, 23 to 29 October 2005, and again 10 to 13 December 2005, with the main aim of assessing the pre-election phase and acquainting itself with the degree of preparedness of all the stakeholders. During these periods, members of the mission held meetings with various electoral stakeholders, including officials of the NEC, representatives of political parties, CSOs and other observer teams and the media in Tanzania.
All these meetings provided first-hand information and valuable insight on the different stakeholders’ assessment of the process as well as their preparedness for the elections. In addition, EISA teams attended election-related press conferences and political party rallies.

**Observation of Voting and Counting**
The EISA technical team was split into two teams, which were deployed in Dar es Salaam on 14 December 2005. EISA teams observed the voting process on 14 December as well as the counting of ballots that followed.

This report depicts the findings of the EISA regional team and the technical team deployed in Tanzania for the 2005 presidential, National Assembly and local government elections.
I.1. POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL BACKGROUND

The United Republic of Tanzania was formed from the union of two British territories, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Tanzania was granted independence on 9 December 1961 and Zanzibar, under a minority government, in December 1963. Shortly after independence, the government of Zanzibar was overthrown in a popular, bloody revolution and in April 1964 Zanzibar and Tanganyika joined to form the United Republic of Tanzania. In 1965 Tanzania formally became a one-party state through an amendment to the Constitution, but this was only realised on 5 February 1977, when the Tanganyika African National Union (Tanu) in the Mainland merged with the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM; ‘Party of the Revolution’).

Tanzania inherited a difficult social and economic situation at independence. Poverty was endemic, unemployment high, illiteracy widespread, infrastructure weak and ill health widespread. The formation of the one-party state was made in an attempt to unite the nation in a single coordinated development effort to drag Tanzania from poverty by its own bootstraps. The second leg of this effort was the uniquely African experiment with socialism, known as Ujamaa: an attempt to engage in an agrarian revolution through the consolidation of the rural populations into concentrated villages where economies of scale could come into play, and where the servicing of the social welfare needs of the population could be efficiently undertaken.
By the early 1980s it was clear that Tanzania was heading towards an economic crisis and that the policy of *Ujamaa* had failed. Under the deteriorating conditions of the early 1980s the government was forced to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans; for its part the IMF laid economic reform preconditions for the extension of credit which amounted to a reversal of the state-led socialist development policies that had dominated thinking since independence. Meeting these demands was extremely painful, especially for the poor and the unemployed. Nevertheless, Tanzania persisted, and gradually economic growth began to accelerate.

Aware of the tide of democratisation that was sweeping Africa, the leadership of the ruling CCM became disillusioned with the one-party system in general and with its own developmental performance in particular. This new attitude dovetailed with those of opposition and civil society intellectual groupings and a groundswell demand for a new multiparty constitution and a national conference emerged that was backed by pressure from donor nations. Rejecting calls for a national conference, the CCM unilaterally amended the 1977 Constitution adopted in July 1992 to allow for a multiparty democracy. In terms of these changes, parties could only be registered if they had a national basis (i.e. a presence in both parts of the Union) and foreswore mobilisation of the electorate on regional, racial, ethnic or religious grounds.

The first multiparty general elections for the presidency and the National Assembly were held in December 1995. Thirteen political parties qualified for registration and participated in the elections. In Zanzibar the election outcome was very close, with the ruling CCM barely warding off the Civic United Front’s (CUF) challenge for power. CCM presidential candidate Salmin Amour obtained 50.2% of the vote against 49.8% for the CUF’s Seif Sharrif Hamad. The CCM took 26 seats in the legislature against the CUF’s 24. Election observers declared the process in Zanzibar flawed, for there was clear evidence of ballot box stuffing. The CUF believed it had been robbed of victory in Zanzibar and refused to take up its seats in the Zanzibari House of Representatives.

In the Mainland the outcome was an overwhelming endorsement of the ruling CCM. The CCM won 214 of the 269 seats available and its presidential candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, won 62% of the vote. The organisation of the
elections was chaotic and in some areas elections had to be rerun. The opposition parties cried foul and boycotted the reruns in some areas.

1.2. THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

Tanzania’s second multiparty elections proceeded without much interruption and received the endorsement of most of the international observer groups, who judged it as relatively free and fair. The contest itself however was a foregone conclusion; Mkapa’s CCM won a second term. The number of opposition seats in the National Assembly was reduced to 14 (see election results below). This was blamed largely on opposition parties’ inability to field joint candidates for these elections, which many observers felt would have enabled them to make significant electoral inroads.

Despite the endorsement these elections received from the international community, the opposition parties were highly sceptical of the electoral process. The opposition voiced their concerns over CCM’s tactics, which they alleged produced an unlevelled playing field. Firstly, they claimed, the abolition of state subsidies to political parties reduced the opposition’s financial ability to campaign adequately; secondly they said that the CCM used the police to intimidate opposition supporters at rallies. Moreover, according to the opposition, the CCM was accorded the lion’s share of government media election coverage and the opposition was given scant attention.

In the end, however, what actually emerged from these elections was that the political opposition in Tanzania was fragmented and marginal. Their fall in popular support was due to several factors, most notably defections and power struggles within the opposition.
Table 1
29 October 2000 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Mkapa (CCM)</td>
<td>5 863 201</td>
<td>71.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF)</td>
<td>1 329 077</td>
<td>16.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine Mrema (TLP)</td>
<td>637 115</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Cheyo (UDP)</td>
<td>342 891</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 172 284</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Electoral Commission

Table 2
29 October 2000 National Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
<td>4 628 127</td>
<td>65.19</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>87.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
<td>890 044</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)</td>
<td>652 504</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party (UDP)</td>
<td>315 303</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)</td>
<td>300 567</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>256 591</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>56 500</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 099 636</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>231</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Electoral Commission
2.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.1 The Constitutional Set-up

The Tanzanian Constitution (Article 41) stipulates that the president is directly elected by universal adult franchise for a five-year term by a plurality of votes. The president is eligible for re-election for one additional term. The vice-president is elected on the same ticket as the president. The Constitution stipulates that if the candidate president is from the Mainland, the vice-presidential candidate must be from Zanzibar, and visa versa. Only registered political parties may nominate candidates (no independents are permitted).

The United Republic of Tanzania has a unicameral National Assembly (called the Bunge) with a total of members equal to the number of constituencies, plus up to 30% of reserved seats for women, five seats elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar, 10 members nominated by the president and the attorney general who is ex officio a member of the House.

For the 2005 elections there were a total of 323 seats, allocated as follows:

- 232 members elected by popular vote in single member constituencies;
- 75 seats allocated for the representation of women;
- 5 seats elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar;
- 10 members nominated by the president; and
- The attorney general.
Members of the National Assembly serve five-year terms. In addition to enacting laws that apply to the entire United Republic of Tanzania, the Assembly enacts laws that apply only to the Mainland, although there have been instances in which the National Assembly enacted laws on non-Union matters which extended to Zanzibar.

2.1.2 Legal Framework of Elections
Presidential and National Assembly elections in Mainland Tanzania are held according to the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (with relevant amendments), the Elections Act, 1985 (Act No 1 of 1985) with all the amendments up to and including 30 June 2000, and the Political Parties Act No 5 of 1992. Local government and town council elections are regulated under the Local Authorities (Elections) Act, 1979 (Act No 4 of 1979).

Zanzibar however has a separate Constitution and Elections Act. The following legislation regulates the isles’ elections:

   i. The Zanzibar Constitution of 1984 with amendments up to 1995
   ii. The Ninth Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002
   iii. The Zanzibar Election Act of 1984, with amendments up to 1995
   iv. The Election (Amendment) Act, 2000
   v. The Election (Amendment) Act, 2001
   vi. The Election (Amendment) Act, 2002

2.2. ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES
In Tanzania, there are two statutory bodies charged with the duty of delivering elections:

a) The National Electoral Commission
The National Electoral Commission (NEC) is responsible for the conduct of elections throughout the Union for all elections of the president, members of the National Assembly and local government councillors. The NEC is assisted by the director of elections, who functions as the executive arm of the NEC. In terms of Article 74 of the Constitution, the NEC is independent of other state structures. The statute relevant to the establishment of the NEC is the Elections Act No 1 of 1985 as amended in 1990 and 1992.
The president of the United Republic of Tanzania has the power to appoint the chairperson of the commission, the vice-chairperson and five other commissioners according to certain legislative requirements. The chairman and the vice-chairman have to be judges of the High Court or the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. If the chairperson is from the Mainland then the vice-chairperson has to come from Zanzibar and vice versa. One other member has to come from the Tanganyika Law Society. The remaining four members must have experience in the conduct or supervision of National Assembly elections, or have other qualifications considered necessary by the president for the effective performance of the commission’s functions. The members of the NEC may only be removed if a special commission, appointed by the president, recommends a commissioner’s removal, but even then only if the commissioner is unable to perform the duties allocated or for serious misconduct. Commissioners are appointed for a five-year term of office.

The current seven members of the NEC are:
- Justice LM Makame: Chairperson
- Mr OO Makungu: Vice-Chairperson
- Mr H Mahundi: Commissioner
- Mr H Mkate: Commissioner
- Ms JC Manning: Commissioner
- Prof AE Chaligha: Commissioner
- Ms M Mjaka: Commissioner

The director of elections is Mr R Kiravu

The NEC is responsible for:
- The supervision and coordination of voter registration
- The delimitation of electoral areas
- The supervision and coordination of elections
- To declare elected members of the National Assembly and councillors for women’s special seats
- Any other functions legislated by the National Assembly.

b) Zanzibar Electoral Commission

Zanzibar however has a separate Constitution and Elections Act and its Electoral Commission (ZEC), responsible for the conduct of elections for
the election of the president and the members of the House of Representatives of Zanzibar. EISA deployed a separate mission to Zanzibar and produced a separate report for the Zanzibar presidential, House of Representatives, and local government elections.

2.3. ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN TANZANIA

An electoral system is the means by which a country translates votes into parliamentary seats/political party representation in the country’s parliament. In Tanzania, the single member plurality system, often also referred to as the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, is used to elect National Assembly representatives in each constituency. The country also conducts concurrent presidential elections in which the candidate with the highest percentage of votes is elected president. The Tanzanian system is unique in Southern Africa, due to political arrangements between the Mainland of Tanzania and Zanzibar. These arrangements are designed to allow for a degree of autonomy for Zanzibar, along the lines of a federal state.

The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania states that: ‘All state authority in the United Republic shall be exercised by two organs with executive powers, two organs with judicial powers and two organs with legislative powers.’ This separation of powers between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar affords the latter greater autonomy than would be possible under alternative arrangements. There are approximately one million people living on the Unguja and Pemba islands that make up Zanzibar, compared to the approximately 36 million citizens who reside in the Mainland. A president of Zanzibar is elected to act as the executive in Zanzibar, and is second only to the Union president in terms of authority in the Union. In the 2000 elections there were 296 National Assembly seats and 50 of these seats were reserved for Zanzibar representatives, with another five special seats allocated to members of the Zanzibar House of Representatives. This arrangement ensures that Zanzibar’s interests are well represented in the Union legislature.

Additionally, Zanzibar is also accorded its own House of Representatives, elected by the citizens of Zanzibar to legislate on all domestic issues pertaining to Zanzibar’s internal affairs. Although the House of Representatives is bound by legislation passed in the National Assembly, it is in
practice afforded a significant degree of independence in its management of Zanzibar’s internal affairs. Zanzibar has its own independent government structures such as courts, an electoral commission and security forces.

On 30 October 2005, two elections took place in Zanzibar: citizens were able to vote for the president of Zanzibar as well as their candidate for the Zanzibar House of Representatives. In these two elections, only Zanzibari citizens and those who have been naturalised were eligible to vote, and required proof that they had resided at their current residence in Zanzibar for a minimum period of three years.

On 14 December 2005, three elections took place throughout the Union (including Zanzibar). Voters were asked to select their candidate in the Union presidential elections, a National Assembly candidate in their constituency and a local authority leader to represent them in their relevant district. As such, citizens cast three ballots at the polls.

One of the unique aspects of the Tanzanian arrangement is the separation of powers between the Union’s two electoral commissions: the NEC, which generally handles all electoral matters in the Mainland, and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), which handles all electoral-related matters in Zanzibar. Although the two commissions operate within almost identical frameworks, it is clear that there are unique policy differences between the two bodies. During the process of verification of the voters’ register, for example, the ZEC suspended the activities of the South African company Waymark, hired to verify its voters’ roll, after the NEC had used the same company to verify the Mainland roll with satisfactory results.

2.4. CONSTITUENCY DELIMITATION
In the Tanzania Mainland, the responsibility for reviewing the boundaries and demarcating the United Republic into various areas for the purpose of National Assembly elections rests with the NEC. Article 75 (4) of the Constitution of 1977 empowers the Commission to review the constituency boundaries after at least 10 years. The NEC reviewed the boundaries for the first time in 1977. The last delimitation took place in the 1995 elections following the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992, but there were no revisions of constituencies for the 2000 elections. In Zanzibar, the
responsibility is left to the ZEC. The rules and regulations for the exercise are entrenched in the Constitution. One key requirement is to ensure that the population is fairly divided into the constituencies to ensure that they are relatively of the same size.

Both in Zanzibar and in the Mainland, the judiciary has no power to intervene in the work of the NEC and the ZEC. Both bodies, when demarcating these constituencies, take into account the following criteria: ‘geographical features, means of communication and adequate representation of urban and sparsely populated areas’.

The NEC has, for the 2005 elections, introduced some realignment of the districts and town councils in the Mainland. The changes are not very significant in terms of numbers. There were 231 constituencies and 2,538 wards in the 2000 elections. In 2005 the largest constituency was split in two and 16 new wards were added. This takes the number of constituencies to 232 and the number of wards to 2,554.

While the current delimitation in the Mainland seems to be accepted by all stakeholders, the possibility of increasing the number of districts in some areas has been mooted. Those who want this increase make reference to population changes. Indeed it has been 10 years since the last delimitation was done. The population has increased and people have moved from rural to urban areas, shifting the population balance in certain areas. This explains why earlier in 2005 a request was made in the National Assembly for the establishment of five new constituencies in Pemba and the creation of new constituencies in Unguja.

Although the delimitation of boundaries process in Zanzibar has been contested by opposition parties, disputes that arose in these elections were not centred on delimitation but on other difficulties.
3.1. VOTER REGISTRATION

In the past, registration of voters was done manually, using temporary registers. This would usually be carried out again for the whole of the Mainland whenever an election was to be conducted. After the 1995 general election, the NEC recommended the establishment of the Permanent National Voters Register (PNVR) to the government. The recommendation was accepted but the exercise could not start for a number of reasons, lack of funds being one. In 2000, there was an amendment to the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, which directed the NEC to establish the PNVR. It was only in 2004 that the Commission was able to begin implementing the PNVR in time for the 2005 elections. The electoral laws were amended accordingly.

For Zanzibar the situation that called for a Permanent Voter Register (PVR) was slightly different from that of the Mainland. The PVR in Zanzibar resulted from the Peace Accord of 2001 (Muafaka II) between the CCM and CUF. The accord was a concerted effort by all political parties in Zanzibar to solve the political crisis, which emanated from the multiparty elections of 1995 and 2000. During both elections the voters’ register continued to be a major source of contention. There were allegations of double registration, and registration of non-citizens and deceased people as well as registration of soldiers in
selected constituencies in order to shift the number of registered voters against the opposition. There were also allegations that suspected opposition supporters were deliberately omitted from the voters’ roll. The need for a better voters’ registration system was apparent and the Constitution was amended in 2002 for the introduction of the PVR.

However, there were delays in the implementation of the PVR and the target set by Muafaka II, February 2003, was not met. Other than the Constitution, the Zanzibar Elections Act No 11 of 1984 was amended to govern the voters’ registration process.

The election law of Zanzibar stipulates that voters must be:

- At least 18 years of age
- Tanzanian citizens
- Have no prior judgement of insanity
- Have not been incarcerated with a sentence longer than six months, or with a sentence of death.

In addition certain residence regulations must be met:

- A person is eligible to register in whichever constituency he/she currently resides in and has resided in for the past 36 months continuously; or in whatever constituency he or she works. Previously the requirement was five years, but this was amended as Mainland Tanzanians stationed in Zanzibar for fewer than five years would be denied the right to vote in their own constituency, and in any election other than those for the Union presidency.

- Service qualifications allow members of the military, police force or special units and their spouses, assigned in a particular constituency, to be registered there and to vote there.

- People who are not in their constituency of residence during voter registration have the right to travel to the constituency to register in order that they may be eligible to vote.
PNVR Process

In the Mainland, the preparations for the PNVR for the 2005 general election commenced in March 2004, and on 7 October that same year, the NEC began to register the electorate in the PNVR. The exercise ended on 10 May 2005 with the NEC registering Zanzibar residents who were ineligible to register as voters in the isles but who were eligible to vote in the Union presidential elections. Those registered in Zanzibar were from the Tanzania Mainland who were living in Zanzibar but had been barred from registering because they had not lived in the isles for 36 consecutive months as required by Zanzibar electoral laws.

Generally, various stakeholders and monitors of the registration exercise commended the NEC, not only for the effective way in which it administered the exercise but also for the integrity and impartiality it displayed throughout the registration period. Although the registration overall was carried out efficiently, some minor irregularities and problems were observed at the local level. Many of the problems reported by the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (Temco) were caused by insufficient or late distribution of registration materials.

The problems varied in the regions. In the Central Zone, for example, the turnout was much higher than expected, resulting in some shortages of registration material. In a number of registration centres, camera-related shortages of items such as films and batteries were reported. As a result, many centres ran out of the necessary registration materials and the entire process was delayed for several days. There were also shortages of registration centres in the rural areas, forcing most voters to travel several kilometres to the nearest registration centre. The Temco monitoring report, for instance, observed that in some districts the average distances covered by many voters were between four and six kilometres. In the Lake Zone, similar problems were encountered, which mostly centred on insufficient supplies of registration material, due mainly to the NEC’s poor packaging of the materials and underestimating the numbers of eligible voters.

In terms of the numbers registered, the NEC had reported that in many of the regions the registration of voters was over 90%. In fact, by early April 2005 the NEC had registered almost 13 million voters out of an estimated
16.7 million potential voters. At the end of the exercise, it was reported that the numbers registered had far exceeded the target. Altogether 16,423,039 voters were registered throughout the Union. Of those, 15,915,814 voters had been registered by the NEC and 507,225 Zanzibari citizens had been registered by the ZEC. The details of the PVR exercise for Zanzibar may be found in the EISA server Mission Report on the Zanzibar October 2005 elections.

The NEC displayed the Provisional Voters Register at the ward level for a sufficient length of time. This afforded adequate opportunity for registered voters to inspect the list and to make objections for persons not qualified for registration. A registered voter may object to the retention in the voters’ register of the name of another person on grounds that such a person is not qualified or is no longer qualified to be registered as a voter. There were many complaints that the voters’ list contained duplicate entries. The director of elections himself expressed dissatisfaction with this and noted that the NEC had detected at least 2,000 double registration cases countrywide. The overall conclusion of the NEC registration exercise was that of a process without major flaws.

### 3.2. PARTY REGISTRATION AND CANDIDATE NOMINATION

#### Party Registration

The Political Parties Act of 1992, which applies to both Zanzibar and the Mainland, provides for the establishment of the office of the Registrar of Political Parties, which is responsible for regulating and governing the operations of political parties. The president appoints both the registrar and his deputy. In the performance of his functions the registrar is required to consult regularly with the minister responsible for legal affairs. The Act protects the registrar and his officers from being sued, provided they perform their duties without negligence and in accordance with the functions stipulated in the Act.

The Political Parties Act of 1992 also allows for the registration of political parties by the Registrar’s Office. Party registration follows two stages. First there is a provisional registration of six months, which political parties are required to apply for before final registration. The provisional registration requires a political party only to hand over an application form and a party
constitution. For the registration of the final phase, parties are legally required to have at least 200 members who qualify as voters from each of at least 10 regions of the Union and at least two regions must be in Zanzibar.

Registration of parties is further conditional on their non-advocacy of religious, ethnic, racial, gender or regional interests. Parties can also be denied registration if they advocate the breaking up of the Union or the use of force/violence, and fail to allow for periodic and democratic elections of their leadership. The registrar is empowered to cancel the registration of any party that does not fulfil these conditions and/or contravenes any of the provisions stipulated in the Political Parties Act of 1992.

The 2005 elections have seen seven new parties registering: Jahazi Asilia, Sauti ya Umma, Tanzania Peoples Organisation for Democracy and Development (Tapodd), Chama Cha Ukombozi was Demokrasia ya Watu Masikini (Chudewema), Solidarity of United Party (Supa), National Democratic Party for Rehabilitation (NDPR Marejesho) and National Patriotic Front (NPF).

Currently 18 political parties have full registration and six others are provisionally registered (see list below). A few of these parties experienced minor hiccups during the registration process. In May 2005 the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), the National Reconstruction for Alliance (NRA) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) were almost deregistered for failing to fulfil some of the registration conditions. According to the Registrar of Political Parties, the TLP, for example, had registered without having any officially recognised office bearers. In response to the registrar’s threat to deregister the party, its chairman Augustine Mrema quickly convened an extraordinary conference to elect new officials of the party. Among those elected were several officials who had been kicked out earlier in the year. The NRA was threatened with deregistration on the grounds that it did not have a national outlook because of its lack of representation in Zanzibar. In the end these three parties managed to overcome these deficiencies and were eventually registered.

There were, however two political parties which the registrar struck off the provisional registration list altogether. These were the Tanzania’s Peoples
Congress (TPC) and Soft Party, which had been granted provisional registration in November 2004, and were required to have met all the conditions for full registration by April this year. Both parties had failed to provide proof that they had 200 members in at least 10 of Tanzania’s regions, including Zanzibar and Pemba.

Table 3
Political Parties with full registration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
<td>Benjamin Mkapa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
<td>Ibrahim Lipumba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChamaCha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)</td>
<td>Bob Makani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)</td>
<td>Salum S Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR Mageuzi)</td>
<td>James F Mbatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National League for Democracy (NLD)</td>
<td>Emmanuel Makaidi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)</td>
<td>Ulotu Abubakar Ulotu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party (Tadea)</td>
<td>John Chipaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)</td>
<td>Augustine Mrema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party (UDP)</td>
<td>John Cheyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasia Makini (Makini)</td>
<td>Leonard Shayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Peoples Democratic Party (UPDP)</td>
<td>Fahmi Dovutwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Haki na Ustawi (Chausta)</td>
<td>James Mapalalala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Forum for Restoration of Democracy (Ford)</td>
<td>Ramadhani Mzee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>Rev C Mtikila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Tanzania (PPT-Maendeleo)</td>
<td>Kuga Mziray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahazi Asilia</td>
<td>Abuu Amour Juma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauti ya Umma</td>
<td>Paul Kyara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Political parties with provisional registration**

- National Democratic Union of Tanzania (Nduta)
- Tanzania Peoples Organization for Democracy and Development (Tapodd)
- Chama Cha Ukombozi wa Demokrasia ya Watu Masikini (Chudewama)
- Solidarity of United Party (Supa)
- National Democratic Party for Rehabilitation (NDPR Marejesho)
- National Patriotic Front (NPF)

**Nomination of Candidates**

Nomination of candidates in the United Republic of Tanzania for both the National Assembly and the Zanzibar House of Representatives is carried out in a two-stage process. First there is the nomination within a political party (‘primaries’) where candidates are selected under a respective party’s constitution. The legal nomination of the party candidates with the relevant electoral commissions of the country (NEC, ZEC) then follows this procedure. Both the NEC and ZEC only accept nominations of candidates that have been submitted by registered political parties. As mentioned above, the Constitution of the Union prohibits independent candidates from seeking election in all the three separate elections: presidential, National Assembly (or House of Representatives) and local government elections, and only political parties duly registered are entitled to nominate candidates.

In order to be accepted by the electoral commissions, the contesting candidate for member of the National Assembly must fulfil a set of qualifications and conditions. Each candidate is required to have the nomination endorsed by 25 people who have been registered as voters in the respective communities and the candidate must pay a deposit of Tsh 100 000 to the returning officer.

The candidate must make a statutory declaration before a magistrate confirming that the required qualifications have been met. Article 67 of the Constitution stipulates that a candidate shall be qualified for election as member of the National Assembly if:

- He/she is a citizen of Tanzania.
- He/she has attained the age of 21 years.
• He/she has not been convicted in any court for an offence of tax evasion within the period of five years before election.
• He/she is proposed by a political party.

The nomination timetable issued by the electoral commissions varied slightly; the ZEC issued the forms for House of Representatives candidates on 15 August, whereas aspirants for seats in the National Assembly collected their forms on 1 August. The deadline for returning forms for both the National Assembly and the House of Representatives was 3 September. However, the electoral commissions recommend that forms be returned a few days prior to the deadline, so that the candidates have time to rectify any mistakes on their forms. The returning officers are expected to review the submitted forms well in advance of the deadline; however, there have been instances where returning officers have left the review of the nomination papers to the last minute, making it impossible for the candidates to rectify any mistakes. The deposit requirement, as several observers have noted over the years, is a barrier for smaller opposition parties since many are unable to raise the funds needed to nominate candidates, while for the larger and more established parties this presents no difficulties.

Each party undertakes its own nomination under its own selection procedures. The larger parties, such as the CCM and CUF, have clearly established formal processes through which candidates for the National Assembly are selected at constituency level and vetted at regional and national level. In the case of the smaller parties, however, the processes are frequently informal, with nomination decisions being made by the national leadership with little or no consultation with grass-roots structures. For the smaller parties, where constituency level structures are weak or wholly absent and suitable candidates few and hard to come by, anyone prepared to stand and who is suitable is virtually guaranteed endorsement by the national leadership and accepted by lower levels.

The formal procedures followed by the larger parties are not without their difficulties. On the one hand it is argued that vetting of lower level decisions by higher levels is necessary to weed out unsuitable candidates chosen at grassroots. On the other hand, interventions of the national leadership are viewed as high-handed and undemocratic.
In the case of the CCM, the national leadership frequently overturned constituency-level nominations on the grounds that the candidates concerned were weak or unworthy of representing the party in the elections. Constituency-level structures in turn objected to these decisions and conflict between national and constituency leaderships emerged, leading in some cases to the defection of members from the CCM to other parties.

In the case of the CUF, the national leadership overturned fewer constituency-nominated candidates, but similar conflicts emerged as with the CCM, with some members defecting to other parties, and in particular to the CCM. To forestall defections on the part of its nominated candidates, the CUF entered into legal agreements with all its National Assembly and House of Representatives candidates before their names were submitted to the NEC and ZEC. According to the agreements, any candidate who defects after endorsement by the party will be forced to pay compensation in the amount of Tsh 50 million. Whether the courts would uphold such agreements as contractually binding is moot.

Both electoral commissions have, time and again, recommended an amendment to the legislation to ensure that political parties adhere to democratic principles when conducting internal nominations of their candidates.

In the end, despite the various defections that occurred between parties, the NEC received over 1 000 nominations representing all registered parties for the National Assembly elections. For both the National Assembly and House of Representative elections, the CCM had candidates in every constituency with CUF second in terms of the number of overall candidates.

As in any election, political parties were given an opportunity to object to other parties’ candidatures during the nomination period. All parties were given a 24-hour window to raise their objections; this usually followed the 16h00 deadline for delivery of nomination papers. This is also the timeframe that the returning officers have had to decide on the validity of every objection. For those parties dissatisfied with the returning officers’ decisions, their final recourse was to file an appeal to the electoral commissions. The aggrieved candidate could appeal through the returning officer within
48 hours after receiving the returning officer’s decision. The Commission’s decisions on any of the appeals are, however, final and conclusive, and cannot be challenged in any court.

Both the NEC and ZEC use the same procedures when processing objections. Before any objections can be made, the electoral commissions must display all the candidates nominated by the different parties in public for inspection. Only the director of elections, the returning officer or assistant returning officer in the respective constituency, and other candidates can make objections. After an objection is made, the first task is for the returning officer to bring together all the parties to argue their cases. Objections may be based on any of the following grounds:

- The particulars given in respect of the candidate are insufficient to identify him or her.
- The nomination paper does not comply with the law.
- It is apparent from the content of the nomination papers that the candidate is not qualified.

The mission noted that generally both electoral commissions dealt with the protests properly and in accordance with the regulations. A total of seven objections were brought before the ZEC, most of which were filed by CUF, Tadea and Jahazi Asilia against the CCM. Most of the objections were based on insufficient signatures of endorsement or false education certificates. All of these objections were overturned by the ZEC. The NEC, on the other hand, received 180 petitions, the vast majority of which centred on errors and oversights in filling in the nomination forms. Others were based on citizenship challenges or allegations that candidates could not speak Swahili. In the end, the NEC ploughed through all the objections that had been lodged; the majority were overturned and only a few led to disqualifications.

The commissions tend to avoid disqualification because the process is potentially open to manipulation. In fact if a party’s candidate is disqualified, affected parties are prevented from nominating alternative candidates to replace those disqualified. The opportunity to object then is on occasion strategically used as a tool by parties to gain a competitive advantage. This is especially so because the rules guiding the disqualification process are
open ended and therefore leave ample opportunity for discretionary action. The number of candidates in the 2005 presidential elections has tripled compared to that of the 2000 elections. There were only three opposition presidential candidates contesting the Union presidency in the 2000 elections, while 10 candidates registered to contest the Union presidential election in 2005. For a person to qualify as a presidential candidate in Mainland Tanzania, he/she is required to present to the NEC a letter of introduction indicating endorsement by the party to run for the presidency.

Table 4
Candidates for the 2005 Tanzanian Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President/Vice-President</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakaya Kikwete/ Ali Mohammed Shein</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Shayo/ Suleiman Hussein Ali</td>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia Makini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kyara/ Haji Ramadhani Haji</td>
<td>Sauti ya Umma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeman Mbowe/ Anna Valerian Komu</td>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mvungi Sengondo/ Naila Majid Jidawi</td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Lipumba/ Duni Juma Haji</td>
<td>Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine Mrema/ Rukia Omari Kiota</td>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Claudia/ Mchenga Yusuph Rashid</td>
<td>PPT-Maendeleo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtkila Christopher/ Said Soud Said</td>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makaidi Emmanuel/ Kassim Ally</td>
<td>National League for Democracy (NLD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Party Funding**

Public funding for political parties was abolished in 2000, for financial reasons. Since Tanzania does not have resources to fund political parties, they are funded from a donor basket. The donor basket is a fund supported by 10 countries – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom – as well as the United Nations Development Program, to help to develop a programme for technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of the NEC, civil society, the
media and political parties to hold free and fair elections. However, many stakeholders reported that some parties seem to have no real permanent life, but only come into existence for the purposes of obtaining access to these funds. All sources of funding, whether local or foreign, must be disclosed in writing to the Register of Political Parties in accordance with the Political Parties Act of 1993.

3.3. WOMEN AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
Articles 66(1)(b) and 78(1) of the Union Constitution promote women’s representation in the National Assembly through allocating special seats to women. Above and beyond elected seats, up to 30% additional seats should be reserved for women. In the 2000 elections, 20% of the total constituency seats were reserved, while in 2005 there were 75 (30%) of such seats. In 2000 these special seats were allocated to each political party in proportion to the seats the party won in the election.

Table 5
Special Seats for women MPs in 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.4. VOTER EDUCATION AND INFORMATION
Until 2004 voter education was not a legal function of the NEC. However, an amendment to the Elections Act of 1985 mandated that the NEC provide voter education throughout the country and supervise those who conduct such education.
In order to enhance voter participation, the NEC is responsible for voter information and voter education. The aim of voter education and information dissemination is to encourage public awareness about the essence of democracy in general and voting in particular. However, stakeholders contacted by the EISA election observer mission affirmed that for the 2005 elections, the NEC was able to provide only limited voter education due to lack of funding.

Larger scale voter education was conducted by non-governmental organisations, which were supported through donor funding (in a donor basket of contributions). The campaign was done with the cooperation and participation of civil society organisations (CSOs), political parties, church organisations and community leaders.

Despite this, it is fair to note that the Commission regarded voter education as a high priority and made some effort in educating the electorate on the technicalities of the voting process. It did this mainly via arranged seminars; workshops; the distribution of booklets and posters in public places as well as the production of radio and television programmes and newspaper features and articles. But EISA observers reported that most stakeholders whom they had meetings with believed that voter education for this election was still inadequate.

3.5. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

Principles governing the campaign

A new Code of Conduct for political parties was signed in the beginning of August 2005 by 18 registered political parties. The five-page document is a voluntary ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between political parties, the government and the NEC. The Code of Conduct was signed in the hope that it would further political tolerance and help level the electoral field for all political parties.

It was suggested that an independent council be formed to oversee its implementation rather than the registrar of political parties, who had initially been proposed as overseer. Many political parties and other stakeholders, however, opposed this proposal. At present, it seems, no one oversees the implementation of the Code.
Among the rules contained in the document aimed at guiding the activities of political parties during the campaigning is a prohibition of political violence, hatred, and mudslinging. According to the document, ‘each political party is duty-bound to avoid and condemn abusive language, intimidation and all acts likely to lead to violence’.

The document, in addition, encourages the government-owned media, both print and electronic, to provide fair coverage to all political parties throughout the election period. The document further requires that the authorities should not interfere with NEC scheduled rallies; that the NEC should not change the campaigning timetable without full consultation; that religious leaders should not engage in campaigns; and that security officers should not use excessive force in maintaining order.

**The Campaign**

According to the law, all the parties are free to campaign as and when they want and are guaranteed the full protection of the police, should that be found to be necessary. Ahead of elections the NEC released a timetable for electoral campaigning that was harmonised at a meeting between leaders of all political parties that were fielding presidential candidates and the NEC officials in Dar es Salaam. Public spaces were allocated to political parties to use to articulate publicly their visions and programmes and to rally supporters.

The most widely employed method of campaigning used posters and vehicle convoys moving from one area to another with loudspeakers blaring. EISA teams were able to attend political rallies in the last days of campaigning in Dar es Salaam. Overall, the parties complied with the Code of Conduct signed by all the contestants beforehand.

The CCM dominated the political landscape and was present in all areas and fielded candidates in all constituencies. The mission noted that overall rallies were conducted in a peaceful manner, without obvious signs of intimidation or violence. The campaign was generally free from violence when compared to Zanzibar.

Notwithstanding the fact that the campaigning was generally peaceful and marked by tolerance, there were some incidents, worth mentioning here:
• The police seemed to tear gas the opposition’s peaceful rallies easily, while leaving CCM rallies to disperse peacefully.
• There were incidents of political thuggery and intimidation in the Lake District, Tanga and in the south-east, where the opposition seemed to be doing well. While these incidents may not have been orchestrated by the CCM leadership, they were perceived to be similar to those taking place in Zanzibar.
• There was a stir caused by Chadema’s use of a helicopter to fly its presidential candidate around.

Postponement of the Elections
The death of the Chadema vice-presidential candidate on 26 October 2005 required the postponement of the presidential election in terms of Tanzania’s electoral laws. For logistical and financial reasons, the NEC decided to postpone the National Assembly and local government elections as well, until the date set for the presidential election, 14 December 2005. The postponement impacted on the campaigning, in that the parties’ efforts had already peaked and voter interest was at its height. The parties had expended their financial resources, while candidates and party workers alike were physically exhausted. Nevertheless all involved soldiered on and when the extended campaign period came to an end, interest in the election was as high as it had been when the unexpected postponement had been made, as evidenced by the high voter turnout of 72% for the presidential poll.

3.6 MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
In 1992 the media was liberalised in the Mainland. Since then, the private media has steadily expanded. Today in the Tanzania Mainland there are some 15 operational television stations and over 30 radio stations, most of them privately owned. TV Tanzania and Radio Tanzania, with wide-range coverage and frequencies, and some daily newspapers are under the control of the government.

In terms of media access, radio is the most influential news medium on account of its relative cheapness and wide coverage. Television is next, as it only tends to reach the urban areas and those rural areas that have electricity. Print news has limited circulation. The media uses Swahili and English for publication.
Access to the media by political parties varied greatly. Opposition parties were critical of the ruling party’s overwhelming resources and use of government and private media. Airtime in government-controlled media was allotted to the political parties and candidates according to an agreed-on formula. However, the mission was regularly informed that the incumbent party and its candidate had enjoyed more coverage in the state-owned media, even though a Code of Conduct governing the media had been signed to regulate the equitable access of all contesting parties and candidates to the public media, as well as to promote fair media reporting.

The opposition political parties uniformly claimed discrimination against them by the state media, but in most of the cases the claims were due to the difference in perception and the parties’ confusion between equitable (or fair) coverage and equal coverage. CSOs, especially those concerned with state media coverage, commended the system and said that while coverage by state media was not wholly equitable it was a great deal better than had been the case in previous elections, and expected that as the system matured and developed, future improvements could be forthcoming.
4 Election Day

• The voting process
• Opening of the polling stations
• Voters’ roll
• Voting stations
• Voter turnout
• Voting staff, party agents and security personnel
• Observers
• Counting

4.1 THE VOTING PROCESS
Observers visited four districts in the Dar es Salaam region. The technical team noted that the atmosphere of the elections throughout was peaceful and orderly, with voters waiting patiently in the hot sun to vote, despite long queues. Throughout the day, the technical team observed the voting station staff behaving in a consistent and professional manner and demonstrating a good awareness of the codes and practices expected of them. There was no evidence of significant irregularities that might suggest either unintentionally or intentionally fraudulent voting practices. However, there were a number of technical deficiencies which were observed on more than one occasion, including:

• Irregular or non-existent checking for inked fingers before issuing voters with ballot papers;
• An ease in removing the indelible ink;
• Inconsistent application of the indelible ink on various fingers on both hands;
• The use of multiple formats of voter registration lists, rather than a consolidated list to avoid duplication and unnecessary delays;
• Instances of persons whose names did not appear on the registration list despite having in their possession voter registration cards.

4.2 OPENING OF THE POLLING STATIONS
As required by law, the polling stations opened at 07h00 in almost all cases, and where there were delays, these delays were not substantial. Minor incidents related to overcrowding, limited space for the polling stations and in the layout of the polling centres, particularly at the beginning of the poll, were reported. The mission recommends that steps be taken to avoid a recurrence of such incidents in the future.

The technical team noted that the opening procedures at all stations observed were applied consistently and in line with the stated regulations from the NEC. In some instances, such as was observed at Kipawa Primary School ‘A’, the officials had difficulty affixing the seals to the ballot boxes. This difficulty with the seals led to the improper and incomplete sealing of some ballot boxes at several other polling stations. The team received no reports of delays in opening due to a lack of election materials and attributes this to the NEC’s efficient logistics plan.

4.3 VOTERS’ ROLL
The team applauds the fact that the voters’ roll for each polling station was visibly displayed outside or near the polling station in question for eight days prior to the polling day. In some cases, due to the large number of polling stations crowded together in a small space in a polling centre, the polling lists displayed were ambiguous as to which polling station they referred to. During the polling day, the NEC election staff and police officers were observed to be directing voters who were unclear about which voting station they were allocated to.

The team encountered several persons claiming that their details did not appear on the voters’ roll despite the fact that they had registered and could produce voters’ registration cards. In the majority of instances, this appeared to be a case of attempting to vote at an incorrect polling station within the polling centre, and was thus easily rectified by officials who redirected the person to the correct polling station. However, the mission also encountered
several persons with voters’ registration cards whose details did not appear on any of the voters’ rolls at the polling centre and were thus unable to cast their ballots.

4.4 VOTING STATIONS
The voting centres were laid out in a way that facilitated the flow of voters and maintained the secrecy of the ballot, with minimal exceptions, and as a result satisfied the team that there were no deficiencies in terms of the polling centres. The team did note that, based on population density, the size and frequency of the polling centres varied considerably; however the team also recognised that all polling centres were allocated manageable numbers and that in most cases each polling station at a polling centre handled on average 350 persons.

4.5 VOTER TURNOUT
There were queues outside the polling stations on the voting day from the first moment of voting, but voters were orderly and patient. From early morning, a high voter turnout was indicated. The official voter turnout for the presidential elections was 72.28%, a small reduction from the 74% of 1999. This is a very impressive achievement by international standards and the people of Tanzania should be congratulated for taking a keen interest in the electoral process.

4.6 VOTING STAFF, PARTY AGENTS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL
The team noted with satisfaction the helpful, courteous and professional manner of the majority of the voting staff. In almost all cases, the staff demonstrated a good knowledge of procedures and regulations pertaining to the elections. Despite instances of procedural irregularities, which were the exception rather than the norm, the team was very impressed by the conduct of the voting staff. The team also noted the balanced gender representation amongst the NEC voting staff.

At all stations observed, at least two party agents were present, and in several cases three or more. In most cases, the party agents were vigilant in monitoring proceedings, were not impeded and did not attempt to obstruct the normal flow of the voting process. Observers noticed that disabled and illiterate voters were kindly attended to.
The team observed a significant police presence at every polling centre visited. By and large, the police presence was not overtly intimidating and police were generally helpful in facilitating a peaceful flow of voters throughout the day. In only one case was a policeman observed to behave in a high-handed manner, but even in this case it was clearly due to misplaced zeal rather than any nefarious intent.

4.7 OBSERVERS
The Tanzania electoral authorities were transparent and opened their doors to external and domestic observers. The NEC put in place a smooth accreditation process. Before the postponement of the 30 October 2006 poll there were a large number of international election observers, but most of them could not return for 14 December, probably because of inadequate funds.

During the deployment phase the technical mission came across only a few international observers, including some from the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the SADC Parliamentary Forum, as well as various diplomatic missions. The only domestic observers were Temco observers, whose coverage was excellent.

4.8 COUNTING
The Tanzania Elections Act (1985 S.70A) and the Local Authority (Elections) Act (1979 S. 70A) stipulate that the votes of presidential, National Assembly and local government elections are counted at every polling station at which they are cast, excepting when circumstances such as inadequate security do not allow:

The presiding officer of each polling station, assisted by the polling assistants, shall as soon as practicable after the closing of the poll proceed continuously with the counting of votes. Before votes are counted, the presiding officer/the polling assistant in the presence of counting agents or persons authorised to be in the counting room shall ascertain and record the number of all the persons who voted at the polling station; count and record all unused ballot papers and seal them in an envelope; and inspect each seal to ascertain whether or not they have been tampered with. (Elections Act (S.79A))
Where the EISA observers were present at the count, the presiding officer followed these procedures scrupulously. The team observed the counting at two stations, Mchangane Primary School in Kinondoni, and Kipawa Primary School ‘A’ in Ilala. At Mchangane, the counting process began once the polling centre closed at 16h00. At Kipawa, the counting was delayed until after 17h00, to allow voters who had been in the queue at the close of polling at 16h00 to cast their ballots. The team noted that the closing time, at 16h00, was generally sufficient to facilitate all those who wanted to vote, and that by beginning the count at 16h00, voting staff were able to gain the benefit of at least two hours of daylight, which greatly assisted in the transparency and speed of the counting.

The team was satisfied that the counting process was conducted in a manner that promoted transparency and accuracy during the count, and that the final results of the polling stations observed were consistent with the results posted outside the polling stations at the end of the count. The team noted that the voting staff appeared, for the most part, to have a clear understanding of the counting process, regulations and procedures specified by the NEC. The team noted the following during the counting process:

- There was good cooperation between electoral officials and party agents during the counting and verification process, and the security forces did not interfere in the counting process.

- In some instances, voting staff and party agents rejected ballots as spoilt for minor technicalities, despite the intention of the voter being clear as to their preferred candidates.

Overall, despite the poor light available, the counting was conducted with a transparency and efficiency that is a credit to the NEC and the people of Tanzania.
5.1. CONSOLIDATION AND TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS
After the votes have been counted and the final outcome of the ballot ascertained, the presiding officer has the authority to declare the results of the poll by reading aloud the certified votes recorded for the various candidates. Then the results are transmitted from the polling station to the returning officer at the constituency level. The returning officer is required to prepare and submit to the NEC a report of the partial results of the elections in the constituency. The commission, after verifying the election results from a constituency, declares the results of such constituency.

5.2. ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS
After receiving all the reports of the presidential vote counts from all the constituencies, the commission should immediately declare the candidate with the majority of votes to have been elected and the results should be sent for publication in the *Government Gazette*.

For the parliamentary elections, immediately after the result has been ascertained, the returning officer declares the candidate with the majority of votes to have been elected and the results in each constituency are published in the *Government Gazette*.

5.3. THE RESULTS
The NEC was able to announce the final results of the 2005 presidential, National Assembly and local government elections on time. The inauguration
of the president was also performed according to schedule. The CCM candidate and his political party secured a massive victory of 80.23% and 88.34% for the presidential and National Assembly elections respectively.

Compared to the previous general elections the opposition lost some ground, except for the strongest opposition party, the CUF, which gained two additional seats. The opposition does not represent a critical challenge to the ruling CCM at this point in Tanzania’s history. The final results of the election are contained in the table below.

### Table 6
Results of the Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President/Vice-President</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakaya Kikwete / Ali Mohammed Shein</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
<td>9 123 952</td>
<td>80.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Lipumba / Duni Juma Haji</td>
<td>Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
<td>1 327 125</td>
<td>11.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeman Mbowe / Anna Valerian Komu</td>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</td>
<td>668 756</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine Mrema / Rukia Omari Kiota</td>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)</td>
<td>84 901</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mvungi Sengondo / Naila Majid Jidawi</td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>55 819</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtikila Christopher / Said Soud Said</td>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>31 083</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makaidi Emmanuel / Kassim Ally</td>
<td>National League for Democracy (NLD)</td>
<td>21 574</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Claudia / Mchenga Yusuph Rashid</td>
<td>PPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>18 783</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Shayo / Suleiman Hussein Ali</td>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia Makini</td>
<td>17 070</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kyara / Haji Ramadhani Haji</td>
<td>Sauti ya Umma</td>
<td>16 414</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total valid votes 11 365 477 100
Spoilt ballots 510 450 4.30
Total votes 11 875 927 (72.3) *
Total registered voters 16 423 039

* Voter turnout as a percentage of the voters who actually voted against the total registered voters.

### Table 7
Results of the National Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>Const.</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)</td>
<td>7 579 897</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
<td>1 551 243</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)</td>
<td>888 133</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)</td>
<td>297 230</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Party (UDP)</td>
<td>155 887</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td>357 123</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total valid votes</td>
<td>10 829 513</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoilt ballots</td>
<td>608 837</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total votes</td>
<td>11 438 350</td>
<td>69.72*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total registered voters</td>
<td>16 407 318</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Voter turnout as a percentage of the voters who actually voted against the total registered voters.
Source: NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION 2005 ‘Parliamentary Election Results (Political Parties): 2005 General Election’
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the preceding sections, this report has provided a detailed account of the team’s observations regarding the critical areas of the conduct of the 2005 Tanzanian presidential, National Assembly and local government elections. It should be recalled that these observations are based on the guidelines enshrined in the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO), prepared by EISA and the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of SADC countries. In light of the death of the Chadema running mate, Mr Jumbe Rajab Jumbe, and the consequent postponement of the Tanzanian general elections, EISA was not able to field a full election observation mission to the country on election day. The observations regarding the voting process are thus limited to what the EISA technical team could observe. It is the conclusion of the EISA technical team that the 2005 Tanzanian presidential and National Assembly and local government electoral process was free of any technical deficiencies which might have significantly impacted on the legitimacy and credibility of the electoral process. Based on the technical team’s review, EISA would like to make recommendations in the areas where it felt that some improvements could be made:

- **Voters’ Roll**
  PEMMO proposes that eligible voters should be provided with a continuous and accessible voter registration facility. There should be sufficient time for eligible voters to register, for public inspection of
the voters’ roll, for objections and for the adjudication of appeals. The 2005 Tanzanian election complied with these conditions, but it was apparent that there were inaccuracies on the roll. EISA recommends that the continuous updating of the voters’ roll be persisted with and that it be supplemented with well timed registration campaigns to ensure that whatever defects it currently has can be corrected before the next election/by-election.

• **Voting stations**
  The displays of the rolls were not always optimal, for it was not always easy to see which voters’ roll in a voting centre belonged to which voting station. This was due to the shortage of space at the polling centres and can only be remedied by the use of boards acquired for display purposes. This may, however, prove to be prohibitively expensive and the benefits of reduced voter confusion weighed up against the costs involved.

• **Voter information and education**
  Despite the limited voter education conducted by the NEC and CSOs, the voters generally displayed a clear understanding of voting procedures. However:
  – Illiterate voters, especially the very old and very young, occasionally required assistance to vote. Future voter education programmes should thus be targeted at these groups.
  – Voters did not always check their names on the displayed rolls before voting and thus stood unnecessarily in queues for long periods before the error was discovered and they were redirected to the correct queues. Future information campaigns should thus emphasise the importance to voters of checking their names on the rolls before joining queues.

• **Access to Media**
  PEMMOM proposes that access to public media during an election period should be equitable and equal to the benefit of all contesting parties and candidates. While commending Tanzania for the progress made in this respect, the mission received reports that the system implemented did not ensure equitable access. Hence it recommends
that stakeholders be engaged in a process that will address these perceptions.

• **Funding of Political Parties**
Elections are an expensive political activity and thus claim a considerable chunk of the national budget and the meagre resources of political parties. It is for this reason that in a number of SADC countries, public funding of political parties has been legislated with a view to nurturing and sustaining multiparty democracy. Tanzania is one of the countries that, for financial reasons, does not provide public funding for political parties, but relies on funds from donors, distributed through a basket, to serve this purpose. EISA received reports that many parties exist not to compete for political power but to access funds allocated at election time for self enrichment. For this reason EISA recommends that the state enforce existing legislation governing party finances and that donor basket administrators set stricter conditions for the access to these funds, and stricter accountability for the way these funds are used.

• **The Electoral System: Inclusivity and Representation of Women**
PEMMO recommends that political parties contesting an election should be required to ensure equal gender representation and at least 30% of women candidates by 2005 in line with the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development.
  – Most first-past-the-post systems, such as the one in use in Tanzania, produce election outcomes less gender balanced than proportional representation systems. Tanzania is to be commended for its innovative way of increasing gender representation.
  – For the 2005 elections 75 seats were allocated for women under the quota system, and women in total are 97 (29.4%). Unfortunately Tanzania failed to reached the SADC 30% target. The mission therefore commends the effort but calls for further improvement in women’s representation by setting constituency quotas on parties and/or by tying party funding to greater gender balance.
## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1

Composition of the EISA Observer Mission and Technical Team

#### EISA Technical Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Zefanias Matsimbe</td>
<td>EISA (team coordinator)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Grant Masterson</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Themba Nkwinika</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Deane Stuart</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### EISA Observation Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bertin Mpunga</td>
<td>Electoral Commission</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bhekithemba Buthelezi</td>
<td>SACC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Boaventura Zita</td>
<td>FECIV</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Caroline Thole</td>
<td>NWLG</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Celestino Onesimo Setucula</td>
<td>Coiepa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Charles Tshibi Tshibi</td>
<td>Electoral Commission</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Daphne de Klerk</td>
<td>Nangof</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Deane Stuart</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Denis Kadima</td>
<td>EISA, Executive Director</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Dieudonne Nzuzu Phukuta</td>
<td>Renosec</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Ellen Kandororo</td>
<td>ZESN</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Engracia Francisco</td>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Ferdinand Kapanga</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jackie Kalley</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Leshele Thoahlane</td>
<td>Lesotho Electoral Commission – Chairperson</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Maureen Magwaza</td>
<td>Cango</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Mooneelall Ramphul</td>
<td>Macoss</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Moses Mkandawire</td>
<td>Church &amp; Society</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Onkemetse Tsimanyane</td>
<td>Besnet</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Serafim Melo</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Themba Nkwinika</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Usha Kala</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Zahira Seedat</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Zefanias Matsimbe</td>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2
Code of Conduct for EISA Regional Election Observers

Election observation is widely accepted around the world. It is conducted by intergovernmental and international, regional and national non-governmental organisations in order to provide an impartial and accurate characterisation of the nature of election processes. Much therefore depends on ensuring the integrity of election observation. All observers invited to be part of an EISA regional election observation team must subscribe to and follow this code of conduct.

Respect Sovereignty and International Human Rights
Elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the people of a country. Genuine elections are a human right, and they require the exercise of a number of other human rights and fundamental freedoms. Election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.

Respect the Laws of the Country and the Authority of Electoral Bodies
Observers must respect the laws of the host country and the authority of the bodies charged with administering the electoral process. Observers must follow any lawful instruction from the country’s governmental, security and electoral authorities. Observers must also maintain a respectful attitude towards electoral officials and national authorities. Observers must note if laws, regulations or the actions of state and/or electoral officials unduly burden or obstruct the exercise of election-related rights guaranteed by law, constitution or applicable international human rights instruments.

Respect the Integrity of the Election Observation Team
Observers must respect and protect the integrity of the election observation team. This includes following this code of conduct, any written instructions (such as terms of reference, directives and guidelines) and any verbal instructions from the observation team’s leadership. Observers must: attend all of the observation team’s required briefings, training and debriefings; become familiar with the election law, regulations and other relevant laws as directed by the observation team; and carefully adhere to the methodologies employed by the observation team. Observers must also report to the leadership of the observation team any conflicts of interest they may have and any improper behaviour they see conducted by other observers who are part of the team.
Maintain Strict Political Impartiality at All Times
Observers must maintain strict political impartiality at all times, including leisure time, in the host country. They must not express any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process. Observers also must not conduct any activity that could be perceived reasonably as favouring or providing partisan gain for any political competitor in the host country, such as wearing or displaying any partisan symbols, colours, banners or accepting anything of value from political competitors.

Do Not Obstruct Election Processes
Observers must not obstruct any element of the election process, including pre-election processes, voting, counting and tabulation of results and processes transpiring after the election day. Observers may bring irregularities, fraud or significant problems to the attention of election officials on the spot, unless this is prohibited by law, and must do so in a non-obstructive manner. Observers may ask questions of election officials, political party representatives and other observers inside polling stations and may answer questions about their own activities, as long as observers do not obstruct the election process. In answering questions observers should not seek to direct the election process. Observers may ask and answer questions of voters but may not ask them to tell them for whom or what party or referendum position they voted.

Provide Appropriate Identification
Observers must display identification provided by the election observation team, as well as identification required by national authorities, and must present it to electoral officials and other interested national authorities when requested.

Maintain Accuracy of Observations and Professionalism in Drawing Conclusions
Observers must ensure that all of their observations are accurate. Observations must be comprehensive, noting positive as well as negative factors, distinguishing between significant and insignificant factors and identifying patterns that could have an important impact on the integrity of the election process. Observers’ judgements must be based on the highest standards for
accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence. Observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not draw conclusions prematurely. Observers must also keep a well documented record of where they observed, the observations made and other relevant information as required by the election observation team and must turn in such documentation to the team.

**Refrain from Making Comments to the Public or the Media before the Team Speaks**
Observers must refrain from making any personal comments about their observations or conclusions to the news media or members of the public before the election observation team makes a statement. Observers may explain the nature of the observation team, its activities and other methods deemed appropriate by the observation team and should refer the media or other interested persons to those individuals designated by the observation team.

**Cooperate with Other Election Observers**
Observers must be aware of other election observation teams, both international and domestic, and cooperate with them as instructed by the leadership of the election observation team.

**Maintain Proper Personal Behaviour**
Observers must maintain proper personal behaviour and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host country cultures and customs, exercising sound judgement in personal interactions and observing the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

**Violations of this Code of Conduct**
In a case of concern about the violation of this code of conduct, the election observation team shall conduct an inquiry into the matter. If a serious violation is found to have occurred, the observer concerned may be expelled from the election observation team. The authority for such determinations rests solely with the leadership of the election observation team.
EISA OBSERVER MISSION REPORT

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APPENDIX 3
EISA Election Observer Mission Arrival Statement

ARRIVAL STATEMENT
EISA OBSERVER MISSION
PRESIDENTIAL, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS
TANZANIA, 15-16 OCTOBER 2005

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
EISA is pleased to announce the official launch of its Election Technical Team to the 2005 General Elections in Tanzania scheduled to take place on Sunday, 30 October 2005. The team is led by Mr Leshele Thoahlane, the Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho and Mr Denis Kadima, EISA’s Executive Director is the Deputy Team Leader. It is present in the country at the invitation extended by the NEC. This team will cover seven regions in the Mainland, namely Arusha, Bukoba, Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Mtwara, Mwanza and Tanga. A separate delegation has been deployed to Zanzibar.

The team consists of 24 members, including representatives from electoral commissions and civil society organisations (CSOs) from SADC countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The overall objective of the team is in line with EISA’s vision of promoting credible elections and democratic governance in Africa.
Specific objectives for this particular team include the following:

- To assess whether the conditions exist for the conduct of elections that express freely the will of the people of Tanzania;
- To assess and determine whether the elections are conducted in accordance with the electoral legislative framework of Tanzania;
- To determine whether the final results of the electoral process as a whole reflect the will of the people of Tanzania;
- To assess whether the elections meet the benchmarks set out in the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO), developed under the auspices of EISA and the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) of SADC countries.

As a reminder, PEMMO is the result of three years of work by ECF and EISA, in consultation with CSOs who work in the field of elections. Subsequently, the election principles which serve as benchmarks in the conduct and assessment of elections in the SADC region were adopted on 6 November 2003 in Johannesburg, South Africa. PEMMO has been applied for the assessment of most elections held since April 2004 to date in the SADC region.

On Wednesday, 26 October 2005, EISA will deploy teams throughout the Mainland, where they will meet electoral stakeholders, including electoral officials, representatives of political parties, CSOs, and the diplomatic community, ahead of the election day. The EISA team will remain in the country until Tuesday, 1 November 2005 in order to observe the voting and counting processes, as well as post-polling activities, including the announcement of results.

On Tuesday, 1 November 2005, all EISA teams will reconvene in Dar es Salaam where an interim statement expressing the team’s preliminary views and recommendations on the 2005 Presidential, National Assembly and Local Government Elections in Tanzania will be issued. Principles enshrined in the PEMMO will be the basis of the team’s assessment of the electoral process, and the electoral environment as a whole.
The team undertakes to cooperate closely with the Tanzanian electoral stakeholders and other observers, and strives to act, at every stage of the electoral process under scrutiny, with impartiality, objectivity and independence.

EISA is a regional, non-profit organisation established in 1996 and headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa, with field offices in Angola, Burundi, the DRC and Mozambique. The vision of the organisation is to promote credible elections and democratic governance throughout Africa. The vision is executed through the organisational team to strengthen electoral processes, good governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other targeted interventions. EISA services electoral commissions, political parties, civil society organisations, governments and other institutions operating in the democracy and governance fields in Africa.

The EISA team is based at Movenpick Royal Palm Hotel in Dar es Salaam where it has established a Secretariat on First Floor, Room 111.

For further information, please contact Ms Zahira Seedat, the EISA Team Coordinator, on +255 748 398 014.

Mr Leshele Thoahlane
Team Leader
APPENDIX 4

Schedule of briefing meetings

EISA ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO TANZANIA
PROGRAMME

PRESIDENTIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND
LOCAL COUNCILS ELECTIONS

OBSERVERS BRIEFING

Dar es Salaam

Monday 24th – Tuesday 25th October 2005

DAY ONE – Monday 24th October

SESSION 1  WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

08h30-08h45  Welcoming Remarks
Mr Leshele Thoahlane: Mission Leader, Chairperson of the Lesotho Electoral Commission

08h45-09h15  Introductions

SESSION 2  THE OBSERVATION PROCESS

Facilitator: Mr Leshele Thoahlane: Mission Leader, Chairperson of the Lesotho Electoral Commission

09h15-10h00  Mission Outline
This session will give a general overview of the Mission and the activities to be undertaken
Mr Denis Kadima - Deputy Mission Leader, Executive Director, EISA
10h00-10h30 EISA Mission Photograph - Coffee/Tea Break

SESSION 3 THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
Facilitator: Prof Rwekaza Mukandala

10h30-12h00 The Political Context of the Tanzanian Elections
Political history of Tanzania
The development of political parties
The role of civil society
The appointment and operation of the Election Management body
Panel Discussion – Wamuyu Gatheru, DFID and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, UNDP.

12h00-12h45 PRESS CONFERENCE
Presentation of Arrival Statement
Mission Leader

12h45-14h00 Lunch

SESSION 4 THE TANZANIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

14h00-15h00 • The system and the electoral politics
• The appointment and operation of the Election Management body;
• The electoral legislation
  By Honourable John Billy Mtendwa,
  Registrar of Political Parties.

SESSION 5 THE MEDIA AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

14h00-14h40 • Independence
• Impartiality
• Coverage of different political parties
  Phili Mtambilike – Media Council of Tanzania & Mr Gideon Shoo (MISA Media Monitoring project – Tanzania)
14h40-15h30 Readiness of the Tanzania Electoral Commission
Preparations thus far
Elections in figures
The essential regulations
Mr Rajab R Kiravu – Director of Elections

15h30-16h00 Discussions

SESSION 6 THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Facilitator: Mr Leshele Thoahlane

16h00-16h30 CCM
16h30-17h00 CUF
17h00-17h30 Chadema

DAY TWO – Tuesday 25th October

SESSION 7 THE PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTION MANAGEMENT,
MONITORING AND OBSERVATION IN THE SADC REGION (PEMMO)

08h30-10h30 Assessing the Election in Accordance with PEMMO
• Discussion of the PEMMO and how it will be used to
  assess the elections
• Key aspects of the Tanzanian election to be placed under
  PEMMO scrutiny
• Checklists
  Denis Kadima – Executive Director, EISA

10h30-11h00 Tea Break

SESSION 8 DEPLOYMENT PLAN
Facilitator: Mr Dennis Kadima

11h00-13h00 Deployment Plans and Logistical Packages
Ms Zahira Seedat
APPENDIX 5

List of International and Domestic Observer Groups

International Observer Groups

1. EISA
2. The African Union
3. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
4. The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF)
5. The European Union Delegation

Domestic Observers

Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (Temco)